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Introduction 
      “The pathways taken to office by political leaders  
      certainly affect the way in which they will govern.” 
          Prewitt (1970: 22) 
 
      “In the long run who gets into the legislature, perhaps 
      rising during a twenty- or thirty-year career into the 
       highest  offices of state, may have more important 
       repercussions for the future of the country than other 
      electoral choice.”   Norris (1997: 3) 
 
The processes of transition in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
about transformation of political elites and re-emergence of freely elected parliaments 
that have been and remain a cornerstone of representative democracy. Parliamentary 
representation, in spite of the egalitarian democratic idea behind it, turned out to be 
the main pathway into the political elite and confirmed the pattern of many 
established, long lived and stable democracies where recruitment from the parliament 
remains the most common route to the top.  
 Classical elite theories (Pareto and Mosca) and most recent studies on political 
elites (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Best and Cotta 2000; Best and Higley 2010) relate 
the change and stability of a political order to changes in the personnel of the formal 
institutions of government (circulation of elites). The competitive theory of 
democracy (Schumpeter 1979; Sartori 1987) sees political elites as a fundamental 
element of democratic regimes. 
 Pareto and Mosca emphasised the extent of circulation (how much of it matters?), 
most recently this line is being followed by Best and Cotta (2000). The study by 
Higley and Lengyel (2000) argues that what matters is not the extent of elite 
circulation, but its manner (the way elite is changing). The third group would 
emphasise neither extent nor manner, but frequency of circulation (Matland and 
Studlar 2004). 
 The literature divides elite circulation into a circulation of individuals and into a 
circulation of their social/political profiles (Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 1952; 
Keller 1991). Although a circulation of social/political profiles (structural circulation) 
always involves circulation of individuals (individual circulation), the opposite is not 
necessarily the case: individual circulation does not necessarily mean a structural 
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circulation. In other words, we may have totally different names (persons) in a 
parliament, but their social/political profiles would be the same ones as of persons 
who did not come back to a parliament.  
 The issue of circulation shaped the main discourse in research on the Eastern 
European elites after 1989. One group of scholars - Hankiss (1990) and Staniszkis 
(1991) - argued that old (communist) elites continued, the other - Eyal, Szelényi and 
Townsley (2000) – attempted to prove that a new elite came into power. However, 
this discussion on the Eastern European elites has been mostly limited to the 
individual circulation. The issues of structural circulation have been taken into 
account in the study by Eyal and Townsley (1995) and Best and Edinger (2003), but 
this is rather an exception of the common stream. 
 The question of circulation, among the questions of elite cohesion, attitudes and 
behavior, was considered in the most prominent study on the Baltic elites by Steen 
(1997), but it was rather limited to circulation of individuals. Individual circulation is 
a main concern of the article on Estonian elites by Steen and Ruus (2002) as well. 
Differently from them, the structural circulation is being investigated by Klāsons 
(2003), but it takes into account the 7th Latvian Saeima (from 1998 to 2002) only. 
Some elements of structural circulation analysis could be found in the article on the 
Lithuanian parliamentary elite 1990-2000 by Matonytė (2003), but cross-country 
dimensions are missing. 
 My own dissertation focuses on the recruitment and careers of the Baltic 
parliamentary representatives and argues that not only individual but also structural 
circulation takes place among the Baltic parliamentary elites after 1990. It provides 
evidence that we have not only new elite members but also a transformation of their 
social and political profiles. 
 The dissertation takes the social background of legislators (variables of 
occupation, education, gender, ethnicity and age) as an indicator of the structure of 
social power and views the political background of MPs (their political party family 
affiliation) as an indicator of political power. At the same time, variables of gender 
and ethnicity are employed for measurement of democratisation and the mean number 
of legislative elections and incumbency rates are used for measuring political 
professionalisation. By doing this, the presented work treats changes in parliamentary 




   
The dissertation, as the first comparative longitudinal study on the parliamentary 
elites from all three Baltic countries, contributes to the research into the Baltic elites 
by using original longitudinal data1 - it covers the social and political backgrounds of 
the Baltic parliamentary representatives in the period from 1990 to 2012. The cross-
Baltic comparison in an Eastern and Western European perspective and application of 
both structural and individual elite circulations are the steps making this area of 
research more comparative and systematic. 
 
 
1 The Estonian and Latvian data were collected and coded by myself. The Lithuanian dataset for the 
period from 1990 to 2008 was kindly provided by Prof. Irmina Matonytė, however, the variables of 
education, occupation and political experience were recoded by me in order to match the Latvian and 
Estonian data. 
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1. Parliamentary Recruitment and Theory of Elites 
 
1.1. The Recruitment Process 
Parliamentary recruitment is a part of political recruitment which is defined as “a 
process by which individuals are inducted into active political roles” (Marvick 1976: 
29). The process of parliamentary or legislative recruitment happens in the political 
party context which is affected by the general structure of opportunities. In this 
process individuals start with meeting legal requirements and end up with serving in 
parliament (see figure 1). The first step in the recruitment process is decision to run 
for a parliament or selecting yourself (Matland 2005: 94). This step involves 
motivation (personal ambition) and resources. In the second step – selection by the 
political party – individuals move from the pool of aspirants to the pool of candidates. 
At this stage the preferences and decisions of party gatekeepers (selectorate) are 
crucial. The third and final step is parliamentary election: here the voters (electorate) 
determine who will enter a new legislature. 
 
Motivation and Resources 
Motivational factors (the desire for prestige, power and material rewards) and 
resources (relevant qualifications and skills, ability to fund electoral campaign, social 
capital) are crucial in turning an eligible into an aspirant. Personal ambition is a 
precondition for any aspiring politician2, however, it is constrained by a political party 
context and legal, electoral and party system structures which any candidate must 
cope with. The current office (occupational position) of the eligible also belongs to 
structure of opportunities. 
 Schlesinger (1966: 9) argues that “the independent influence of ambition upon 
opportunity occurs early in a man’s career; as he moves on, both in office and in age, 
the possibilities modify his ambitions”. Schlesinger (1966: 10) distinguishes three 
types of ambitions: discrete, static and progressive. In our interpretation, the discrete 
ambition would mean that an aspirant wants to be elected a legislator for a limited 
time after which he or she would withdraw from the legislative office. The static 
ambition would refer to a parliamentary representative who wishes to remain in a 
parliament and make a long-standing career as a legislator. The progressive ambition 
2 According to Schlesinger (1966: 3-6), any theory of recruitment includes a theory of ambition. 
 7 
                                                 
  
   
would refer to the situation in which the aspirant seeks a higher or a more important 
office. Certainly, ambitions change over time. Someone, who has a discrete ambition  
 
 





























Source: Adapted and modified from Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 184). 
 
 
initially, may find a legislative activity so exciting that later develops static or 
progressive ambitions. 
 If we take the gender perspective, the structure of opportunities is also shaped by 
the cultural milieu and the level of socio-economic development. If running for 
parliament is conceived as not really appropriate activity for a woman, the probability 
is high that there will be less female aspirants than in the country with a pronounced 
egalitarian culture; and more female aspirants will come in the advanced industrial 
country than in the developing one (Matland 1998; Matland and Montgomery 2003: 
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21-23).  With regard to resources, female dispositions of time (due to tasks such as 
childraising, cooking and cleaning) and cultural capital (levels of education) are 
considered to be inferior in comparison with acquisitions of their male counterparts 
(Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007: 267). Women as elected officials tend to be 
older than men when they become active in politics, have no children, or have fewer 




Although the voters are those who make the final judgement about candidates through 
elections, the elitist approach assumes that the demand of selectors is the most 
important one: the selectors turn aspirants into candidates first and only then the 
voters have a say about the proposed candidates.  
 We assume that selectorates choose candidates upon meritocratic criteria 
(qualification, experience, etc), however, it is unlikely that all candidates are very well 
known to them. Therefore, perceptions of selectorates are affected by what Norris and 
Lovenduski (1995: 14) calls direct and imputed discrimination towards certain types 
of applicants. In the case of direct discrimination, candidates are being positively or 
negatively evaluated not so much on the individual but rather on the group 
characteristics. In the case of imputed discrimination, certain applicants, personally 
favoured by some selectors, may not be selected due to expectation that this candidate 
would lose votes among the electorate. Secondly, the selection (and discrimination) 
criteria may vary not only among the political parties but within the same party from 
election to election: if selectorate is more confident about control of a large part of 
electorate, electoral competitiveness of candidates will be of less importance than 
their expected loyalty, managing skills or ideological suitability (Best and Cotta 2000: 
12). Finally, candidates may be screened for qualities and capacities their current 
selectorates never had to possess (Marvick 1976: 37).  
 
Electorate 
Electorate has a final say on the list of candidates proposed by selectorate and it is 
very likely that the end consumer (voters) judge candidates on other information and 
criteria than those by selectorate. Information on candidates’ credibility, competence 
and influence is being inferred from educational, occupational and political 
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background of parliamentary candidates, however, the weight and importance of 
certain biographical details change with new demands of the electorate.    
 This work, relying on the fundamentals laid down by Norris and Lovenduski 
(1995), Norris (1997), Best and Cotta (2000), treats parliamentary recruitment as an 
outcome of interaction between the supply of aspirants and candidates and the 
demand of both the selectorate and electorate. The formal structure of opportunities is 
seen as a framework where interaction between supply and demand sides takes place. 
The legal acts on citizenship and voting rights, laws on the political party 
membership, regulations on remuneration of MPs and other practices would belong to 
this structure. These kinds of regulations and practices influence selectors and 
candidates and affect the supply and demand side of recruitment.  
 As mentioned above, motivational factors and resources determine the size and 
quality of aspirants’ and candidates’ pool. If the pool is large enough, the selectors 
cannot claim that they have not been able to select more ethnic minority and female 
candidates. On the demand side, the electorate and, especially, the selectorate shape a 
legislature to be elected.  
 The supply and demand model is seen in the light of a ‘new institutionalism 
research design’ which emphasises the role of formal institutions - the legal, electoral 
and party system rules – in selecting  parliamentary candidates.  
 Recruitment, a concept with its roots in the structural-functional school of 
sociological thought, needs to be placed in a wider (more general) theoretical 
framework connecting society and politics. One possible framework is offered by 
democratic elitism. It sees a parliament as an elitist foundation of democracy and, at 
the same time, allows to observe the election of parliamentary representatives as a 
process of political elite recruitment. The elitist perspective also allows to explain the 
change of political order by the transformation of political elites and enables to go 





   
1.2. Elite Circulation as a Link between Parliamentary Recruitment and 
Democratic Elitism 
  
1.2.1. Heritage of Modern Machiavellians  
Although theory of elites is almost always associated with the writings of Vilfredo 
Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, the modern thought on elites reaches the writings of 
Niccolò Machiavelli, a statesman and thinker of Italian Renaissance.3 The 
Machiavellian thesis on historical cycles and description of rulers as lions and foxes4 
found a profound impact on the theory of elite circulation by Pareto. ‘Political 
formula’ by Mosca5 as self-justification of elite rule has its origins in the teaching of 
manipulation techniques by Machiavelli. A scientific (value-free) Machiavellian 
manner to analyse political power was an innovative step in contemporary political 
theory6 and laid down fundamentals for the political sociology of elites. 
 The unavoidable division of society into elites and non-elites or into a small 
ruling (organised) minority and large unstructured masses was the main message of 
the elite theory that emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century7. Still, the elite 
theory sees the contest for political control not in the competition between elites and 
masses but between one elite and another.  
 In the sociology of Mosca, the society is divided into two political classes: a 
ruling class and the ruled (Mosca 1939: 50). The ruling class is divided into the 
highest stratum (very few persons at the top) and the second stratum, which is more 
numerous but nevertheless more important than the highest stratum: the stability of 
the political system mainly “depends on the level of morality, intelligence and activity 
3 James Burnham (1943: 82) was the first to assign the label “modern Machiavellians” to the classical 
elite theorists Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels. For the most recent analysis of the 
Machiavellian thought, see Donskis (2011). 
4 The ruler must act (at least appear) as both the lion and the fox: “because the lion is defenceless 
against traps and a fox is defenceless against wolves. Therefore one must be a fox in order to recognize 
traps, and a lion to frighten off wolves. Those who simply act like lions are stupid” (Machiavelli 1981: 
99). Lions personify force, Foxes are associated with fraud. Foxes are more common in political affairs 
than Lions: “men rise from a low to a great position by means rather of fraud than force” (Machiavelli 
1983: 310). 
5 Elites “do not justify their power solely by de facto possession of it, but try to find a moral and legal 
basis for it, representing it as a logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are 
generally recognized and accepted” (Mosca 1939: 70). 
6 The cost of this Machiavellian innovation was a widespread blame for divorcing politics from ethics 
and opening opportunities for legitimation of political immorality. 
7 We should mention the well known ‘iron law of oligarchy’ by Michels which reads that any organised 
society has its elite: “It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the 
electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says 
organization, says oligarchy” (Michels 1966: 365). 
 11 
                                                 
  
   
that this second stratum has attained” (Mosca 1939: 404); this second stratum “alone 
is capable of bridging the gap between the few and the many” (Meisel 1965: 6). 
Secondly, the deficiences in the second stratum cause much greater danger to the 
survival of the political system, since the repair of rather similar deficiences in the 
second stratum is more difficult in comparison with the tiny highest stratum (Mosca 
1939: 404-405).   
 The competition between one elite and another occur through the contest of 
mechanisms of power and elite recruitment. In the conception of Mosca (1939: 394-
395), the power flow is characterised by the opposing ‘autocratic’ and ‘liberal’ 
principles and sources for elite8 recruitment by the division into competing 
‘aristocratic’ and ‘democratic’ tendencies. The principles refer to the direction of 
power flow which is either “from above downward” (autocratic principle) or “from 
below upward” (liberal principle); the tendencies refer to sources for elite recruitment 
that are either lower classes (democratic tendency) or from within the elite 
(aristocratic tendency). Mosca allows for the fusion and balance of ‘principles’ and 
‘tendencies’. After cross-tabulating two principles with two tendencies, one receives 
four types of variation in power flow and elite recruitment: 
 
“At first glance it might seem that the predominance of what we call the “autocratic” principle should 
go with what we call the “aristocratic” tendency; and that the opposite principle which we call “liberal” 
should go with the tendency that we call “democratic”. Examining a number of types of political 
organizations, one might conclude that a certain affinity does exist between autocracy and aristocracy 
on the one hand, and between liberalism and democracy on the other. That, nevertheless, would be a 
rule that is subject to a great many expectations. It would be easy to find examples of autocracies that 
have not recognized the existence of classes on which birth conferred legal privileges. The Chinese 
empire, during long periods of its history, might be mentioned in that regard. It would be easier still to 
find examples of elective systems in which the electing group has been made up entirely of hereditary 
ruling classes. That was the case in Venice and in the Polish republic.” (Mosca 1939: 395-396)  
 
Thus, we have not only autocratic-aristocratic and liberal-democratic, but also 
autocratic-democratic and liberal-aristocratic types. Following this typology, the 
optimal form governance and elite recruitment would be a balance of principles and 
tendencies, “with enough democratic openness to refresh the ruling class and enough 
8 To be precise, Mosca uses the term ‘ruling class’, not ‘elite’. 
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of an aristocratic restrictiveness to ensure stability, a ‘liberal’ system of elective 
authority but an electorate confined to the middle class” (Parry 1980: 40).  
 The main criterion for elite recruitment, according to Mosca, is the ability to rule: 
 
“Add to it the will to rule and the conviction of possessing the right qualities – qualities which undergo 
continuos change as the conditions of each people in intellectual, moral, economic, as well as in 
military matters change continuously, with the result that each people’s political and administrative 
arrangements also need appropriate modifications. 
 These modifications may take place gradually, in which case the new elements who infiltrate the 
ruling class will not effect a radical change in its attitude and structure. If, on the contrary, the changes 
in the composition of the ruling class take place in a tumultuous and rapid fashion, the replacement of 
the old minority by the new elements may be almost completed in the course of one or two generations. 
In the first case, the prevailing influence is, as we called it elsewhere, the aristocratic tendency; in the 
second it is the one which we called the democratic.” (Mosca 1958: 388-389) 
 
 Pareto also divides the elite into two groups: the governing and the non-
governing (Pareto 1942: 1424). He terms the movement between the elite and non-
elite ‘the circulation of elites’ (Pareto 1942: 1426) the most precise description9 of 
which is the following: 
 
“Let A be the elite in power, B the social element seeking to drive it from power and to replace it, and 
C the rest of the population, comprising the incompetent, those lacking energy, character and 
intelligence… an army without commanders. They become important only if guided by the A or B. 
Very often – in fact almost always – it is the B who put themselves at the head of the C, the A reposing 
in a false security or despising the C. Moreover, it is the B who are best able to lure the C for the 
simple reason that, not having power, their inducements are long-dated. It sometimes happens, 
however, that the A endeavour to get the better of the B, seeking to content the C with apparent 
concessions. If the B gradually take the place of the A by slow infiltration, if the movement of social 
circulation is not interrupted, the C become deprived of the leaders capable of spurring them to revolt, 
and there ensues a period of prosperity. The A usually strive to resist this infiltration, but their 
resistance may be ineffective and amount in the end only to an inconsequent resentment. But if the 
resistance of the A is effective, the B can wrest the position from them only by open conflict, with the 
help of the C. If they succeed and get into power, a new challenging elite, D, will be formed and will 
play the same role vis-à-vis the B as the B played vis-à-vis the A, and so on.” (Pareto 1966: 134-135) 
9 Marie Kolabinska, one of Pareto’s students, distinguished three types of circulation in his theory: 
“First, there is the circulation which takes place between different categories of the governing élite 
itself. Secondly, there is the circulation between the élite and the rest of the population, which may take 
either two forms: (i) individuals from the lower strata may succeed in entering the existing élite, or (ii) 
individuals in the lower strata may form new élite groups which then engage in a struggle for power 
with the existing élite” (Bottomore 1993: 36). 
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Circulation of elites by Pareto needs to be seen in a wider context of his sociological 
thought. The theory of social action by Pareto lists six types of constant elements 
(they are called residues) that do not change or change very little over time10. Out of 
all of them, the residue of combination and the residue of group-persistencies 
(persistent aggregates) are the most important for change and replacement 
(circulation) of elites: 
 
“The first, called the residue of combination, corresponds to the progressive and inventive type – in 
business it is the speculator; in politics, the Machiavellian fox, who prefers cunning and appeasement 
to brute violence – whose methods are “humanitarian”, democratic, corrupt, and corrupting. The 
second, the residue of persistent aggregates, is Pareto’s term for the mentality of the herd, worshipping 
tradition, and fond of foreceful action.” (Meisel 1965: 9) 
 
The most optimal conditions for a well-functioning society, according to Pareto, are a 
relatively free circulation of elites and a balanced distribution of residues across social 
strata: predominance of residues of combination (‘foxes’) in the elite and prevalence 
of residues of group-persistences (‘lions’) in the non-elite with a condition that 
residues of group-persistences (‘lions’) are not excluded from the elite.  
 The main differencies between Mosca and Pareto are the quantitave superiority of 
the second stratum of the ruling class by Mosca in comparison with a qualitative 
superiority of the governing elite by Pareto11. Secondly, “Mosca’s conception of a 
closely knit and self-conscious organized minority is demonstrably too narrow to fit 
modern democracies; but Pareto’s network of ‘leading minorities’ is too broad to 
distinguish between them” (Finer 1966: 81).  
 The common thing between Mosca and Pareto is that they treat the contest for 
political control not as the competition between elites and masses but as a struggle 
between one elite and another. Another common thing is that the classic theory of 
elites12 is constructed not only as a counter-theory to Marxism but also as an 
10 The six types of residues are: (1) instinct for combination, (2) group-persistences (persistence of 
aggregates), (3) need of expressing sentiments by external acts, (4) residues connected with sociality, 
(5) integrity of the individual and his appurtenances, and (6) the sex residue (Pareto 1942: 516-519). 
11 One of the examples of the qualitative superiority of elite is the following statement: “Three or even 
four mediocre engineers cannot achieve the output of one capable and intelligent engineer” (Pareto 
1986: 76) 
12 James H. Meisel claims that one more common thing for classical elite theorists is their belief that 
elites function according to the law of “the three Cs: group cohesion, consciousness, conspiracy – the 
unity of being, thought, and purpose” (Meisel 1958: 16). 
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expression of scepticism toward the functioning of representative democracy. 
Therefore, elites and democracy are opposing and conflicting entities in the works of 
Pareto and Mosca; democratic representation and democratic governance are merely a 
fiction for them13.  
 
1.2.2. Democratic Elitism since Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter 
Elites and democracy were reconciled in the works of Max Weber and Joseph 
Schumpeter. Democratic elitism is, however, not only about reconciliation of 
democracy and elites, but also about replacement of cyclical understanding of history 
with a more linear mode of change. Secondly, a classic Paretian circulation of elites is 
disrupted by violent upheavals and revolutions, whereas modern representative 
democracy institutionalises competition of elites for power into the negotiated regular 
and peaceful parliamentary elections. Of course, democracies can fail and 
democratisations can experience set-backs (see Huntington 1993), however, Paretian 
(or even Aristotelian or Polibian) certainty in cyclical historical change of political 
regimes is abolished. One could certainly observe electoral cycles in contemporary 
representative democracies, but they happen within one type of regime; thus, their 
notion is different from the historical cycles of Pareto. 
 In the conception of Weber, a strong, democratically elected parliament was seen 
not only as a counter-balance to the powerful bureaucracy but also as the main 
training ground for political elites. Second, Weber regarded a strong parliament as a 
protector of civil rights and individual liberties “in face of power of the plebiscitary 
leader” (Beetham 1992: 114).   
 Schumpeter treated democracy as a method for selecting political leaders: “the 
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1979: 269). For Schumpeter parliamentary 
elections are merely a procedure by which political elites acquire the power.  
 Like Pareto, Schumpeter was an economist. This enabled him to draw paralels 
between economy and politics and allowed him to see politics as a market: “What 
businessmen do not understand is that exactly as they are dealing in oil so I am 
dealing in votes” (Schumpeter 1979: 285). Schumpeter was sceptical about the 
13 Geraint Parry argues that in his later years Mosca “was amongst the first to offer a mode of 
reconciling elites with democracy” (Parry 1980: 143). 
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capacity of voters to “pick their members of parliament from the eligible population 
with a perfectly open mind” (1979: 282) and considered party politicians as a mere 
“response to the fact that the electoral mass is incapable of action other than 
stampede” (1979: 283). 
 The poorly informed electorate, centrality of political leadership and competition 
between rival political elites were only some of the conditions of democratic elitism 
by Weber and Schumpeter. Among the other conditions were: domination of 
parliament by party politics, parliamentary government with strong executive, 
bureaucracy as an independent and well-trained administration and a political culture 
tolerating differences of opinion (Held 1987: 184). 
 The Schumpeterian version of democratic elitism, also termed the competitive 
theory of democracy (Sartori 1987), was continued by Sartori (1987: 156) who 
defined democracy as “the by-product of a competitive method of leadership 
recruitment”.  
 The evolution of democratic elitism owes much to the development of political 
science in the North America where the classic elite theory was transformed. Firstly, 
thanks to Harold D. Laswell, the analysis of elites was re-oriented from historical 
change to the political process (Seligman 1974: 300). Secondly, from being 
conservative (liberal anti-Marxist) in the continental Europe, elite theory turned into 
instrument of leftist criticism in the North America (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 
143). Radical elite theory, represented by James Burnham (1960; originally in 1941) 
and, especially, by C. Wright Mills (1956), Floyd Hunter (1953) and G. William 
Domhoff (1967), challenged the belief in the pluralistic structure of democratic elites. 
 Burnham in his “Managerial Revolution” argued that the ruling class of 
capitalists, former managers of their own enterprises, are being replaced by the rising 
professional managerial elite14. Mills with his “Power Elite” disclosed the exploitive 
institutional triumvirate of the highest position holders from the military, the big 
corporations and the political executive, unresponsive to the electorate and allocating 
only a secondary role to the US Congress. Hunter with his “Community Power 
Structure” revealed a similarly exploitive and unresponsive power elite on the 
regional level. The findings and analysis of the ‘governing class’ by Domhoff 
14 Raymond Aron criticised this thesis as inadequate because “the character of the society is entirely 
different if those managers come to power within a pluralistic society or if they do so through the 
seizure of power by a unified élite. The managers are one of the groups in any modern élite. They are 
never, as managers, the ruling group” (Aron 1950: 142). 
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confirmed to a large extent the thesis of power elite by Mills. Walker (1966) criticised 
democratic elitism for its normative shortcomings and inadequate guide to empirical 
research. The critique of democratic elitism by Bachrach (1969) proposed democracy 
not only as the political method but also as an ethical end with alterable elite-mass 
structure, equality of power and reliance upon broadening and enriching the 
democratic process. 
 Radical elite theory received a strong criticism from Robert A. Dahl (1958; 1966) 
and other pluralists, mainly for inadequacy of the ruling elite model, misleading 
measurement of political control and unity of elites, and inadequacy of elitist 
interpretations of American democracy both empirically and normatively. Radical 
elite theorists themselves believed that coexistence of elites and democracy is possible 
but with one condition - if conspiracy of elites, one of the three essential elements of 
“the three C’s law” by Meisel, is eradicated.  
 Neither radical elitists, nor pluralists managed to eradicate the tradition of 
democratic elitism. It was continued by Suzanne Keller (1991; originally in 1963) and 
revived by Field and Higley (1980)15. The most recent interpretations of democratic 
elitism are those by Higley and Burton (2006) and Best and Higley (2010). They 




15 As Best and Cotta (2000: 17) observe, “Incidentally, it is interesting to note that characteristics of 
political elites which were considered by authors like C.W. Mills (1956) to be incompatible with 
pluralist democracy were treated by Field and Higley as its cornerstones”. 
16 Higley and Lengyel (2000: 5) characterise the classic elite circulation as “gradual and peaceful in 
mode” and “wide and deep in scope”. For a more detailed description see chapter 2. 
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1.3. Changes in Social and Political Background of Legislators as an Indicator of 
Parliamentary Elite Transformation 
 
     “Individual turnover is clearly an important issue. . . . But  
     if incumbent and successor are basically similar, so that the  
     social composition of the elite remains constant, we hardly  
     want to speak of elite transformation.”   
         Putnam (1976:168) 
          
Although some scholars argued that elite circulation “has been used from Mosca on as 
a synonym for recruitment” (Zartman 1974: 487; Harasymiw 1984: 15), we should be 
aware that the classic elite theory by elite circulation meant not only recruitment but 
also elite transformation: “By the circulation of elites, the governing elite is in a state 
of continuous and slow transformation” (Pareto 1966: 250). In other words, the elite 
theory is interested not only who gets into power but also how one type of elites 
(lions, rentiers) is replaced by another type of elites (foxes, speculators). Therefore, 
elite circulation is also about elite transformation which implies changes in the form 
and stability of political order. This line of classical elite theory is followed in the 
most recent studies on political elites (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Best and Higley 
2010).  
 The literature divides elite circulation into a circulation of individuals and into a 
circulation of their social/political profiles, or what Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 
1952: 8) call ‘personal circulation’ and ‘social circulation’ and what Keller (1991: 
227-258) differentiates between ‘circulation of elite individuals’ and ‘circulation of 
elite positions’. Although a circulation of social/political profiles (structural 
circulation) always involves circulation of individuals (individual circulation), the 
opposite is not necessarily the case: individual circulation does not necessarily mean a 
structural circulation. In other words, due to a high legislative turnover we may have 
totally different names (persons) in a parliament, but their social/political profiles 
would be the same ones as of persons who did not come back to a parliament. 
 Inquiry into structural circulation of elites requires studying their social and 
political backgrounds and relies on a solid and established tradition of research into 
political elites (Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 1952; Matthews 1954; Eulau and 
Sprague 1964; Putnam 1976; Matthews 1984). 
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 Although an explanatory value of social background for elite behaviour and 
attitudes is rather mediocre (Edinger and Searing 1967; Searing 1969; Schleth 
1971)17, it serves “as a kind of seismometer for defecting shifts in the foundations of 
politics and policy” (Putnam 1976: 43). It also allows to make inferences about elite 
integration, stability of political system and political legitimacy. Moreover, social 
characteristics of elite members provide a solid ground for detecting patterns of 
parliamentary elite recruitment. The latter is not an aim in itself - it serves as an 
indicator of structural circulation of elites or, in other words, as an indicator of 
parliamentary elite transformation.  
 Parliamentary recruitment, as a process by which individuals are inducted into 
active legislative roles, is not identical with the political elite recruitment, however, a 
main pathway into the political elite goes through the parliament. Cabinet ministers, 
chairmen of the parties and heads of state may also be recruited from the media, 
bureaucracy or military, but recruitment from the parliament remains the most 
common route in most democracies (Norris 1997; Blondel 1987). Secondly, this work 
treats parliament both as (1) a picture of political power distribution and (2) a 
connection between social structure and the political elite. 
 The first perspective is close to the object of political science viewing parliament 
as an assembly of most powerful political parties divided into governing and opposing 
ones and spread along spectrum of different political ideologies. The second 
perspective is close to political sociology; it goes beyond institutions of political 
representation and searches for the social roots of the political. Certainly, the 
connection between the social structure and political elites is complex one and not a 
one way street. It is legitimate to see parliamentary representation as a translation of 
society into politics and view individual and collective features of parliamentary 
representatives as a reflection of society and its changing structure. However, 
parliamentary representatives shape the political form of society and, to some extent, 
society itself (Best and Cotta 2000: 7-8). In one case parliamentary recruitment is seen 
as a dependent variable, in another – as independent variable: 
 
17 Compared to highly developed societies, significance of social background for elite behaviour is 
greater in developing countries (Quandt 1970: 197-198). Putman suggests to look at the social 
background of elite members not so much as a predictor of individual behaviour but rather “as an 
indicator of the structure of social power” (Putnam 1976: 43). 
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“The elite recruitment pattern both reflects and affects the society. As a dependent variable, it expresses 
the value system of the society and its degree of consistency and contradictions, the degree and the type 
of representativeness of the system, the basis of social stratification and its articulation with the 
political system, and the structure of and changes in political roles. As a factor which affects change or 
as an idependent variable, elite recruitment patterns determine avenues for political participation and 
status influence the kind of policies that will be enacted, accelerate or retard changes, effect the 
distribution of status and prestige, and influence the stability of the system.” (Seligman 1964: 7) 
 
Focusing on the social background of legislators “as an indicator of the structure of 
social power” (Putnam 1976: 43) and treating political background of MPs as an 
indicator of political power, this work views changes in parliamentary representation 
as a proxy of structural circulation (transformation) of parliamentary elite. The latter 
can be defined in two ways; in a broad (institutional) sense, all members of parliament 
would belong to the parliamentary or legislative elite, similarly as ministers are 
considered the executive elite and judges treated as the judiciary elite. In a narrower 
sense, the parliamentary elite would be only those legislators who affect the national 
political outcomes regularly and substantially. The parliamentary elite in this narrow 
sense is a part of political elite, defined as “persons who are able, by virtue of their 
strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political 
outcomes and the workings of political institutions regularly and seriously” (Best and 
Higley 2010: 6).  
 
Schematically we can view the members of parliament with their individual and 




with its system  
of values, social 
stratification, 
economic structure 
and political form 
 Members of parliament  
with their features in 
social background (education, 
occupation, gender, ethnicity, 
age) and political background 
(party and party family, 
political experience) 
 Society  
with its system  
of values, social 
stratification, 
economic structure 
and political form 
 
The above scheme is expected to capture the process of political modernization, 
defined as “a shift of power from landed interests and rural leadership groups to urban 
elites and secondary or tertiary sector interests” (Best, Hausmann and Schmitt 2000: 
149) and as “increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society” 
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(Huntington 2006: 34).18 The proposed scheme is open for inclusion of both 
(contradictory) streams of political modernization: (1) democratisation as increased 
representation of women, ethnic minorities and other previously politically 
disadvantaged groups and (2) political professionalisation as a mechanism of social 
closure, accompanied by increase of degrees with university education, 
overrepresentation of certain types of occupations and establishment of parliamentary 
activity as a full-time paid occupation19.  
 Modernization means a rapid development20 and proliferation of various social 
groups and their their complex (also conflictual) relations. Parliament cannot include 
all of them and, if it somehow could, the numerical strength of those groups would be 
also different21. In spite of the universal suffrage and well established democracy, a 
parliament functions as an elitist mechanism, providing access for the strongest 
politically. Although historically “cumulative inequalites” give ways to “dispersed 
inequalities” (Dahl 1961: 85-86) and hereditary principles of recruitment have been 
replaced by meritocratic ones, ‘the law of increasing disproportion’ by Putnam (1976) 
remains an essential element of representative democracy. Still, the society or, to use 
the vocabulary of Mosca and Pareto, “social forces” make an impact on a parliament, 
therefore its members are being changed not only individually, but also structurally. 
 
18 Increased participation of various social groups in politics is only one of the three components of 
political modernization. The other two are the rationalisation of authority and the differentiation of 
structures (see Huntington 2006: 34). 
19 Best, Cotta and Verzichelli (2006: 91) propose to interprete the long-term change in parliamentary 
representation “as a process of retarded political development” and treat parliamentary recruitment “as 
a kind of brake, delaying political change and separating it from the dynamics of change in other 
sectors of society”. A similar approach is held by Putnam (1976: 179-180) who treats elite composition 
as “the lagged response” to changes in society. 
20 On the speed of the social change and modernization see Suda 1981. 
21 We focus on what Hanna Pitkin (1972) calls ‘descriptive representation’ or, to use the wording by 
Jane Mansbridge (1999), on the mode of representation when “blacks represent blacks and women 
represent women”. However, instead of choosing its ‘microscopic’ form (see Birch 1995: 72-73) 
implying that a parliament represents a microcosm or a representative sample of the electorate, we 
concentrate on what Mansbridge (1999) calls the ‘selective’ form of descriptive representation.   
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2. Elite Transformation in Eastern Europe after 1989: A Literature Review 
One of the first thorough analyses of the literature on the Eastern European elites has 
been the study by Best and Becker (1997). Since then a number of additional surveys 
on post-communist elites has been conducted and they were followed by literature 
reviews. Most recent ones are those by Bozóki (2003), Wesołowski (2000), Higley 
and Pakulski (2000).  
 A huge pile of the literature that emerged after 1989 focused on the negotiations, 
pact-making and pact breaking of elites, their attitudes and, of course, on the issue of 
renewal and reproduction of elites. Survival of the old (Communist) elites and 
recruitment of the new ones or the issue of reproduction and circulation of elites 
shaped the main discourse in research into Eastern European elites after 1989. One 
group of scholars - Hankiss (1990) and Staniszkis (1991) - argued that old 
(Communist) elites continued, the other - Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (2000) – 
attempted to prove that a new elite came into power. The empirical evidence suggests 
that the countries most advanced in the processes in democratisation and democratic 
consolidation were those that had relatively lower reproduction rates among political 
elites. In his study on Russia, Hungary and Poland, Wasilewski (1998) found 48.2 
percent continuity for the political elite in Russia, although the aggregate average for 
all three countries in his study was about one-third; he also found that significant 
proportions of the elite members had been “deputies” one step below the top 
nomenklatura in 1988: 49 percent in Russia, 37.4 percent in Hungary and 26 percent 
in Poland. The ratios of winners to losers (between those who were elites and 
subelites in 1988 and 1993 and elites and subelites of 1988 not in 1993 elite positions) 
were following: 90:10 in Russia, 19:10 in Poland and 21:10 in Hungary (Wasilewski 
1998: 166).22 The continuity of the old elites in the Czech Republic was 42 percent in 
politics, 40 percent in the economy and 33 percent in culture (Machonin and Tucek 
2000: 36-37). The Hungarian data provided evidence for elite circulation in politics 
and reproduction in economy (Szelényi, Szelényi and Kovách 1995). The Baltic data 
on elites showed a combination of continuity and change (Steen 1997b: 166): 46 
percent of Lithuanian Central Committee members of the Communist Party continued 
in politics and state administration, 54 percent of Estonian CC members of the CP 
22 Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski (1996: 146) argue that Wasilewski’s figures understate the continuity 
of Hungarian and Polish elites – the return of former communist leaders after parliamentary elections in 
Poland in 1993 and in Hungary in 1994 and after Polish presidential election in 1995 is not taken into 
account. 
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acquired positions in business (Steen 1997a: 43). Slovenia, an example of successful 
democratic consolidation, was a notorious exeption from the common trend; it 
demonstrated a spectacular reproduction of elites at a general rate of 77 percent: 66 
percent in politics, 78 percent in culture and 84 percent in business (Adam and 
Tomšič 2002: 440; also Iglič and Rus 2000: 103).  
 How these changes in recruitment patterns of elites could be explained? Which 
theories could account for them? A survey below reviews the main theories on elite 
change in Eastern Europe. 
 
2.1. Linking the Type of Elite, Regime and Circulation 
The three-fold typology of political elites (consensually united, ideocratically united, 
disunited) proposed for the analysis of processes in post-Communist Eastern Europe 
by Higley and Burton in 1997 was later expanded to a four-fold one and enriched with 
world-wide applications (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 3; Higley, Pakulski and 
Wesołowski 1998: 5). The four-fold typology supposes a link between a certain type 
of elite and a certain type of regime. For instance, the consensual elite relates to the 
consolidated democracy, the fragmented elite is linked with unconsolidated 
democracy and possibly a short-lived authoritarian regime; the divided elite is 
characterised by authoritarian or sultanistic regime, and the ideocratic elite is related 
to totalitarian or post-totalitarian regime. Since elites are treated as an independent 
variable and considered “the principal determinants of political orders” (Higley and 
Pakulski 2000: 39), the link could be described in the following way: the elite → 
political order.  
 In the scheme of Higley, certain type of elite and regime is related to a certain 
type of circulation (elite change). For example, the consensual elite and consolidated 
democracy correspond to classic circulation (“gradual and peaceful in mode and wide 
and deep in scope”). The fragmented elite and unconsolidated democracy are 
associated with reproduction circulation (“gradual and peaceful in mode but narrow 
and shallow in scope”), the ideocratic elite and totalitarian or post-totalitarian regimes 
are connected to replacement circulation (“wide and deep in scope but sudden and 
enforced in mode”). The divided elite and authoritarian or sultanistic regimes are 
linked to quasi-replacement circulation which is “sudden and enforced in mode and 
narrow and shallow in scope” (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 7). Following this typology, 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are classified as having classic circulations, 
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Russia, Slovakia and Bulgaria as having reproduction circulations, Serbia and Croatia 
are characterised by quasi-replacement circulations (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 13-
14). Classified as divided (Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski 1996: 142-143), the elites of 
Romania, Ukraine and Belarus would refer to the cases of quasi-replacement 
circulation. 
 Since consolidated democracy is an aim and since it is determined by elites, the 
valid question becomes how to make the consensual elites. One of the ways, discussed 
by Higley and his collaborators, is an elite settlement, characterised by quick face-to-
face negotiations, formal agreements, informal forbearance and experienced leaders 
(Burton and Higley 1987: 299-300). However, elite settlements are exceptional and 
rare events. For instance, elite settlements in Poland and Hungary in 1989 are two23 
out of only twelve cases in the world history during the last 300 years.24 Hence, 
Higley and Burton describes two other ways in which consensual elites and stable 
democracy emerge: (1) gradual convergence “toward restrained competitions and 
agreed institutions through successive electoral contests in unstable democracies” and 
(2) “the long experience of limited representative political practices under British 
colonial rule, augmented by unifying elite mobilizations to win national 
independence”(Higley and Burton 1998: 99).25 Consensual elites and consolidated 
democracy can emerge from unstable (unconsolidated) democracy, traditional, 
authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes. What is excluded in the scheme of Higley 
is the emergence of consensual elites and consolidated democracy from totalitarian 
regimes26 (Dogan and Higley 1998: 22). 
 
Critique. Elites are treated as an independent variable, they are ontologically self-
sufficient. Higley allows one case where political crisis makes an impact on elite 
change (Dogan and Higley 1998: 23), but in other cases they are “principal causes” 
and “prime shapers” (Higley and Pakulski 2000: 40). This causal primacy of elites 
was criticised by Tarrow (1995: 205). Merkel (1997: 14) criticises Higley and 
23 The case of Czechoslovakia in November-December 1989 could be considered an elite settlement 
with reservations only. 
24  The other ten countries are: England 1688-89, Sweden 1808-09, Mexico 1928-29, Costa Rica 1948, 
Colombia 1957-58, Venezuela 1958, Spain 1977-78, Uruguay 1984, Korea 1987, South Africa 1992-93 
(Burton and Higley 1998: 50-51). 
25 According to Higley and Burton, the first elite settlement occurred in England in 1688-89 and was 
diffused overseas during eighteen and nineteenth centuries. 
26 This scheme does not list a possibility of turning a stable (consolidated) democracy into unstable 
democracy and authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. 
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collaborators for “overestimating the role of elites in the mobilisation of anti-regime 
protests and underestimating the readiness of the mobilised mass movements for 
compromise and action”. The analytical scheme of Higley receives a critique from 
Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch (1997: 64-65) not only for ignoring the level of masses 
but also for fading out the institutional level and isolating elites from societal and 
political-cultural processes. 
 Finally, in the scheme of Higley, only classic circulation relates to the consensual 
elites and consolidated democracy. This can be challenged by the case of Slovenia 
where after 1989 consensual elites and consolidated democracy emerged together 
with a very clear reproduction circulation (see Adam and Tomšič 2002: 440).  
 
2.2. Professionalisation of Parliamentary Elites 
The main focus of the parliamentary elites project by Best and Cotta (2000) and Cotta 
and Best (2007) has been recruitment and professionalisation of Western European 
parliamentary representatives. After collecting the data reaching back to the 19th 
century and developing a typology of MPs, the project has been “expanded to the 
East” and has already resulted into the study of the Eastern European parliamentary 
representatives (see Best and Edinger 2003). As in the study of 2000, 
professionalisation of political elites is treated as a necessary condition for 
consolidated democracy. Differently from other occupations, a professional politician 
is being taught and trained not in a university, but in the parliament. Therefore, terms 
served in the parliament (not diploma in politics) and full time activity in politics 
(living off politics, to use a phrase of Max Weber) count as professionalisation. 
According to the project results, the rising trends of political professionalisation were 
observed for all the countries under investigation: Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Recently, the project has been 
expanded and includes eleven countries from Central and Eastern Europe (see 
Semenova, Edinger and Best 2013).  
 The political professionalisation thesis for the Czech Republic and Poland was 
confirmed also by scholars (Shabad and Slomcynski 2002) that are not associated 
with this project. However, this positive trend goes together with a very high turnover 
of Eastern European MPs (much higher than of their Western European counterparts); 
this can be interpreted as a possibility to attain elite status for a larger number of 
persons, but it also means a smaller number of professional politicians in a parliament. 
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It may even be that slow and not sufficient professionalisation of legislators in Eastern 
Europe provides Western democracies with an image of their own future, including 
insight into the consequences of political career insecurity (Best 2007b: 30-31). 
 
 
2.3. Different Elites for Each Phase of Social and Political Change 
Wasilewski’s three types of elites correspond to the different phases of social and 
political change in East Central Europe (Wasilewski 2001: 133-142). He claims that 
certain periods require certain types of elites. For instance, transition, “as a relatively 
brief period between two regimes, during which new rules of the political game are 
established”, requires the elite of transition (it is the elite of mission and vision). 
Transformation, defined as a period between transition and consolidation, requires the 
elite of transformation (it engineers the new order). Consolidation requires the elite of 
consolidation (it integrates and habituates the new order).  
 Transition, or period of “symbolic politics”, is a time of leaders of mass 
democratic movements, dissidents, party reformers, visionaries, popular tribunes, 
devoted designers. Transformation, or period of “reform politics”, is a time of policy-
makers, planners and technologists of democracy and market economy. 
Consolidation, or a period of “distributive politics”, is a time of professional 
politicians, moderators, growth-inducers (Wasilewski 2001: 137). 
 
Critique. Differently from Higley, emphasising the crucial role of elites in the 
beginning (the first stage) of transition27, and differently from Rustow (1970), 
highlighting the importance of elites in the second (“decision”) phase of 
democratisation28, the scheme of Wasilewski assigns an equally important role to 
elites in three different stages of social and political change. To some extent it could 
be compared with the model of Merkel (1997) treating elites as the most important 
actors in three of four levels of democratic consolidation29. On the other hand, the 
scheme of Wasilewski could be put into a more longitudinal perspective – the study 
27 At this stage the crucial role is assigned to what Higley and Burton (1998, 2006) call “elite 
settlements”. 
28 In the analysis of Rustow (1970: 356), the elite plays a crucial role in “the decision phase” of 
democratic transition which comes after “the background and preparatory conditions” are fulfiled.  
29 The first three levels, involving elites, are: institutional consolidation, representative consolidation 
and behavioural consolidation. The fourth (last) level – consolidation of civic culture – is assigned to 
the masses (see Merkel 1997: 23). 
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on the European parliamentary elites by Best (2007a: 85) explaining the emergence of 
different types of  elites by the “selectorates’ responses to a sequence of fundamental 
problems challenging polities” could be a good example of this.   
 On the empirical level, Wasilewski accepts that his theoretical construct of the 
distinctiveness of three elites has a weak empirical ground in the Polish case: there are 
no major differences in sociological terms between the elite of transformation and 
elite of consolidation. Therefore, the analysis should be better focused on the 
transition elite and the post-transition elite, or on the first generation of elites and the 
second generation of elites, as another study by Frentzel-Zagórska and Wasilewski 
(2000) suggests. 
 
2.4. Theory of Elite Control and the Elite Network State 
The study by Steen (1997a) claims that configurations, interaction and orientation of 
the elites in the Baltics can be explained by a theory of elite control. Ethnic 
proportions, social cleavages and cultural traits are main causes for the elites to 
control the political development by selective recruitment to power positions forming 
specific networks and choosing policies favourable for elite control (Steen 1997a: 
345). The ‘elite network state’ is especially emphasised in creating ‘ethnic 
democracies’ in Estonia and Latvia and explaining the nationalist and ethnocratic 
positions of their elites.  In the case of Lithuania, rather authoritarian attitudes among 
elites allow the author to interpret this as the elite network state. 
 Ethnic structures are the most import ones comparing attitudes and behaviour of 
the Baltic political elites (or Estonia and Latvia, on the one hand, and Lithuania, on 
the other). Due to importance of ethnicity in Latvia and Estonia, the political attitudes 
towards communist past does not matter as much as in Lithuania. According to the 
author, a more tense ethnic situation in Latvia and Estonia results in a more integrated 
and consensual elite there. The Lithuanian elite is characterised as a more polarised 
and conflictual, having more distrust in other elites and fewer inter-elite contacts 
(Steen 1997a: 353).  
 
Critique. Importance of the Latvian club ‘21’ for the integration of the national elite is 
rather overestimated (see Matonytė 2001). Indeed, the Latvian club ‘21’ was unique 
in the Baltics (nothing similar had emerged in Estonia and Lithuania after 1990), it 
involved not only ethnic Latvians but also the representatives of ethnic minorities; it 
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included not only former Soviet nomenklatura but also emigré Latvians from western 
Diaspora. However, its impact on ethnic integration at the elite level for the years to 
come was almost non-existant: for the last twenty years none of the parliamentary 
political parties having most ethnic minorities and sometimes almost one-third of all 
parliamentary seats managed to enter the Latvian governing coalitions and their 
cabinets of ministers.  
 
2.5. Political Capitalism, Conversion of Power and the “Grand Coalition” 
“Political capitalism” of Staniszkis (1991) refers to Eastern European capitalism after 
1989 designed by political means for the needs and interests of the resigning 
communist political elite. Although political capitalism with its six possible forms of 
combining power and capital (Staniszkis 1991: 42-45) has advantages – nomenklatura 
did not oppose the change of the system due to its interests in privatisation, there are 
also disadvantages. One of them is a compromising nature of the state sector 
privatisation from the viewpoint of society. 
 Thesis of Hankiss (1990) is similar to that of Staniszkis. Ruling elites are never 
ready to resign from power.30 If they do that voluntarily, there must be special 
conditions that attract and motivate them. Privatisation is one of them since it saves 
political power by converting it into another field (economy). Winners of  this social 
and political change would merge into the “grand coalition” consisting of the former 
communist oligarchy, upper and upper-middle layers of state bureaucracy, and classes 
of managers (from big state companies and agricultural co-operatives) and 
entrepreneurs (Hankiss 1990: 240). 
 
Critique. Eyal, Szelény and Townsley (2000: 4-5) find little evidence in support of the 
political capital thesis in Central Europe. There were a couple of successful political 
capital conversions into private wealth in the countries of Central Europe, but this is 
more an exception rather than a common rule. Eyal, Szelény and Townsley claim that, 
differently from Central Europe, a thesis of political capitalism would explain the 
social and political change much better in Russia and China. 
 
 
30 There are a couple of historical exceptions, but they only confirm the common rule (Hankiss 1990: 
253). 
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2.6. Post-Communist Managerialism and the Dominance of Cultural Capital 
Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1997) explain the changes in East Central Europe 
(defined as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) by their theory of post-
communist managerialism31. Post-communist managerialism is characterised by 
diffuse ownership with no identifiable owner and a legitimate decision-making power 
which is appropriated by managers (Eyal et al. 1997: 70). They claim that the power 
elite, constituted by the coalition of class fractions and elites, currently controls the 
command positions of political, cultural and economic institutions in East Central 
Europe (Eyal et al. 1997: 61).  The authors reject the thesis of conversion of political 
capital into economic capital (this was claimed by Hankiss and Staniszkis) on the 
basis that a new system does not have ... clear property owners. The post-communist 
society is run by managers, who are not owners and who have already been managers 
in economic positions during communism. The clear owners are missing, only 
managers are identifiable. Therefore, it is called ‘capitalism without capitalists’ or 
‘capitalism from above’. This new power elite consists of the technocratic-managerial 
elite and intellectual elite from humanities and social sciences, and, according to the 
authors, “resembles most closely what Bourdieu has called ‘the dominated fraction of 
the dominant class’ in Western capitalism: it exercises power principally on the basis 
of knowledge, expertise and the capacity to manipulate symbols, in short, ‘cultural 
capital’” (Eyal et al. 1997: 61). Cultural capital in post-communism is dominant, 
social capital is dominated, and economic capital is a subordinate one32 (Eyal, 
Szelényi and Townsley 2000: 191). The new power elite in East Central Europe 
exercises “power  as symbolic domination and legitimate their claims on the basis of 
technical know-how rather than ownership of economic capital” (Eyal et al. 1997: 
91). However, as authors conclude, it is not clear if post-communist managerialism 
will dominate societies of East Central Europe in the future. If propertied bourgeoisie 
is not formed, post-communist managerialism may consolidate itself as a new form of 
a unique managerial capitalism.  
31 The roots of this theory are in the “Managerial Revolution” by James Burnham (1960; originally in 
1941), who was influenced by “The Bureaucratization of the World” by Bruno Rizzi (1985; originally 
in 1939), in “The New Class” by Milovan Djilas (1957) and “Nomenklatura” by Mikhail Voslensky 
(1984). 
32 This is a case with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The USA, England and France are the 
countries where economic capital is a dominant one, cultural capital is dominated and social capital is 
subordinate. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are characterised by the dominance of economic capital, a 
dominated social capital and a subordinate cultural capital. 
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Critique. The boundaries between classes and elites are not clearly defined. The 
analytical distinction between big capital owners and managers is overestimated. 
Inconsistencies between the statement “the incumbents of economic command 
positions are those who were already in managerial positions prior to the fall of 
communism” (Eyal et al. 1997: 61) and the statement “many old-style communist 
managers indeed lost power in 1989 and the years that followed” (Eyal et al. 1997: 
91). If we take the former statement as a correct one and consider owners and 
managers constituting the same class, the Staniszkis and Hankiss theses of political 
capitalism and power conversion would be confirmed. This would mean a 
reproduction of communist nomenklatura in the economy.  
 Bozóki (2003: 235) argues that thesis of nomenklatura reproduction in economy 
has been proved correct. Wasilewski’s data confirm the conversion of political capital 
into economic assets, particularly, as he writes, in Hungary and Poland (Wasilewski 
1998: 165)! This supports the main theses of Hankiss and Staniszkis, formulated in 
1990 and 1991. 
 
2.7. Other Studies 
Other studies worth mentioning are those by Szalai (1995 and 1996) and Kaminski 
and Kurczewska (1995). The former is rather similar to the studies of Hankiss and 
Staniszkis; it argues that “the political transition was initiated partly by groups who 
hoped to retain their positions in the new political regime, or at least to convert their 
political power into economic power” (Szalai 1996: 120). These elite groups, 
consisting of (1) new technocrats or the late Kádár technocrats, (2) the democratic 
opposition and (3) the new reformist intellectuals, formed the latent alliance which 
was dissolved during the regime change (Szalai 1995: 159-161). The first group 
members (new technocrats) “became managers with private banks operating with 
international capital, thus creating new economic power centers” (Szalai 1995: 162).  
 The study on elites as institution-builders by Kaminski and Kurczewska (1995) 
attributes quality of democratic transition to the availability of certain types of elites. 
Building upon the authority typology of Max Weber, authors distinguish among four 
types of elites: traditional, charismatic, bureaucratic-collectivist and interactionist-
individualist ones (Kaminski and Kurczewska 1995: 143-145). The most advanced 
transitions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and, especially, Poland are explained by 
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Table 2.1. The Main Studies on Elite Transformation in Eastern Europe 
Types of Elites 
 
Authors 
Politicians of morals, politicians of historical vision, 
politicians by chance, the old nomenklatura, an 
emerging new professional political elite  
 
Ágh (1996) 
Political elites Baylis (1994 and 1998)  





Best and Edinger (2003)  
Best (2007)  
Ilonszki and Edinger (2007) 




Best and Hornbostel (2003) 
Professionals, missionaries, hesitants and retreatists 
 
Bozóki (2003) 
The power elite of professionals, the technical 
intelligentsia and owners of cultural capital  
 
Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1997) 
“Grand coalition” of the former communist oligarchy, 
upper and upper-middle layers of state bureaucracy, 
and classes of managers and entrepreneurs  
 
Hankiss (1990) 
Consensual, ideocratic, fragmented, divided 
 
Higley and Lengyel (2000) 
Traditional, charismatic, bureaucratic-collectivist, 
interactionist-individualist elites 
 
Kaminski and Kurczewska (1995) 
Post-communist political elites 
 
Krupavičius (1996) 
Government, parliament, party elite, top leadership, 
regional elite, business elite 
 
Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996) 
Nomenklatura and political elite 
 
Lane (1997)  




Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski (1998) 
Matonytė (2003a) 
 
Parliamentary, administrative, business, party, 
intellectual, judicial, local elites 
 
Steen (1997a) 
New technocrats, democratic opposition and new 
reform intelligentsia 
 
Szalai (1995 and 1996) 
Elites of transition, transformation and consolidation  
 
Wasilewski (2001) 
 “A paid job” politician, “politician with a calling”  
and a charismatic leader  
Wesołowski (2000) 
Source: Own selection. 
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the strongest presence of interactionist-individualist elites in those countries in 
comparison with other states of Eastern Europe.     
 Other studies on Eastern European elites not reviewed but worth mentioning here 
are included in the table 2.1. 
 
 
2.8. Summary: Issues of Elite/Class and Circulation/Reproduction 
Theories by Hankiss, Staniszkis, Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley have lots of things in 
common: they all are influenced by Bourdieu theory of cultural, social and economic 
capitals (1986) and they are focused more on the classes than elites, or, in other 
words, their authors are interested more in socio-economic development than political 
structure of institutions. It seems that a uniting pattern in their theories is the 
astonishment that a socialist revolution happened in Eastern Europe (Russia) in 1917 
without a proletariat and that after 1989 capitalism is emerging there in absence of 
capitalists. 
 The studies by Higley, Burton, Pakulski, Lengyel, Dogan, Best, Wasilewski and 
Steen share their interest in elites in the context of structure and change of political 
institutions. This group of researchers, differently from the first one, uses mainly a 
concept of elite, not a class. Of course, “using the elite concept is not the same as 
adopting the elite paradigm” (Higley and Pakulski 2000: 38),  but theories of the 
scholars from the second group seem to be closer to the elite paradigm than the 
studies of the theorists from the first group.  Alternatively, usage of  the class term 
and ignoring the concept of elite do not preclude the possibility to adopt the elite 
paradigm – Gaetano Mosca used a concept of the ruling class (Mosca 1939) and did 
not refer to the elite term.33  
 Hence, clearly defined political or ruling class is not a problem for the elite 
theory. The analyses by von Beyme (1996) and Etzioni-Halevy (1998) serve as a 
positive example of using “elite” and “class”; the terms are clearly defined and not 
used interchangeably. The problem, however, occurs when both the social class and 
political elite concepts, or both Marxist and elite theories are combined. The elite and 
Marxist theories are rooted into different paradigms (meta-theories).34  Paradigms are 
33 The only time he mentions elite is in his final version of the theory of the ruling class, but only as a 
reference to the term of Pareto (Mosca 1958: 382). 
34 Paradigms are conceptual world-views that consist of formal theories, classic experiments and 
trusted methods (Kuhn 1996). 
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self-contained and, differently from theories, are not subject to empirical testing: it is 
possible to test a number of alternative approaches, but it is not possible to test the 
paradigms (Kuhn 1996: 144). Paradigms “do not provide explanations, only 
instructions as to where to go for explanations” (Janos 1986: 1). From this 
perspective, “the elite paradigm denies that there can be a politically meaningful 
social class without an elite shaping and leading it; the class paradigm regards elites 
as epiphenomena rather than social class cores. Theories that have their roots in two 
or more such opposing paradigms will confuse more than illuminate” (Higley and 
Pakulski 2000: 39).  
 This critical remark would first apply to the studies by Hankiss (1990), Eyal, 
Szelényi and Townsley (1997, 2000) that seem to define “elite” and “class” in a rather 
loose manner and use these concepts almost interchangeably and, indirectly, to 
Bourdieu. On the other hand, out of all the theories on Eastern European elites 
discussed and mentioned here, only the studies of Higley would probably satisfy the 
criteria of the purity of the elite paradigm (one of the instructions formulated by 
Higley and Pakulski is that “elites are the principal determinants of political orders”). 
An absolute majority of scholars currently working on elites follow, to use the terms 
of Wesołowski (2000: 18), neither elitaristic nor elitist, but the neutral approach. 
 The second evident issue in the reviewed works is the one of circulation and 
reproduction of elites – the concepts are differently defined by the researchers 
studying the Eastern European elites. For instance, Szelényi and Szelényi (1995) 
define circulation and reproduction as alternative forms of social and political change. 
For them, circulation means that “the transition to postcommunism resulted in a 
structural change at the top of the class hierarchy: new people are recruited for 
command positions on the basis of new principles”. The reproduction means that 
“revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe did not affect the social composition of 
elites. This because the old nomenklatura elite has managed to survive at the top of 
the class structure and is now becoming the new propertied bourgeoisie” (Szelényi 
and Szelényi 1995: 616). 
 Differently from Szelényi, for whom circulation and reproduction are alternative 
forms of elite change, Higley and Lengyel use a term “reproduction circulation”. For 
them, reproduction circulation, as well as classic circulation, replacement circulation 
and quasi-replacement circulation, means the mode (gradual and peaceful or sudden 
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and coerced) and the scope (wide and deep or narrow and shallow) of elite change 
(Higley and Lengyel 2000: 5). 
 Wesołowski (2000) argues that Szelényi’s concept of circulation is too broad, it 
does not differentiate between termination of employment due to age and a politically 
motivated expulsion from one’s job. He attacks the concept of reproduction in elite 
studies of Szelényi (“reproduction is an intergenerational, not an intragenerational 
phenomenon; it refers to changes of positions between generations: father to son, 
mother to daughter”). However, his proposals to use (1) retention, (2) formal transfer 
to equivalent position, and (3) reincarnation through conversion of resources 
(Wesołowski 2000: 30-32) do not seem to be convincing conceptual alternatives. 
 
2.9. Literature on the Recruitment and Transformation of Elites in the Baltics 
The literature review on elite transformation in Eastern Europe provided a glimpse 
into a general context of elite theorising, however, it could not include a 
comprehensive inventory of the studies on the Baltic elites. The table below lists both 
one country and comparative studies on the Baltic elites. We would like to 
concentrate our further review on the comparative studies focusing on the recruitment 
and transformation of national elites in all three countries.  
 The largest body of literature on the Baltic elites belongs to Anton Steen, Vello 
Pettai and Irmina Matonytė. Our list also includes the book on the Baltic elites by 
Sten Berglund and Kjetil Duvold, a discussion paper on the Baltic political elites by 
Algis Krupavičius and a doctoral dissertation on the Soviet nomenklatura in the 
Baltics from 1953 to 1990 by Kastytis Antanaitis. 
 Matonytė locates research tradition on elites in the Baltics as belonging neither to, 
what she calls, the Warsaw-Budapest nor Moscow zone, but to the third separate Grey 
zone. In the text co-authored with Georges Mink, she outlines not only the specificity 
of Baltic nomenklatura within the Soviet and Eastern European context, but also 
explains its survival and success in the new post-Soviet regime.  
 The research by Pettai focuses on behaviour of Baltic legislators, legislative 
performance of the Baltic parliaments (co-authored with Madise) and parliamentary 
candidates as the political class. His analysis on the political class consolidation 
proposes tripartite set of parameters (political experience, political cohesion and social 




   
Table 2.2. Research on Elites in the Baltic States 
Countries 
Covered 
Focus of Research Author(s) 
Estonia Political Parties Arter 1996 
 Parliamentary Elites Kuklys 2013b 
 Political Leadership Park 1994 
 Ethnic Control and Elites Pettai and Hallik 2002 
 Parliamentary Elites Ruus and Taru 2003 
 Continuity of Elites Steen and Ruus 2002 
 Parliamentary and Ministerial Elites Toomla 1999 
   
Latvia Political Parties Ikstens 2011 
 The 1990 Supreme Council Jundzis 2000 
 Political Elite Recruitment Klāsons 2001 
 Parliamentary Elites Kuklys 2013a 
 Soviet Elite Levits 1987 
 Political Elite Steen 2011 
 Ministers  Treijs 1998 
   
Lithuania Legal Consciousness of Power Elites Babachinaitė et al. 1998 
 Political Elite Gaidys 1999 
 Soviet Nomenklatura Grybkauskas 2011; Ivanauskas 2011 
 Political Elites Janušauskienė 2011 
 Political Elite Recruitment Krupavičius and Žvaliauskas 2003 
 Economic Values and Political 
Orientations of Elites 
Masiulis 1997 
 Business Elite Matonytė 2001 
 Parliamentary Elite Matonytė 2003b 
   
Baltic States Soviet Nomenklatura Antanaitis 2001 
 Local Elites Åström 2007 
 Elites Berglund and Duvold 2003 
 Post-Communist Political Elites Krupavičius 1996 
 Elite Studies and Communism Matonytė 2003a 
 Communist and Post-Communist Elites Matonytė and Mink 2003 
 Behaviour of Legislators Pettai 2005 
 Consolidation of the Political Class Pettai 2007 
 Legislative Performance of the Baltic 
Parliaments 
Pettai and Madise 2006 
 
 Recruitment of Political Elites Steen 1996 
 Elites Steen 1997a and 1997b 
 Recirculation and Change of Elites Steen 1997c 
 Elites in Relation to Ethnic Minorities Steen 2000, 2006, 2010 
 Democratic Elitism Steen with Kuklys 2010 
Source: own selection. 
 
comparison with Latvia and Lithuania. 
 The most comprehensive body of research on the Baltic elites by Steen includes 
not only parliamentary elites but also elites from other segments of society; the focus 
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of research is not only on recruitment, but also on the interpersonal trust, networks 
and values of elites. In any case, the issue of ethnicity and the ethnicity variable, 
especially in Estonia and Latvia, play an important role in explaining the recruitment 
and configuration of the Baltic elites.  
 Previously Steen (1997a) applied the theory of elite control and labeled Baltic 
countries ‘the elite network states’ (see a review on the elite transformation in Eastern 
Europe). More recently he (2010, with Kuklys) proposes conceptualising the political 
processes in the Baltic States from 1990 onwards as a development from ethnic 
democracy to liberal democracy, a process that passes through the stages of the ethno-
elitist and ethno-liberal democracies. This contribution of Steen to the analysis of 
democratic elitism in multi-ethnic states allows to see political regimes as ever-
changing, non-static entities. A more detailed description of this contribution is 
provided with the help of the figure below. 
 



























Source: Steen with Kuklys 2010: 205.  
 
The first and second cells in the Figure 2 refer to political regimes in which political 
participation is restricted to the indigenous ethnic majority. The members of a titular 
nation secure over-representation and dominant positions in the national government 
and civil service. In the participative form of the regime, the indigenous ethnic 
community is the subject of the political process. In the elitist shape of the regime 
(“ethno-elitist democracy”), the ethnic majority is regarded as an object for competing 
elites for support in elections (Steen with Kuklys 2010: 205-206). In both regimes, the 
main ethnic policy is one of exclusion.  
 The third cell refers to the regime that is labelled “ethno-liberal democracy”. 
Here, the national elite makes concessions for the inclusion of ethnic minorities but 
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requires them to satisfy strict citizenship criteria (for instance, an advanced level of 
language proficiency). The fourth cell depicts the liberal democratic regime whose 
main features are bottom-up pluralism and inclusiveness. Different cultural and ethnic 
groups are bound by a common political identity and all enjoy open access to 
government and decision-making (Steen with Kuklys 2010: 206). 
 This analytical framework is of most relevance to the analysis of parliamentary 
recruitment in Estonia and Latvia. However, the authors do hope it could be of use in 







   
3. Comparative Method and the Longitudinal Data on the Baltic Parliamentary 
Elites  
                 “One of the problems of political elite studies is that they  
                  rely too heavily on observations made at one point in time.”  
         Seligman (1974: 314) 
 
Differently from physics and many other natural sciences, there is no such thing as 
experimental political sociology. The comparative physics does not exist either, 
although scientists do compare the results of their experiments. To quote Dogan and 
Kazancigil (1994:2), “the comparative method is adopted exclusively in some fields 
of the social sciences”. The comparative political sociology is one of them. 
 Comparisons employed in political sociology and other social sciences take a 
variety of forms, however, the term ‘comparative method’ has a standard meaning – 
“the comparison of large macrosocial units” (Ragin 1987:1) - and “refers to the 
methodological issues that arise in the systematic analysis of a small number of cases” 
(Collier 1993: 105). Certainly, there is a variation in the breadth of the concept. For 
instance, for Przeworski and Teune (1970: 50), the comparison of large macrosocial 
units is a not sufficient condition to qualify for a comparative research; a truly 
comparative research requires not only multiple levels of observation but also the 
multiple levels of analysis: 
 
“Comparative” studies were defined as those in which the influence of larger systems upon the 
characteristics of units within them is examined at some stage of analysis. Consequently comparative 
studies involve at least two levels of analysis. In this sense not all of the studies conducted across 
systems or nations are comparative, but all studies that are comparative are cross-systemic. If national 
social political, or economic systems constitute one of the levels of analysis, the study is a cross-
national comparative study. If, however, the analysis is conducted exclusively at the level of nations, 
then according to this definition it is not comparative.” (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 74) 
 
This definition of comparative analysis by Przeworski and Teune is rather narrow, it 
excludes the possibility to conduct a comparative research relying exclusively on 
aggregate data and disqualifies the entire fields of social sciences as non-comparative  
(Norkus 2008: 112-113).35 
35 Some of the examples named by Norkus would be holonational bibliography by Raoul Naroll (1972) 
and comparative sociology by Robert Marsh (1967). 
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The comparative method is often considered not the most advantegous method of all 
available research methods in the social sciences. Lijphart (1971), as well as Smelser 
(1976), regards it the third best method after the experimental and statistical ones and 
superior only to the case study. This happens because the comparative method is not 
capable to eliminate rival explanations through experimental control or to assess them 
through statistical control; its difficulty is characterised by “many variables but few 
cases”. However, even the best methods cannot help if the collection of data requires 
enormous financial, temporal and other resources. In this situation the application of 
comparative method is the most appropriate: “But often, given the inevitable scarcity 
of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few 
cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many 
cases” (Lijphart 1971: 685). Ragin (1987:15-16) even argues that the comparative 
method is superior over statistical one because: (1) “the statistical method is not 
combinatorial; each relevant condition typically is examined in a piecemeal manner”, 
it makes difficult to investigate situations as wholes; (2) “applications of the 
comparative method produce explanations that account for every instance of a certain 
phenomenon” and is “especially well suited for the task of building new theories and 
synthesizing existing theories”; (3) “the boundaries of a comparative examination are 
set by the investigator” and the sampling rules for the tests of statistical significance 
are not necessary; (4) “it forces the investigator to become familiar with the cases 
relevant to the analysis”. The comparative-historical analysis, as an application of 
comparative method, has an advantage over statistical analysis in investigating 
substantively important and large-scale outcomes (Mahoney and Terrie 2010: 739). 
 Furthermore, the application of the comparative method can be improved in four 
ways: by increasing the number of cases, reducing the property-space of analysis by 
combining variables, focusing on the key variables for the sake of a more 
parsimonious theory, and by employing a comparable-cases strategy (Lijphart 1971: 
686-691; Lijphart 1975). Distinction between unit of analysis as a data category and 
the unit of analysis as a theoretical category is also an essential step of caution in the 
comparing procedure36. Some other contributions to the advancement of the 
36 For instance, Allardt (1966: 339-341) distinguishes between the data units and analytical units, 
Scheuch (1966: 164) between the units of observation and units of inference, Przeworski and Teune 
(1970: 49-50) between levels of observation and levels of analysis and Ragin (1987: 8-9) between 
observational unit and explanatory unit. According to Ragin (1987: 8), the unit of analysis is not a 
problem for most non-comparativists since their analysis and explanations proceed on one level; 
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comparative method are the “thick description” by Geertz (1994), guidelines against 
conceptual stretching and other forms of miscomparing by Sartori (1970; 1991), 
“disciplined configurative approach” by Verba (1967), Almond and Genco (1977) 
and, more recently, qualitative comparative analysis by Rihoux and Ragin (2009).  
The comparative method also profits from what Collier (1993: 108) calls “an 
intellectual cross-fertilization” - innovations in the experimental, statistical and case-
study methods.37  
 To sum up, comparing is also about controlling (Sartori 1970; Smelser 1976) and 
the comparative method, or what Smelser (1976) labels “systematic comparative 
illustration”, is “the method of testing hypothesized empirical relationships among 
variables on the basis of the same logic that guides the statistical method, but in which 
the cases are selected in such a way as to maximize the variance of the independent 
variables and to minimize the variance of the control variables” (Lijphart 1975: 164).   
 The chosen comparative strategy for this dissertation is the one of the “most 
similar systems” design (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32). Out of five methods 
(canons) of scientific investigation proposed by John Stuart Mill - (1) the method of 
agreement, (2) method of difference, (3) joint method of agreement and difference, (4) 
method of residues, and (5) method of concomitant variations (Mill 1996: 388-406), 
this would be the method of difference38. It searches for patterns of invariance. The 
most similar systems design goes well with what Tilly (1984) calls individualising 
and variation finding strategies. 
comparativists, on the contrary, often analyse on one (individual) level and explain on another (the 
macro-social) level. 
37 These four analytically distinguished methods are linked and not completely separated. For instance, 
“within-case comparisons have in fact begun to blur the distinction between case studies and the 
comparative method” (Collier 1993: 116); Ragin (1987: 12) sees the comparative method as a case 
oriented strategy. Lijphart (1975: 160) argues that “there is no such unambiguous dividing line between 
the comparative and statistical methods” and treats the comparative method as a stepping stone for 
statistical analysis; the statistical method is seen as an approximation of the experimental method. In 
general, it seems that the quantitative research strategy is more inclined towards the experimental and 
statistical methods, whereas a qualitative research strategy goes better with the comparative method 
and the case study.    
38 We follow David Collier (1993: 117), who argues that “the most similar and most different systems 
designs correspond, respectively to John Stuart Mill’s method of difference and method of agreement. 
Whereas Przeworski and Teune’s label of “similar” and “different” refer to whether the cases are 
matched, as opposed to contrasting, on a series of background variables, Mill’s labels of “difference” 
and “agreement” refer to whether the cases are contrasting, as opposed to matched, on the dependent 
variable”. This analogy is, however, to some extent criticised by Charles C. Ragin who urges to 
distinguish between theoretical and empirical methods; he argues that the Mill’s indirect method of 
difference [joint method of agreement and difference], not the method of difference, corresponds to the 
most similar systems design. Mill’s method of difference “is a theoretical method and therefore not in 
the same class with such empirical methods as the method of agreement and the indirect method of 
difference” (Ragin 1987: 39).  
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Comparing elites also involves specific methods for elite identification (Parry 1980; 
Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987). The basic are three of them: positional, decisional and 
reputational; most often scholars choose exclusively one method for elite 
identification, however, there are some studies pursuing a hybrid stategy and applying 
a mixture of methods for elite identification. The positional method identifies elite 
persons according to the formal positions they occupy in the power structure. For 
instance, the prime minister and his/her cabinet are considered the executive elites, 
members of parliament are defined as legislative elites. The shortage of this method is 
that those who occupy formal positions of power (de jure) are not always those who 
have power informally (de facto). Therefore, in this situation, decisional and 
reputational methods can provide a complementary assistance: “The reputational 
method relies on experts who are asked to name the most powerful individuals in the 
community or other political system”; “the decisional method identifies elites by 
studying the decision-making process for important policy issues” (Hoffmann-Lange 
2007: 912 & 913)39. The last two methods are rarely applied for studying national 
elites; however, even a greater rarity is a truly comparative research into national 
elites40. 
 By choosing recruitment and transformation of parliamentary elites as an object 
of this doctoral research, we automatically opt for a positional method of elite 
identification. Parliament is a clearly defined political body; in a broad (institutional) 
sense, all members of parliament would belong to the parliamentary elite. In a 
narrower (long term political influence) sense, not all legislators can be considered a 
parliamentary elite; the parliamentary elite in a narrow sense would be only those 
legislators who affect the national political outcomes regularly and substantially. 
 With an aim to detect long-term trends in parliamentary recruitment of the Baltic 
states, my dissertation employs the longitudinal data41; differently from cross-
sectional studies on elites having only one point of temporal observation, this allows 
me to monitor changes in parliamentary recruitment of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
over time which includes seven points of observation for every Baltic country.  
39 The difficulty faced by the reputational method is impossibility to compile a non-arbitrary and 
comprehensive list of experts; the shortage of decisional method is the limited set of policy issues. 
40 According to Hoffmann-Lange (2007: 920), until 2007 there were conducted only three truly 
comparative elite surveys, namely, those by Lerner and Gorden (1969), Aberbach, Putnam and 
Rockman (1981) and Spence (1996).  
41 Some authors (Pierce 2008), treat longitudinal research even as a separate method, next to the 
experimental method, the comparative method and the single case study.  
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The dissertation uses qualitative (nominal) data and proceeds at three levels of 
analysis: 
1. Individual level 
2. Parliamentary political party family level 
3. All-parliament level 
 
We follow some of the instructions by Martz (1994), formulated for the improvement 
of comparability and conceptualisation in comparing most similar countries: 
 
• “In order to implement a strategy of comparing similar countries and to generate meaningful 
theories, limit the spatial reach; /…/ 
• rather than looking for macro-theories, aim at middle-range theories, built on multivariate 
empirical analysis, and situate the analysis at middle-level generalizations; 
• practise greater analytical eclecticism, and in particular introduce the cultural variable in the 
analysis together with the economic and institutional ones; 
• in order to escape regional parochialism, link area research to global issues and trends, 
methodologically, theoretically and substantively.” (Dogan and Kazancigil 1994: 8) 
 
Although Przeworski and Teune (1970) are very sceptical about the usefulness of 
“most similar systems” design (they argue that in practice it is impossible to find 
systems that would be sufficiently similar and warns about the danger of 
overdetermination42), “such a criticism [of Przeworski] is not justified because the 
similar countries are not chosen on simple characteristics, but on the criteria of basic 
analogies, such as the sociological context or the socio-economic level”(Dogan and 
Kazancigil 1994: 9). It is a matter of perspective and the strength of the magnifying 
lens we approach the object under investigation. 
 We are convinced that the “most similar systems” design is a legitimate and most 
appropriate strategy of comparative inquiry for the Baltic States. The political and 
social developments in the most recent centuries allows us to view the Baltic States as 
a quasi-experiment: independent states with periods of democracy between the first 
and the second world wars; all three occupied by the Tsarist Russia before the First 
World War and by the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1991; and all three members of the 
European Union and NATO since 2004. In addition to similarities in the most recent 
42 The problem of overdetermination stemms from the issue of comparability: “Comparability is a 
quality that is not inherent in any given set of objects; rather it is a quality imparted to them by the 
observer’s perspective” (Rustow 1968: 47).  
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history, similarities of the Baltic States in size and post-Communist economic 
development could be taken into account as well.43  
   
 
3.1. Data Set on the Baltic Parliamentary Elites and Challenges of Classification 
Our data set covers the past seven consecutive legislative terms in the Baltic States;  
in Estonia:   the last (1990) Supreme Council of Estonia and the 7th, 8th, 9th,  
   10th, 11th and 12th Riigikogu (elected in 1992, 1995, 1999, 2003, 
   2007 and 2011, respectively);  
in Latvia:   the last (1990) Supreme Council of Latvia and the 5th, 6th, 7th, 
 8th, 9th and 10th Saeima (elected in 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006 
 and 2010, respectively);  
in Lithuania: the last (1990) Supreme Council of Lithuania and Seimas elected  
   in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012.  
 
It is based on the individual-level social and political background data for all MPs 
from the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments in the beginning of term 
(latecomers or substitutes are not included), altogether 2485 observations44, where the 
unit of observation is a deputy/legislative term. This data is also available on a more 
aggregate level of observation where the unit of observation is a political party 
family/legislative term. 
 The self reported information by MPs, publications by parliaments and national 
electoral committees, catalogues “Who is who” in Estonian (Karu 1992; Kelder and 
Mustimets 1993; Isotamm and Ude 1995; Toomla 1999; Alaküla 2000), Latvian 
(Belokoņ Publishing House) and Lithuanian (published by Neolitas Ltd) served as the 
main sources of information in the process of data coding.  
 For the comparative purposes of this dissertation, the Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian parliamentary political parties have been classified according to the 
scheme of Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006: 230-262). The post-1990 party election 
programs were taken as the main point of reference, but other sources of information, 
such as reports by the parliamentary information departments, the handbooks on 
43 As Norkus (2011a: 22) observes, the post-Communist transformation “increased the differences 
between the Baltic states”. Still, in many respects Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain the most similar 
countries in the region.  
44 711 observations for Estonia, 801 observations for Latvia and 973 observations for Lithuania. 
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political parties by Bugajski (2002) and Szajkowski (2005) and the website “Parties 
and Elections in Europe” by Wolfram Nordsieck have been also consulted. The 
biggest puzzle to arise was the classification of the right wing parties, namely the 
Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) and the movement “Estonian Citizen” 
(entered the Riigikogu in 1992) in Estonia and the Latvian National Independence 
Movement (LNNK) and Union “For Fatherland and Freedom” (TB) in Latvia.  
 Instead of the terms „nationalistic“ or “national-conservative”, the scheme of 
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006) uses the categories “conservative” and “extreme 
right.” Since it foresaw exclusionary policies towards non-citizens among the Russian 
speaking population in Estonia, the ERSP was considered extreme right. The 
Movement “Estonian Citizen”, founded by a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and 
the minister of defence in the Estonian government-in-exile, Jüri Toomepuu, was 
aggressively anti-Communist and sought to “decolonise” Estonia by repatriating 
Soviet settlers to Russia. Our decision to code both of these political organisations as 
“extreme right” is supported by Andres Kasekamp, expert on extreme-right parties in 
Estonia, who classifies “Estonian Citizen” and the ERSP before its merger with a 
more pragmatic Pro Patria as extreme-right organisations (Kasekamp 2003: 401-414). 
 In Latvia, the Union “For Fatherland and Freedom” (TB) programs of 1993 and 
1995 classified all those who came to Latvia after 17 June 1940 as “civil occupants” 
and as such granted them no political and land property rights and instead advocated 
for their repatriation, therefore, TB was classified “extreme right” (see also Pabriks 
and Purs 2001: 69). LNNK was slightly more moderate on these issues and thus was 
labelled “conservative”45. In the 1998 election, TB/LNNK (the two parties merged) 
ran with a much more moderate program than that of the TB in 1993 and 1995 and, 
therefore, was classified as conservative. In the 2010 election TB/LNNK formed an 
alliance with the party “Everything for Latvia!” (“Visu Latvijai!”), seeking “the 
elevation of kinship to the level of the whole nation”, fighting for the “Latvian Latvia” 
and led by its honorary chairman Visvaldis Lācis, former legionnaire of the Latvian 
Waffen SS. The Popular Movement for Latvia – Siegerist’s Party (TKL) – has been 
classified as extreme right not due to its electoral program but rather because of the 
party’s behaviour and the actions of its extremist leader, Joachim Siegerist (see 
Lieven 1999: 301 and Mudde 2000: 21).  
45 Relying on the analysis of party manifestos, Jānis Ikstens (2011: 45) found that TB was more to the 
right than LNNK also on economic issues. 
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 The National Harmony Party (TSP), Equal Rights (L) and Socialist Party of 
Latvia (LSP) could be considered ethnic minority parties in Latvia (see Ikstens 2005), 
but it seems more accurate to classify the TSP as socialist/social democratic and the 
last two as communist.  
 The other challenge to classification has been groups of political parties with 
rather different ideologies running on the same electoral list and with one electoral 




3.2. Structure of the Dissertation 
Taking into account the reviewed literature and the proposed theoretical framework, 
this dissertation investigates the patterns of structural and individual circulation 
among the Baltic parliamentary elites46. The structural elite circulation is analysed 
according to the following indicators: occupational background (chapter 5), pre-
parliamentary political experience (chapter 6), education, gender and ethnicity 
(chapter 7). The chapter 8 deals with an individual elite circulation and the chapter 9 
analyses the careers of the long-standing parliamentary representatives. The 
conclusion reviews the main findings of this work and places them into a perspective 
of political sociology.  
 The next chapter we move to is on the structure of opportunities for the Baltic 
parliamentary representatives. 
    
 
46 It is important to note that there is no Baltic parliamentary elite as such; there are Baltic 
parliamentary elites or the parliamentary elite of Estonia, the parliamentary elite of Latvia and the 
parliamentary elite of Lithuania. Of course, an inter-parliamentary institution like the Baltic Assembly, 
founded in 1991 – a gathering of selected MPs from national legislatures of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania – is aimed at the creation of the Baltic parliamentary elite, however, without existence of the 
federal political structure of the Baltic states, its power is condemned to remain symbolic.   
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4. Structure of Opportunities for Baltic Legislators 
 
4.1 Historical Background and Issue of Citizenship 
Although in strictly ethno-linguistic terms nowadays there are only two Baltic nations 
- Latvia and Lithuania, it is common to think of the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania47. Since their incorporation into the Russian empire in the 18th century 
and especially since the 20th century, all three of them shared a similar historical path. 
The modern statehood of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania started with declaring 
independence in 1918 and the election of constituent assemblies in 1919 and 192048. 
All three countries have been occupied and re-occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 
and 1944, all three of them have been internationally recognised as independent 
unitary states in 1991 and all three of them joined the European Union and NATO in 
2004. 
 Before incorporation into the Tsarist Russia in the 18th century, Estonia was 
under the the Danish, German and Swedish rule. Latvia was exposed to the Germanic 
influences through being part of the Teutonic Order and the Swedish Empire. 
Lithuania (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) was exposed to Slavic influences through 
the union with Poland and conquests of territories that are nowadays part of Belarus 
and Ukraine. As a consequence of these varying influences, the Lutheran Church in 
Estonia and Latvia and the Catholic Church in Lithuania became the dominant 
religious and cultural actors. The traces of Lutheranism and Catholicism, in spite of 
spread secularisation, are distinguishable in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of the 21st 
century49. 
 Out of the many historical events and transformations most directly affecting the 
current Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian politics, the Soviet policies of Russification 
and industrialisation are worth mentioning. Lithuania, due to more agrarian mode of 
production (and relative backwardness of industry) and more numerous participation 
47 It could be reminded that for the German historiography the Baltic history and das Baltikum meant 
for a long time also two countries – Estonia and Latvia, which were the areas of German settlement. 
Since ruling elites in Lithuania were of Polish and not German origin, Lithuania used to be excluded 
from the analysis of the Baltic states (see Kasekamp 2010: x).   
48 Vincent E. McHale outlines seven similarities among the Baltic States in the beginning of the 
twentieth century, namely: “(1) prior colonial status; (2) pre-independence opportunities for local self-
government and competition for representation in the Russian Duma; (3) divisive class, ethnic, 
religious, and regional cleavages of an overlapping nature; (4) radical democratic traditions; (5) 
international copying of political forms; (6) economic dislocations from war and revolution; and (7) 
external pressures of a geopolitical nature”(McHale 1986: 298). 
49 The differencies between post-Soviet Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are well explained by the 
Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism thesis of Max Weber in the work of Mattusch (1997). 
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of Lithuanians in the structures of the Communist Party, has been able to withstand 
the policies of Moscow better in comparison with Latvia and Estonia – by the end of 
the collapse of the USSR, ethnic Lithuanians made around 80 per cent of all 
inhabitants of Lithuania which was about the same before the Second World War. 
Ethnic Latvians, from constituting 77 per cent of the country population in 1935, 
turned into 52 per cent in 1989. The share of ethnic Estonians in Estonia fell from 
88.2 per cent in 1934 to 61.5 per cent in 1989. The Soviet economic policy of building 
large enterprises and importing labour force for them - among the losses due to the 
Second World War and deportations to Siberia, settlement of the retired Soviet 
officers and arrival of state, party and other personnel, low or declining birth rates 
among ethnic Latvians and ethnic Estonians – had a significant impact on the ethnic 
composition of populations in Latvia and Estonia (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 
353-356, 358; Karklins 1994: 123-127; Dreifelds 1996: 143-156; Raun 2001: 234).  
 After regaining independence in 1991, the choice of the Estonian and Latvian 
political elites was granting citizenship automatically to those who had it before the 
Soviet occupation in June 1940 and their descendants.50 The result was that a 
significant part of the population – almost one third of their inhabitants in 1991 - 
became disenfranchised51 and turned the regimes into what was labelled an ethnic 
democracy (Stepan 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; Smith 1996; Järve 2000 and 2005) or 
regime of ethnic control (Steen 1997; Pettai and Hallik 2002). The ethnic cleavage or, 
more precisely, the divide52 between citizens and non-citizens has been crucial in 
shaping politics of post-1990 in Estonia in Latvia. The Latvian constitution with no 
provision for the basic human rights,53 and the strict laws on citizenship54 made the 
50 It reduced the eligible electorate in Estonia from 1,164,000 to 661,000 (Mikkel and Pettai 2004: 
335). According to Kalnins and Palonkorpi (2003), “in the end of the 1980’s roughly 40 per cent of 
Latvia’s population were neither citizens of Latvia nor their descendants”. 
51 Naturalisation of persons having no legal connection to the interwar republic started in 1995 after the 
law on naturalisation was passed in July 1994. According to Pabriks and Purs (2001: 73), there were 
more than 600 thousand people without citizenship at that time. The number by Schmidt (2004: 116) 
and Kalnins and Palonkorpi (2003) is about 700 thousand people, it would amount to 27.7 per cent of 
2529543 inhabitants (Statistical Yearbook of Latvia 1995: 61) in Latvia in 1995. The number by 
Dreifelds (1996: 173) amounts to 724 thousand stateless persons or 28.6 per cent of all inhabitants in 
Latvia. The data of Dorodnova (2003: 43) record 740231 non-citizens or 29.3 per cent of the total 
population in 1995. 
52 According to Deegan-Krause (2007: 539-540), who relies on the work by Bartolini and Mair (1990), 
the full cleavage, as a form of closure of social relationships, involves three elements: (1) a structural 
(e.g. demographic) difference, (2) an attitudinal difference, and (3) an institutional (political) 
difference. If a closure involves only two elements, we have a divide; if only one element is available, 
we have a difference. 
53 The chapter on the basic human rights has been incorporated into the Latvian Constitution in 1998. 
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cleavage more pronounced. Although naturalisation and liberalisation of citizenship 
policy reduced the numbers of non-citizens, about 6.9 per cent of the population in 
Estonia and 14.1 per cent in Latvia remain without any citizenship (Kuklys 2013b; 
Kuklys 2013a). Lithuania, differently from Estonia and Latvia, chose the liberal ‘zero-
option’ in citizenship policy, meaning that everyone could apply without any 
preconditions and receive a passport of the Lithuanian citizen. Still, according to some 
citizenship analysts (Howard 2009: 176), Lithuania is the most similar to Estonia and 
Latvia out of all EU-member states in terms of other citizenship policies.  
 It must be mentioned that the restrictive decisions on citizenship by the Estonian 
and Latvian political elites were largely an outcome of the so-called doctrine of legal 
restorationism produced by the Citizens’ Congresses in both countries. The Estonian 
Congress, which functioned as an alternative parliament to the Supreme Council of 
Estonia, was elected on 18 March 1990. The 499 members of Congress, representing 
31 political organisations, were elected on 24 February 1990 by the people who were 
either citizens of the pre-war republic of Estonia or their descendants55, comprising a 
total of 590,000 or 91 per cent of eligible electors (Taagepera 1993: 174). The 
Congress served as an important forum for the right wing opposition to the 
government controlled by the Popular Front (Park 1994: 145) and in fact legitimised 
and institutionalised what could be considered counter-elites. The Congress was 
dominated by the Estonian National Independence Party56 and became increasingly 
marginalised from May 1990 onwards since political power was directed through the 
Supreme Council (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004: 63). However, in August-September 
1991, after the anti-Gorbachev coup in Moscow, the Congress regained its importance 
54 The Estonian citizenship law of January 1995 required at least five years of permanent residence, 
proficiency in the Estonian language, knowledge of the Constitution and the citizenship law, loyalty to 
the state of Estonia and permanent lawful income sufficient to support the applicant and his or her 
dependents (Article 6). In Latvia, in addition to the language requirement and basic knowledge of 
Latvian history and Constitution, the law of July 1994 included so called windows of naturalisation: 
potential applicants have been divided into groups according to age and status. “According to the law 
of 1994, during the year 1995, members of a citizen’s family could apply for citizenship. From January 
1, 1996 to 2000, people born in Latvia could apply; after 2001 people born outside Latvia could apply 
for citizenship. Additional priority was given to young people” (Pabriks and Purs 2001: 87). The 
windows of naturalisation were abolished in June 1998. 
55 Those who were neither Estonian citizens before June 1940 nor their descendants could register with 
Citizens’ Committees and participate in the Estonian Congress but possessed only advisory rights. 
(Altogether 43 advisory representatives were elected.) 
56 The Estonian National Independence Party “was the first political party to be founded in Soviet 
Estonia in 1988 and might be considered the first real opposition party established in the entire Soviet 
Union” (Kasekamp 2003: 403). Party leaders were Estonian dissidents who had been actively involved 
in anti-Soviet activities long before Gorbachev started Perestroika. 
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and together with the Supreme Council formed a 60-member Constitutional Assembly 
(consisting of 30 delegates from each institution) designed to draft a new Constitution 
for the Republic of Estonia.  
 The Citizens’ Congress in Latvia was elected in April 1990 “by more than 
700,000 citizens who had signed in to citizens’ committees that began to emerge in 
the latter part of 1989 in response to dubious attitude of the People’s Front towards 
the concept of legal continuity of the Republic of Latvia” (Ikstens 2011: 40). Many of 
Congress members found their place later in the electoral union “For Fatherland and 
Freedom” (TB) that successfully participated in the Saeima elections in 1993 and 
1995. Similarly as the Congress of Estonia, Citizens’ Congress of Latvia attempted to 
provide an alternative to the last Supreme Council (however, without institutional 
success it had in Estonia) and relied on the so-called doctrine of legal restorationism. 
The doctrine held that Estonia and Latvia were not newly established states but rather 
the old republics illegally occupied by the Soviet Union. Therefore, sovereignty had 
to be restored to those from whom it had been taken, namely, the people who had 
been citizens of Estonia and Latvia before the Soviet occupation in June 1940.  
 
4.2. Electoral Systems 
Currently 101 members of the Riigikogu are elected in 11 or 12 electoral districts 
depending on the election, the candidates must be Estonian citizens no younger than 
twenty-one years old. Although political parties present a national list of electoral 
candidates, the nomination of a candidate is restricted to one electoral district. The 
magnitude of electoral districts vary in size, so far it ranged from 5 to 14 mandates 
(Mikkel and Pettai 2004: 333). The seats are allocated in three rounds. In the first 
round of seat allocation, personal mandates are awarded to those candidates who 
surpass the Hare quota for the electoral district (it is calculated for each electoral 
district by dividing the number of valid votes casts in the district by the number of 
mandates). In the second round, so-called district mandates are awarded by summing 
up all the votes cast for the members of a party in a given district. If the party 
surpasses the Hare quota, its candidate with the largest share of votes receives a 
mandate, provided that the party itself gets at least 5 per cent of the national vote and 
that the mandate receiver gets at least 10 per cent of the Hare quota. In the third 
round, the mandates not allocated in the previous two rounds are distributed to the 
parties (they must have passed the 5 per cent threshold) using a modified d’Hondt 
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method. The compensation mandates are distributed relying on the separate rank-
ordered lists of candidates, compiled by political parties (Pettai 2004: 830). Over time, 
the number of personal mandates declined from 17 in 1992 to 14 in 201157. For the 
same period, the number of compensation mandates gradually declined from 60  to 19 
and the number of district mandates steadily grew from 24 to 68 (see National 
Electoral Committee 2012: 33).  
 
Table 4.2.1. Electoral Systems in the Baltic States 
 
Country Estonia 1992-2011 Latvia 1993-2010 Lithuania 1992-2012 
Type PR: Hare/d'Hondt PR: St Laguë Mixed: SMD & PR-Hare 
% of PR Seats 101/101 100/100 70/141 
Electoral Districts, N 11+1¹ 5 71+1 
District Magnitude 5 to 14 14 to 29 1 & 70 
Ballot Categorical (+/-) unlimited PR: semi-ordinal 
Threshold, % 5 5² 5³ 
Turnout Threshold N/A N/A 25% for SMD, 40% for 
PR List 
Success Requirement in 
SMD 
N/A N/A Abs. majority/2nd round 
runoff4 
Source: National Electoral Committee of Estonia, Central Electoral Commission of Latvia, Chief Electoral 
Commission of Lithuania and own completion. 
¹ 1992: 12+1 
² From 1995. In 1993: 4% 
³ From 1996. In 1992: 4% for normal political parties and 2% for ethnic minority parties 
4 In 2000: Plurality 
 
 
In Estonia political party membership is restricted to Estonian citizens only (§ 48 of 
the Estonian Constitution). Since 1999 a political party must have at least 2000 
members, before 1999 it was sufficient to have 1000 members (Lagerspetz and Maier 
2010: 96). Electoral coalitions (apparentements) are forbidden since 1999. 
Parliamentary parties receive a considerable amount of money from the state and 
there are no spending limits on electoral campaigns.  
 As a consequence of the post-Communist lustration, until 2000 the lustration 
rules required that parliamentary candidates sign a statement claiming that they had 
not actively persecuted others in the Soviet period. In terms of language requirements, 
the Estonian law demanded that parliamentary candidates have advanced proficiency 
in the Estonian language. This law, criticised by international organisations as 
57 The lowest number of personal mandates (10) was awarded in 2007. 
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violation of human rights convention, was never extensively enforced. It was 
abolished in the late 2001 (Mikkel and Pettai 2004: 335-336). 
 
Table 4.2.2. Length of Term, Party Lists Submitted and Elected, Political Parties and Their 


















7th Riigikogu 1992 4 years 17 9 10 8 
8th Riigikogu 1995 4 years 16 7 9 5 
9th Riigikogu 1999 4 years 12 7 8 5 
10th Riigikogu 2003 4 years 11 6 6 5 
11th Riigikogu 2007 4 years 11 6 5 6 
12th Riigikogu 2011 4 years 9 4 4 4 
Source: National Electoral Committee of Estonia and own calculation. 
 
 
Latvia, as Estonia and most of Eastern European states, applies a proportional 
electoral system for the election of national parliament. Electoral opportunities for 
100 members of the Latvian Saeima are being provided by five constituencies the 
magnitude of which is determined by the number of voters residing in each 
constituency. The smallest and most stable constituency is Kurzeme, providing 14 
seats for the Saeima (in 2010 it provided 13 seats). The Zemgale constituency has 
provided 15 parliamentary seats so far, except for the election in 1993 for which the 
figure was 16 seats. The magnitude of the Latgale constituency has gradually declined 
from 20 seats in 1993 to 16 seats in 2006 and 2010. The size of the Vidzeme 
constituency grew from 25 seats in 1995 to 27 seats in 2010. The most growing and 
largest is the constituency of Riga. It expanded from 24 seats in 1993 to 29 seats in 
2006 and 2010. 
 Unlike the 1990 election to the Latvian Supreme Council, where individual 
candidates competed and a majority system was applied, elections to the Saeima are 
characterised by proportional representation and competition between political party 
lists. The ballot structure is partially preferential, the election results are calculated by 
a modified Saint-Laguë method.58 Whether a candidate for the Saeima runs in all five 
constituencies or only in one of them, is decided by the political party. All candidates 
must be Latvian citizens no younger than 21 years old. In addition to disqualifications 
58 The modified Saint-Laguë formula relies on the 1.4 as an initiating divisor in the allocation of seats 
(Choe 2003: 40). 
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due to legally recognised incapacity, imprisonment or criminal conviction, restrictions 
of lustration are also enforced: all those who belong or have belonged to the salaried 
staff of the USSR, Latvian SSR or a foreign state security, intelligence or counter-
intelligence services and those who have been active in certain organisations59 after 
13 January 1991 are not eligible to compete for a seat in Saeima. The highest level of 
proficiency in the Latvian language has also been an eligibility requirement until May 
2002 (Schmidt 2010: 129). 
 
Table 4.2.3. Length of Term, Threshold, Party Lists Submitted and Elected, Political Parties 


















5th Saeima 1993 3 years 23 8 8 8 
6th Saeima 1995 3 years 19 9 13 7 
7th Saeima 1998 4 years 21 6 6 4 
8th Saeima 2002 4 years 20 6 6* 4 
9th Saeima 2006 4 years 19 7 7** 4 
10th Saeima 2010 4 years 13 5 8*** 4 
Source: Central Electoral Commission of Latvia and own calculations. 
* If the Union of Greens and Farmers is counted as two and the Union of Political Organisations “For 
Human Rights in the United Latvia” as three political parties – National Harmony Party, Equal Rights 
and Latvian Socialist Party – the number of parliamentary parties would increase to eight. 
** If the Union of Greens and Farmers is counted as two and the coalition of the Latvia’s First Party 
and Latvia’s Way as two parties– the number of parliamentary parties would increase to nine. 
*** If the Union of Greens and Farmers is counted as three and the Harmony Centre as two political 
parties, the number of parliamentary parties would increase to eight. 
 
 
Founding of a political party is reserved for Latvian citizens only, but non-citizens 
may belong to a political party as well if they do not exceed a half of all non-citizens 
in a given party.60 Registration of a political party requires the party to have at least 
200 members which is forty times more than what was required in the First 
Republic.61  
 After the abolishment of mixed electoral systems in Ukraine (2006) and Russia 
(2007), Lithuania belongs to the few countries in the region (together with Hungary 
and Macedonia) that employ a mixed electoral system. 70 legislators out of 
59 Those organisations are the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Communist Party of Latvia, 
the Working People’s International Front of the Latvian SSR, the United Board of Working Bodies, the 
Organisation of War and Labour Veterans, the All-Latvia Salvation Committee and its regional 
committees.  
60 For a long period after 1990, non-citizens were not allowed to belong to any political party (Schmidt 
2004: 115). 
61 A group of any five persons was sufficient to register a political party (Bilmanis 1951: 343). 
According to Spekke, in order to register a political party, a group of seven citizens was required 
(Spekke 1957: 374). 
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Table 4.2.4. Length of Term, Threshold, Party Lists Submitted and Elected, Political Parties 


















Seimas 1992 4 years 17 5 11 7 
Seimas 1996 4 years 24 5 14 8 
Seimas 2000 4 years 15 4 16 9 
Seimas 2004 4 years 15 6 9 7 
Seimas 2008 4 years 16  7 10 7 
Seimas 2012 4 years 18 7 8 6 
Source: Chief Electoral Commission of Lithuania and own calculations. 
* The multi-member district only. 
 
total 141 are being elected through the party lists in one country-wide constituency. 
The candidates for the remaining seats run in the 71 single member districts. Double 
candidacies (party list and SMD) are allowed. The ballot structure is categorical, 70 
seats from the country-wide constituency are being allocated according to the Hare 
electoral formula. All candidates must be Lithuanian citizens of no younger than 25 
years old. In a compulsory questionnaire the candidates are supposed to indicate 
whether they collaborated with the Soviet KGB (and any other foreign secret service), 
however, in contrast to the Latvian case, previous collaboration with the Soviet secret 
service and other power structures of the USSR does not preclude someone from 
running for a parliamentary seat. The fact that a candidate has collaborated is used to 
inform the electorate and does not form a prohibitive constraint.  
 After January 2005 founding a new political party in Lithuania requires at least 
1000 members (400 members have been sufficient prior to January 2005). 
 
4.3. Political Party Families in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
History of the Baltic parliamentary democracy is much shorter and more 
discontinuous than that of many Western European polities. Parliamentary democracy 
of sovereign Baltic states starts after the First World War and could be divided into 
two periods: pre-Soviet (or interwar, since Baltic democracies were dismantled some 
years before the Soviet occupation in 1940) and post-Soviet.  
 The strongest parliamentary party families in the interwar Estonia and Latvia, 
Baltic countries with predominantly Lutheran heritage, were Socialists/Social 
Democrats (especially in the beginning) and Agrarians (see tables 4.3.1 to 4.3.3). The 
most important parliamentary party family in Lithuania was Catholic Christian 
Democrats often having an absolute majority in the legislature; Socialists/Social 
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Democrats in the Lithuanian parliaments were only a third force in strength which is 
explained by a less urban and more rural character of the Lithuanian society (Vardys 
1978: 67). The Baltic parliamentary democracies, initially styled according to the 
French and Weimar constitutions and described as powerful legislatures with weak 
and unstable cabinets of ministers62, were crushed by authoritarian regimes long 
before the Soviet occupation in 1940. The Lithuanian coup d’état of 1926 and the 
Estonian and Latvian takeovers of 1934 are explained as “Nationalist Agrarian 
reaction to economic difficulties and to the perceived deficiencies of democractic 
performance” (Vardys 1978: 68), which was rather a common trend in contemporary 
Europe. Indeed, our tables show the highest percentages of Agrarians in each of the 
last Baltic parliaments before the regime change, however, there are important cross-
country differences to be highlighted. First, the abrupt coup in Lithuania was 
organised by young military officers (for the benefit of the Nationalist Union 
comprising 3.5 per cent of seats in the 1926 parlament63) and was not so much caused 
by economic difficulties whereas the protracted fall of democracies in Estonia and 
Latvia was more of a consequence of economic depression and was characterised by a 
less direct military involvement. Second, coups in Lithuania and Latvia were justified 
as preventive actions against the threat of Communists, whereas in the Estonian case 
“the pretext was the danger from domestic fascists” (Taagepera 1974: 408)64.  
 The Baltic parliamentary party families in the post-Soviet period have only 
symbolic continuity with the party families of the first Republic. Many of the post-
Soviet political parties in Baltic countries emerged out of anti-Soviet popular 
movements founded in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1988. Very few post-Soviet 
parliamentary parties could claim their origins dating back to the First Republic65.  
 
Estonia 
Elections to the 1990 Supreme Council, conducted by single transferable vote (STV), 
were characterised by the fact that an overwhelming majority of candidates and 
62 The average life span of a cabinet in the period of parliamentary democracy varied from 8 months in 
Lithuania to 10 months in Latvia (see Vardys 1974: 402-403). 
63 Labeled in our table as Extreme Right.  
64 The regimes that emerged after the coups in the Baltic countries were classified by Georg von Rauch 
(1995) as authoritarian democracies in Estonia and Latvia and as presidential regime in Lithuania.  
65 These parliamentary political parties were: Rural Union in Estonia; Farmers’ Union and Social 
Democratic Workers’ Party in Latvia; Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party, Christian 
Democratic Party, Peasants’ Union,  Nationalist Union and National Party “Young Lithuania” in 
Lithuania. 
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elected representatives belonged to more than one party or political movement. The 
Popular Front66 won at least 41, antiindependence forces at least 26 (including 4 seats 
for Soviet military), reform communist Free Estonia and its rural allies at least 25 
 
   Table 4.3.1. Party Families and Percentage of Their Seats in Estonian Parliaments 
Source: For the 1st to the 5th Riigikogu adapted and modified from Parming (1975:11) and Raun 
(2001: 113). For the Post-Soviet Riigikogu data are taken from the Estonian National Electoral 
Committee, www.vvk.ee. 
Note: The Riigikogu in the First Republic contained 100 legislators, in the Second Republic it 
comprises 101 MPs. The 1990 Supreme Soviet had 105 seats. 
 
 
seats (Taagepera 1993: 176). Since majority of them had more than one political 
affiliation (we found that 105 deputies had 162 organisational affiliations), we 
considered it more meaningful to determine their ideological orientation by 
parliamentary factions their founded after election. There were all party families 
except Conservatives, Right Liberals and Extreme Right in the 1990 Supreme 
Council. The Left Liberals and Agrarians were the largest party groups.  
 The winner of the 1992 election, conducted under the personalized-PR, was 
conservative Homeland (Pro Patria) with 29 seats. They were followed by left liberal 
Secure Home (a newly established Coalition Party was a part of it) with 17 seats. The 
Popular Front won only 15 seats. It lost its function as an umbrella organisation by the 
time of election due to defection of three important political formations: social 
democrats, liberal democrats and agrarians.  
66 This would comprise 39 per cent of all parliamentary seats. Our figures for the Popular Front in the 
table 4.3.1 are much lower since they refer to the parliamentary factions formed after the 1990 election.  
Party Families 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Communists 5 10 6 6 5 6.7       
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
29 20 24 25 22 8.6 11.9 5.9 16.8 5.9 9.9 18.8 
Greens      5.7 1    5.9  
Agrarians 22 29 39 41 42 13.3   6.9 12.9 5.9  
Left Liberals 22 12 13 10  15.2 16.8 56.4 27.7 27.7 28.7 25.7 
Right Liberals       1 18.8 24.8 18.8 30.7 32.7 
Conservatives       28.7 12.9 17.8 34.7 18.8 22.8 
Extreme Right       17.8      
Ethnic Minority 5 7 5 5 8 6.7  5.9 5.9    
Other 10 14 8 9 23 11.4 7.9      
No Party      7.6       
Liberals      5.7       
Christian 
Democrats 
7 8 5 4  5.7       
Popular Front      13.3 14.9      
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 The 1995 parliamentary election saw Russian minority parties finally entering the 
Riigikogu and emergence and success of the right liberal Estonian Reform Party. The 
elections were won by the list of the Coalition Party and Rural Union (41 seats). The 
left liberal Centre Party – inheritor of the Popular Front – was allocated 16 seats in the 
Riigikogu. 
 The Centre Party celebrated a victory - it won 28 seats - in the 1999 elections, 
however, the President Lennart Meri proposed a prime minister from Homeland (Pro 
Patria) Alliance (18 parliamentary seats) which formed a new government with 
Reform Party (18 seats) and Moderates (17 seats). 
 The 2003 Riigikogu elections saw emerging a new conservative political party – 
Res Publica, propagating anti-corruption and political renewal. This new party not 
only entered the legislature but also was one of the two electoral winners gaining 28 
parliamentary seats (the same number of seats was allocated to the Centre Party) and 
the post of prime minister. The newcomer party was joined by the right liberal Reform 
Party (19 seats) and agrarian People’s Union (13 seats) in the government formation. 
 The 2007 and 2011 elections to the Riigikogu witnessed victories of the Reform 
Party as it won 31 and 33 seats respectively. Res Publica, after experiencing a 
meteoric rise in 2003, demonstrated a similarly abrupt fall in the following years and 
in the end merged with Pro Patria. The new organisation, named Union of Pro Patria 
and Res Publica, won 19 and 23 parliamentary seats in 2007 and 2011. The Centre 
Party, with 29 and 26 seats respectively, remained the largest opposition party. 
 To sum up, the number political parties and party coalitions competing in national 
elections gradually fell from 17 in 1992 to 11 political parties in 2003 and 200767. The 
number of parliamentary parties (electoral lists) decreased from 9 in 1992 to 4 in 
2011. These trends were interpreted as signs of party system consolidation. Some 
analysts saw “Scandinavianization of the Estonian party system - emergence of at 
most five to six stable major parties” (Raun 1997: 360) or even emergence of cartel 
party system in Estonia (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999; Sikk 2003, Mikkel and Pettai 
2004). These generalisations have been confronted and challenged by the rapid 
emergence and electoral success of the Res Publica Party. Nevertheless, if we employ 
Laakso – Taagepera index, we see an obvious decrease in the effective number of 
electoral parties from 8.84 in 1992 to 4.78 in 2011. The effective number of 
67 Since 1999 single political parties participate in parliamentary elections, their electoral coalitions 
(apparentements) are forbidden. 
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parliamentary parties falls from 5.90 in 1992 to 3.84 in 2011. This allows us to 
conclude that over time Estonian political party system clearly moved toward 
consolidation. 
 If we turn onto a more aggregate – political party family – level of analysis, we 
observe that Socialists/Social Democrats and Left Liberals are present in all seven 
Estonian parliaments (see table 4.3.1). Conservatives and Right Liberals are part of all 
legislatures from 1992 onwards. Green and ethnic minority parties are successful in 
three of seven parliamentary elections.  
 
Latvia 
The number of parliamentary political parties in the Second Republic of Latvia is 
significantly lower than in the First Republic (5 to 13 compared with 22 to 27), 
however, the number of political party families seems to be rather similar.  
   
Table 4.3.2. Party Families and Their Percentage of Seats in the Latvian Parliaments 
Year of Election  
Party Family 
1922 1925* 1928 1931 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Communists**   6 7 28.9 7 5     
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
38 37 30 21  13 6 30 25 23 29 
Agrarians 25 28 29 34  12 16  12 18 22 
Left Liberals 13 11 9 11  5 18     
Conservatives      15 8 41 53 49 41 
Extreme Right      6 30    8 
Ethnic Minority 15 16 18 19        
Christian 
Democrats*** 
   6  6  8 10 10  
Liberals****      36 17 21    
Other Right 
Wing 
9 9 8 2        
No Party     5.9       
Popular Front     65.2       
Source: For the 1st to the 4th Saeimas, adapted and modified from Bilmanis (1951: 342-343) and 
Spekke (1957: 374). For the Supreme Council of 1990 and 5th to the 10th Saeimas, Central Electoral 
Commission of Latvia and own classification. 
Note: All parliaments contain 100 seats except for the one elected in 1990 – it had 201 seats. 
* Due to unknown reasons percentage of seats amounts to 101 in the data source (Bilmanis 1951) 
consulted. 
** Communists entered the 7th Saeima (1998) on the list of the National Harmony Party and the 8th 
Saeima (2002) as a part of the Union of Political Organisations “For Human Rights in the United 
Latvia”. 
*** In the election of 1995 Christian Democrats from KDS entered Saeima on the list of Agrarians. 





   
Not shown in the table above, the family of Greens is present in the Saeima of 1995 
and 2002 as well, Regionalists are present in the Saeima of 1995. If one compares the 
variety of party families in the First and the Second Republic, Communists, 
Socialists/Social Democrats, Agrarians, Left Liberals and Christian Democrats are 
found in both periods. However, there are stake differences in the numerical strength 
of those party families: Socialists/Social Democrats, Agrarians and, especially, the 
right wing party families have a substantially different weight in the interwar and 
post-1990 legislatures. The dominance of the families from the right in the post-1990 
Latvia is more than obvious not only in the parliament, but also in the government: 
from 1990 up to now out of all fifteen cabinets of ministers Socialists/Social 
Democrats have been recruited only twice.68   
 
Lithuania 
The number of political party families in the Second Republic of Lithuania is higher 
than in the First Republic (5-6 compared to 7-9). Party families of Communists, 
Socialists/Social Democrats, Agrarians, Extreme Right, Ethnic Minority and Christian 
Democrats are present in both Republics, of course, not always with the same 
numerical strength (the parliamentary strength of Agrarians, Christian Democrats and 
Ethnic Minority parties had substantially declined). Conservatives and Liberals are an 
exceptional feature of the Second Republic. 
 
Table 4.3.3. Party Families and Their Percentage of Seats in the Lithuanian Parliaments 
Year of Election  
Party Family 
1922 1923 1926 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Communists 6.4   4.5       
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
12.8 10.3 17.6  57.4 17.5 34 14.2 17.7 26.6 
Agrarians 25.6* 20.5 28.2**   0.7 2.8 7.1 2.1 0.7 
Left Liberals       19.9 7.8 0.7  
Conservatives      51.1 7.1 17.7 32.6 23.7 
Extreme Right   3.5  2.8 1.5 1.4 0 0  
Ethnic Minority 6.4 17.9 9.4  2.8 0.7 1.4 1.4 2.1 5.8 
Other/Independents   5.9  6.4 5.1 3.5 39 31.9 36.0 
Liberals     1.4 10.9 25.5 12.8 12.8 7.2 
Christian Democrats 48.7 51.3 35.3  7.8 12.4 4.3    
Popular Front     95.5 21.3      
Source: Švoba (1990: 103, 117) for the first three parliaments, Chief Electoral Commission of 
Lithuania for the last seven parliaments and own classification. 
* Alliance of Peasants’ Union and Socialists Democrats 
** Peasants’ Union and Farmers’ Party 
68 In 1994 and 1998. 
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Post-1990 period compared 
• The last Supreme Council of Lithuania has the largest share of activists from 
the anti-Communist Popular Front whereas the last Supreme Council of 
Estonia has the smallest percentage of members from this movement. The 
figures for Latvia are in-between  
• Success of the former Communists in Lithuania 
• Clear dominance of Liberals69 and Conservatives in Estonia and Latvia 
• Alternating dominance of Socialists/Social Democrats and Conservatives in 
Lithuania 
• Disappearance of Liberals in Latvia in 2002 and vanishing of Christian 
Democrats in Lithuania in 2004 
• Rise of the new political parties (some of them fighting corruption, preaching 
law and order and using anti-elitist rhetoric) in the Baltic parliaments: Res 
Publica in Estonia, New Party and New Era in Latvia and New Union (Social 
Liberals), Labour Party and Order and Justice in Lithuania 
 
The insignificance of Socialists/Social Democrats and left wing parties in general can 
be explained by ethnic democracy patterns in Latvia: the titular ethnic group takes 
care that ethnic minorities, most of them found in the left wing parties, are not taking 
over in politics.  
 The disappearance of Liberals in Latvia in 2002 and vanishing of Christian 
Democrats in Lithuania in 2004 goes together with strengthening of Latvian Christian 
Democrats and Lithuanian Liberals – this dialectical dynamics is explained by 
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001): in the system where Christian Democrats are 
strong, Liberals are weaker; and where Liberals are strong, Christian Democrats are 
less powerful.  
 In addition to the absence of the explicit ethnic minority parties in the Latvian 
parliaments, non-existence of the parliamentary women’s party must be noted as well. 
The ethnic minority parties in the Lithuanian parliaments are present since 1992, the 
Women’s Party (in the person of Mrs. Prunskienė, the former prime minister of 
Lithuania 1990-1991) is present in the 1996 Seimas. 
69 In Estonia: dominance of Left Liberals and, later on, Right Liberals. 
 59 
                                                 
  
   
 
4.4. Remuneration and Benefits of Parliamentary Representatives 
Legislative activity for a term of four years is a full-time job in all three Baltic 
national parliaments.  
 From January 2012 the monthly payment for an Estonian Parliament member is 
3,380 euros70. The payment of MPs is linked to the salary of the President of Estonia, 
so that the Riigikogu member is compensated at 65 per cent of the president’s salary. 
The President of Estonia is paid 5,200 euros, as is the President of the Riigikogu, 
Prime Minister and Chairman of the Supreme Court. 
 Member of the Riigikogu is prohibited to hold any other state office (§ 63 of the 
Constitution). The authority of MP is suspended upon his/her appointment as a 
member of Cabinet Ministers and is restored after resigning from the Cabinet (§ 64 of 
the Constitution).  
 Member of parliament in Latvia and Lithuania is a full-time job with a guaranteed 
salary that is thrice the monthly average in the country.  
 In accordance with the Anti-Corruption Law of Latvia, MPs may combine their 
work with other forms of employment, including teaching, scientific research, medical 
practice or other creative work (Article 19). In comparison with the average monthly 
and minimum pay in Latvia, the remuneration of parliamentary representative is very 
attractive: between 1995 and 2001 the average monthly wage of MP in Latvia was 3.3 
– 3.9 times higher than the average monthly pay in the country and a basic monthly 
salary of MP between 1993 and 2003 was 6.8 – 10 times higher than a minimum 
monthly wage set up by the Latvian Government.71 In 2008, the MP monthly salary 
was 2.6 times higher than the average monthly pay in the country. However, if it is 
compared with other members of the political, administrative and, especially, the 
business elite, this remuneration is much less attractive. Parliamentary representatives 
in the highest positions are clearly below top people in business and government: the 
monthly pay of the Speaker of the Parliament (1165 Lats or 1658 Euro72) is 7.7 times 
lower than that of the Head of the Riga Free Port, 6 times than President of the 
Latvian Bank, 5.6 times than President of Latvian Telecom and 4.8 times than 
70 Estonia replaced its national currency the Estonian kroon (EEK) with the euro in 2011 and thus 
became the first ex-Soviet state to join the eurozone 
71 Calculations are based on the data of Kancāne (2002: 52), Statistical Yearbook of Latvia (2003: 64) 
and Finance Department of Latvijas Saeima. 
72 The rate on the 28 August 2005: one Latvian lats (LVL) was worth 1.4229 Euro. 
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President of Latvian Railways; the Speaker is paid 2.1 times less than the President of 
the country, 1.9 times than the Prime Minister, 1.7 times than a Minister or the Mayor 
of the capital city.73 However, Latvian legislators – in both ordinary and highest 
positions – are financially better off than top academics74 and are best compared with 
career bureaucrats – by law MPs are financially qualified as civil servants of the 1st 
(highest) category. If 78 Lats or 111 Euro for representation, 20 Lats or 28.5 Euro for 
participating in both committee and sub-committee, 34 Lats or 48 Euro compensation 
for not having a business car, up to 282 Lats or 401 Euro for renting a flat in Riga (if 
the MP does not come from Riga) or 96 to 202 Lats (137 to 287 Euro) for transport 
expenditures (depending on the place of residence) to be added to the basic salary of 
MP,75 an ordinary parliamentary representative of Latvijas Saeima comes close to the 
state secretary.76 Nevertheless, parliamentary representatives cannot compare to civil 
servants in terms of career stability: full legislative (4 years) term and permanent 
position as civil servant have different stability perspectives, especially knowing that 
more than a half of Latvian MPs does not get re-elected (see analysis on legislative 
turnover in chapter 8). 
 The Lithuanian parliamentary representatives in the top positions, compared with 
their Latvian colleagues, seem to be better remunerated in relation to other high 
political and administrative positions: the Speaker of the Lithuanian parliament is paid 
less than the President of the country but as high as the Primer Minister or the 
Chairman of the Constitutional Court. The salary of the Speaker is higher than the one 
of Prosecutor General, President of the Board of the Lithuanian Bank and the Director 
General of the State Security Department. Ordinary parliamentary representatives are 
paid better than prosecutors and judges on the district level and mayors of towns with 
less than 50 thousand inhabitants. In addition to salaries, as in the case of Latvian 
MPs, Lithuanian legislators receive extra pay for the work in the factions, committees 
and sub-committees; they are entitled to a car without a driver, one average monthly 
73 Calculations are based on the data from Diena, 24 April 2004: 18-19; Neatkariga Rita Avize, 12 July 
2004: 10. 
74 In 2004 a University Rector earned 630 Lats, a University Professor was paid 504 Lats (Latvijas 
Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Ziņotājs 2004 (21): 162) 
75 In 2004 the basic salary of MP was 717 Lats, a head of Faction or Committee received 829 Lats and 
Vice-Speaker earned 1098 Lats. Source of information: Finance Department of the Latvijas Saeima. 
76 In 2003 a state secretary earned 992 Lats. The Cabinet regulation of 7 January 2003 stipulated that 
state secretaries, as well as cabinet ministers, would not receive extra payment in addition to their 
salary (Karnite 2004). 
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pay for office needs every month, travel money and, if an MP does not live in the 
capital city, a room in the hotel or an apartment for his/her family. 
 Since 2004, Lithuanian legislators are not paid for teaching and lecturing; since 
2003 they are not allowed to combine a position of an MP with a seat in local council. 
Positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet Minister, according to the Article 60 of the 
Lithuanian Constitution, do not forbid and prevent from serving as an MP. Combining 
positions of an MP and Cabinet Minister turned into a common political practice in 
Lithuania.   
 In Latvia, on the contrary, it has become a normal political practice for MPs – if 
they get appointed to the posts in the Cabinet or become state ministers – to suspend 
their Saeima mandates and, after resigning as a member of the cabinet or a state 
minister, to renew his/her parliamentary mandate and come back to the Saeima. 
However, neither Parliamentary Rules of Procedure (Article 5.1), nor the Anti-
Corruption Law (Article 19.1) prevent from combining the office of a member of 
parliament with the duties of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Cabinet 
Minister, State Minister or Parliamentary Secretary. The restriction here is a financial 
one: an MP is allowed to be remunerated for one office only. 
 In Estonia, similarly as in Latvia, MPs suspend their parliamentary authority if 
they become cabinet ministers and renew their Riigikogu mandates upon resignation 
from the cabinet. As prescribed in the Status of Member of Riigikogu Act (§ 5), the 
same procedure applies in case an MP (President of the Riigikogu) performs the 
duties of the President of Estonia. Member of Riigikogu is prohibited from holding 
any other office, be it public or civil service, municipality (mayor or a member of 





   
5. Occupational Background as a Link between Society and Parliament 
 
5.1. Politics and Profession 
The connection between politics and occupation is a widely accepted and well 
documented tradition of research into political elites (Best 1990: 49). It raises a 
question which occupations are most relevant in entering the political elite and asks – 
especially in the case of legislature – how representative (how similar or how different 
from the rest of society) the parliamentary elite is. Secondly, this research tradition 
also allows to focus on politics as occupation itself, it asks to what extent politics is a 
profession.    
 Although parliaments functioned well before the 20th century, politics itself as a 
full-time paid occupation turned out to be a very new phenomenon – the members of 
the 18th and the 19th century parliaments consisted of part-time and un-paid 
legislators. To use the conceptual vocabulary of Max Weber, the legislators of the 18th 
and the 19th century lived for politics, not off politics. The Weberian contrast is not 
exclusive, it is possible to live both off and for politics, however, a professional 
politician, in comparison with someone living full-time or part-time for politics77, 
makes politics a permanent source of income (Weber 1988: 513).   
 In spite of turning into a full-time paid occupation, politics remains a special case 
in comparison with other occupations. Professionalisation means not only 
development from honorary position to a full-time paid occupation, but also the 
qualifying process during which a layman turns into a professional (Borchert 2003a: 
149)78. The typical profession assumes education and training which ends up with a 
qualifying certificate (and license) permitting entrance into a certain occupation, 
however, this is not a case with politics. The university degree in political science 
does not make you automatically enter a parliament or any other group of professional 
politicians. A criterion of non-manual, full-time paid occupation is not sufficient 
condition to qualify politics as a profession. A profession also means a (1) specialised, 
systematic and scholarly training, (2) control of entry to the occupation through 
examinations, diplomas and titles, (3) monopoly for expert services in the labor 
77 Living exclusively for politics may sound more idealistic than living off politics, however, living for 
politics may simply refer to plutocratic recruitment – a government of those who have property and are 
rich. 
78 Political professionalisation includes three structural preconditions: “(1) a reliable source of income 
in politics, (2) a realistic chance of maintaining a job in politics or moving on to something more 
attractive and (3) a chance of a career, that is, of moving further up the ladder” (Borchert 2003b: 7-8). 
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market and (4) autonomy or freedom of control by the state, lay persons and other 
outsiders (Burrage, Jarausch and Siegrist 1990: 205). Due to insecurity, missing 
qualifying requirements and clear-cut structure of career advancement, politics is not 
a profession but a precare occupation (Best and Jahr 2006: 79). Politics in the 20th 
century did become more professional in comparison with the 19th century, however, 
it did not turn into a profession.79 Full professionalisation of politics (politics as 
profession) is not possible due to the logic of conflicting processes of 
professionalisation (bureaucratisation) and democratisation. On the one hand, in the 
20th century politics became a full-time paid vocation as a consequence of spread 
democratisation (democratised polities) and increased bureaucratisation; on the other 
hand, precisely this democratisation does not allow to upgrade politics to a fully-
fledged profession (otherwise it would turn into some kind of civil service without 
electoral democracy).   
 The route to parliament and professional politics goes through a variety of 
occupations and some of them are more suited for politics than others. The historical 
analysis of Max Weber lists seven strata as recruitment pools for professional 
politicians: clergy, humanistically educated literati, court nobility, gentry, the 
university trained lawyers, journalists and political party officials (Weber 1988: 521-
528). Not all of these occupational categories are of equal significance for all 
countries and all parliamentary periods, however, many of them are important sources 
of current parliamentary recruitment. There seem to be at least four criteria in 
explaining why some occupations are better suited for politics, namely (1) expenses, 
(2) time, (3) insecurity, and (4) skills of communication80: 
 
“In the first place, the expenses involved in seeking elective office are so high and the rewards so small 
that only those financially capable can afford the necessary sacrifices. Second, the amount of time 
required for holding public office, even if it does not mean full-time service, is so great that only 
occupationally “expendable” persons may be available for political recruitment. Third, the insecurity 
accompanying elective office is so high that only those who can readily return to their private 
occupations will venture into politics. Finally, the politician’s role, in the electoral process as well as in 
79 In general, professions are a minority among occupations: “Perhaps no more than thirty or forty 
occupations are fully professionalized” (Wilensky 1964: 141). Secondly, the term ‘profession’ 
primarily refers to the development of occupations in the Anglo-American world: “Not a single 
continental [European] language either before or after the Second World War developed indigenously a 
term synonymous with or generally equivalent to the English term ‘profession’”(Sciulli 2005: 915). 
80 Gordon Black (1970) singles out a skill at bargaining as a crucial condition for a professional 
politician. 
 64 
                                                 
  
   
elective office, calls for considerable communicative skills which, in part at least, can only be acquired 
in the course of preparation for and practice in a private occupation.” (Eulau and Koff 1962: 507)  
 
If we replace humanistically educated literati and court nobility with professors 
(teachers) and civil servants, a modified Weberian list of occupations would be the 
following: lawyers, journalists, political party officials, professors (teachers), civil 
servants and clergy81. Since we see an occupational representation in parliament as a 
delayed mirror of historical development in a society, we would add 
businesspersons/managers, medical doctors (under other liberal professions) and blue 
collar workers, although Weber (1988: 514) was not willing to recommend them due 
to indispensability of these occupations. Military, agriculture and judges/prosecutors 
as recruitment pools for legislators could be included as well (see Herzog 1975; Best 
and Cotta 2000).  
 The above explanation of occupational suitability for politics by Eulau and Koff 
(1962) points to the distinction between private and public, therefore, we see it 
meaningful to differentiate all our occupations according to this criterium by adding 
the public sector variable. 
 
 
5.2. Occupational Profile of Legislators in Baltic Countries 
The most trusted occupational groups in Europe and the USA are medical doctors and 
teachers; in a declining sequence, they are followed by military officers, policemen, 
priests, lawyers, journalists and managers. Politicians end this continuum with the 
lowest amount of trust (see Kaina 2008: 407)82. Therefore, we should not be surprised  
to see a downgrade in status of the representatives of most trusted occupations – 
medical doctors or teachers - in case they enter a legislature. 
 What are the most common occupational groups among Baltic legislators? The 
occupational data show (see table 5.2) that civil servants in Estonian parliaments and  
businessmen and managers in the Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures take the largest 
81 Paul Cairney (2007: 214) lists lawyers, professors (teachers), journalists and political party officials 
as ‘politics-facilitating occupations’ and divides them into brokerage (the first two) and instrumental 
(the last two) occupations. 
82 The survey sample included twelve Western European and six Central and Eastern European 
countries (the Baltic States were not included). In many respects the support for occupational groups in 
both WE and CEE countries was similar, except for the much lower trust in policemen among CEE 
countries: 49 per cent against 73 per cent for WE countries (see Kaina 2008: 407).    
 65 
                                                 
  
   
 Table 5.2. Occupational Profile of Baltic Legislators (in per cent)* 
 
Latvian MPs as… 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 Mean 
Teachers, Professors 24.9 23.0 19.0 12.0 16.0 12.0 17.0 17.7 
Journalists, Writers 7.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.6 
Party Employees 13.9 15.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 9.0 11.0 11.7 
Civil Servants 10.9 21.0 13.0 20.0 13.0 27.0 22.0 18.1 
Military  3.0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0 0.9 
Clergy 0.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 0 1.1 
Lawyers 3.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 2.6 
Judges, Prosecutors 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Agriculture, Fishing 0.5 3.0 6.0 3.0 2.0 0 0 2.1 
Blue Collar Workers 2.0 0 1.0 0 1.0 0 0 0.6 
Managers, Business 20.4 17.0 23.0 24.0 25.0 24.0 29.0 23.2 
Liberal Professions  11.4 6.0 11.0 10.0 11.0 13.0 8.0 10.1 
Other 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 0 0 1.0 
Public Sector 88.1 68.0 61.0 60.0 51.0 58.0 54.0 62.9 
 
Lithuanian MPs as… 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Mean 
Teachers, Professors 34.6 35.5 25.5 16.3 13.5 14.2 17.3 22.4 
Journalists, Writers 9.8 8.5 6.6 4.3 2.8 3.5 2.9 5.5 
Party Employees 12.0 16.3 16.8 9.9 14.9 15.6 18.0 14.8 
Civil Servants 3.8 7.8 22.6 17.0 19.1 20.6 20.1 15.9 
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clergy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.1 
Lawyers 4.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.7 2.1 1.4 1.9 
Judges, Prosecutors 3.0 1.4 2.2 0 1.4 1.4 0.7 1.4 
Agriculture, Fishing 0.8 0.7 0 0 0 1.4 0.7 0.5 
Blue Collar Workers 2.3 2.8 2.2 0 0 0.7 0 1.1 
Managers, Business 15.0 17.0 8.0 41.1 36.2 25.5 28.1 24.4 
Liberal Professions 14.3 8.5 14.6 9.2 11.3 14.9 8.6 11.6 
Other 0 0 0 0.7 0 0 1.4 0.3 
Public Sector 90.2 90.1 83.2 53.9 58.9 58.9 59.7 70.7 
* All occupations except for public sector add up to 100 per cent.  Source: Own data and calculations.
Estonian MPs as… 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 Mean 
Teachers, Professors 14.3 16.8 18.8 21.8 13.9 12.9 7.9 15.2 
Journalists, Writers 7.6 14.9 7.9 6.9 5.9 5.9 5.0 7.7 
Party Employees 16.2 8.9 8.9 15.8 11.9 18.8 16.8 13.9 
Civil Servants 13.3 20.8 25.7 25.7 36.6 33.7 43.6 28.5 
Military  4.8 1.0 0 0 0 1.0 0 1.0 
Clergy 1.9 5.0 2.0 1.0 0 0 0 1.4 
Lawyers 1.9 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.4 
Judges, Prosecutors 1.9 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
Agriculture, Fishing 7.6 3.0 4.0 3.0 0 0 0 2.5 
Blue Collar Workers 1.9 1.0 1.0 2.0 0 0 0 0.8 
Managers, Business 16.2 9.9 19.8 13.9 20.8 15.8 15.8 16.0 
Liberal Professions 10.9 9.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 3.0 2.0 6.2 
Other 0 2.1 3.0 0 0 0 1.0 0.9 
Public Sector 95.2 70.3 78.2 74.3 80.2 69.3 65.3 76.1 
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share among occupations on average. The businessmen and managers in Estonian 
Riigikogu, civil servants in the Latvian Saeima and teachers and professors in the 
Lithuanian Seimas come second. The political party employees comprise from 11.7 to 
14.8 per cent on average.  Liberal professions (law is not included) range from 6.2 per 
cent in Estonian parliaments to 11.6 per cent in Lithuanian legislatures. The 
proportion of journalists and writers in the Baltic parliaments fluctuates between 5.5 
to 7.7 per cent on average. 
 From 1990 onwards military, clerical and agricultural occupations and 
occupations of a blue-collar worker and of a judge/prosecutor do not reach 3 per cent 
on average and play no role in the Baltic parliaments83, therefore, they will not be 
included in our further comprehensive analysis. The lawyers in Baltic legislatures so 
far never exceeded 2.6 per cent on average, however, we will make an exception for 
them due to the historical importance and current prominence of lawyers in the 
parliaments of western democracies; in order to increase the number of cases we will 




5.2.1. Teachers and Professors 
Inspite of some fluctuations, there was an overall increase of teachers and professors 
in Western European parliaments of the twentieth century, especially from 1970 to 
1989 when the proportion jumped from roughly eleven to eighteen percent (Cotta and 
Almeida 2007: 60). In the post-war Eastern Europe where parliaments were merely 
façade institutions, Konrád and Szelényi (1979) also saw the rise of intellectuals as a 
new power in the mature epoch of socialism after Brezhnevism and later emphasised 
the dominant position of intelligentsia in the post-Communist period (Konrad and 
Szelenyi 1991: 356).    
 The first post-Communist Latvian and especially Lithuanian parliaments (in the 
latter at least every third MP was a teacher or professor) showed a clear dominance of 
teachers and professors over other occupational groups. However, later – after the 
second parliamentary elections in Latvia and Lithuania and the fourth election in 
Estonia – the proportions of teachers and professors started to decline with every new 
83 Military occupation is even absent in the Lithuanian parliaments. The highest percentages of military 
in the 1990 legislatures of Estonia and Latvia are the last remnants of the Soviet authoritarian regime. 
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legislative term (see annex tables 5.2.1.1 to 5.2.1.3). This decrease could be 
interpreted as an outcome of the changing demands of the different stages of post-
communist transformation. The initial phase of radical change in Eastern Europe is 
characterised by symbolic politics and dominance of visionaries and politicians of 
morals (Wasilewski 2001: 137). Teachers and professors are best suited for this stage 
of political development, intellectuals and artists “are the first to manifest public 
opposition to authoritarian rule” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1993: 49). Similar to 
Central Europe where in 1989 “intellectuals were at the forefront of the democratic 
transition” (Bozóki 1999: 5), intellectuals of the Baltic Republics played a major role 
by initiating social movements, proposing political programs and establishing political 
parties. One of the most prominent Baltic political figures in that transitional period 
was Vytautas Landsbergis, professor in musicology; he was the chairman of the 
Lithuanian parliament and head of the state, under leadership of whom Lithuania was 
the first of the Baltic Republics to proclaim its independence from the Soviet Union84. 
 What patterns of recruitment do we observe among teachers and professors in the 
Baltic parliaments? The data on the political party families indicate that Left Liberals 
dominate among Estonian teachers, Conservatives lead among Latvian teachers and 
Socialists/Social Democrats prevail among Lithuanian teachers. 
 Teachers (professors) in the Baltic parliaments have very high educational 
credentials, 100 per cent of them85 hold university or comparable degrees. Dominance 
of humanities and social sciences over natural and technical sciences on average is a 
typical feature of education among teachers (professors) in all Baltic parliaments.  
 Teachers and professors in Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from 
their Latvian and Lithuanian colleagues in the highest proportions of women (17.6 per 
cent) and parliamentary incumbents (51.6 per cent), the largest shares of experience in 
local politics (46.3 per cent), leading a political party (33.3 per cent) and cabinet of 
ministers (7.4 per cent). They also comprise the highest percentages of those in local 
Soviets (10.2 per cent), nomenklatura (29.6 per cent) and CPSU (41.7 per cent). 
 Teachers (professors) in Latvian parliaments stand out with the highest 
percentage (22.1 per cent) of ethnic minorities, the lowest proportion of MPs coming 
from the public sector (90.6 per cent) and the lowest percentage of those in leading 
party positions (14.8 per cent). They distinguish themselves also with the highest 
84 Independence of the Republic of Lithuania was proclaimed on 11 March 1990. 
85 Except for parliamentarians in Latvia where 97 per cent of them hold university degrees. 
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percentages of those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the 
families which members have been murdered by the Soviet regime (9.4 per cent) and 
the lowest proportion of former dissidents (2 per cent). With the lowest proportion of 
incumbents (44.4 per cent) and long-standing parliamentarians (MPs serving at least 
three legislative terms), teachers and professors in Latvian parliaments seem to have 
the worst opportunities for parliamentary careers (1.4 mandates on average).  
 Teachers (professors) in the Lithuanian parliaments distinguish themselves with 
the largest proportion of MPs coming from public sector (100 per cent), the lowest 
percentage of ethnic minorities (8.3 per cent), the lowest experience in local politics 
(12 per cent), absence of cabinet ministers and the highest proportion of long-standing 
parliamentarians (38.8 per cent). They stand out also with the lowest percentage of 
those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which 
members have been murdered by the Soviet regime (6 per cent) and the highest 
proportion of former dissidents (5.5 per cent) 
 Teachers and professors in the Baltic parliaments, from 15.2 per cent in Estonia 
to 22.4 per cent in Lithuania on average, are comparable with the Western European 
parliaments not only in the size of proportions86 but also in terms of declining trends 
after 1990. Declining trends in the Baltic States, as well as entire Eastern Europe (see 
Edinger 2010: 134), are attributed to the post-Communist transformation and its 
different tasks in different stages. The changes in the Western European parliamentary 
representation are not qualified as post-Communist transformation but we do not 
exclude a possibility to see a decline of teachers and professors in parliaments of 
Western Europe as a political elite transformation following the Eastern European 
track. This would imply a thesis of convergence in parliamentary recruitment: not 
only Eastern Europe follows Western Europe, but also Western Europe follows 
Eastern Europe.    
 
 
5.2.2. Journalists and Writers 
Similarly as teachers and professors, journalists and writers are a potential recruitment 
pool for visionaries and politicians of morals. Lennart Meri, Minister of Foreign 
86 Lithuania is especially comparable with France having almost 30 per cent of teachers and professors 
in the period between 1980 and 1989 and Denmark with almost 25 per cent between 1990-1999 (see 
Cotta and Almeida 2007: 66). 
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Affairs 1990-1992 and President of Estonia 1992-2001, and Dainis Īvāns, Chairman 
of the Latvian Popular Front 1988-1993 and the head Vice-Speaker of the Latvian 
Supreme Concil 1990-1992, are the most prominent Baltic political figures of that 
time having occupational background in writing and journalism.  
 The proportion of journalists and writers in the Baltic parliaments varies from 5.5 
per cent in Lithuania to 7.7 per cent in Estonia. Latvia, having an average of 6.6 per 
cent, seems to have the most stable share of journalists and writers from parliament to 
parliament. Nevertheless, the Latvian Saeima, as well as other two Baltic legislatures, 
discloses a continuous decline in percentage of journalists and writers in comparison 
with the first post-Communist parliaments (see annex tables 5.2.2.1 to 5.2.2.3). 
Similarly as in the case of teachers and professors, this decline could be explained by 
the changing stages and their tasks of post-Communist transformation; the first stage 
of post-Communist transformation is followed by the second one, one type of 
politicians is replaced by another one. 
 Our data show that the Left Liberals occupy the largest proportion among 
journalists and writers in Estonian parliaments. Comparable positions in Latvian and 
Lithuanian legislatures are taken by Conservatives and Socialists/Social Democrats 
respectively. 
 Journalists and writers in the Baltic parliaments have lower educational 
credentials, their percentage with university or comparable degrees ranges from 83.7 
per cent in the Lithuanian Saeima to 90.7 per cent in the Latvian Saeima. Dominance 
of humanities and social sciences over natural and technical sciences is a typical 
feature of education among journalists (writers) in all Baltic parliaments. Prevalence 
of humanities and social sciences was also observed among teachers (professors), 
however, the journalists’ share of humanities and social sciences is 3.4 to 5 times 
larger than the one in technical and natural sciences. This could be explained by the 
‘nature’ of a journalistic profession which requires more an advanced manipulation of 
words and symbols rather than a proficiency in calculating figures and usage of 
formuli.  
 Absence of cabinet experience87 and of experience in the Soviet councils of 
ministers, low percentages of those coming from public sector (from 49.1 per cent in 
87 The only exception is made by the Lithuanian journalists (writers) – 1.9 per cent of them were 
members of cabinet of ministers before getting elected into parliament. 
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Lithuania to 63 per cent of MPs with journalistic background in Latvia) are other 
features of journalists (writers) in the Baltic parliaments. 
 The journalists from Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their 
Baltic counterparts in the highest percentages of doctoral degrees (9.1 per cent), local 
elective (41.8 per cent) and leading party (25.5 per cent) experience. Estonian 
journalists distinguish themselves in the largest share of pre-parliamentary political 
experience - a half of them held political posts before getting elected to legislature for 
the first time, whereas only 22.2 and 26.4 per cent of their Latvian and Lithuanian 
colleagues respectively did so. One third of Estonian journalists where involved in the 
Citizens’ Committees in the period of struggle from independence from the USSR, 
this is a sharp contrast in comparison with Latvia in which parliaments none of the 
journalists were members of a similar organisation. Journalists and writers in Estonian 
parliaments have also the largest percentages of dissidents (12.7 per cent) and those 
whose parents experienced political repressions from Soviet authorities (7.3 per cent).  
 The journalists from Latvian parliaments stand out from their Baltic colleagues 
with the highest percentages of women (24.1 per cent) and ethnic minorities (22.2 per 
cent). The smallest proportion of parliamentary newcomers (61.1 per cent) and the 
largest proportion of incumbents (48.7 per cent), the largest percentages of long-
standing MPs (serving at least three terms) and the highest mean number (1.7) of 
mandates are indicators that Latvian MPs with journalistic background are the most 
experienced in parliamentary affairs in comparison with their Estonian and Lithuanian 
counterparts. However, the Latvian MPs are least experienced in pre-parliamentary 
politics – almost four-fifths (77.8 per cent) of them had not been part of local 
councils, political party board or cabinet of ministers before getting elected to the 
Saeima. Absence of former dissidents is another characteristic of journalists and 
writers in Latvian parliaments. 
 The characteristics of journalists from Lithuanian parliaments are the largest 
percentage of experienced founders (25 per cent) and the largest proportions of Soviet 
experience compared to other Baltic counterparts: 9.4 per cent of them in the local 
Soviets, 13.2 per cent in leading the Communist Party, 34 per cent in nomenklatura 
and even 50.9 per cent membership in the Communist Party of Soviet Lithuania are 
typical features of journalists from Lithuanian legislatures. Explanation for this is that 
Lithuanians were in general more numerous and active in the Soviet republican 
political structures in comparison with their Baltic neighbours.  
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5.2.3. Political Party Employees 
A rise of political party employees observed in the Western European parliaments 
after the Second World War (Cotta and Best 2000: 502) was absent in the Baltic 
countries. The full political party developments from cadre or elite party through the 
stages of mass and, later on, catch-all party to the cartel party described by Katz and 
Mair (1995) were missing either. 
 Employment in the political party in the Baltic Republics or a career of party 
politician was for almost half a century reserved exclusively for those involved in the 
structures of the Soviet Communist Party.  The 1990 parliamentary elections and 
regained state independence in 1991 opened new opportunities for multi-party 
systems and careers of party politicians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Employees 
of newly established and re-established political parties started to enter the Baltic 
parliaments; their proportion among legislators in the post-Communist period varies 
from 11.7 per cent in Latvia to 14.8 per cent in Lithuania which is close to the Eastern 
European average (see Edinger 2010: 134).  
 The data on party employees in the Baltic parliaments reveal cross-country 
differences with regard to political party families. The largest proportion of party 
employees in Estonian parliaments is found among Left Liberals; the highest 
percentages of political party employees are observed among Conservatives in 
Latvian parliaments and Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuanian parliaments. 
 A common feature of party employees in the Baltic parliaments is a relatively 
low percentage of university degrees (about 88 per cent on average) and absence of 
pre-parliamentary cabinet experience88.  
 Party employees in the Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their 
Baltic counterparts with the highest proportion of degrees in humanities and social 
sciences (52.4 per cent on average), the highest percentage of women (22.2 per cent) 
and rich pre-parliamentary political experience: more than a half (57.6 per cent) of 
party employees in Estonian parliaments held local elective position, more than a 
third (36.4 per cent) held two political offices before entering legislature. However, 
they have least parliamentary experience compared to their Baltic colleagues: the 
highest percentage of parliamentary newcomers (64.6 per cent) and the lowest 
percentage of parliamentary incumbents (34.1 per cent), lowest proportions of 
88 The exeptions are the 1995 and the 2010 Latvian Saeima and the 2012 Lithuanian Seimas having one 
party employee with experience as a cabinet minister. 
 72 
                                                 
     
longstanding legislators and absence of experienced founders, the shortest legislative 
tenure (1.5 years) and the smallest age difference between all MPs and newcomers 
indicate that party employees in Estonian parliaments had the worst chances to 
continue parliamentary careers. 
 Party employees in Latvian parliaments stand out with the highest percentages of 
degrees in law (13.2 per cent) and in technical and natural sciences (72.4 per cent), the 
highest proportion of ethnic minorities (18.8 per cent) and the lowest percentage of 
public sector employees (27.1 per cent). The highest proportions of experienced 
founders (20.6 per cent) and longstanding MPs (34 per cent) show that party 
employees in Latvian parliaments had more favourable conditions for parliamentary 
careers compared to their Baltic colleagues. Party employees in Latvian parliaments 
distinguish themselves not only with the highest share of the Soviet Communist Party 
members (one-third) but also with highest proportions of dissidents (11.5 per cent) 
and those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which 
members have been murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime.  
 Party employees in Lithuanian parliaments distinguish themselves with the 
highest percentage of doctorates (17.2 per cent). Although they have the highest 
percentage of those who held leading party positions (50 per cent), in general party 
employees in Lithuanian parliaments have less pre-parliamentary political experience 
than their Baltic colleagues (one quarter came to parliament without any political 
experience, 61.1 per cent held one political office before getting elected to 
legislature). With the lowest percentage of parliamentary newcomers (53.5 per cent), 
the highest share of incumbents (46.9 per cent) and the longest tenure (1.9 terms on 
average), party employees in Lithuanian parliaments have very good opportunities for 
legislative careers. The highest percentages of local soviets’ members (20.8 per cent 
on average), Soviet Communist party leaders (23.6 per cent) and representatives of 
nomenklatura (29.9 per cent) show that party employees were involved more in these 
Soviet structures than their Baltic counterparts. 
 The rising proportions of party employees in the last Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian parliaments (see annex tables 5.2.3.1 to 5.2.3.3) conform to the general 
trends of rising percentages of party politicians in legislatures of both Eastern (see 
Edinger 2010: 134) and Western Europe (see Fiers and Secker 2007: 144). There is no 
upper benchmark of party employees recommended for parliaments of democratic 
polities, however, one should not forget that the highest percentage in the 
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parliamentary history ever was observed in the Weimar Germany before Nazi 
takeover (see Cotta and Best 2000: 502)89.  
 
 
5.2.4. Civil Servants 
Democracy theorists often see a legislature as an institution capable to counterbalance 
the power of the executive or bureaucracy. To employ a more historical perspective, 
“the elected parliaments were introduced in Europe for the fundamental purpose of 
cheking and controlling the absolutist (or semi-absolutist) monarchies which in the 
previous period had greatly expanded their powers thanks to the development of the 
large and pervasive bureaucracies of the modern state” (Cotta and Almeida 2007: 51). 
Therefore, absence of civil servants would be an expected finding in the parliaments 
of democratic polities. However, in reality this is not the case; in many European 
countries civil servants are an important source for legislative recruitment (see Best 
and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007). The Baltic parliaments are no exeption of this; 
in the Latvian Saeima and the Lithuanian Seimas civil servants comprise 18.1 and 
15.9 per cent of all MPs respectively. In Estonia even more than an every fourth 
legislator has an occupational background in civil service (see annex tables 5.2.4.1 to 
5.2.4.3).  
 Estonia clearly leads in high numbers of civil servants in parliaments not only 
among Eastern European90 but also among Western European democracies. The only 
Western European democracy close to Estonia in terms of legislative recruitment of 
civil servants is Finnland, having almost 30 per cent of civil servants in its 
parliaments on average between 1987 and 1997 (see Ruostetsaari 2000: 66). It is 
possible to explain the large number of civil servants in  Estonian parliaments by a 
geographical and linguistic proximity of Finland, interprete it as an indication of 
executive dominance over a legislature or a sign of the strong intervening state - a 
large number of civil servants among parliamentary representatives is seen as a 
consequence of “the developent of large-scale interventions of the state in the 
economy, the ever broader welfare policies and the great expansion of state 
89 In Germany “one in three MPs had previously been employed through his party at the first elections 
of the the Weimar Republic in 1919. This share reached a peak of 40 per cent at the 1932 elections” 
(Fiers and Secker 2007: 143). 
90 Slovenia is the only post-Communist country which could overcome Estonia: “Since the mid-1990s 
in Slovenia, or example, the majority of MPs have had backgrounds in higher administration” (Edinger 
2010: 135). 
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bureaucracies after the Second World War” (Cotta and Almeida 2007: 56). The 20th  
century trends with “the growing state apparatus, increasingly led by technically 
trained, professional career administrators” (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981: 
1) fully confirmed the prophecy of the emerging modern bureaucracy proclaimed by 
Max Weber in 1918 (Weber 1988: 320-321). The inescapable part of the prophecy or 
the side-effect of the emerging modern bureaucracy in the 20th century was the arrival 
of professional politicians. Max Weber differentiated between bureaucrats and 
politicians not in terms of constitutional separation of powers (executive vs. 
legislature) but rather in terms of two different logics of responsibility: impartiality 
vs. passion (Weber 1988: 524-525). Being concerned about the consequences of 
domination by civil servants over the weak Reichstag in imperial Germany, Weber 
was in favour of strengthening a parliament. In a parliament he saw a training ground 
for politicians with the capacity for leadership and an institution capable to control the 
administrative apparat (Beetham 1992: 113).  
 Inspired by the Weberian analytical distinction, Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 
(1981) proposed four types of possible relations between civil servants and 
parliamentary politicians. 
 
1. “Policy versus Administration:  
Politicians make policy; civil servants administer. Politicians make decisions; bureaucrats merely 
implement them.” 
2. “Facts versus Interests: 
Both politicians and civil servants participate in making policy. Civil servants bring facts and 
knowledge; politicians, interests and values.” 
3. “Energy versus Equilibrium: 
Both bureaucrats and politicians engage in policymaking, and both are concerned with politics. 
Whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, bureaucrats mediate 
narrow, focused interests of organized clienteles. Politicians are passionate, partisan, idealistic, even 
ideological; bureaucrats are, by contrast, prudent, centrist, practical, pragmatic.” 
4. “Pure Hybrid.” (Aberbach et al 1981: 4, 6, 9, 16) 
 
The first type (Weberian distinction) separates civil servants and parliamentary 
politicians completely; the fourth type indicates an absence of differences between 
bureaucrats and politicians. The types 2 and 3 indicate some overlap or increasing 
convergence of bureaucracy and politics. 
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 The Estonian and Latvian rules of parliamentary incompatibility favor the first 
type of relationship - Latvian and Estonian MPs give up their parliamentary mandates 
in case they take up posts of cabinet ministers. Lithuanian parliaments, on the 
contrary, opt for the hybrid relationship – there legislators combine their 
parliamentary offices with the positions of cabinet ministers. However, if we look at 
the large proportions of civil servants in the Baltic parliaments, the second and third 
types of relations between civil servants and politicians seem to be more 
corresponding to reality. In support of this, one should also bear in mind that the 
government with its ministries (not parliament) is the largest law initiator in the law-
making process. 
 If we look at careers and recruitment patterns of civil servants in Baltic 
parliaments, our data disclose some similarities and many differencies among 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legislators.  
 In terms of political party families, the Left Liberals dominate among Estonian 
civil servants and Conservatives prevail among Latvian and Lithuanian civil servants. 
 The university education of civil servants varies from 95.5 per cent in Lithuanian 
parliaments to 100 per cent in Latvian legislatures. Estonian and Latvian parliaments 
show a dominance of technical and natural sciences over humanities and social 
sciences among civil servants, however, if the election results in the 2007 and 2011 
Riigikogu and the 2008 and 2012 Seimas will turn into stable trends, the Estonian and 
Lithuanian developments may follow the Latvian track which is described by the 
prevalence of humanities and social sciences among legislators with background in 
civil service. All Baltic legislators with experience as civil servants come from the 
public sector, and that is not surprising since civil service is by definition a public 
service. 
 Civil servants in Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their Baltic 
colleagues with the highest proportion of doctorates (20.3 per cent of those with 
university degrees), highest percentages of those having local elective experience 
(66.8 per cent) and those who held two political offices before the first time getting 
elected to parliament (33.2 per cent) and, at the same time, with the lowest 
proportions of women (16.8 per cent) and ethnic minorities (4 per cent). The civil 
servants in Estonian parliaments have better opportunities for parliamentary careers 
by being more experienced in the following dimensions compared to their Latvian and 
Lithuanian counterparts: the lowest proportion of parliamentary newcomers and the 
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highest percentage of incumbents, the highest percentages of experienced founders 
and longstanding MPs (serving at least three legislative terms), the highest mean 
number of successful elections and the largest difference in age between all civil 
servants and newcomers. Civil servants in Estonian parliaments have also the highest 
percentages of former members of the Soviet Communist party. 
 Civil servants in Latvian parliaments stand out with the highest percentage of 
those holding degrees in law (17.4 per cent) and in humanities and social sciences 
(52.9 per cent) compared to their Estonian and Latvian counterparts. Civil servants in 
Latvian parliaments have the lowest proportion of doctorates (10.1 per cent), although 
they have more MPs with university degrees (100 per cent) than their Baltic 
colleagues. Civil servants in Latvian legislatures have the highest proportion of 
former cabinet ministers and ethnic minorities out of all Baltic parliaments, however, 
they have the worst opportunities for parliamentary careers since they have the 
highest percentage of newcomers and the lowest share of incumbents among all Baltic 
legislators with experience in civil service. The highest percentages of those with 
experience in council of ministers (8.7 per cent), Supreme Soviet (11.6 per cent) and 
national nomenklatura (29.7 per cent) show that civil servants from Latvian 
parliaments have more continuity with the Soviet past compared to their counterparts 
from other Baltic parliaments. 
 Civil servants in the Lithuanian legislatures distinguish themselves from their 
counterparts in other Baltic parliaments by the highest proportion of technical and 
natural sciences (52 per cent), the highest percentage of MPs entering parliament 
without any political experience (29.7 per cent) and the highest share of women (28.4 
per cent). A higher proportion of former members of the local soviets is an additional 
feature of civil servants in the Lithuanian parliaments.   
 
 
5.2.5. Managers and Businessmen 
Although Max Weber (1988: 514) and Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) did not consider 
businessmen (especially large-scale entrepreneurs) suitable for a full-time legislative 
activity, they are present and visible in many European and non-European 
parliaments. 
 Out of the three Baltic countries Latvia earned a reputation of having the 
strongest impact of so called ‘oligarchs’ on national politics (The Baltic Times 2010; 
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Baltic News Service 2011), however, it is Lithuania, not Latvia which has the highest 
proportion of businessmen and managers in parliaments (24.4 per cent compared to 
23.2 percent on average). If we take separate legislatures, we find that Lithuania in the 
parliaments of 2000 and 2004 – there businessmen comprised 41.1 and 36.2 per cent 
of all legislators accordingly - had already achieved the levels of businessmen 
representation in the Ukrainian and Russian parliaments where 30 to 40 per cent of all 
deputies are businessmen and managers (Semenova 2008: 40; Semenova 2012: 548).  
 The notion of the term ‘oligarchy’ in the public discourse of the Baltic countries 
has little to do with the concept of Robert Michels (1966) referring to the 
bureaucratisation of the political parties or four kinds of oligarchy by Aristotle (1995: 
83) for whom oligarchy meant a debased form of aristocracy. Oligarchy in the Baltics 
is understood rather as a political system serving the richest persons in the country; 
oligarchs are considered not simply large-scale entrepreneurs, but the large-scale 
entrepreneurs who mix business with politics. In other words, they combine their 
business activity with political positions in parliament and cabinet of ministers. The 
rules of incombatibility do not allow Baltic MPs to combine business activity with the 
office of parliamentary representative, however, a numerous presence of businessmen 
in the Latvian Saeima and Lithuanian Seimas raise the suspicion that for them a 
parliamentary office means a continuation of their business activity with other 
(political) means. 
 The Latvian political system is often described as the oligarchy of “(AŠ)2+AL” 
where AŠ are initials for Andris Šķēle and Ainārs Šlesers and AL initials for Aivars 
Lembergs (Oborune 2011). Andris Šķēle, founder and leader of the People’s Party, 
three times Prime Minister of Latvia and three times elected to the national 
parliament, managed to privatise the largest and most successful enterprises of food 
industry. Ainārs Šlesers, chairman of the New Party and later on leader of the First 
Party, Minister of Transport (three times) and Minister of Economics, twice Deputy 
Prime-Minister and MP of Saeima four legislative terms, pursued his interests in 
transport business (Latvian railways, Riga free port and airport). Aivars Lembergs, 
mayor of Ventspils, former Ventspils district Soviet Communist Party secretary and 
Chairman of the Town Executive Committee, nominated by the Latvian Green Party 
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for the post of prime minister in 2006 and 201091; his main domains of activity are 
shipping and oil transit92. In 2010 Andris Šķēle, Ainārs Šlesers and some other 
Latvia’s leading businessmen run for the Latvian Saeima on the list of the political 
party “For a Good Latvia”, however, a couple of months after the parliamentary seats 
have been won they did not need a party anymore, started to split and explained that 
“it would be easier for them to accomplish their objectives on their own” (The Baltic 
Times 2011a). The fight against oligarchs and political corruption was on agenda of 
Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, President of Latvia 1999-2007, however, its culmination was 
achieved in 2011 when the Latvian President Valdis Zatlers dissolved the 2010 
Saeima93 and announced new parliamentary elections. 
 The warning about oligarchic tendencies in the Lithuanian political system was 
expressed by Valdas Adamkus, President of Lithuania 1998-2003 and 2004-2009, in 
his last state of the nation address (Adamkus 2009: 8) and indicated by some social 
scientists (Genzelis 2009: 134; Bielinis in Rašimaitė 2011: 7)  
 The candidates’ list of Lithuanian oligarchs is not as complete as in the case of 
Latvia but it would definitely include Viktor Uspaskich, the Russian born charismatic 
millionaire and member of the Lithuanian parliament from 2000 to 2005, from 2008 
to 2009 and from 2012 onwards. His populist Labour Party, founded in 2003, 
demonstrated a meteoric rise in the 2004 Lithuanian parliamentary elections (39 seats 
out of 141). Upon demand of coalition partners, he refused to candidate for the post of 
prime minister as the chairman of the single winning party and “modestly” agreed to 
become minister of economics. Officially accused of mixing private and public 
interests, in June 2005 he gave up the position of minister and mandate of MP. As in 
May 2006 the Labour Party was charged with illegal income and unpayed taxes by the 
state prosecutors, Viktor Uspaskich escaped to Russia and gave up the post of the 
party chairman94. After return from hide of almost 1.5 years in Moscow, in November 
2007 he regained the official position of party chairman, run successfully for a seat in 
91 He remained official candidate of the Green Party “even after he was subsequently arrested and 
charged with paying over five million lats in bribes to Latvian political parties and politicians in spring 
2007” (Galbreath and Auers 2009: 345). In 2011 the High Court of England ordered to freeze his assets 
in the value of 135 million US dollars (The Baltic Times 2011c). 
92 Interests in media market should be mentioned as well, “The Ventspils group controls two of the 
three major Latvian daily newspapers – Latvijas Avize and Neatkariga Rita Avize” (Galbreath and 
Auers 2009: 344).  
93 This was the President’s reaction to the refusal of Saeima to lift the immunity of  MP Ainārs Šlesers 
charged with corruption. 
94 He continued of course to give political orders to his party comrades in Lithuania from there (once 
the party board held even a meeting and press conference in Moscow). 
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the Lithuanian Parliament in 2008 and 2012 and was elected to the European 
Parliament in 2009.  
 Another person who mixes business with politics is Ramūnas Karbauskis, the 
chairman of the Peasants‘ Party 1997-2001 and the chairman of the Lithuanian 
Peasants People‘s Union95 since 2009. He was a member of the Lithuanian parliament 
from 1996 to 2004 and held a post of a deputy speaker of Seimas from 2000 to 2001. 
He is involved in the business of agriculture as the CEO of Agrokoncernas Ltd and its 
main shareholder. 
 The Lithuanian post-Soviet political system was influenced by Bronislovas 
Lubys, who was not only an MP (1990-1992), Deputy Prime Minister (1991-1992) 
and Prime Minister of Lithuania (1992-1993), but also the CEO and the main 
shareholder of fertilizers‘ factory Achema, president of one stevedoring company and 
the chairman of the Lithuanian Industrialists‘ Confederation. He did not lead any 
political party, but owned a daily newspaper, television and many radio stations 
(Eigirdas 2011: 19). 
 The culmination of oligarchic tendencies in Lithuania was the LEO LT 
(Lithuanian Electricity Organisation) project proposed in 2007 by the leading 
Lithuanian businessmen96 and the Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas; it officially 
aimed at the creation of a ‘national investor’ for the new nuclear power plant97. 
Although the project lacked transparency98 and was an obvious attempt to monopolise 
the energy market, in 2008 the Lithuanian parliament approved the agreement 
negotiated between the Government and NDX Energija99. With the time and more 
information available, the real intentions of this project became suspicious in the eyes 
of the society and resulted into petitions and protests. In 2009 the newly elected 
Lithuanian Seimas voted to liquidate the LEO LT.   
 Estonia does have large-scale enterepreneurs like Vjatcheslav Leedo and Nikolai 
Ossipenko (The Baltic Times 2011b) but they abstain from direct involvement in 
95 Original name in Lithuanian: Lietuvos valstiečių liaudininkų sąjunga.  
96 The privately owned company NDX Energija, part of the VP Market Group. Four out of eight richest 
persons in Lithuania in 2011 were the owners of the VP Market Group (Rašimaitė 2011: 7).  
97 The only nuclear power plant in Lithuania (in Ignalina) was to be closed in 2009 as a condition in the 
accession treaty between the EU and Lithuania. 
98 NDX Energija was selected without public competition, Seimas violated the rule of procedure (§3 of 
the chapter 67). 
99 The law was also signed, not vetoed by President Adamkus who warned about oligarchic trends in 
Lithuanian politics. 
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politics (they are not members of parliament or cabinet of ministers100). Absence of 
oligarchs in Estonia explained by the fact that “most of Estonia’s larger enterprises 
were acquired by foreigners, which did not allow local businessmen to amass assets” 
(The Baltic Times 2011b). Privatisation in Estonia was handled at a much higher 
speed compared to Latvia and Lithuania, this prevented from monopoly of local 
businessmen. 
 Our data on the Baltic MPs indicate that Left Liberals are the largest party family 
among managers and businessmen in the Estonian Riigikogu; a similar role is taken 
by Conservatives in the Latvian Saeima and Socialists/Social Democrats in the 
Lithuanian Seimas. There is no surprise to find the largest shares of liberals and 
conservatives among businessmen, however, the dominance of social democrats101 
requires an additional explanation. The Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuanian 
parliaments are to a large extent former Communists who preserved old social 
networks and took advantage of privatisation; in other words, they managed to 
transfer a political and social capital into a financial one (differently from Estonia and 
Latvia, the Communist Party of Lithuania was successfully transformed into the 
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, the 1992 electoral winner, which in 2001 
merged with the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and acquired its name). 
 The university education of managers and businessmen varies from 88.4 per cent 
in Latvian parliaments to 97.3 per cent in Estonian legislatures (see annex tables 
5.2.5.1 to 5.2.5.3). The dominance of technical and natural sciences over humanities 
and social sciences among managers is a common feature of  all Baltic parliaments 
(this dominance is especially evident in the case of Latvia where the proportion of 
technical and natural sciences is almost three times larger than the one of humanities 
and social sciences). 
 Estonian managers and businessmen distinguish themselves in the largest 
proportion of university education (97.3 per cent) and the highest proportion of 
degrees in technical and natural sciences (69.1 per cent). They are the most 
experienced in local politics (60.5 per cent) and cabinet of ministers membership (6.1 
100 The entrepreneur Tiit Vähi is an exception of this, he was Prime Minister of Estonia twice: in 1992 
and from 1995 to 1997. 
101 The largest number of businessmen in the 2000 Seimas were found in the Lithuanian Liberal Union, 
in the 2004 Seimas – in the the Labour Party which could be possibly considered a liberal party (in the 
European Parliament it belongs to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), however, if we 
take all seven parliamentary terms, socialists/social democracts have most businessmen among 
Lithuanian political party families. 
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per cent); 12.3 per cent of them belonged to the Citizens’ Committees. More than a 
half (57.9 per cent) of Estonian managers had at least one type of political experience 
before entering legislature for the first time.102 The highest percentages of those with 
experience in local soviets (22.8 per cent), supreme soviets (7.9 per cent), the 
Communist Party (40.4 per cent) and political repressions with regard to parents (9.6 
per cent) are also features of Estonian managers. This rich pre-parliamentary 
experience stands in sharp contrast with their parliamentary experience – two-thirds 
of managers and businessmen in Estonian legislatures are parliamentary newcomers 
and only 28.9 per cent are incumbents. The highest shares of female MPs (11.4 per 
cent) and public sector (54.4 per cent) are two more characteristics of managers in 
Estonian legislatures. 
 The managers and businessmen in Latvian parliaments distinguish themselves 
from their Baltic colleagues in the smallest proportions of university degrees (83.6 per 
cent) and humanities and social sciences (29.4 per cent). Low proportions of pre-
parliamentary experience – both post-Soviet and Soviet – are other features of Latvian 
managers: only 25.7 per cent of them were members of the local councils, about 
three-fifths (60.1 per cent) came to parliament without any post-Soviet political 
experience. The Soviet experience provides low figures as well: 3.3 per cent for local 
soviets, 0.5 per cent for councils of ministers and dissidents, 14.2 per cent for 
nomenklatura and no experience in supreme soviets. However, in terms of the post-
Soviet legislative experience managers and businessmen in Latvian parliaments are 
the most experienced; they have the largest proportion of parliamentary incumbents 
(34.5 per cent). The largest proportion of ethnic minorities (24 per cent) compared to 
Estonian and Lithuanian colleagues is another feature of Latvian managers and 
businessmen. The latter could be explained by the outcome of ethnic democracy in 
Latvia which reserved the state (civil service) and politics for ethnic Latvians and 
pushed many ethnic minorities into business and etrepreneurship (see Dreifelds 1996). 
 Managers and businessmen in Lithuanian parliaments stand out with the highest 
percentage of degrees in humanities and social sciences (49.3 per cent) and 
percentage of doctoral degrees (11.7 per cent which is almost two times more than 
among their Estonian and Latvian counterparts). The lowest percentages of those from 
public sector (26.4 per cent), with leading party (16.3 per cent) and cabinet of 
102 The figures for Latvia and Lithuania are only 32.2 and 36.4 per cent respectively. 
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ministers (3.8 per cent) experience, the highest percentage of former dissidents (5.4 
per cent) and the lowest share of Soviet Communists (24.3 per cent) are special 
features of managers in Lithuanian parliaments. 
 If the Russian Duma and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada are excluded, the 
Lithuanian and Latvian parliaments clearly lead in presence of businessmen and 
managers in legislatures of Eastern Europe. Out of western European parliaments 
after 1989, France with over 20 per cent (see Best and Gaxie 2000: 100) and Austria 
with 21.3 per cent are the closiest countries to Lithuania and Latvia. The only 
unsurpassed leader remains the Parliament of the United Kingdom where after the 
Second World War every third legislator has an occupational background in business 
(see Rush and Cromwell 2000: 476) and where the “Conservative Party still draws 56 
per cent of its MPs from the sphere of business” (Best et al. 2001: 74). The 
persistence of business interests in the UK Parliament is historically explained by the 
“industrial and commercial interests seeking to have a direct impact on policy through 
Parliament, especially during the industrial revolution” (Rush and Cromwell 2000: 
482). In this respect, the UK Parliament is more similar to the US Congress which 
enormous proportions of businessmen and other oligarchic trends allowed C. Wright 
Mills (1956) to develop a critical concept of ‘power elite’ and enabled Dye and 
Zeigler (1996) to describe American politics as an irony of democracy. However, one 
has to be careful in interpreting high numbers of businessmen in Eastern European 
and Anglo-American parliaments. In order to avoid a misleading comparison of 
“oranges and apples”, one has to bear in mind that most MPs in the UK and US 
legislatures come from private sector, which is not the case in the Baltic (also Russian 
and Ukrainian) parliaments. Presence of large numbers of businessmen and liberal 
professions (especially lawyers) in Anglo-American legislatures comes close to a 
tradition of strong civil society seeking control of government (the state), whereas 
historical weakness of civil societies and heritage of the strong socialist state in 
Eastern Europe make business activity easier a part of the political domain. Post-
socialist Eastern Europe is rather a system of ‘political capitalism’ (Staniszkis 1991) 
or a system ruled by ‘grand coalition’ of the former communist oligarchy, upper and 
upper-middle layers of state bureaucracy, and classes of managers (from big state 




     
 
5.2.6. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions 
Lawyers own a special place among occupations in a society and a parliament. In a 
society, because law was “the first occupational field to professionalize anywhere in 
the world” (Sciulli 2009: 75).103 In a parliament, because a large (in some – the 
largest) proportion of legislators has an occupational background in law. Eulau and 
Sprague (1964: 11) call lawyers “the high priests of politics”. The largest percentages 
of lawyers in parliaments are found in the United States (Matthews 1984: 551; 
Rueschemeyer 1989: 310), however, importance of lawyers in the western European 
parliamentary recruitment is observed as well (see Best and Cotta 2000). Among valid 
explanations of this phenomenon are (1) the verbal/talking nature of this profession 
and (2) relative easiness (in comparison with other professional occupations) to move 
back to the lawyer’s job after leaving a parliament104. Legislation is about discussing 
and drafting the laws, therefore, lawyers are much better prepared for this activity 
than representatives of other professions.  
 The Baltic parliaments, as well as other Eastern European legislatures105, differ 
from western legislatures in having very low proportions of lawyers (between 2 and 3 
per cent on average). Therefore, for the sake of our further analysis, we increased the 
number of cases by adding MPs with occupational background in law to the 
representatives of other liberal professions in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
legislatures. (On average, lawyers comprise 27.9 per cent, 20.5 percent and 14.1 per 
cent of all liberal professions in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures 
respectively.) 
  The data on parliamentary party families show that Right and Left Liberals have 
the largest proportions among Estonian liberal professions, Conservatives lead among 
Latvian and Lithuanian liberal professions. 
 The common feature of representatives of liberal professions in the Baltic 
parliaments (see annex tables 5.2.6.1 to 5.2.6.3) is a relatively large proportion of 
public sector (from 68.9 per cent in Estonia to 80.9 per cent in Lithuania). 
103 The English law got professionalised during the mid- or late nineteenth century (Abbott 1988: 247); 
medicine, science and engineering got professionalised in the beginning of the 20th century (Sciulli 
2009: 75-76). In Germany lawyers had become professionalised in the late 1870s, followed by teachers 
in the first decade of the 20th century and engineers after 1918 (Jarausch 1990: 8). 
104 Some US scholars report findings that “solo and small firm lawyers, regardless of party, are more 
likely to seek or hold office than large firm lawyers” (McIntosh and Stanga 1976: 440). 
105 Especially the national  legislatures of the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Russia. 
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 Representatives of liberal professions in Estonian parliaments distinguish 
themselves from their Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts by the largest proportions 
of degrees in law (29.8 per cent) and humanities and social sciences (22.8 per cent) 
and the highest percentage of local political experience. With the highest percentage 
of parliamentary newcomers (67.2 per cent), the lowest percentage of incumbents 
(39.6 per cent) and 1.5 mandates on average, Estonian MPs are least experienced in 
parliamentary affairs. The largest proportions of former members of local soviets (9.8 
per cent on average), national nomenklatura (26.2 per cent) and Communist party (41 
per cent) show that they have been more involved in the Soviet structures than their 
Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts.  
 Lawyers and representatives of other liberal professions from Latvian parliaments 
stand out with the lowest percentage of university degrees (92.2 per cent) and the 
largest proportions of party leaders (30.1 per cent) and parliamentary incumbents 
(43.2 per cent).  
 Lawyers and representatives of other liberal professions from Lithuanian 
parliaments distinguish themselves with the highest proportions of university degrees 
(99.2 per cent) and doctorates (21.5 per cent), the highest percentages of degrees in 
medicine, natural and technical sciences (73.8 per cent). Compared to their Estonian 
and Latvian counterparts, they have least of pre-parliamentary political experience – 
almost a half of them did not have any political experience before entering legislature. 
However, with the lowest percentage of parliamentary newcomers (53.4 per cent) and 
the highest proportions of long-standing MPs (serving three or more terms with or 
without interruption), almost five years age difference between all MPs and 
newcomers and 1.9 mandates on average they are the most experienced in 
parliamentary affairs among lawyers and other liberal professions in the Baltic 
legislatures. They have not only the lowest proportion of former Communists (16 per 
cent), but also the largest percentages of Soviet dissidents (10.7 per cent) and those 
born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been 
murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime (19.8 per cent). 
 There are at least four explanations for low percentages of lawyers in the Baltic 
parliaments, namely: (1) supply, (2) incentives, (3) global trends in parliamentary 
recruitment, (4) society and state structure. 
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1. Supply side - too few lawyers in the Baltic societies. For instance, the dominance of 
lawyers in the U.S.A. parliaments could be explained by the fact that the U.S.A. have 
the largest legal profession in general - both in absolute numbers and in proportion to 
the population - in the world106. The regained independence of the Baltic States after 
the collapse of the USSR opened wider opportunities in teaching law and training 
lawyers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, however, we do not observe (yet) increase 
neither of lawyers nor those with legal education in the Baltic legislatures. 
 
2. Incentives structure: an MP position is not attractive enough for the Baltic lawyers 
in terms of financial remuneration and career opportunities. Election to the parliament 
requires to stop working for their clients which is not the case in some other European 
countries with large proportion of lawyers in legislatures.107 
 
3. Global trend: The last couple of decades show a world-wide trend of decreasing 
percentages of lawyers in parliaments (also in the United States) and the Baltic 
legislatures are simply part of this global trend (see Cotta and Best 2000: 501). 
 
4. Scandinavian affinity: A more precise inspection of the parliamentary recruitment 
in the western European parliaments of the 20th century (see Best and Cotta 2000) 
discloses that Scandinavian countries – Denmark108, Norway and Finnland – have 
strikingly similar (low) levels of lawyers in their parliaments. Hence, the Baltic 
parliaments may simply follow a Scandinavian way of legislative recruitment in this 
respect.   
 
 
5.3. Concluding Remarks on Occupational Background of MPs: Left Liberals in 
Estonia, Conservatives in Latvia and Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuania 
The data on occupational representation in the Baltic parliaments allows us to 
distinguish, to a large extent, the transitional and post-transitional parliamentary 
elites. In general, on the basis of a decreasing recruitment of teachers and professors, 
106 In 1983, “there were more than four times as many lawyers per capita in the United States as there 
were Rechtsanwälte in West Germany or barristers and solicitors combined in England” 
(Rueschemeyer 1989: 291). 
107 For instance, Italian laws allow lawyers (as well as architects) to continue working for their clients 
while having taken up a seat in the lower house. 
108 For a contrasting comparison of the Danish and US legislatures see Pedersen 1972. 
 86 
                                                 
     
journalists and writers, public sector employees, and increasing recruitment of 
managers and businessmen, civil servants, one can roughly talk about structural 
circulation of parliamentary elites and transformation of their social profile. However, 
a more detailed inspection of the data provides us with evidence that in some cases 
there is a continuity (e.g. stable patterns in parliamentary representation of lawyers in 
Estonia and Lithuania) or a mere change without transformation (fluctuations in 
representation of lawyers and civil servants in Latvian parliaments or public sector 
employees in Estonian legislatures); and, if there is a transformation of patterns in 
occupational representation, it is limited to one country only (e.g. decline of liberal 
professions in the Estonian Riigikogu). 
 The higher percentages of civil servants in Estonian parliaments could be partly 
explained by the higher share of civil servants in Estonian society in comparison with 
societies of Latvia and Lithuania109; the higher percentage of businessmen in 
Lithuanian parliaments could be partly attributed to the higher birth rates of 
enterprises in Lithuania in comparison with birth rates of enterprises in Estonia and 
Latvia (Eurostat Yearbook 2011: 324). However, representation of occupations in a 
parliament is not a simple mirroring process of the developments in a society; as 
longitudinal and historically grounded studies on parliamentary representation (Best 
and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007) demonstrate, some changes in the occupational 
structure of society affect the parliamentary representation with a huge delay or, 
sometimes, occupational representation in parliament even follows a pattern which is 
rather independent from changes in a society (e.g. U-curve in representation of public 
sector in the European national parliaments).   
 Which occupations have been more suitable for parliamentary careers in the 
Baltic countries? Which professions produced most of professional legislators? 
 Our data show that these occupations are teachers and professors in Estonia and 
Lithuania and political party employees in Latvia – they have the highest average 
mean number of mandates and the largest percentage of MPs with tenure of at least 
three terms in the legislatures of the respective countries; the second relevant 
occupations are liberal professions (including lawyers) in Estonian and Lithuanian 
parliaments and writers/journalists in the Latvian legislature. 
109 If we take employees in the public administration and administrative and supportive service in 2011 
as a proxy for civil servants, Estonia has the largest comparative percentage among the Baltic States 
(information from national statistical offices of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).  
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 If we take the age of parliamentary newcomers as an indicator for beginning of 
legislative careers, we find that the youngest occupational groups are the political 
party employees in Estonian and Lithuanian parliaments, the second youngest being 
managers and businessmen in Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures. The explanation 
for this finding is that employment in a political party and a start of own business are 
less related to formal entrance requirements in comparison with other occupations, 
therefore, individuals of  a younger age are able to enter these occupations earlier.  
 The oldest parliamentary newcomers in all three Baltic parliaments are journalists 
and writers, second oldest being teachers and professors. With some exceptions, 
writer’s occupation is a life-long project bringing fruits in the mature stage of career 
(differently from careers in sports, it takes years or even decades to earn a reputation 
as a famous writer). Similarly, a university professorship is often received in the 
mature period of occupational advancement which means that a young age is rather an 
exeption than a rule.  
 Professions represent a social closure in themselves (Collins 1979), and the 
parliament even increases this social closure. For instance, in Baltic societies civil 
servants and managers constitute from 8.1 to 12.4 per cent of all working population 
(2000 Round of Population and Housing Censuses in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
2003: 45), whereas the combined average for civil servants and managers in the Baltic 
parliaments comprises from 40.3 per cent to 44.5 per cent (see table 5.2 in the 
beginning of this chapter). Hence, the Putnam’s law of increasing disproportion is at 
work; the parliament displays its elitist nature by increasing overrepresentation of 
non-manual and more prestigous occupations. The same applies for the recruitment 
from public sector.  
 Cross-country differences in occupational backround among Baltic legislators 
clearly coincide with the lines of political party families, namely the largest political 
families in all occupational groups are Left Liberals in Estonia, Conservatives in 
Latvia and Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuania.110 This tallies well with the 
prominence of Liberals and Conservatives in the politics of Estonia and Latvia after 
1990 and an exceptional success of the former Lithuanian Communist Party that 
managed to transform itself into a new political organisation in the post-Communist 
Lithuania. 
110 Except for the civil servants and liberal professions (including lawyers) in the Lithuanian 
parliaments.  
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 6. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Baltic Legislators 
A great amount of literature on established democracies emphasise the importance 
of previous political experience before getting elected to the parliament (Best and 
Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007), amount and type of previous political 
experience are considered signs of political professionalisation of a given assembly 
(Fiers and Secker 2007: 137).  
 Our analysis focuses on the parliaments of the countries under transition 
which is defined as “the interval between one political regime and another” 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1993: 6). In the case of the Baltic States after 1990, as 
well as of the entire Eastern Europe, we have to do not only with a political (which 
is relatively short111) but also with an economic and social transitions plus nation 
building (see Ágh 1998: 49-50; Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998: 18). The political 
transition was clearly over long before 2004 when all three Baltic States joined the 
European Union112, however, we see it meaningful to incorporate into our research 
since our longitudinal analysis starts with the parliaments elected in 1990. 
 Although the new Eastern European democracies begin as “institutional 
Tabula Rasa of 1989” (Elster et al. 1998: 25), personally they have to rely on some 
cadres from the old regime (Keller 1999: 358)113. The Baltic States after 1990 are 
no exeption of this; therefore, we hypothesise that, the more years pass after the 
system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament 
with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-
democratic experience will join new legislatures114. Secondly, knowing that the 
stages of democratic transition, transformation and consolidation have different 
tasks and institutional choices (Dahrendorf 1990; Wasilewski 2000), we ask 
whether parliamentarians in the transition phase are different from legislators in the 
phase of consolidation, and if yes, whether this means a parliamentary elite 
111 According to Linz and Stepan (1996: 3), “A democratic transition is complete when sufficient 
agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a 
government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government 
de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial 
power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure”.  
112 In 2002, Thomas Carothers argued that we should talk not only about the end of transition in 
Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, but even about the end of transition paradigm in political 
science. 
113 Except for East Germany. For reproduction of old elites see theses of Hankiss (1990) and Staniszkis 
(1991). 
114 At first glance this statement sounds rather trivial, however, our further analysis of pre-
parliamentary political experience in the Baltics provides with an empirical variety. 
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transformation. Thirdly, relying on the fact that appointed politicians are more 
distanced from voters in comparison with elected politicians115, we expect that 
MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist characteristics (better 





1. The more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the 
new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and 
the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new 
legislatures. 
2. Parliamentary elite tranformation: MPs in the starting legislative terms will be 
qualitatively different from legislators in the last parliaments.  
3. Since appointed politicians are more distanced from voters in comparison with 
elected politicians, MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist 
characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions. 
 
Since we are interested in professionalisation of politicians, we also ask which sort 
of pre-parliamentary political experience leads to the longest parliamentary tenure 
or, in other words, which pre-parliamentary political pathway increases the 
chances to become a professional legislator. 
 The following chapter screens and compares three types of pre-parliamentary 
political experience116 – local elective positions, political party leadership and 
membership in the cabinet of ministers – according to seven parameters: (1) 
education, (2) democratic political experience, (3) occupation, (4) gender, (5) 
ethnicity, (6) non-democratic political experience and (7) age and seniority. For the 
sake of shortness, MPs with experience in local councils will be called local 
politicians, parliamentarians with experience in political party leadership will be 
named political party leaders and parliamentary representatives with cabinet 
experience will be labelled cabinet ministers.  
115 According to Putnam (1976: 39), “elected elites are typically more representative demographically 
than are other strategic elites”. 
116 According to Putnam (1976: 49), “political parties, bureaucracies, and local governments are the 
most common institutional channels into the political elite”. 
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Table 6.1. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Baltic Legislators (in per cent) 
Estonian MPs as Previous 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Local Politicians 41.0 27.7 45.5 63.4 65.3 73.3 77.2 
Political Party Leaders 27.6 45.5 42.6 25.7 15.8 17.8 19.8 
Cabinet Ministers 3.0 5.0 8.9 9.9 22.8 15.8 16.8 
Latvian MPs as Previous 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Local Politicians 18.9 14.0 17.0 37.0 29.0 45.0 39.0 
Political Party Leaders 13.9 17.0 20.0 28.0 31.0 37.0 35.0 
Cabinet Ministers 1.0 8.0 12.0 13.0 11.0 14.0 12.0 
Lithuanian MPs as Previous 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Local Politicians 4.5 11.3 32.8 49.6 46.1 47.5 54.7 
Political Party Leaders 13.5 24.8 27.0 34.0 26.2 27.0 25.2 
Cabinet Ministers 0 0.7 4.4 4.3 4.3 2.8 3.6 





6.1. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Legislators in Estonia 
 
6.1.1. Estonian MPs as Local Politicians  
The importance of the local political background among Estonian parliamentary 
representatives increases with every legislative term. The differences in local political 
background are especially evident between the first three and the last four 
parliamentary terms. This raises a question whether we have a qualitative 
transformation of parliamentary elite or observe a simple numerical increase of MPs 
with the same characteristics. 
 The former local politicians are well educated, 97 per cent of them on average 
have university degrees. Although technical and natural sciences dominate the 
university education of local politicians (47.9 per cent against 44 per cent for 
humanities and social sciences on average), the proportion of technical and natural 
sciences declines with every legislative term (see annex table 6.1.1). The humanities 
and social sciences demonstrate an impressive continuous rise from 1990 onwards. In 
the 2011 term they reach a share of 57.5 per cent, leaving technical and natural 
sciences a proportion of 28.8 per cent.  Hence, we observe a transformation of 
educational profile among local politicians.  
 The proportion of law degrees fluctuates between 6.5 and 19.2 per cent (overall 
average: 12.2 per cent), the share of doctorates jumps and goes down between 4.1 and 
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22.6 per cent (overall average for doctoral degrees is 12.4 per cent), however, in those 
two cases we cannot observe a transformation of educational profile.  
 The data on political experience also support parliamentary elite transformation 
thesis. The last four terms differ from the first three terms with a distinction that 
cabinet experience is gaining weight over the years and the importance of members of 
citizens’ committees and party leaders decreases rather with every legislature. The 
share of one type political experience gains importance (total average: 57.6 per cent) 
and the last four parliaments are rather different from the first ones as well. The 
importance of three types of political experience decreases continuously, the level of 
two types of political experience in the last three parliaments is stabilised around 30 
per cent. 
 Left Liberals constitute the largest proportion of Estonian local politicians (33.1 
per cent), Right Liberals with 21.6 per cent on average come second. Left Liberals are 
clear leaders in 1990, 1995 and 1999, Conservatives lead in 1992 and 2003. In the last 
two legislatures Right Liberals comprise the largest proportion of local politicians. 
 Civil servants are the largest occupational group among local politicians (33.8 per 
cent), they are followed by managers (17.3 per cent) and political paty employees 
(14.3 per cent). Although the public service indicates a declining trend with each 
legislative term, the employees of public service still comprise a solid proportion of 
75.2 per cent. 
 The proportions of women (16 per cent) and ethnic minorities (9.3 per cent) 
among MPs with local political background disclose rather rising trends, however, the 
differences between the first three and last four parliaments are not clear-cut. 
 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of 
MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience 
and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures 
is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart 
from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out 
of varieties of new political experience, the leading party position dominates among 
Estonian local politicians: 23.8 per cent of them on average held leading positions in 
the political parties,  12.3 per cent in the cabinet of ministers,  14.3 per cent were 
active in the citizens’ committees. In terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 
38.6 per cent of local politicians were members of the Communist party, 23.3 per cent 
were part of the national nomenklatura, 16.5 per cent were part of the local political 
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structures in the Soviet regime, 3 per cent of local politicians occupied leading 
positions in the Communist party, 2.3 per cent belonged to councils of ministers, 1.5 
per cent were members of the supreme councils.  
 The data indicate that 5 per cent of local politicians were born in the families 
deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the 
repressive organs of the Soviet regime. The share of former dissidents among local 
politicians is 2.5 per cent. 
 The data on seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage of 
newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of 
incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary 
tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 1.9 mandates in 2011. Still, in spite of 
these developments, turnover of newcomers remains high and very few MPs have 
legislative careers. On average, 62.9 per cent of MPs with local political background 
are newcomers, incumbents comprise 34.6 per cent. The parliamentary tenure is only 
1.5 legislative terms. Another indicator that many local politicians do not have careers 
is the age difference between all MPs (46.7 years) and parliamentary newcomers 
(45.1 years) which is 1.6 years on average. Experienced founders (MPs from the 1990 
parliaments) – similarly to the parliamentarians with Soviet political experience – 
leave legislatures. However, the share of longstanding MPs (serving at least three 




6.1.2. Estonian MPs as Political Party Leaders 
The data on the political party leaders show that their share in the last three 
parliaments is much lower than their share in the first four legislatures. This is an 
unexpected and counterintuitive finding since all types of democratic political 
experience are expected to gain weight in the Baltic States after restoration of their 
independence (see the 1st hypothesis). The further inquiry aims to investigate whether 
we simply have a numerical decrease of political party leaders in the Riigikogu or we 
deal with a genuine transformation of the Estonian parliamentary elite. 
 The parliamentarians with experience as political party leaders are rather well 
educated, 91.9 per cent of them hold university degrees. The proportion of humanities 
and social sciences (42.5 per cent) comes close to the proportion of technical and 
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natural sciences (44.2 per cent); in the 1992, 2003 and 2011 legislative terms 
humanities and social sciences even dominate over degrees in technical and natural 
sciences (see annex table 6.1.2). 
 18.2 per cent of political party leaders finished legal education, the proportion of 
degrees in law fluctuates between 8.7 and 26.3 per cent.  Almost one quarter of 
political party leaders holds doctoral degrees (23.8 per cent), however, the data show 
a rather continuous decrease in share of doctorates from 1990 to 2011.  
 Although Left Liberals comprise the largest proportion among party leaders on 
average (22.2 per cent) and Conservatives come second (18.7 per cent), the largest 
share holders vary from parliament to parliament: in 1990 it is the umbrella 
movement, in 1992 it is Conservatives, in 1995 it is Left Liberals. Right Liberals lead 
in 1999, 2003 and 2011, Social Democrats take over in 2007.  
 The variables of gender and ethnicity show signs of elite transformation, albeit in 
opposite directions; the proportions of female party leaders (14.1 per cent on average) 
are larger with every legislative term, the shares of ethnic minorities among party 
leaders decline and since 1999 are equal to nil. 
 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of 
MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience 
and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures 
is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart 
from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. 
However, the exceptional decrease in numbers of political party leaders itself strongly 
rejects the proposed hypothesis and requires an additional explanation. The decrease 
in numbers of political party leaders is explained by the obvious consolidation of the 
Estonian political party system: if we employ Laakso – Taagepera index, we see a 
clear decrease in the effective number of electoral parties from 8.84 in 1992 to 4.78 in 
2011; the effective number of parliamentary parties in Estonia falls from 5.90 in 1992 
to 3.84 in 2011. 
 The largest group of party leaders – 48 per cent – have experience as local 
politicians, members of citizens’ committees comprise 31.3 per cent. Cabinet 
experience has a lowest average which is 17.7 per cent. The last four parliaments 
seem to be different from the first three ones in terms of the level of political 
experience; local experience gains importance and the members of citizens’ 
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committees disappear. These trends point to the transformation of parliamentary elite 
as well.  
 The largest proportion of party leaders (61.1 per cent) experienced two types of 
political positions before getting elected to the parliament for the first time, this trend 
gets stronger from 1995 onwards. More than one fifth (21.2 per cent) of party leaders 
were active in one type of political activity and less than one fifth (17.2 per cent) held 
three different political posts. 
 The former members of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) 
comprise 36.4 per cent of political party leaders, they are followed by national 
nomenklatura with 21.7 per cent and local politicians with 14.6 per cent. Other types 
of the old (Soviet) political experience are: 8.1 per cent for dissidents, 5.6 per cent for 
councils of ministers and 4 per cent for the supreme soviets. Even 15.2 per cent of 
MPs as political party leaders were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the 
families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet 
regime. 
 The largest occupational group among Estonian party leaders are civil servants 
(25 per cent); they are followed by political party employees (22.4 per cent) and 
teachers and professors (18.4 percent). About four fifths (77.3 per cent) of party 
leaders were employed in the public sector right before getting elected to the 
Riigikogu. 
 The data on age and seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage 
of newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of 
incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary 
tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 2.5 mandates in 2011. On average, 
56.1 per cent of MPs with background as party leaders are newcomers, incumbents 
comprise 48.5 per cent. Although the parliamentary tenure is 1.8 legislative terms and 
the age difference between all party leaders (45.4 years) and parliamentary 
newcomers (43.4 years) is only 2 years, some evidence for emerging parliamentary 
careers could be observed; for instance in the last term parliamentary tenure was 2.5 
mandates, the age difference in the 1999 term was already 10.9 years. Experienced 
founders (MPs from the 1990 parliaments) – similarly to the parliamentarians with 
Soviet political experience – leave legislatures. However, the share of longstanding 
MPs (serving at least three terms) continuously grows and reaches the level of 44.4 
per cent in the 2007 Riigikogu.  
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6.1.3. Estonian MPs as Cabinet Ministers 
The continuously growing numbers and percentages of MPs as previous cabinet 
ministers clearly show a changing pattern of parliamentary recruitment. The last three 
legislative terms differ in numbers and percentages from the rest especially. In order 
to tell whether we deal here with elite transformation, it is required to explore the 
other aspects of parliamentary recruitment of former cabinet ministers. 
 In all legislative terms Estonian cabinet ministers demonstrate exceptionally high 
level of education – all of them graduated from universities, there are no differences 
between legislative terms (see annex table 6.1.3). The largest proportion among 
cabinet ministers are the degree holders in humanities and social sciences (41 per 
cent), technical and natural sciences come close to them with 34.9 per cent on 
average. Slightly more than one fifth (22.9 per cent) of cabinet ministers hold degrees 
in law, 18.1 per cent of cabinet ministers carry doctoral titles. 
 Local elective experience among cabinet ministers takes a share of 59 per cent, it 
seems to gain more weight with every legislative term. Experience in leading political 
party is observed among 42.2 per cent of cabinet ministers. Membership in Citizens’ 
Committees comprises 8.4 per cent and, as expected, declines continuously. 
 The majority of cabinet ministers - 62.7 per cent – had two types of political 
experience before first time getting elected to the parliament. Those who were 
involved in three types of political activities constitute 21.7 per cent. (Only 14.5 per 
cent performed one pre-parliamentary political function.) 
 In terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 36.1 per cent of cabinet 
ministers were members of the Communist Party, about one third (31.3 per cent) 
belonged to national nomenklatura and almost one quarter (22.9 per cent) was part of 
Soviet local councils. The Soviet parliamentary experience and experience in leading 
the Soviet Communist party amounts to merely 2.4 and 1.2 per cent respectively. 
 Soviet ministers comprise 13.3 per cent among the post-Soviet cabinet ministers 
of Estonia, the same percentage of post-Soviet ministers were born in the the 
politically repressed families (e.g. deported to Siberia) or in the families which 
members have been murdered by the Soviet regime. Surprisingly, there is no single 
former dissident among post-Soviet cabinet ministers of Estonia. We interpret this 
that these MPs with cabinet experience chose not to openly confront and challenge the 
Soviet authorities with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal 
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and own family history as the only way to advance in the Soviet society; this type of 
parliamentarians was probably less idealistic and better adapted to the Soviet structure 
of career advancement. The most prominent example would the career of Edgar 
Savisaar, vice-president of the Riigikogu and minister and prime minister in the post-
Soviet Estonia, who was born in prison in 1950, but this has not prevented him from 
joining the Communist Party and working in the Planning Committee of the Soviet 
Estonia from 1980 to 1988. 
 On the average, Left Liberals comprise the largest proportion of cabinet ministers 
(36.1 per cent), Conservatives with 21.7 per cent come second (in the 2007 term 
conservatives are the largest party family among cabinet ministers). 
 The largest professional group among cabinet ministers is the one of civil 
servants (75.9 per cent). Teachers (professors) comprise 9.6 per cent on average. 
 The data on public sector show some transformative developments. Although 
86.7 per cent of cabinet ministers came from public sector, the last four parliaments 
demonstrate its declining proportion among cabinet ministers. 
 Women among cabinet ministers comprise 14.5 per cent, their proportion among 
ministers seems to be increasing. Ethnic minorities among cabinet ministers are 
almost absent (the only exception is the last two terms). 
 The data on age and seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage 
of newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of 
incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary 
tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 2.4 mandates in 2011. There are 51.8 
per cent of parliamentary newcomers and 42.5 per cent of incumbents among cabinet 
ministers. The proportion of experienced founders declines, the share of long-standing 
MPs (serving at least three terms) shows an upward trend in the 2011 term reaching 
47.1 per cent. An upward trend is observed in parliamentary tenures of MPs (it 
reaches 2.4 mandates in the last term), although the average tenure is only 1.9 
legislative terms and the age difference between all cabinet ministers (47.8 years) and 
parliamentary newcomers (45.1 years) only 2.7 years. 
 
6.1.4. Estonian MPs as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders and Cabinet 
Ministers: A Comparison 
All three groups of MPs – previous local politicians, political party leaders and 
cabinet ministers – show signs of parliamentary elite transformation with essential 
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difference being the increasing proportions of local politicians and cabinet ministers 
and decreasing percentages of political party leaders.  
 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of 
MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience 
and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures 
is also supported by the data on the political experience in the Soviet regime. 
 The evidence for the third thesis that MPs with cabinet experience will display 
more elitist characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions is 
there, albeit thin and not solid. The variables on university education, gender and 
ethnicity indeed show that cabinet ministers are better educated, include fewer women 
and ethnic minorities than local politicians and political party leaders, however, local 
politicians come rather close in terms of university education and political party 
leaders are not far with regard to gender and ethnic representation. 
 The Estonian data reveal that local politicians, political party leaders and cabinet 
ministers – in spite of some common features - have different patterns of recruitment 
and careers. For instance, political party leaders and cabinet ministers are similar in 
absence of military and judges (prosecutors) in their ranks, however, cabinet ministers 
stand out by not recruiting journalists (writers), political party employees, clergy, 
lawyers, workers in the agricultural or industrial sector. Although civil servants are 
the largest occupational group among all three types of politicians, the cabinet 
ministers stand out from other two types of politicians with exceptionally high 
representation of civil servants and a larger percentage of public sector employees. 
The cabinet ministers also stand out in dominance of humanities over natural and 
technical sciences, in larger share of law degrees, older age and lower percentage of 
parliamentary newcomers. The larger percentages of Soviet nomenklatura, Soviet 
ministers and members of local Soviets are also observed among Estonian cabinet 
ministers. The dissidents among cabinet ministers are absent although cabinet 
ministers have a large share of those who were born in the families deported to 
Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive 
organs of the Soviet regime in comparison with local politicians. This finding tells 
that the only way to advance in the Soviet society was not to openly confront and 
challenge it with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal and own 
family history. 
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 Political party leaders stand out with their youngest age and the highest 
percentage of parliamentary incumbents and PhD holders. Political party leaders also 
have the largest percentage of members of citizens’ committees, dissidents and those 
who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members 
have been murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime. 
 Local politicians differ from other two types of politicians in the lowest mean 
number of legislative mandates, lowest percentage of law degrees, PhDs and 
parliamentary incumbents and the highest percentage of women, ethnic minorities, 
parliamentary newcomers and former members of the Soviet Communist Party.  
 The common feature of all three groups is the dominance of Left Liberals. 
 
 
6.2. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Legislators in Latvia 
 
6.2.1. Latvian MPs as Local Politicians 
The importance of local political background in the recruitment of Latvian 
parliamentarians increases with every legislative term, although the Latvian MPs 
continue to be elected on the PR-list basis and do not have single member districts. 
The differences in local political background are especially evident between the first 
three and the last four parliamentary terms. This raises a question whether we have a 
qualitative transformation of parliamentary elite or observe a simple numerical 
increase of MPs with the same characteristics. 
 In terms of education, there are no significant differences among local politicians. 
93.6 per cent of local politicians have university degrees, the average for six 
parliaments reaches 95.1 per cent, if the third term with 76.5 per cent is taken out.   
 There is a clear dominance of technical and natural sciences among local 
politicians (mean: 57.1 per cent), but no real differences between the first three and 
the last four terms. Those differences are, however, observed in the case of humanities 
and social sciences – the share of local politicians with degrees in humanities/social 
sciences is much higher in the last four parliaments (see annex table 6.2.1). Those 
types of differences are found in the case of law degrees as well, though in the 
opposite direction - the share of law degree holders among MPs with local political 
background declines with every legislative term till 2010. Nevertheless, it is safe to 
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conclude that numerical changes among parliamentarians with local political 
background are being accompanied by transformations of their educational profile. 
 The data on political experience also support parliamentary elite transformation 
thesis. The last four terms differ from the first three terms with a distinction that 
leading party position and cabinet experience are gaining weight over the years and 
the importance of members of the elite club “21” and citizens’ committees decreases 
with every legislature. The share of twofold or threefold political experience gains 
importance and the last four parliaments are rather different from the first ones as 
well. 
 In terms of the political party families, we observe a leadership of 
Socialists/Social Democrats (26.9 per cent on average), the second place is taken by 
Conservatives (21.5 per cent). The strong presence of Socialists/Social Democrats and 
Conservatives is the phenomenon of the last three or four legislative terms only, this 
supports the parliamentary elite transformation thesis. 
 The data on occupations have mixed evidence in support of parliamentary elite 
transformation. Increase of civil servants and businessmen/managers and decrease of 
teachers/professors and political party employees provide evidence for parliamentary 
elite transformation, the differences between the first three parliaments and the last 
four legislatures are rather visible. However, these differences are difficult to notice 
among liberal professions and public sector employees. 
 In general, if public sector is not taken into consideration, civil servants make the 
largest share among local politicians (24.3 per cent on average). They are followed by 
businessmen and managers (mean: 22.4 per cent) and teachers and professors (19.5 
per cent on average), political party employees (14.3 per cent on average) and liberal 
professions (lawyers are not included) with an overall mean of 11 per cent. Judges 
and prosecutors come with a low mean of 2.4 per cent, lawyers and journalists 
(writers) are almost non existent among MPs with local political background.  
 The data on representation of women among MPs with local political background 
do not provide evidence for parliamentary elite transformation, the gender variable 
does not clearly support this thesis. However, the ethnic minority variable indicates 
that a larger share of ethnic minorities is a feature of the new parliamentary elite (the 
mean for the last four parliaments is clearly higher than the mean for the first three 
legislatures). 
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 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of 
MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience 
and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures 
is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart 
from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out 
of varieties of new political experience, the leading party position dominates among 
local politicians: 24.2 per cent of them on average held leading positions in the 
political parties, 11.4 per cent in the cabinet of ministers, 6.4 per cent belonged to the 
elite club “21” and 3.2 per cent were active in the citizens’ committees. In terms of 
the old (Soviet) political experience, 26 per cent of local politicians were members of 
the Communist party, 18.3 per cent were part of the local political structures in the 
Soviet regime, 15.1 per cent were part of the national nomenklatura, 5.5 per cent of 
local politicians occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 4.1 per cent were 
members of the supreme councils. Almost none (0.5 per cent) occupied governmental 
positions. 
 Almost 9 per cent of local politicians were born in the families deported to 
Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive 
organs of the Soviet regime. However, the share of former dissidents among local 
politicians is rather moderate (2.7 per cent). 
 The data on age and seniority (age of newcomers and all MPs, mean number of 
mandates and percentage of newcomers) disclose that MPs as local politicians do not 
have careers. On average, two thirds of MPs with local political background are 
parliamentary newcomers, a parliamentary tenure is shorter than two legislative terms. 
Another indicator that local politicians do not have careers is the age difference 
between all MPs and parliamentary newcomers which is 1.6 years on average. 
Experienced founders (MPs from the 1990 parliaments) – similarly to the 
parliamentarians with Soviet political experience – leave legislatures. However, the 
share of longstanding MPs (serving three terms with or without interruption) grows 
and reaches even 28.2 per cent in the last parliament. 
 
 
6.2.2. Latvian MPs as Political Party Leaders 
The importance of the leading party position – similarly as the importance of the local 
elective positions - in the recruitment of Latvian parliamentarians increases with 
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every legislative term and the differences in leading party position are also evident 
between the first three and the last four parliamentary terms. We ask again: do we 
deal with a qualitative transformation of parliamentary elite or a simple numerical 
increase of MPs with the same characteristics? 
 The data on education support the elite transformation thesis: the first three 
legislative terms rather differ from the last four terms in university education. 89.3 per 
cent of political party leaders have university degrees. If the 1995 term with 80 per 
cent university degree holders is taken out, the average for six parliaments reaches 
90.3 per cent.  
 The changes in law, technical/natural sciences and humanities/social sciences 
accompany the numerical increase of political party leaders as well, the differences 
between the first three and the last three terms are rather visible. They also reveal that 
until 2010 the technical/natural sciences lose their importance and humanities/social 
sciences gain their weight in the recruitment of political party leaders. From 1998 
onwards the doctoral degrees and law increase their importance in the recruitment of 
party leaders (see annex table 6.2.2). 
 The parliamentary elite transformation thesis is supported by the data on political 
experience. The first three parliaments differ from the last four legislatures, local 
elective positions and governmental experience gain weight and membership in the 
club ‘21’ and citizens’ committees lose their importance. Over time, political party 
leaders acquire richer experience, threefold political experience in the last parliaments 
has a much larger share than in the first three legislatures. Out of variety of political 
experience, the local elective positions occupy the largest share – 27 per cent on 
average – among political party leaders. There are 16.8 per cent of political party 
leaders with cabinet experience, 9.7 per cent belonged to the citizens’ committees and 
4.6 per cent were members of the elite club “21”. However, if we focus on each 
legislative term separately, the dominance of the local elective experience is observed 
for the last four parliaments only. The first three parliaments are dominated by the 
political party leaders coming from the citizens’ committees. These differences also 
point to the direction of parliamentary elite transformation.  
 With regard to the political party families, Conservatives clearly dominate among 
political party leaders from 1998 onwards, the second place is taken by Christian 
Democrats in 1998 and 2002 and by Agrarians in 2006 and 2010.  
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 The data on occupations provide sufficient evidence for the parliamentary elite 
transformation thesis, the differences between the first three and the last three terms 
are visible. Percentages of civil servants and party employees, businessmen and 
managers, teachers and professors show decreasing trends. Still, if public sector 
employees are excluded from analysis, political party employees are best represented 
among political party leaders (23.5 per cent on average). They are followed by civil 
servants (19.9 per vent on average) and businessmen and managers (18.4 per cent) 
and 13.8 per cent of those from liberal professions (lawyers are excluded). With 
regard to the lawyers, a declining trend of their representation is observed in the first 
three terms (from 7.1 per cent to 5 per cent) and, finally, their disappearance from 
1998 onwards. 
 The gender variable supports the elite transformation thesis, representation of 
women among political party leaders in the first three parliaments differs from 
representation in the last four legislatures. If we turn to ethnic minority representation, 
we observe much higher percentages in the last two legislatures.  
 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the lower share of 
MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is supported by the 
data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments. Of 
variety of old (Soviet) political experiences, 19.9 per cent of political party leaders 
were members of the Communist party, 14.8 per cent belonged to national 
nomenklatura, 8.2 per cent occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 4.6 per 
cent held governmental positions in the old regime and the same share belonged to the 
supreme councils. Only 4.1 per cent of current political party leaders were involved in 
the local political structures of the Soviet regime. 
 It is also worth mentioning that 7.7 per cent of political party leaders on average 
were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have 
been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime and that 3.6 per cent 
were active in a dissident movement. 
 The data on age and seniority (age of newcomers and all MPs, mean number of 
mandates and incumbency) reveal rather visible differences between the first three 
and the last four parliaments. Although the share of parliamentary newcomers 
declines (54.8 per cent on average if the first parliament is excluded) and the share of 
long-standing MPs (serving three and more terms) reaches 29.7 per cent in the 2006 
parliament, the opportunities for parliamentary careers are rather unfavourable: the 
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parliamentary tenure is 1.6 legislative terms on average and the age difference 
between all MPs and newcomers is 1.9 years.  
 
 
6.2.3. Latvian MPs as Cabinet Ministers 
The data on parliamentarians with cabinet experience do not provide clear differences 
between the first three and the last four legislatures. With regard to elite 
transformation, we could rather consider the last five terms that differ from the first 
two. 
 Educationally, there are no differences among cabinet ministers since they come 
with university degrees in all parliaments (see annex table 6.2.3). Cabinet ministers 
impress with their balance between humanities/social sciences (overall mean of 44.4 
per cent) and technical/natural sciences (the average of 45.8 per cent). Humanities and 
social sciences dominate among cabinet ministers in 1998 and 2006, technical/natural 
sciences lead in 1993, 1995, 2002 and 2010. 
 The elite transformation thesis finds support in the data on political experience, 
though. The variables of the leading party position and local elective background 
disclose that the last four terms are obviously different from the first three terms. With 
regard to the twofold and threefold political experience the last four terms are also 
different from the first three ones. Out of different types of experiences in political 
area, the largest share – 45.8 per cent on average – of cabinet ministers were leaders 
of political parties, about one third (34.7 per cent) was elected to the local councils 
and 11.1 per cent belonged to the elite club “21”. The surprising news is that none of 
the MPs with cabinet experience were members of the citizens’ committees. This fact 
indicates that cabinet ministers - differently from local politicians and political party 
leaders – were not involved in the Latvian nation-building and processes of ethnic 
nationalism right after 1990.  
 In terms of the political party family affiliation, Conservatives dominate among 
MPs with cabinet experience in the last four legislatures, Liberals and the left wing 
Liberals lead in the second and third parliaments. 
 The elite transformation thesis is supported by the data on businessmen and 
managers, their share in the last four terms declines but is still considerably higher 
than in the first three terms. In general, if public sector is not taken into consideration, 
civil servants make the largest share among cabinet ministers (mean of 73.6 per cent), 
 104 
     
they are followed by businessmen and managers (13.9 per cent on average) and 
military (4.2 per cent on average). Political party employees, teachers (professors), 
lawyers and other liberal professions are almost non-existent among the cabinet 
ministers. The cabinet ministers do not include journalists (writers), clergy, judges 
(prosecutors) and blue collar workers.  
 The elite transformation thesis does not work for representation of women – 
except for the last two parliaments, there are simply no female representatives among 
MPs with cabinet experience. However, the ethnic minority representation discloses 
differences between the first and last parliaments, ethnic minorities gradually leave 
the governmental posts.  
 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the lower share of 
MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is also supported by 
the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments. 
Out variety of old (Soviet) political experiences, 29.2 per cent of cabinet ministers 
have been part of national nomenklatura and 27.8 per cent were members of the 
Communist party; 16.7 per cent of cabinet ministers occupied governmental positions 
in the old regime, 11.1 per cent on average had leading position in the Communist 
party and the same share on average belonged to the supreme councils. 6.9 per cent of 
the cabinet ministers were involved in the local political structures during the Soviet 
regime, 9.7 per cent were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families 
which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime. 
However, none of the cabinet ministers experienced political persecution or were 
active in dissident movement! MPs with background as cabinet ministers probably 
saw that the only way to advance in the Soviet society was not to openly confront and 
challenge it with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal and own 
family history. This finding (together with a finding that none of ministers belong to 
citizens’ committees after 1990) allows to interperete that this type of 
parliamentarians was less idealistic and better adapted to the Soviet structure of career 
advancement. For example, Vilnis Edvīns Bresis and Alfrēds Čepānis, whose 
relatives have been politically repressed, became the first secretaries in the 
Communist Party Local Committees and have been in charge of the Council of 
Ministers in the end of 1980s.  
 The data on age and seniority (age of newcomers and all MPs, mean number of 
mandates) do not disclose the differences between the first three and the last four 
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parliaments, there are no clear indication for two generations of parliamentary elites. 
Although in the 2002 parliament it reaches 2.1 mean number of mandates and the 
share of newcomers goes down to 18 per cent, the careers of cabinet ministers do not 
differ much from local politicians and political party leaders: their career tenure is 1.6 
mandates on average, the age difference between all MPs and newcomers is 1.5 years.  
The average turnover rate of 58.3 per cent (if all seven parliaments are counted) or 
57.1 per cent (if the first legislature is excluded) of parliamentary newcomers among 
cabinet ministers is another unfavourable condition for parliamentary careers. 
 
 
6.2.4. Latvian MPs as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders and Cabinet 
Ministers: A Comparison 
Two groups – local politicians and political party leaders– experienced a remarkable 
increase in their membership in the last four elections. This observation allowed us to 
formulate the thesis of parliamentary elite transformation which was in many aspects 
confirmed by the data on recruitment and careers.  
 Another thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share 
of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political 
experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new 
legislatures was also supported by the data on the political experience in the Soviet 
regime. 
 The third thesis that MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist 
characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions was confirmed 
by the variables on education and gender: cabinet ministers are clearly better educated 
and have clearly less women than local politicians and political party leaders. 
 Our data reveal that local politicians, political party leaders and cabinet ministers 
– in spite of many common features like very low shares of lawyers and non-inclusion 
of blue collar workers - have different patterns of recruitment and careers, disclosing 
their specific features and peculiar trends of development. For instance, the share of 
Conservatives is overwhelming in all groups except for the group of local politicians 
– there the Socialists/Social Democrats have a slight advantage over Conservatives. 
 MPs with local political background stand out with the highest legislative 
turnover rate (66.7 per cent) and the shortest parliamentary tenure (1.5 mandates). 
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They also show the highest percentage of ethnic minorities (24.2 per cent) and the 
largest share of those involved in the Soviet local political structures. 
 The political party leaders distinguish themselves with the lowest percentages of 
university education but, surprisingly, show the highest shares of PhD holders. The 
lowest percentage of public sector employees and the lowest membership shares in 
the club “21” are also features of the political party leaders.  
 Political party leaders stand out with the highest percentage (23.5 per cent) of the 
full-time party employees and the highest share of the members from the citizens’ 
committees. They also have the largest shares of Soviet dissidents, therefore, it is not 
surprising that political party leaders have the smallest share of politicians involved in 
the national nomenklatura, the Communist party and Soviet local councils in 
comparison with MPs as cabinet ministers and local politicians. 
 MPs with cabinet experience distinguish themselves with the highest percentage 
of university degrees (100 per cent), with their balance of degrees in humanities/social 
sciences and technical/natural sciences and the lowest share of degrees in law. The 
highest percentage of civil servants (73.6 per cent) and the largest share of the elite 
club “21” members, the largest shares of the Soviet Communist party representatives, 
national nomenklatura members and those who occupied governmental positions in 
the Soviet regime are also features of MPs with cabinet experience. 
 MPs with cabinet experience stand out with the lowest share of parliamentary 
newcomers (58.3 per cent), absence of the members of citizens’ committees, least 
friendliness towards recruitment of women and a surprising finding that ethnic 
minorities are better represented than women among them.117 What is also surprising 
is the largest share of politicians born in the families deported to Siberia or in the 
families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet 
regime, and, at the same time, the absence of dissidents among cabinet ministers. 
Similarly to Estonia, this finding tells that the only way to advance own career in the 
Soviet society was not to openly confront and challenge it with sensitive issues, but to 
forget or ar least ignore the personal and own family history. 
   
 
 
117 Usual data for Latvia record that normally women are better represented than ethnic minorities in 
the cabinets of ministers (see Kuklys 2008). 
 107 
                                                 
     
6.3. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Legislators in Lithuania 
 
6.3.1. Lithuanian MPs as Local Politicians 
The importance of the local political background among Lithuanian parliamentary 
representatives increases with every legislative term. The differences in local political 
background are especially evident between the first three and the last four 
parliamentary terms. This raises a question whether we have a qualitative 
transformation of parliamentary elite or observe a simple numerical increase of MPs 
with the same characteristics. 
 The educational level of local politicians does not show transformative patterns 
(see annex table 6.3.1), university education remains on a rather similar level and 
amounts to 91.9 per cent on average. Almost one tenth (9.5 per cent) of local 
politicians hold doctorates, but clear patterns of change or continuity are not observed. 
Transformative patterns are, however, observed in the fields and types of university 
degrees. Although technical and natural sciences occupy a lion’s share (62.5 per cent) 
among MPs with local political background, their percentages seem to decline from 
term to term. Law degrees (5.7 per cent on average) and humanities and social 
sciences (46.1 per cent on average), on the contrary, seem to be gaining in weight 
with each legislative term. 
 The data on political experience provides some evidence for the parliamentary 
elite transformation thesis. The last five terms differ from the first two terms. The 
share of one type political experience (70.1 per cent on average) declines before the 
last parliament. The level of two types of political experience is stabilised around 28.4 
per cent. 
 Socialists/Social Democrats occupy the largest share (29 per cent) among local 
politicians. They are followed by Conservatives with 21.2 per cent. 
 Representation of gender and ethnic minorities among local politicians reaches 
the averages of 13.9 and 8.4 per cent respectively, the last Seimas shows a jump in 
representation of women and ethnic minorities. 
 The data reveal that more than half of local politicians (62.6 per cent) come from 
the public sector. The largest occupational group among local politicians is managers 
and businessmen (32.8 per cent), civil servants with 28.7 percent come second. They 
are followed by political party employees with 16.2 per cent. The data allow to 
observe certain transformative patterns in the occupational profile of Lithuanian local 
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politicians – it shows declining proportions in public sector, among managers and 
businessmen, journalists and writers and indicates declining percentages of teachers 
and professors (this trend conforms to the general parliamentary pattern of teachers 
and professors leaving Lithuanian parliaments)118 and increase of civil servants and 
party employees from 2000 to 2012. 
 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of 
MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience 
and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures 
is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart 
from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out 
of varieties of new political experience, the leading party position dominates among 
Lithuanian local politicians:  28.1 per cent of them on average held leading positions 
in the political parties, 3.5 per cent in the cabinet of ministers.  In terms of the old 
(Soviet) political experience, 20 per cent of local politicians were members of the 
Communist party, 18.6 per cent were part of the national nomenklatura and the local 
political structures in the Soviet regime, 7.2 per cent of local politicians occupied 
leading positions in the Communist party, 0.3 per cent belonged to councils of 
ministers, 0.9 per cent were members of the supreme councils.  
 The data indicate that 5.5 per cent of local politicians were born in the families 
deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the 
repressive apparat of the Soviet regime. The share of former dissidents among local 
politicians is 3.2 per cent. 
 The data on seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage of 
newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of 
incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary 
tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 2.2 mandates in 2012. Still, in spite of 
these developments, turnover of newcomers remains high and very few MPs have 
legislative careers. On average, almost two thirds of MPs with local political 
background are newcomers (61.2 per cent), incumbents comprise 33.9 per cent. The 
parliamentary tenure is only 1.7 legislative terms. Another indicator that many local 
politicians do not have careers is the small age difference between all MPs (48.6 
years) and parliamentary newcomers (46.4 years) which is 2.2 years on average. 
118 See the sub-chapter 5.2.1 on the recruitment of teachers and professors. 
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Experienced founders (MPs from the 1990 parliaments) – similarly to the 
parliamentarians with Soviet political experience – leave legislatures. However, the 
share of long-standing MPs (serving at least three terms) continuously grows and 
reaches the level of 39.5 per cent in the last parliament.  
 
 
6.3.2. Lithuanian MPs as Political Party Leaders 
There are no substantial numerical differences among the first three and the last four 
Lithuanian parliaments in terms of recruitment of political party leaders, although 
proportions of political party leaders among MPs have been continuously rising till 
2000. The further analysis will show what kind of recruitment patterns are observed 
among political party leaders. 
  The Lithuanian data show that 93.5 per cent of political party leaders hold 
university degrees, 9.9 per cent of them studied law. Percentages of degree holders in 
technical and natural sciences (53.4 per cent) are slightly higher than of those in 
humanities and social sciences (50.9 per cent). Even 31 per cent of those who 
graduated from university hold doctoral titles, but their percentage until 2012 was 
continuously declining with every term.  
 Socialists/Social Democrats are the largest party family among political party 
leaders (22.6 per cent), the parties coded as ‘Other’ with 17.3 per cent come second. 
 The trends in recruitment of women (11.3 per cent) and ethnic minorities (8.5 per 
cent) are rather contradictory and disclose lots of ups and downs. It seems, however, 
that a general proportion of women among party leaders increases and percentage of 
ethnic minorities (till 2012) decreases.  
 About two-thirds of political party leaders (67.7 per cent) come from the public 
sector. The largest occupational group among party leaders are political party 
employees (29 per cent), teachers and professors with 21.8 per cent come second. 
Transformative patterns are observed in the public sector (continuous decline till 
2012) and among civil servants (continuous increase of their proportions till 2000 but 
a continuous decline since 2004). Till 2000 party employees experienced a decline 
among party leaders but afterwards we observe an upward trend in their percentages 
until 2012. 
  Although one type of political experience takes a lion’s share (59.7 per cent), its 
percentages among party leaders continuously decline till 2012. Until 2008 every new 
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parliament brings more party leaders having two types of political experience 
(average of 38.3 per cent). Almost half of all party leaders (49.2 per cent) are 
parliamentary newcomers, but their percentages decline in the last four legislatures. 
The percentage of experienced founders also declines with every parliament. The 
proportion of incumbents (average of 41.9 per cent) has been growing in the last four 
parliaments. The same applies to the long-standing MPs (serving at least three 
legislative terms) – their share among party leaders reached 57.1 per cent in the last 
parliament. Still, in spite of increasing percentages of incumbents and long-standing 
MPs, relatively few party leaders have parliamentary careers – they serve in 1.9 
legislatures on average, the age difference between all MPs (49.3 years) and 
parliamentary newcomers (46.4 years) is 2.9 years. 
 The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of 
MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience 
and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures 
is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart 
from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out 
of varieties of new pre-parliamentary political experience, the local political 
experience dominates among Lithuanian political party leaders: 39.1 per cent of them 
on average held local elective positions, 3.6 per cent were the cabinet ministers.  In 
terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 21 per cent of party leaders were 
members of the Communist party, 20.2 per cent were part of the national 
nomenklatura, 8.1 per cent belonged to the local political structures in the Soviet 
regime, 12.9 per cent of new party leaders occupied leading positions in the 
Communist party, 2.8 per cent belonged to councils of ministers, 4.4 per cent were 
members of the supreme councils.  
 The Lithuanian data indicate that 8.5 per cent of party leaders were born in the 
families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by 
the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime. The share of former dissidents among 
political party leaders is even 10.9 per cent. 
 
 
6.3.3. Lithuanian MPs as Cabinet Ministers 
Recruitment of previous cabinet ministers shows exceptional stability among 
Lithuanian MPs in the third, fourth and fifth terms. The further data analysis should 
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demonstrate whether these three terms have different recruitment patterns in other 
aspects. 
 Cabinet ministers are highly educated, 100 per cent of them graduated from 
universities. Almost half (46.4 per cent) of cabinet ministers studied humanities and 
social sciences, 39.3 per cent of them graduated with degrees in technical and natural 
sciences. Law degrees comprise an average of 17.9 per cent. Even 53.6 per cent of 
cabinet ministers hold doctoral titles. 
 The largest proportion of cabinet ministers (46.4 per cent) belongs to the political 
party family of Socialists/Social Democrats, 21.4 per cent of ministers are 
Conservatives. 42.9 per cent of cabinet ministers were previously elected to the local 
councils and 32.1 per cent lead political parties. 
 Recruitment of women and ethnic minorities follows different patterns among 
cabinet ministers: there are 14.3 per cent of women but no ethnic minorities among 
ministers.  
 Two occupational groups – civil servants and managers (businessmen) – occupy 
the largest proportions (each 32.1 per cent) among cabinet ministers, however, the 
percentage of civil servants clearly declines with every new parliament. Lawyers and 
other liberal professions together take 28.6 per cent. More than a half of ministers 
come from public sector (an average for all terms is 57.1 per cent). 
 Although one type of political experience takes a lion’s share (42.9 per cent), its 
percentages among cabinet ministers continuously decline. Every new parliament 
brings more cabinet ministers having two types of political experience (average of 
39.3 per cent). More than a half of cabinet ministers (57.1 per cent) are parliamentary 
newcomers, but their percentage declines continually till 2012. The proportion of 
incumbents (average of 44.4 per cent) has been growing in all parliaments until 2012. 
The same applies to the long-standing MPs (serving at least three legislative terms) – 
their share among cabinet ministers reached 50 per cent in the 2008 parliament. 
However, experienced founders are absent among cabinet ministers. Still, in spite of 
increasing percentages of incumbents and long-standing MPs, relatively few cabinet 
ministers have parliamentary careers – they served in 1.8 legislatures on average, the 
age difference between all MPs (53.4 years) and parliamentary newcomers (51.4 
years) is only two years. 
 As expected, MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from 
parliaments (with an exception of experience in local soviets). The largest proportions 
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of the old (Soviet) political experience are those of the Communist Party and 
nomenklatura, each of them takes 35.7 per cent among cabinet ministers; 28.6 per 
cent of cabinet ministers were part of the local political structures in the Soviet 
regime, 14.3 per cent of new cabinet ministers occupied leading positions in the 
Communist party, 10.7 per cent belonged to the Soviet councils of ministers, none of 
them was a member of the supreme councils.  
 Although one quarter (25 per cent) of MPs with cabinet experience were born in 
the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered 
by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime, the share of former dissidents among 
ministers is equal to nil. The possible explanation for this finding is that this group of 
MPs saw for them the only way to advance in the Soviet society not to by openly 
confronting and challenging it with sensitive issues, but by forgeting or ar least 
ignoring the personal and own family history. 
 
 
6.3.4. Lithuanian MPs as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders and Cabinet 
Ministers: A Comparison 
Out all three groups of Lithuanian MPs, only local politicians show clear signs of 
numerical increase; proportions of political party leaders and cabinet ministers remain 
rather stable.  
  The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of 
MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience 
and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures 
is also supported by the data on the political experience in the Soviet regime (with a 
few exceptions). 
 The evidence for the third thesis that MPs with cabinet experience will display 
more elitist characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions is 
provided by the variables of university education and ethnicity, but not gender; 
cabinet ministers are better educated and have less ethnic minorities than local 
politicians and political party leaders, however, their include more women in 
comparison with local politicians and party leaders. 
 Common for all three groups – local politicians, party leaders and cabinet 
ministers – is leadership of Socialists/Social Democrats, dominance of public sector 
(from 57.1 to 67.7 per cent) and the fact that one type of pre-parliamentary political 
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experience (taking the largest portion so far) declines and two types of political 
experience continually gain in weight. 
 Local politicians are singled out for the largest proportion of degrees in technical 
and natural sciences, dominance of managers and businessmen, the largest proportion 
of newcomers and the lowest mean number of successful elections. 
 Political party leaders differ from the other two groups in the largest proportion 
of degrees in humanities and social sciences, largest proportions of political party 
employees, public sector and former dissidents. Political party leaders also have 
longer parliamentary careers since they have the lowest percentage of newcomers and 
the highest proportion of incumbents, the largest age difference between all MPs and 
parliamentary newcomers and the largest mean number of successful elections in 
comparison with local politicians and cabinet ministers. 
 Cabinet ministers are singled out for the largest proportion of degrees in law, 
clear dominance of humanities and social sciences over technical and natural sciences, 
for the largest percentage of civil servants and the highest average age at the entrance 
of parliament. The absence of teachers (professors) and workers from the agricultural 
sector, the largest proportions of Soviet political experience, the highest percentage of 
those born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have 
been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime and, at the same time, 
absence of Soviet dissidents are also specific features of cabinet ministers. The latter 
finding, similarly to Estonia and Latvia, tells that the only way to advance in the 
Soviet society was not to openly confront and challenge it with sensitive issues, but to 
forget or ar least ignore the personal and own family history. 
 
 
6.4. A Cross-Country Comparison: Baltic Legislators as Local Politicians, 
Political Party Leaders and Cabinet  Ministers 
Notwithstanding some cross-country differences – prevalence of Left Liberals among 
Estonian, Conservatives among Latvian119 and Socialists/Social Democrats among 
Lithuanian parliamentarians, our data provided with sufficient evidence for the 
common patterns in pre-parliamentary political experience of the Baltic legislators. 
119 The exception is Latvian local politicians representing predominantly Socialists/Social Democrats. 
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The common features of Baltic local politicians are a clear prevalence of degrees in 
technical and natural sciences, dominance of civil servants120, high (or the highest) 
percentage of ethnic minorities and high (or the highest) proportion of those who 
belonged to the local soviets during the Soviet regime, as compared with political 
party leaders and cabinet ministers. 
 The Baltic political party leaders distinguish themselves by the highest 
percentage of former dissidents and the lowest percentage of those with university 
education. The other features are prominence of party employees121, low (or the 
lowest) proportions of parliamentary newcomers and high (or the highest) percentages 
of incumbents and the mean number of successful elections. 
 The Baltic cabinet ministers are characterised by higher level of education (100 
per cent of them graduated from universities), balance or even dominance of degrees 
in humanities and social sciences over technical and natural sciences, prevalence of 
civil servants and high (or the highest) share of public sector employees, high or the 
highest age at the first entrance of parliament. Other features of the Baltic cabinet 
ministers are a lower share or even absence of ethnic minorities, high or the highest 
percentages of those with Soviet political experience (except for local soviet 
background in Estonia and Latvia) and absence of dissidents in spite of high or the 
highest percentage of those born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families 
which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime. 
 
 
120 The exception is Lithuanian local politicians, 32.8 per cent of them are managers and businessmen, 
28.7 per cent are civil servants. 
121 Except Estonia where party employees comprise 22.4 per cent and civil servants comprise 25 per 
cent. 
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6.5. Refining Analysis on Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience 
Our above analysis of pre-parliamentary political experience was rather rough since it 
did not differentiate between those who had only one, two or three pre-parliamentary 
political functions (see table 6.2). We did this in order to maximise the number of 
observations per legislative term122 and did not include certain sorts of pre-
parliamentary experience123. If we refine our analysis and include all possibilities for 
 
Table 6.2. Percentages of Pre-Parliamentary Political Functions 
Estonian Legislators 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
One Function 39.8 30.7 40.6 47.5 53.5 56.4 60.4 
Two Functions 28.0 35.6 30.7 26.7 25.7 27.7 24.8 
Three and More Functions 8.6 5.0 5.9 6.9 4.0 2.0 3.0 
Latvian Legislators 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
One Function 30.8 32.0 31.0 43.0 44.0 48.0 49.0 
Two Functions 4.5 6.0 11.0 14.0 12.0 18.0 13.0 
Three and More Functions 0.5 0.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 
Lithuanian Legislators 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
One Function 16.5 35.5 48.2 51.8 40.4 44.0 51.8 
Two Functions 0.8 0.7 8.0 14.9 17.0 16.3 14.4 
Three and More Functions 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.7 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
pre-parliamentary political experience for Baltic legislators, we receive an analytical 
variety of fifteen  pre-parliamentary paths: 
 
Type 1. (Four possibilities):  
 
(a) local politician,  
230 observations for Estonia, 152 observations for Latvia and 242 observations for Lithuania; 
 
(b) party leader,  
42 observations for Estonia, 109 observations for Latvia and 148 observations for Lithuania; 
 
122 By doing this, we got in total 399 observations for Estonia, 219 observations for Latvia and 345 
observations for Lithuania in the analysis of MPs as previous local politicians; 198 observations for 
Estonia, 196 observations for Latvia and 248 observations for Lithuania in the analysis of 
parliamentarians as former political party leaders; 83 observations for Estonia, 72 observations for 
Latvia and 28 observations for Lithuania in the analysis of legislators as former cabinet ministers. 
123 The membership in citizens’ committees was not included in our previous analysis since it was 
Estonian and Latvian, but not the Lithuanian phenomenon. Aiming to pursue a truly Baltic comparison, 
we had to drop the membership in citizens’ committees.  
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(c) cabinet minister,  
12 observatons for Estonia, 31 observations for Latvia and 12 observations for Lithuania; 
 
(d) member of citizens’ committee,  
45 observations for Estonia and 17 observations for Latvia. 
 
Type 2. (Six possibilities):  
 
(a) local politician + party leader,  
60 observations for Estonia, 35 observations for Latvia and 91 observations for Lithuania; 
 
(b) local politician + cabinet minister,  
30 observations for Estonia, 8 observations for Latvia and 7 observations for Lithuania; 
 
(c) party leader + cabinet minister,  
17 observations for Estonia, 16 observations for Latvia and 4 observations for Lithuania; 
 
(d) local politician + member of citizens’ committee,  
38 observations for Estonia and 6 observations for Latvia; 
 
(e) party leader + member of citizens’ committee,  
44 observations for Estonia and 18 observations for Latvia; 
 
(f) cabinet minister + member of citizens’ committee, 
5 observations for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia. 
 
Type 3. (Four possibilities):  
 
(a) local politician + party leader + cabinet minister, 
17 observations for Estonia, 17 observations for Latvia and 5 observations for Lithuania; 
 
(b) local politician + party leader + member of citizens’ committee,  
17 observations for Estonia and 1 observations for Latvia; 
 
(c) local politician + cabinet minister + member of citizens’ committee, 
1 observation for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia; 
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(d) cabinet minister + party leader + member of citizens’ committee, 
0 observations for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia. 
 
Type 4. (One possibility): 
 
local politician + party leader + cabinet minister + member of citizens’ committee, 
1 observation for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia. 
 
 
Descriptive Analysis of Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1 
The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data show similar trends observed in the above 
analysis on local politicians, party leaders and cabinet ministers (see the sub-chapter 
6.4): 
 
• The highest share of degrees in technical and natural sciences, the highest 
percentage of ethnic minorities124 and the highest proportion of those who 
belonged to the local soviets during Soviet regime are features of local politicians 
(type 1a). 
 
• The political party leaders distinguish themselves by the highest percentage of 
former dissidents, the lowest percentage of those with university education125 and 
the largest share of political party employees (type 1b). 
 
• Cabinet ministers (type 1c) are better educated, have no dissidents but have a 
much higher share of civil servants and those from public sector than local 
politicians and political party leaders.  
 
Except of some differences126, these findings are in conformance with the findings 
summarised in the sub-chapter 6.4. 
124 Except for Lithuania where 8.7 per cent of MPs as previous local politicians have an ethnic minority 
background and 8.8 per cent of MPs as political party leaders belong to ethnic minorities.  
125 Except for Lithuania where 95.9 per cent of political party leaders have university degrees and 92.6 
of per cent of local politicians finished education on the same level. 
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What is new in our refined analysis is the inclusion of membership in citizens’ 
committees as a pre-parliamentary political experience (type 1d). It allows for a 
comparison of two countries only, since citizens’ committees were an Estonian and 
Latvian, but not the Lithuanian phenomenon127. Estonian and Latvian legislators with 
experience in citizens’ committees stand out with a lower share of university degrees, 
a clear prevalence of humanities and social sciences over technical and natural 
sciences, absence of ethnic minorities and absence not only of lawyers but also of 
those with degrees in law. The specific features of members from citizens’ 
committees are the highest percentage of dissidents, the highest mean number of 
parliamentary mandates, the lowest share of parliamentary newcomers and the highest 
percentage of incumbents, also the highest percentage of long-standing MPs (serving 
at least three terms with or without interruption) compared to Estonian and Latvian 
legislators as previous local politicians, party leaders or cabinet ministers (types 1a, 
1b and 1c). Certainly, there are some country differences – Estonian members of 
citizens’ committees have much higher percentage of doctorates, civil servants and 
those with Soviet experience in comparison with their Latvian counterparts whereas 
Latvian members of citizens’ committees have much higher shares of political party 
employees and liberal professions and lower percentage of those from the public 
sector. 
 
Descriptive Analysis of Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2 and Type 3 
The general trends among legislators with two pre-parliamentary political functions 
are following:  
 
• Any combinations with governmental experience (types 2b, 2c, 2d and 2f) show 
the highest levels of education (100 per cent with university or comparable 
degrees), the prevalence of humanities and social sciences over technical and 
126 A couple of differences are worth mentioning here. First, the balance (or even prevalence) of 
humanities and social sciences is observed not among ministers but among party leaders of Estonia and 
Latvia. Secondly, the variables of gender and Soviet experience do not confirm the findings reported in 
the sub-chapter 6.1.4 since cabinet ministers of Estonia have the highest share of women and the lowest 
share of Soviet experience in comparison with Estonian local politicians and party leaders. 
127 For the role of the citizens’ committees in the restoration of statehood in Estonia and Latvia in 1990, 
see the sub-chapter 4.1 of this dissertation. 
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natural sciences, the highest levels of civil servants’ representation128 and absence 
of Soviet dissidents. 
 
• Combinations with membership in the citizens’ committees (types 2d, 2e and 2f), 
show higher percentage of Soviet dissidents and, in most of the cases, the longer 
parliamentary tenure129, lower share of parliamentary newcomers and the higher 
percentage of incumbents. 
  
For those with three pre-parliamentary functions, analytically we have four possible 
combinations, however, due to the low number of cases we analyse two combinations 
(types 3a and 3b) only. The main feature of legislators with three political functions is 
the prevalence technical and natural sciences over humanities and social sciences130 
and absence of ethnic minorities.  
 
Pre-Parliamentary Political Functions and Parliamentary Career 
The attempt to provide a more refined analysis of pre-parliamentary pathways to 
Baltic legislatures showed an empirical variety of parliamentary recruitment. The 
main conclusion we draw is that out of four types of pre-parliamentary experience, the  
 
Table 6.3. Pre-Parliamentary Political Functions and Parliamentary Tenure 
Estonian Legislators with Incumbents, % Longstanding MPs, % Terms, N 
One Function 34.9 16.9 1.6 
Two Functions 46.2 28.3 1.7 
Three and More 51.9 29.6 1.7 
Latvian Legislators with Incumbents, % Longstanding MPs, % Terms, N 
One Function 38.1 22.3 1.6 
Two Functions 37.8 19.1 1.6 
Three and More 35.3 17.6 1.6 
Lithuanian Legislators with Incumbents, % Longstanding MPs, % Terms, N 
One Function 40.1 25.5 1.8 
Two Functions 37.6 21.0 1.8 
Three and More 20.0 0 1.2 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
Note: The above table covered seven legislatures in each of the Baltic countries from 1990 
onwards. The MPs were classified as long-standing if they served at least three legislative terms. 
 
128 Except for the Lithuanian legislators having the 2b pre-parliamentary path. 
129 However, the absolutely longest parliamentary tenure not only among those with two pre-
parliamentary functions but among all possible combinations is observed among Estonian MPs with 
experience as party leaders and cabinet ministers (type 2c) reaching 2.9 legislative terms. 
130 Except Lithuanian MPs. 
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membership in citizens’ committees provides the best opportunity for a longer 
parliamentary career. This conclusion is limited to Estonian and Latvian legislators 
only, since citizens’ committees did not occur in Lithuania. However, the Latvian and  
Lithuanian legislators are similar in another respect: the increase of pre-parliamentary 
political functions decreases the longevity of parliamentary career in Latvia and 
Lithuania (see table 6.3.). In other words, the increase of pre-parliamentary political 
functions (more than one pre-parliamentary political function) increases chances for 
professional legislators in Estonia, but not in Latvia and, especially, not in Lithuania.  
This allows to conclude that, in spite of many common patterns in the Baltic pre-
parliamentary experience, the cross-country differences in legislative recruitment 





     
7. Other Acquired and Ascriptive Assets for Parliamentary Recruitment 
 
7.1. Level and Type of Education 
     “Education, especially university education, distinguishes  
     elites from nonelites throughout the world.” Putnam (1976:58) 
 
In democracies the share and importance of educational titles for the access to the 
political elites increased over the decades in the way the importance of nobility titles 
decreased. It seems that in the modern world educational titles serve as a replacement 
for the nobility ones: “Everything happens as if education titles were ‘nobility’ titles 
allowing for the access to most of the most leading and prestigious positions (Gaxie 
and Godmer 2007: 107).” In other words, hereditary credentials in the political elite 
recruitment have been replaced by merit-based degrees. 
 
7.1.1. Estonia 
After the Soviet regime, which wiped out the last remnants of nobility and favoured 
education as a mechanism for career advancement, higher education remains an asset 
for the career mobility in the Estonian society. Tertiary education is also an important 
asset for the parliamentary recruitment in Estonia – about 93 per cent of legislators on 
average attained university or comparable degrees. Importance of university education 
in the legislative recruitment (share of MPs with university education) grew  
 
Table 7.1.1. Education of Estonian MPs (in per cent) 












1990 19.8 86.7 12.1 33.0 60.4 
1992 30.0 89.1 12.2 50.0 44.4 
1995 26.6 93.1 11.7 36.2 58.5 
1999 26.8 96.0 6.2 41.2 55.7 
2003 11.1 98.0 13.1 46.5 41.4 
2007 15.3 97.0 12.2 49.0 39.8 
2011 9.6 93.1 21.3 54.3 28.7 
Average 19.9 93.3 12.7 44.3 47.0 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural 
sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education. 
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from 86.7 per cent in 1990 to 98 per cent in 2003. The share of legal education among 
Estonian parliamentarians, differently from Western democracies where the largest 
part of MPs come with law degrees, averages 12.7 per cent.  
 Although technical and natural sciences dominate over humanities and social 
sciences in three out of seven Estonian legislatures, Estonian data confirm a general 
Eastern European trend described by the prevalence of degrees in engineering: 47 per 
cent of MPs on average are educated in technical and natural sciences and 44.3 per 
cent of legislators are trained in humanities and social sciences (see table 7.1.1). The 
highest percentage of technical and natural sciences and the lowest share of 
humanities and social sciences among legislators of the 1990 Supreme Council come 
to us as a great surprise. It seemed that the 1990 year was time of singing revolution 
and artists, not of engineers and technologists. However, it turns out that almost two-
thirds of the legislators elected in 1990 came from technical and natural sciences.  
 If we turn our analysis to the political party families, out of all party families that 
were present in at least three legislatures, Agrarians demonstrate the highest 
educational credentials – 97.4 per cent of their MPs graduated from the university. 
They are followed by Right Liberals and Socialists/Social Democrats – 96.9 and 96.2 
per cent of them respectively hold university or comparable degrees. Tertiary 
education was attained by 95 per cent of Left Liberals. Conservatives with 94.2 per 
cent are just above average. The lowest results are shown by the Ethnic Minority 
family – only 84.2 per cent of their legislators hold tertiary degrees.  
 In terms of law degrees, clear leaders are the Right Liberals with an average of 
18.5 per cent of them having received an education in law. Socialists/Social 
Democrats, Conservatives and Ethnic Minority family with their 9.2, 10.1 and 6.3 per 
cent respectively are well below the average. Left Liberals with their 12.2 per cent are 
close to the total parliamentary average. 
 Humanities and social sciences are best represented among Conservatives and 
Right Liberals – 55.8 and 48.4 per cent respectively. Not far from average are Left 
Liberals and Socialists/Social Democrats – 43.9 and 40.8 per cent of them accordingly 
have degrees in humanities and social sciences. Ethnic Minority family and Agrarians 
with their 25 and 18.4 per cent, respectively, come clearly below the average. 
 The technical and natural sciences are the domain of the Greens, Ethnic Minority 
and the Agrarians – 90, 81.3 and 71.1 per cent of them, respectively, were trained in 
these fields. Socialists/Social Democrats with 52.6 per cent and Left Liberals with 
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48.7 per cent are slightly above the average. Only 37.9 per cent of Right Liberals and 
35.7 per cent of Conservatives hold degrees in technical and natural sciences. 
 It was argued that doctoral degrees could be considered equivalents of the elitist 
grandes écoles in France or Oxford and Cambridge Universities in the United 
Kingdom in terms of structural distinction (Gaxie and Godmer 2007: 127). About one 
fifth of the Estonian legislators with university education hold doctoral degrees, 
although their percentage seems to be declining with every Riigikogu. The largest 
share of MPs with research credentials can be found among the Ethnic Minority party 
family with 31.6 per cent and the Socialists/Social Democrats with 29.1 per cent. 
Close to the parliamentary average are the Agrarians with 22.5 per cent and the Left 
Liberals with 17.9 per cent, whereas only 15.6 per cent of Right Liberals and 15.3 per 
cent of Conservatives hold doctoral degrees. 
 If we differentiate between ethnic Estonian and non-Estonian legislators in the 
entire period from 1990 to 2011, we observe a slightly higher share of university 
degrees (94.9 per cent), slightly lower share of degrees in law (12.5 per cent) and 
humanities and social sciences (37.5 per cent), and substantially higher share of 
degrees in technical and natural sciences (55.4 per cent) among non-Estonian MPs in 
comparison with ethnic Estonian MPs on average. Ethnic minority MPs have also a 
lower share of doctorates – 17.5 per cent on average. 
 
7.1.2 Latvia 
92.6 per cent of Latvian MPs having university degrees in the last six Saeimas is a 
clear advancement in comparison with 53.5 per cent average for the first four 
Saeimas.131 The share of parliamentary representatives with degrees in law, after a 
continuous decline from 16.3 per cent in 1993 to 11.6 per cent in 2006, jumped to 
19.6 per cent in 2010. The share of degrees in humanities and social sciences (from 
33.3 to 47.8 per cent), as well as in technical and natural sciences (from 45.7 to 74.8 
per cent), fluctuates from parliament to parliament, but technical and natural sciences 
clearly dominate humanities and social sciences in five out of seven parliaments. The 
second lowest percentage of degrees in humanities and social sciences in 1990 in 
comparison with the following legislatures comes as a great surprise: the period of 
131 There have been 62 per cent with the university or comparable degree in the 1922 Saeima, 55 per 
cent in the 1925 Saeima, 54 per cent in the 1928 Saeima and 43 per cent in the 1931 Saeima. (Source of 
information: Latvijas Republikas Saeima.) 
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national awakening in Latvia seemed to be characterised by public leadership and 
prominence of humanistic intellectuals and artists, but this public leadership did not 
translate into quantitative dominance in the first democratically elected parliament. 
However, if we compare Anti-Communist Umbrella Movement and Communists in 
the 1990 Supreme Council, differences between those two groups in humanities and 
social sciences are clear: Anti-Communists have more than two times higher 
percentage of legislators with degrees in humanities and social sciences than 
Communists (32.8 per cent against 15.9 per cent).  The share of MPs with degree in 
law among Anti-Communists is also more than two times larger than among 
Communists (14.4 per cent for Anti-Communists compared to 6.3 per cent for 
Communists). 
 
Table 7.1.2. Education of Latvian MPs (in per cent) 





Types of University Degrees 






1990 21.2 92.0 14.6 33.8 74.8 
1993 18.5 92.0 16.3 44.6 50.0 
1995 14.4 90.0 13.3 33.3 61.1 
1998 3.2 94.0 12.8 45.7 45.7 
2002 8.6 93.0 11.8 40.9 57.0 
2006 12.6 95.0 11.6 47.4 50.5 
2010 14.1 92.5 19.6 47.8 45.7 
Average 13.2 92.6 14.3 41.9 55.0 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural 
sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education. 
 
 
It has been observed that in the late Soviet period population with tertiary degrees in 
Latvia split into two groups along the ethnic line: arts, humanities and agriculture 
being favoured by ethnic Latvians and technical sciences being chosen and dominated 
by ethnic minorities: in the mid-1980s, the largest shares of ethnic Latvians studied at 
the Academy of Music (83 per cent), the Academy of Agriculture (84 per cent) and 
the Pedagogical Institute of Liepāja (81 per cent). In the University of Latvia and the 
Politechnical Institute of Rīga, ethnic Latvians made up 55 and 36 per cent of all 
students accordingly. In the Institute of Civic Aviation only 1.4 per cent of the 
students were of ethnic Latvian origin (Zvidriņš and Vanovska 1992: 100). 
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 The data from our parliamentary sample confirm this trend among MPs – the 
proportion of humanities and social sciences (35.2) is lower and the percentage of 
degrees in technical and natural sciences (71.1 per cent) is substantially higher among 
Latvian ethnic minority legislators compared to ethnic Latvian MPs. Ethnic minority 
legislators have also lower proportions of university degrees (89.1 per cent), lower 
percentages of doctorates (8.6 per cent) and law degrees (13.3 per cent). 
 Out of all party families that have been present at least in three parliaments, 
Liberals are the most educated – 98.6 per cent of them have university degrees, the 
second most educated being Conservatives (98.1 per cent on average). With the share 
among Agrarians of only 86.3 per cent with a degree, they are below the share of 
Communists (97.2 per cent) and Socialists/Social Democrats (88.9 per cent), but it is 
the Christian Democrats that have the smallest share of MPs with a university degree 
at 82.4 per cent. 
 The clear leaders in legal education are Liberals and Communists – 23.3 and 20 
per cent of them respectively hold law degrees. Conservatives with 16.3 per cent and 
Socialists/Social Democrats with 12.5 per cent come close to the Saeima average. The 
lowest proportions are observed among Agrarians (4.3 per cent) and Christian 
Democrats (3.6 per cent). 
 Humanities and social sciences are a clear domain of Christian Democrats – more 
than three-quarters (78.6 per cent) of them hold degrees in humanities and social 
sciences. Conservatives with 47.3 per cent and Agrarians with 44.9 per cent are also 
above the Saeima average. The percentages of Socialists/Social Democrats (36.6 per 
cent) and Liberals (35.6 per cent) are below the average. The lowest proportion of 
humanities and social sciences is observed among Communists (31.4 per cent). 
 Technical and natural sciences are best represented among Socialists/Social 
Democrats having 63.4 per cent; they are followed by Agrarians with 60.9 per cent. 
The proportions among Liberals (46.6 per cent) and Conservatives (45.3 per cent) are 
below the Saeima average. The lowest percentage is observed among Christian 
Democrats – 28.6 per cent of them hold degrees in natural and technical sciences. 
 The largest proportion of doctorates is observed among Liberals (19.2 per cent); 
they are followed by Conservatives (13.3 per cent). The percentage among Agrarians 
(11.6 per cent) is below the parliamentary average. The lowest shares of doctoral 
degrees are found among Socialists/Social Democrats (7.1 per cent) and Christian 
Democrats (3.6 per cent). 
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7.1.3. Lithuania 
The members of the Lithuanian parliaments are no less educated than 
parliamentarians in Estonia and Latvia – 94.2 per cent of them hold university 
degrees, more than a quarter of those who graduated from universities have doctoral 
titles (see table 7.1.3). The percentages of law degrees fluctuate from 3.7 to 13.4 per 
cent, but the last three parliaments show an increase of MPs with legal education. 
More than a half of legislators studied technical and natural sciences, less than a half 
graduated with degrees in humanities and social sciences. 
 The rise of degrees in humanities and social sciences and decline of degrees in 
technical sciences and natural sciences among Lithuanian parliamentarians are 
observed since 1992. This change we interprete as a departure from the Soviet type 
industrial society and a transformation into a new type of society where technologies 
play a lesser role in politics. 
 If we turn our analysis to the political party families, out of all party families that 
were present in at least three legislatures, Agrarians and Ethnic Minority party family 
have the highest educational credentials – 100 per cent of their legislators graduated 
from universities. Not far away from them are Liberals (98 per cent) and Left Liberals 
(97.5 per cent). Conservatives with 96.2 per cent and Socialists/Social Democrats 
with 93.6 per cent are rather close to the parliamentary average. The lowest 
percentages belong to the party families of Christian Democrats (82.4 per cent) and 
Extreme Right (87.5 per cent). 
 
Table 7.1.3. Education of Lithuanian MPs (in per cent) 





Types of University Degrees 






1990 32.3 95.5 13.4 40.2 50.4 
1992 41.3 89.4 7.1 38.1 61.9 
1996 33.1 92.7 5.5 43.3 52.8 
2000 22.2 95.7 3.7 48.1 56.3 
2004 20.7 95.7 8.9 51.1 52.6 
2008 16.5 94.3 12.0 51.9 47.4 
2012 19.4 96.4 12.7 57.5 43.3 
Average 26.5 94.2 9.0 47.2 52.1 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural 
sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education. 
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The highest percentage of law degrees belongs to Liberals and Left Liberals (12.4 and 
10.3 per cent respectively); they are followed by Conservatives (9 per cent). 5.3 per 
cent of Agrarians and 5 per cent of MPs from Ethnic Minority family studied law. 
None of Christian Democrats and Extreme Right graduated with law degrees ever. 
 In terms of humanities and social sciences, the clear leaders are Left Liberals 
(64.1 per cent); they are followed by Extreme Right (57.1 per cent) and Liberals (56.7 
per cent). Ethnic Minority family (50 per cent) and Socialists/Social Democrats (49.1 
per cent) are slightly above average, Conservatives (42.9 per cent) are slightly below 
the parliamentary average. The lowest percentages are those for Agrarians (26.3 per 
cent) and Christian Democrats (21.4 per cent). 
 Technical and natural sciences are the domain of Christian Democrats and 
Agrarians – 78.6 per cent and 73.7 per cent of them respectively are trained in this 
type of field. Socialists/Social Democrats with 60.5 per cent and Conservatives with 
57.6 per cent follow them. Left Liberals (48.7 per cent) and Ethnic Minority family 
(45 per cent) are slightly below the parliamentary average. The lowest proportions are 
those observed among Extreme Right (42.9 per cent) and Liberals (34 per cent). 
 The highest percentages of doctoral titles are found among Extreme Right (42.9 
per cent) and Christian Democrats (35.7 per cent). Proportions of doctorates among 
Conservatives (29.9 per cent) and Socialists (29.5 per cent) are slightly above the 
Seimas average. Liberals (21.6 per cent), Agrarians (21.1 per cent) and Left Liberals 
(17.9 per cent) are below the parliamentary average. MPs from Ethnic Minority 
family carry no doctoral titles. 
 If we differentiate between ethnic Lithuanian and non-Lithuanian legislators in 
the entire period from 1990 to 2012, we observe a higher proportion of university 
degrees (98.6 per cent), higher percentage of degrees in in law (9.6 per cent) and a 
lower proportion of degrees in humanities and social sciences (43.8 per cent) among 
non-Lithuanian MPs compared to ethnic Lithuanian MPs. The proportion of ethnic 
minority MPs with doctoral titles (11 per cent) is more than two times smaller. 
 
 
7.1.4. A Cross-Country Comparison: Dominance of Engineering, not Law 
In all three Baltic countries a similar percentage of legislators graduated from 
universities, in all three of them the lion’s share among MPs is allocated not to the 
law degrees but to degrees in technical and natural sciences. In other words, 
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engineers, not lawyers dominate the educational background of Baltic legislators. To 
some extend this reminds us of technocrats as the new elite by Szalai (1995 and 
1996); it conforms to the general educational profile of legislators in Eastern Europe 
(see Best and Edinger 2003) and is likely to remain for the near future. A good 
example of this provides Germany (see Lock 1998: 97); although East Germany re-
joined West Germany more than twenty years ago, Bundestag members from East 
Germany are more similar to Russian Duma legislators than to their West German 
counterparts in large proportion of degrees in technical and natural sciences 
(Semenova 2008: 26). In other words, the Soviet Army left East Germany long ago, 
but engineers “stayed” in politics and this continues to affect the current 
parliamentary recruitment even two decades after. 
 The literature reports that decision-makers with a natural science background are 
much more committed to the technocratic ethos than those trained in the social 
sciences (Putnam 1977: 404). This implies more elitism and authoritarianism since the 
technocratic ethos is defined as “the application of apolitical expertise”, antagonism 
“toward politicians, political institutions, and citizen involvement in government” and 
relative insensitiveness “to conflicting social interests and to issues of distributive 
justice” (Putnam 1977:404)132.  
 A careful observer may notice that proportions of technical and natural sciences 
among Baltic legislators decline slowly over time, however, there is no trend of 
growing percentages in law degrees. What we observe is the rise of humanities and 
social sciences, albeit in rather small proportions. 
 
Table 7.1.4. Education of Baltic Legislators, 1990-2012 (in per cent) 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Doctorate 19.9 13.2 26.5 
University Degrees 93.3 92.6 94.2 
Law 12.7 14.3 9.0 
Humanities & Social Sciences 44.3 41.9 47.2 
Technical & Natural Sciences 47.0 55.0 52.1 
Source: Based on tables 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3. 
Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural 
sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education. 
 
132 One historical illustration for the exposure to authoritarianism among those with education in 
engineering could be the Reichstag of Weimar Republic, where 50 per cent of MPs with engineering 
background were NSDAP members compared to 11.8 per cent of those with degrees in law and 29.7 
per cent of those in humanities (Jarausch 1990: 70).  
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The main cross-country differences are the largest percentage of doctoral titles and 
degrees in humanities and social sciences among Lithuanian legislators and the largest 
proportion of technical and natural sciences and law degrees among Latvian MPs. The 
largest percentage of doctoral titles can be explained by the highest proportion of 
teachers and professors in Lithuanian parliaments compared to the Estonian and 
Latvian legislatures. The explanation for the largest proportion of technical and 
natural sciences should be attributed to the fact that Latvian society was affected by 
the Soviet (and Russian) culture of industrialisation most of all three Baltic countries. 
 Political party families in the Baltic parliaments disclose some common patterns 
in education. The lowest proportion of university degrees is found among Christian 
Democrats133. The highest or one of the highest proportions of degrees in technical 
and natural sciences are observed among Agrarians in all three countries. Liberals134 
have the highest percentage of law degrees, this finding is in conformance with a 
historical connection between lawyers and the rise of political liberalism in the West 
(see Halliday and Karpik 1997). Liberals, in the case of Estonia and Latvia, have also 
the highest proportion of university degrees. This finding contrasts well with the 
lowest share of university degrees among Christian Democrats; it seems as if one 
extreme side (Liberals) represents an individualistic believe in human reason 
(Enlightment and secularisation as its side-effect) and the other one (Christian 
Democrats) represents a priority of collectivistic believe in God and a paternalistic 
orientation. In addition to this, the Baltic Christian Democrats provide us with a sharp 
contrast in degrees of technical and natural sciences: the Lithuanian Christian 
Democrats have the highest proportion (78.6 per cent) of technical and natural 
sciences out of all party families, whereas their Latvian counterparts with 28.6 per 
cent have the lowest proportion. This difference could be explained by the fact that 
Latvian (Protestant) Christian Democrats include priests and theologians who by 
definition have training in humanities, whereas Lithuanian (Catholic) Christian 
Democrats do not include a single priest or theologian.  
 To include an ethnic perspective, ethnic minority legislators in Baltic parliaments 
have lower proportions of degrees in humanities and social sciences and higher 
percentages of degrees in technical and natural sciences in comparison with ethnic 
133 This concerns only those party families that were present in parliament at least three terms, namely 
Christian Democrats of Latvia and Lithuania. 
134 Right Liberals in the case of Estonia. 
 130 
                                                 
     
majority MPs. The Baltic ethnic minority MPs have also lower proportions of 
doctoral titles. In Estonia and Latvia ethnic minority parliamentarians have lower 
percentages in university education and law degrees. 
 How different are recruitment patterns of those educated in law from those in 
humanities and social sciences or technical and natural sciences? The data for all three 
Baltic countries show that those educated in law are of the youngest age; they have 
the highest percentage of lawyers, judges (prosecutors) and those with a leading party 
position; they also have the highest percentage of long-standing legislators (serving at 
least three terms). With regard to the Soviet experience, they have the lowest 
percentage of former leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and the highest 
percentage of members of the Soviet Supreme Councils. Those with education in 
humanities and social sciences distinguish themselves with the highest percentage of 
women MPs and the largest share of teachers (professors) and journalists (writers). 
Legislators educated in technical and natural sciences differ from other two groups 
being of the oldest age and having the lowest percentage of women; they also have 
the highest percentage of liberal professions, managers and businessmen, and those 
with employment in the primary sector. These findings allow to conclude that 
legislators with education in law – despite of numerically low numbers in the Baltic 
legislatures - have the best chances to embark on legislative careers; that humanities 
and social sciences are the friendliest toward recruitment of women; and that technical 
and natural sciences offer the best opportunities for the recruitment of managers and 
businessmen. 
 The above findings apply to all three Baltic States without cross-country 
differences. However, some cross-country differences should be reported as well. For 
instance, Estonia and Latvia stand out from Lithuania with the lowest percentage of 
the Soviet ministers, the highest percentage of parliamentary incumbents and long-
standing politicians (serving at least three legislative terms without interruption) 
among MPs educated in law and with the highest percentage of parliamentary 
newcomers and ethnic minorities among legislators with education in technical and 
natural sciences. Estonia and Lithuania differ from Latvia with the highest percentage 
of cabinet ministers and the former Communist party members among legislators 
educated in law, highest percentage of political party employees and the highest mean 
number of elections among parliamentarians educated in humanities and social 
sciences and the highest percentage of those with local elective background among 
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MPs educated in technical and natural sciences. Latvia and Lithuania differ from 
Estonia with the highest percentage of public sector employees among legislators 
educated in law. 
 High percentage of university degrees among Baltic legislators conforms to the 
general pattern of a much higher proportion of university degrees among MPs in 
parliaments of Eastern Europe (Best and Edinger 2003) in comparison with their 
counterparts in Western Europe (Cotta and Best 2000: 497). A very high proportion of 
university degrees among legislators also indicates a large share of highly educated 
population in general which was an important resource or cultural capital (Bourdieu 
1986) in the tripple transition from Communist regimes for countries of Eastern 
Europe, allowing many of them to achieve democratic consolidation faster than in 
Southern Europe and Latin America (see Schneider and Schmitter 2004) and quicker 
than transitologists and their theories have predicted (Merkel 2010). Intellectuals as a 
new class power in the mature epoch of socialism after Brezhnevism according to 
Konrád and Szelényi (1979) and the dominant position of intelligentsia135 in the post-
Communist period (Konrad and Szelenyi 1991: 356) would also emphasise the role of 
higher education in Eastern Europe. 
 The dominance of technical intelligentsia among Baltic legislators is attributed to 
the heritage of industrialisation and technical modernisation in the Soviet Socialist 
societies. As mentioned above, the percentage of technical degrees among Baltic MPs 
declines and it could be that at some point an educational background of Baltic 
parliamentarians will resemble a background of those from Western European 
legislatures. Alternatively, it could be that, in spite of declining trends, Baltic 
countries will continue an ‘old’ track of development with majority of legislators 
having background in technical and natural sciences. This track is not exceptionally 
Eastern European as the French political system is known for recruitment of engineers 
(Mény 1990: 265) and government by technicians defined as technocracy (Ridley 
1966). Since “engineering (like law) is often considered an ideal education in Europe 
because it combines a training of the mind with practical application” (Riddley 1966: 
43) and a modern government is a modern state co-ordinated by technocrats 
135 We are well aware of the historical distinction between intelligentsia and intellectuals, the former 
referring to the Russian or Eastern European cultural elites with their political-moral mission and the 
latter meaning rather a simple status group of professionals in Western Europe. It must be also 
mentioned that the definition of Eastern European intellectuals by Konrád and Szelényi is rather broad 
since it includes not only technical and humanistic intelligentsia but also the ruling communist elite. 
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(Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 176), one could easily arrive at the conclusion that 
technocracy is a rather universal modern phenomenon. However, we must remain 
cautious by observing that the definitions of technocrats by Szalai, Riddley, Dunleavy 
and O’Leary are very broad; they include not only engineers, but also economists and 
administrators. This means that if our Baltic data set would assign university degrees 
in economics and public administration (coded as degrees in social sciences) to the 
section of technical sciences, the ‘technocratic’ effect in the recruitment of the Baltic 
legislators would be even stronger. Our data do show that in all three Baltic countries 
parliamentarians educated in technical and natural sciences have the best chances to 
enter legislatures as managers and businessmen, nevertheless, we would like to 
remain with our decision to distinguish between economists and engineers, which is 
also advised by Bell (1973: 344) not to link economists with scientists, 




Across Europe, the female gender remains underrepresented in national parliaments. 
This is despite the fact that most of the continent has enjoyed universal suffrage since 
the end of the Second World War, and a liberal democratic form of governance 
remains popular in most of Europe. Women, not a minority in society, are always a 
minority in national representative bodies; it is not possible to find a national 
parliament which would have an adequate representation136 or overrepresentation of 
women.137 
 The Baltic parliaments are no exception to this – women are underrepresented in 
the Estonian Riigikogu, the Latvian Saeima and the Lithuanian Seimas. In spite of the 
fact that the share of women in the Baltic legislatures has been increasing since 1990 
and has already achieved the 23.7 per cent threshold for OSCE countries138, this 
remains far from the Nordic threshold of 42 per cent.139  
 ‘An iron law of andrarchy’ (Putnam 1976) has long been a typical feature of 
political elites and, in spite of some incremental gains in parliamentary representation 
136 Except for the national parliament of Andorra which had 50 per cent of women MPs in 2013. 
137 Sweden was close to achieving an adequate representation in 2006 with 47 per cent of female MPs 
in the Riksdag. Finland  came second with 42 per cent of female MPs in 2007 (IPU Statistical 
Archive).  
138 Except for Latvia. 
139 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments, 1 February 2013. 
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over the last decades, seems to remain a normality. Parliament continues to be an elite 
recruitment structure which favours males. 
 
 
7.2.1. Findings from the Literature on the Parliamentary Recruitment of Women 
 The existing literature highlights three main groups of factors affecting parliamentary 
representation of women: (1) political/institutional, (2) historical/cultural and (3) 
socio-economic (Matland 1998; Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007).  
 
Political/Institutional Influences   
The electoral system is seen as the most important variable affecting parliamentary 
recruitment of women (Norris 1985). In the analysis of twenty-three democracies, 
Rule (1987) finds an electoral system as the single most important predictor of female 
legislative recruitment; Studlar and McAllister (2002) draw the same conclusion in 
their work on twenty industrialised democracies. Proportional representation (PR) 
provides the best chances for election of women, good opportunities under mixed 
electoral systems and the worst chances under straight majoritarian (first past the post) 
system (Rule 1987 and 1994; Kostadinova 2007; Paxton, Kunovich, Hughes 2007). 
The main explanation for this is that political party nominates a group of candidates in 
the PR system and only a single candidate in the single member district. In the first 
case, the party is more conscious of balancing its list, a woman candidate can be seen 
as an advantage in attracting additional votes. The second case involves a nomination 
procedure of the zero sum nature: women compete against the party interests 
represented by men, nomination of a female candidate means a displacement of a 
male competitor (Matland 1998; Paxton, Kunovich, Hughes 2007).  
 Friendliness of left-wing political parties toward inclusion of female candidates 
shows a similarity with ethnic minority recruitment. Left-oriented political parties 
adhere more to egalitarian ideals and are more inclined to support underrepresented 
groups (Caul 1999). They have more females as candidates and legislators (Putnam 
1976: 38); the success of the left-wing party is “the strongest predictor of women’s 
level of inclusion in a political elite” (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 103).  
 Political parties with leftist values are also more likely to adopt gender quotas 
(Caul 2001) that are considered to positively influence the women’s share in 
parliamentary representation (Hoecker 1998). Although “national gender quota laws 
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do not always generate significant increases in women’s represesentation” (Paxton, 
Kunovich, Hughes 2007: 269-270), the intention of them – be it legal or voluntary 
party quotas, aspirant or candidate quotas, gender-neutral quotas or simply reserved 
seats – is to facilitate women’s access to political power. Quotas represent what 
Dahlerup (2006) calls the fast track to equal representation of women and men and 
opposes the incremental track which is slow and mainly European. In addition to 
speeding up the process of access to parliament, the quantitative technique of quotas 
may induce a qualitative transformation in representation of women: “once the group 
reaches a certain size, critical mass theory suggests that there will be a qualitative 
change in the nature of group interactions, as the minority starts to assert itself and 
thereby transform the institutional culture, norms and values”(Norris and Lovenduski 
2001: 2-3). However, findings by Norris and Lovenduski (2001) and Studlar and 
McAllister (2002) do not provide a clear evidence that women act more distinctively 
once their group reaches a certain size. 
 Studies on legislative turnover see high incumbency rates as obstacle for 
women’s access to parliament (Andersen and Thorson 1984; Darcy and Choike 1986; 
Matland and Studlar 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2005). Incumbent MPs tend to be male 
and have better connections to resources, they are likely to be re-elected at a 
significantly higher ratio than candidates without office. Increasing the number of 
female candidates is an important step toward better parliamentary representation of 
women. However, one arrives at a conclusion that “increasing the return rate of 
female incumbents can affect the level of female representation more than increasing 
the number of women candidates” (Darcy and Choike 1986: 237). 
 Some authors argue that “career chances of women improve the less powerful an 
institution is” (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005: 269). This type of argument implies that 
a stronger legislative representation of women could indicate a lower decision-making 
capacity of the parliament. 
 
Historical/Cultural Impact 
It seems that the earlier country has granted voting rights for women, the higher levels 
representation of women will achieve at present. For instance, in 1906 Finland was 
the first to grant voting rights for women in Europe, today female parliamentary 
representation there occupies a second place in Europe. This historical type of 
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explanation is being supported by Hoecker (1998), Reynolds (1999) und Siaroff 
(2000).  
 In the treatment of Siaroff (2000: 199), the historical explanation is connected to 
the religious/cultural one: the countries that earlier started granting political rights for 
women were Protestant countries. The study by Rule (1987) also emphasises a 
positive Protestant (non-Catholic) influence on the legislative recruitment of women. 
 
Socio-economic Level of Development 
Female labour force participation and their integration into the labour market are 
considered to have a significant, positive effect on the number of female legislators 
(Oakes and Almquist 1993: 76; Matland 1998: 116). However, in spite of this 
established link, some researchers warn not to forget that occupations are gender-
specific and seen as traditional domains of males or females (Eccles 1994; Anker 
1998). Therefore, “the important factor is not whether women in a society work but 
where they work” (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 81). If legislative recruitment 
channelled through the occupational group dominated by females (e.g., teachers), 
women are likely to have better chances to get into a parliament. If the main area of 
parliamentary recruitment to be found in the occupational group dominated by males 
(e.g., managers, engineers, military officers) men will have easier access to 
legislature.    
 Higher education alone or through its connection with occupation (education as a 
prerequisite in certain occupations, e.g. law) has been and remains an important 
ladder in attaining social status of women. It is expected that countries with a larger 
share of higher education among women will have more female legislators than 
countries where women are less well educated (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 81).   
 It is also important to note that socio-economic (women’s share in the labour 
force) as well as institutional (PR electoral system) and cultural (cultural standing of 
women) factors apply to the developed (OECD) democracies, none of them has a 
significant effect in less developed countries (Matland 1998: 109).  
 
Literature on the Recruitment of Women MPs in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
The female representation in Estonian parliaments and other political structures are 
discussed in the studies by Raitviir (2000; 2002) and Biin (2004); the issue of 
parliamentary representation of Baltic women is placed into a European and Anglo-
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American perspective by Allik (2011). The works by Matonytė and collaborators 
(Krupavičius and Matonytė 2003; Matonytė 2003 and 2004; Matonytė and 
Novelskaitė 2004a and 2004b; Novelskaitė and Matonytė 2006; Matonytė 2007) 
provide a solid and systematic research into the parliamentary recruitment of female 
MPs in Lithuania. The comparable analysis on the recruitment patterns of Latvian 
female legislators is missing. There are some works (Ostrovska 1994; Zake 2002) 
dealing with general involvement of women in Latvian politics, but the only work 
partly related to the parliamentary recruitment of women is the one by Klāsons 
(2001). Regrettably, it is limited to one legislative term only. 
 
7.2.2. Hypotheses and Analysis of Data 
On average, over 17.7 per cent of female legislators in the last six parliaments of 
Estonia, 16 per cent in the last six parliaments of Latvia and 16.7 per cent in the last 
six legislatures of Lithuania are positive achievements in comparison with Riigikogu, 
Saeima and Seimas of the First Republic; Female MPs in the pre-war Riigikogu never 
constituted more than 3 per cent (Raun 1991: 133), the Lithuanian parliament would 
include 3 to 4 women per term while in the Latvian legislature women were almost 
not present.140 24.8 per cent of female legislators in the 2007 Riigikogu, 19 per cent in 
the last two Saeima and 24.5 per cent of female MPs in the last Seimas are the largest 
wins for women in the history of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliamentary 
elections. The current figures have already reached the average representation levels  
 
 
Table 7.2.1. Female MPs in the Baltic Parliaments 
Parliament 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
Female MPs and  































































Source: Own data and calculations. 
Note: The legislative bodies elected in 1990 were the Supreme Councils. The Estonian Riigikogu 
and the Lithuanian Seimas resumed their activities after the 1992 election, the Latvian Saeima 
started after the 1993 election. 
140 The only female legislator was elected to the Saeima of 1931 which was the last democratic 
parliament before the authoritarian takeover of Kārlis Ulmanis. 
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of many other western democracies141 but they lag behind the Scandinavian and 
Soviet achievements. 
 One might argue that the Soviet Lithuanian Assemblies, one third of which 
deputies have been women, were even greater achievements in the political history. 
However, these assemblies were undemocratically organised façade institutions with a 
rather decorative and not a legislative function.    
 In general, the representation of women in the Estonian parliaments grew from 
7.6 per cent in 1990 to 24.8 per cent in 2007. The Estonian Riigikogu was for three 
legislative terms led by the female head; two of three Presidium members of the 2011 
Riigikogu were women legislators. In Latvia, parliamentary representation of women 
grew from 5.5 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent in 2011. The Latvian Seima had female 
MPs as its speakers for three legislative terms. Three women out of five Saeima 
Presidium members in the 2002-2006 parliament also belong to the greatest wins in 
the Latvian parliamentary history. Since 1990 parliamentary representation advanced 
in the Lithuanian parliaments; the 2008 Seimas had its female speaker for the first 
time in the parliamentary history of Lithuania. 
 
On the basis of literature above, we propose eight hypotheses for the recruitment 
analysis of women legislators in the Baltics: 
 
1. The proportional system hypothesis: 
Countries with proportional electoral systems will have more female legislators than 
those with majoritarian or mixed systems. 
 
2. The candidate hypothesis: 
The larger the pool of candidates, the better chances for women to enter a legislature. 
 
3. The left party hypothesis: 
Left wing parties have higher levels of female representation in comparison with other 
political parties. 
 
141 As of 1 February 2013, there were 42 per cent of women in the Scandinavian legislatures on 
average. The average for other European OSCE member countries was 21.9 per cent (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2013). 
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4. The occupation and education hypothesis: 
The level of female representation is affected positively if the main recruitment bases 
are not male-dominated occupation and education. 
 
5. The turnover hypothesis: 
The higher the legislative turnover, the better chances for women to enter a 
parliament. 
 
6. The age and political experience hypothesis: 
Women as newcomers will be older and have less political experience in comparison 
with their male colleagues. 
 
7. The strength of institution hypothesis: 
The less powerful a political institution, the higher level of women is represented in it. 
 
8. The Protestant culture hypothesis:  




The Proportional System Hypothesis 
If the proportional electoral systems of Estonia and Latvia and a mixed electoral 
system of Lithuania are compared, there is only a slight evidence in support of the 
proposed hypothesis which states that countries with proportional electoral systems 
will have more female legislators than those with majoritarian or mixed systems. The 
averages for the second to the seventh term (the first legislatures in all three countries 
have been excluded from analysis since the 1990 elections have been conducted 
according to the single transferable vote (STV) in Estonia and majority scheme in 
Latvia and Lithuania) are 17.7 per cent for Estonia, 16 per cent for Latvia and 16.7 
per cent for Lithuania. If we compare election by election across countries, the 
Estonian and Latvian PR results show a higher level of female representation only in 
three of six parliaments in comparison with electoral outcomes of the Lithuanian 
mixed system. 
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However, the mixed electoral system of Lithuania offers an opportunity to compare a 
proportional system with a majoritarian one: roughly a half of the Lithuanian 
parliament – 70 legislators – is elected on the PR list, another half – 71 MPs – comes 
through single member (SMD) districts.  
 
 
Table 7.2.2. Election of the Women MPs to the Lithuanian Seimas 
Electoral 
Segment 
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
PR 5 50 14 58.3 9 60 18 58.1 15 57.7 20 58.8 
SMD 5 50 10 41.7 6 40 13 41.9 11 42.3 14 41.2 
Total 10 100 24 100 15 100 31 100 26 100 34 100 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The table above clearly shows that in almost all cases a higher share of women was 
elected through the party lists than through single member districts. This confirms the 
hypothesis that proportional representation is more favourable for the election of 
female MPs than a majority system. 
 
The Candidate Hypothesis 
The candidate hypothesis states that a larger pool of female candidates increases the 
probability that more females will enter a parliament.  
 The percentage of female candidates in Estonia climbed from 14 per cent in 1992 
to 27.1 per cent in 2007. The share of women candidates in Latvia grew from 22.9 per 
cent in 1995 to 30.3 per cent in 2011. In Lithuania it grew from 11.8 per cent in 1992 
to 31.7 per cent in 2012. 
 However, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data do not provide evidence that 
enlargement of candidates’ pool directly affects the increase of legislators. In some 
cases we have the opposite – for instance, in the 2006 Latvian Saeima the share of 
women MPs grows in spite of a decrease in women candidates. One may conclude 
that there must be other factors influencing the rise and decline of female MPs. 
 
 
The Left Party Hypothesis 
The left party hypothesis emphasise that left-oriented political parties adhere more to 
egalitarian ideals and are more inclined to support underrepresented groups (Caul 
1999), that they have more females as candidates and legislators and that the success 
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of the left-wing party is „the strongest predictor of women’s level of inclusion in a 
political elite” (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 103).  
 The Estonian data support this hypothesis to a large extent. With the exception of 
Popular Front in 1992 and Conservatives in 1999, the highest percentages of female 
MPs are found among Socialists/Social Democrats in 1990, 1995 and 2003  
 
Table 7.2.3. Female Legislators within Party Families in Estonian Parliaments 
 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 0 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. 2 22.2 3 25 1 16.7 3 17.6 2 33.3 3 30 4 21.1 
Greens 0 0 0 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 16.7 --- --- 
Agrarians 1 7.1 --- --- --- --- 0 0 2 15.4 2 33.3 --- --- 
Left Liberals 1 6.3 0 0 8 14 5 17.9 7 25 10 34.5 7 26.9 
Right Liberals -- --- 0 0 2 10.5 5 20 3 15.8 7 22.6 5 15.2 
Conservatives -- --- 1 3.4 1 7.7 4 22.2 5 14.3 2 10.5 4 17.4 
Extreme Right -- --- 4 22.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- 
Ethnic Minority 0 0 --- --- 0 0 1 16.7 --- --- --- --- -- --- 
Other 1 8.3 0 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- 
No Party 1 12.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- 
Umbrella 
Movement 2 14.3 5 33.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- 
TOTAL 8 7.6 13 12.9 12 11.9 18 17.8 19 18.8 25 24.8 20 19.8 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
 
and Left Liberals in 2007 and 2011. The highest absolute numbers of women are also 
observed among leftist parliamentary parties – Socialists/Social Democrats in 1990 
and Left Liberals from 1995 to 2011, with an exception being the Popular Front in 
1990 and 1992 and Right Liberals in 1999. 
 The left party hypothesis states that the left wing parties have higher levels of 
female representation compared to other political parties. It is being challenged by the 
Lithuanian and, especially, Latvian data. 
 One of the most striking findings from the Latvian data is greater friendliness 
towards women among the families of the right wing than among Socialist/Social 
Democratic or Communist parties in Latvian parliaments. In absolute numbers, the 
greatest inclusion of female legislators among Anti-Communist Umbrella Movement 
in 1990, Liberals in 1993, Extreme Right in 1995 and Conservatives from 1998 
onwards. In terms of the percentage of women inside of each party family, Socialists/ 
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Table 7.2.4. Female Legislators within Party Families in Latvian Parliaments 
 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 1 1.7 2 28.6 0 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. --- --- 2 15.4 1 16.7 2 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agrarians --- --- 0 0 2 12.5 --- --- 1 8.3 2 11.1 4 18.2 
Left Liberals --- --- 2 40 1 5.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Conservatives --- --- 3 20 1 12.5 7 17.1 15 28.3 15 30.6 14 34.1 
Extreme Right --- --- 0 0 2 6.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- 1 12.5 
Liberals --- --- 4 11.1 1 5.9 5 23.8 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Christian Dem. --- --- 2 33.3 -- --- 3 37.5 2 20 2 20 --- --- 
Popular Front 10 7.6 --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 11 5.5 15 15 8 8 17 17 18 18 19 19 19 19 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
 
Social Democrats and Communists rank lowest in six out of seven Parliaments.142 We 
do not have an explanation for this phenomenon, but there is no wonder if a separate 
party of female Social Democrats in this situation appears and contests in election. 
This was the case of the Social Democratic Organisation of Women which in the 
election of 1998 competed with Alliance of Latvian Social Democrats (LSA) and 
National Harmony Party (TSP). Parliamentary representation of Communists in 1995 
and of the parties belonging to the Social Democratic family - TSP in 1998 and all 
other parties belonging to the Social Democratic family from 2002 onwards has been 
exclusively male: 5, 16, 25, 23 and 29 MPs from 1995 to 2010, respectively.  
 The Lithuanian data also demonstrate – both in absolute numbers and percentages 
within the party family – that Socialists/Social Democrats are not the friendliest when 
it comes to recruiting female legislators. On the contrary, in many cases the 
proportion of women among Conservatives and other parties is higher than among 
Social Democrats. 
 The other finding from Latvian data is that the above mentioned electoral list of 
the Social Democratic Organisation of Women consisted exceptionally of females 
with Latvian ethnicity and that all Communists in the parliament of 1995 and 
Socialists/Social Democrats in the parliaments from 1998 to 2010 were exclusively 
males an absolute majority of who came from ethnic (mostly Russian) minority.143  
142 The exception is the Saeima of 1995 where Socialists/Social Democrats have the highest share of 
women in comparison with percentages of female legislators among other party families. 
143 This does not apply to the Alliance of Latvian Social Democrats which in the parliament of 1998 
had 2 female MPs and an absolute majority of their MPs (92.9 per cent or 13 out of 14 MPs) with 
Latvian ethnicity. 
 142 
                                                 
     
Table 7.2.5. Female Legislators within Party Families in Lithuanian Parliaments 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
To sum up, the left party hypothesis is confirmed only by Estonian data. In Latvia 
and, in majority of cases, in Lithuania the right wing political party families are 
friendlier toward recruitment of female MPs.  
 
Occupation and Education Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is that the level of female representation is affected positively if the 
main recruitment bases are not male-dominated occupation and education.  
 In all three countries female MPs are better educated than their male counterparts. 
This mirrors a generally higher educational level among women in comparison with 
educational level among men in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian societies (see the 
2000 Round of Population and Housing Censuses in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 
However, we are less concerned with the level of education than with the type of 
education. What is the main type of education and which gender dominates it? Do 
humanities and social sciences dominate over technical and natural sciences or vice 
versa? 
 The share of degrees in humanities and social sciences, as well as in technical and 
natural sciences, fluctuates between parliaments. However, technical and natural 
sciences clearly lead in three out of seven Estonian parliaments and in five out of 
seven legislatures in Latvia and Lithuania144. The data also provide evidence for the 
dominance of humanities and social sciences among women MPs in all seven 
144 See the above chapter on education. 
 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2006 2012 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 1 16.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. --- --- 3 3.8 4 16.7 6 12.8 4 20 4 16 10 27 
Agrarians --- --- --- --- 0 0 0 0 3 50 1 33.3 1 100 
Left Liberals --- --- --- --- --- --- 2 7.7 2 18.2 0 0 --- --- 
Conservatives --- --- --- --- 15 21.4 2 20 5 20 10 21.7 6 18.2 
Extreme Right --- --- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --- --- --- --- 
Ethnic Minority --- --- 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 0 0 3 37.5 
Other --- --- 3 33.3 1 33.3 2 66.7 10 22.7 9 22 12 25.5 
No Party --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4 28.6 --- --- --- --- 
Liberals --- --- 0 0 3 20 3 8.3 2 11.1 2 11.1 2 20 
Christian Dem. --- --- 0 0 1 5.9 0 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Popular Front 11 8.7 4 12.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 12 9 10 7.1 24 17.5 15 10.6 31 22 26 18.4 34 24.5 
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parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and prevalence of technical and natural 
sciences among men MPs. This means that technical and natural sciences, as male-
dominated education, is not a favourable recruitment basis for female parliamentary 
representatives.  
 The study of law and lawyer’s occupation deserve to be distinguished as 
especially suited for the legislator’s office. This is due to the practice lawyers attain in 
debating and the relative ease (in comparison with other professional occupations) at 
which they move back to the lawyer’s job after leaving parliament. The work of 
parliamentarians concerns designing new laws and lawyers are best trained for 
reading and writing the laws. The dominance of lawyers in parliaments is mainly 
considered a phenomenon of the U.S.A. (Matthews 1984). Nevertheless, some have 
noted the significance of lawyers in the Western European parliaments as well (Best 
and Cotta 2000). Baltic countries, however, follow an Eastern European pattern of 
development with low shares of lawyers in legislatures: since 1990 the lawyer’s 
occupation among Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian MPs did not reach 4 per cent (the 
only exception is the Lithuanian parliament of 1990, where 7.5 per cent of MPs were 
lawyers). The shares of MPs holding law degrees are higher (9 per cent for Lithuania, 
12.7 per cent for Estonia and 14.3 per cent for Latvia on average). 
 The percentages of law degrees among female MPs in Estonia and Latvia are 
slightly higher than those of male MPs (15.5 per cent compared to 12.1 per cent on 
average for seven elections in Estonia, 15 per cent compared to 12.2 per cent in 
Latvia), whereas female MPs in Lithuania have the same percentage of law degrees as 
their male counterparts (8.6 per cent).  
 The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data indicate that the vast majority of 
female MPs are higher civil servants and public sector employees. The teacher’s 
profession is a second most popular occupation among female legislators in Latvia 
and Lithuania and third in Estonia. The percentage of civil servants and teachers 
(professors) among female MPs in Baltic parliaments is higher than their share among 
male counterparts; it ranges from 47.4 per cent on average in Estonia to 52 per cent in 
Lithuania, therefore, these jobs could be considered favourable recruitment bases for 
female politicians. 
 Across genders, the rate of women MPs coming from public sector is higher than 
the rate for men MPs in all three countries. Across countries, the public sector share 
among Lithuanian women MPs (79.6 per per cent) is higher than among their Latvian 
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counterparts (73.3 per cent), however, Estonian female MPs with 85.6 per cent show 
the highest level of public sector representation. This could be explained by the lowest 
general rate of public sector employees among all Latvian legislators and the highest 
percentage of public sector representatives among all Estonian MPs. The overall 
decline in the recruitment of public sector employees could be attributed to the 
dismantling of the socialist state and introduction of free market economy: this 
diminishes the share of public sector and expands the domain of the private one. 
 
 
The Turnover Hypothesis 
The hypothesis that the higher the legislative turnover the better chances for women 
to enter a parliament is challenged by our data: the first post-communist parliaments 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have the highest shares of newcomers and the lowest 
percentages of women. Excluding the first parliament (1990) we see a higher rate of 
newcomers among women in 4/6 cases in Estonia and Latvia and in 3/6 cases in 
Lithuania. The women’s share among newcomers is clearly lower than the men’s 
percentage among parliamentary newcomers in all six Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian legislatures. However, the data also reveal the following pattern: the 
highest absolute numbers of women come to the legislatures of Latvia and Lithuania 
through the political party family with the highest absolute numbers of newcomers. 
 In Latvia the highest absolute numbers of newcomers have been brought to the 
parliament by Liberals (19 MPs) in 1993, Extreme Right (22 MPs) in 1995, 
Conservatives (21 MPs) and Social Democrats (21 MPs) in 1998, and Conservatives 
(30 MPs, 16 MPs and 21 MPs) in 2002, 2006 and 2010. Most of these party families 
brought the highest absolute numbers of women to those parliaments as well: Liberals 
brought 4 female MPs (22.2 per cent of all women in the parliament) in 1993, 
Extreme Right brought 2 female MPs (25 per cent) in 1995, Conservatives brought 7 
women (41.2 per cent) in 1998, 15 women (83.3 per cent) in 2002, 15 women (83.3 
per cent) in 2006 and 14 women (73.7 per cent) in 2010. Three of 4 of the Liberal 
females were newcomers; 1 of 2 of the extreme right females, majority of 
conservative women in 1998 and 2002 and a half in 2010 were newcomers.  
 In Lithuania the highest absolute numbers of newcomers have been brought to the 
parliament by Socialist/Social Democrats (67 MPs) in 1992, Conservatives (43 MPs) 
in 1996, Liberals (31 MPs) in 2000 and by the populist Labour Party and Liberal 
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Democrats (40 MPs, coded as ‘Other’) in 2004, Labour Party, Party “Order & Justice” 
and Party of National Awakening (24 MPs) in 2008, and the Labour Party (14 MPs) 
in 2012. Similarly as in Latvia, many of those party families recruited the highest 
absolute number of women to the parliament: Umbrella Movement brought 4 female 
MPs in 1992 (40 per cent), Conservatives brought 14 women (60.9 per cent) in 1996, 
Socialists/Social Democrats 6 female MPs in 2000 (40 per cent of all female 
legislators) and the populist Labour party and Liberal Democrats 10 female MPs (43.5 
per cent) in 2004 and 12 female MPs (35.3 percent) in 2012. A half of those women 
from families of Conservatives and Socialists/Social Democrats have been 
newcomers and all female legislators from the populist Labour party and Liberal 
Democrats were for the first time elected to the Lithuanian parliament. 
 The Estonian data, contrary to the Latvian and Lithuanian data showing that the 
highest absolute numbers of women in legislatures are achieved through the political 
party family with the highest absolute numbers of newcomers (Kuklys 2008: 44), do 
not confirm the probability that a higher legislative turnover increases women’s 
chances to get elected to the parliament - the thesis works only for Left Liberals in 
1995 and partly in 1999. If we switch from the party family to all-parliament level, we 
observe a common Baltic paradox: the highest number and percentage of women is 
found in the Riigikogu with the lowest parliamentary turnover (in 2007) and the 
lowest number and share of female MPs is found in the assembly with the highest 
legislative turnover (in 1990). Hence, a higher parliamentary turnover does not 
necessarily mean a higher share of women in the legislature. 
 
Age and Political Experience Hypothesis 
The age and political experience hypothesis states that women as parliamentary 
newcomers will be older and have less political experience in comparison with their 
male colleagues. 
 Our data provide evidence that women newcomers have been older than men 
newcomers in all seven Estonian, in five out of seven Latvian and Lithuanian 
parliaments.  
 If pre-parliamentary political experience is differentiated into local elective posts, 
leading party positions and membership in the cabinet of ministers, Baltic women 
MPs are inferior to their male counterparts in all three types of political experience. 
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However, when it comes to parliamentary experience, women MPs lead over their 
male colleagues: in many Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments the mean 
number of mandates and the share of women MPs serving the third legislative term 
are higher than the mean number and the share among male MPs. This could be 
interpreted in the following way: yes, indeed, the women MPs are fewer and older 
but, differently from their male counterparts, they are more career-oriented and more 
determined to pursue legislative careers. In other words, it is more difficult to enter a 
parliament for women but, once they are in, they have better chances to become long-
standing legislators in comparison with their male colleagues. 
 If cross-country comparisons are being made, Estonian women MPs are clearly 
more politically experienced before entering a legislature for the first time in 
comparison with their Latvian and Lithuanian colleagues, however, women MPs from 
Lithuania have a longer legislative tenure (1.8 terms) in comparison with the 
legislative experience of their counterparts from Estonia and Latvia (1.6 mandates on 
average). 
 
The Strength of Institution Hypothesis 
An argument that “career chances of women improve the less powerful an institution 
is” could be found in the literature (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005: 269). It implies that 
a stronger legislative representation of women could indicate a lower decision-making 
capacity of the parliament. If we assume that governments have more political power 
than parliaments145 (governments dictate legislation agenda), comparison of female 
representation in cabinets of ministers and legislatives would serve in support of the 
argument above: the share of females in the cabinets is lower than the share of 
females in the parliaments. However, the differences are not significant and it seems 
that women in the cabinets are slowly catching up. From 2002 to 2003 almost one-
third of the Estonian cabinet of ministers were women which was much higher than 
the parliamentary percentage. From December 2004 onwards, the share of women in 
the Latvian cabinet of ministers is larger than their share in the Latvian parliament. 
The Estonian women were the fastest to reach the 10 per cent representation level in 
the cabinet: in Estonia it was reached in October 1992, in Latvia it was achieved in 
145 The largest share (31 per cent) of the Lithuanian political elite members who agreed to participate in 
my survey claimed that the government is the centre of power in the Lithuanian political system 
(Kuklys 2000: 46). 
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September 1994, while Lithuanians reached it in December 1996. Still, if one 
compares the highest institutional positions, it seems that women have better chances 
to become a speaker of the parliament than a prime minister of the cabinet (so far, 
since 1990 the Baltic parliaments were led by women in Estonia and Latvia three 
times, in Lithuania this happened once. For the entire period, Estonia and Latvia did 
not have women as prime ministers, Lithuania had the female prime minister in the 
period from 1990 to 1991). 
   The strength of the institution argument can partly explain the appointment of 
Mrs. Kazimiera Prunskienė to the position of Prime Minister of Lithuania in 1990 (the 
only female head of government in the Baltic states) and election of Mrs. Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga into the post of the President of Latvia in 1999 and 2003 and Ms. Dalia 
Grybauskaitė into the post of the President of Lithuania in 2009. The political power 
centre in the period from 1990 to 1992 was not in the Lithuanian government, but in 
the Lithuanian parliament. Latvia and Lithuania are not presidential, but 
parliamentary and semi-presidential republics, respectively. Both of these conditions 
imply better opportunities for women‘s entry into the political elite.  
 The largest female share out of all three Baltic parliaments belongs to the 
Estonian Riigikogu elected in 2007; the growth of women MPs in Estonia, as well as 
Latvia, seems to be over time more gradual and steadier than in Lithuania. In the 
parliamentary hierarchy, the Estonian and Latvian women made most advances: three 
out of five Presidium members of the Latvian Saeima in 2005 have been women, two 
of three Presidium members in the 2011 Estonian Riigikogu were women MPs. 
 
 
The Protestant Culture Hypothesis 
The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data support our hypothesis that the Protestant 
culture is friendlier toward inclusion of women into political elite in comparison with 
the Catholic one. Estonia and Latvia, where Evangelical Lutheranism was a dominant 
religion, granted active and passive voting rights earlier than Catholic Lithuania (1918 
in comparison with 1921)146. After the 60 years of religious suppression and 
secularisation, the Weberian thesis of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism 
146 We should note, however, that women in the Latvian parliaments before the Second World War 
have been almost absent (the first and the only woman appears in the last parliament elected in 1931). 
The Lithuanian parliaments after the First World War, on the contrary, would always include some 
women. 
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is still applicable to the Baltic states147. In the Baltic legislatures of the post-1990 era 
the highest share of women MPs (24.8 per cent in 2007) belongs to Estonia. The 
average percentage of women MPs in the seven Baltic parliaments is the highest in 
Estonia (16.2 per cent) and the lowest in Latvia (14.5 per cent). Lithuania with 15.6 
per cent lies in-between. 
 The Lithuanian society remains predominantly Catholic: according to the 
population census of 2001, 79 per cent of the Lithuanian inhabitants are Roman 
Catholics, the second largest religious group is Orthodox Believers making 4.1 per 
cent of the total population in Lithuania.  In current Latvia, 34.2 per cent of 
population is Evangelical Lutherans; Roman Catholics with 24.1 per cent are the 
second and the Orthodox Believers with 17.8 per cent are the third largest religious 
community. In Estonia, Evangelical Lutherans comprise 13.6 per cent of the 
population; Orthodox Believers 12.8 per cent, other Christians (including Roman 
Catholics) - about 1.4 per cent.148  
  These data should be interpreted with caution since they do not differentiate 
between churchgoers and nominal (cultural) Catholics/Protestants. The 2005 
Eurobarometer finds that only 49 per cent of the Lithuanian population “believe there 
is a God” (Social Values, Science & Technology 2005: 9)149; the figures for Latvia 
and Estonia are 39 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively. This allows to conclude not 
only that Estonia is the most secular society of the three Baltic states150 but also that 
the Catholic Lithuania is not that far from the Lutheran Latvia151. One could possibly 
ask whether Lutheranism is more favourable in spreading secularisation than 
Catholicism; what our data suggests is that the degree of secularism in the Baltics 
147 The work by Katrin Mattusch (1997) documented that right after the collapse of the USSR the 
Estonian population showed the lowest degree of religiosity, conservatism and conformism and the 
highest degree of individualism, emancipation and self-responsibility, whereas the Lithuanian 
population, on the contrary, showed the highest degree of religiosity, conservatism and conformism 
and the lowest degree of individualism, emancipation and self-responsibility. The Latvian population 
fell somewhere in-between. 
148 The ethnic Estonian population is much more secular in comparison to Russian and other ethnic 
groups in Estonia (see Evans 1998: 62). 
149 The distinction between cultural and religious Catholicism is obvious in the other study: it indicates 
an increase of the Lithuanian Catholics from 46 to 66 per cent in the period 1990-1997, however, it 
also reports than only more than 10 per cent of Lithuania’s self-professed Catholics attend Mass on a 
regular basis and 35 per cent come to church only during the great feasts (Streikus 2002: 158). 
150 According to the special Eurobarometer, Estonia is the most secular society not only in the Baltics 
but also in the entire Europe (Social Values, Science and Technology 2005: 9). 
151 There are no differences between the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia and the Catholic 
Church of Lithuania in terms of ordination of women: in both churches women are not allowed to serve 
as priests. 
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partly explains the differences in gender representation starting with 1990: the most 
secular Estonia has 16.2 per cent of women in all seven parliaments, the less secular 
Latvia and Lithuania have 14.5 and 15.6 per cent of women in their seven national 




Underrepresentation of ethnic minorities has long been typical features of political 
elites and, in spite of some incremental gains in parliamentary representation over the 
last decades, seems to remain a normality. Parliament continues to be an elite 
recruitment structure which favours candidates from the titular-nation groups. 
 Europe is no exception, ethnic minorities remain underrepresented in the 
European national parliaments. This is despite the fact that most of the continent 
enjoys a liberal democratic form of governance. Ethnic minorities in the society tend 
to be minorities in a parliament (or political structure in general), however, exceptions 
of ethnic overrepresentation in some national parliaments do exist (Lijphart 1994: 
122; Edinger and Kuklys 2007: 170). 
 Ethnic minorities, in comparison to their share of the total population, have been 
underrepresented in all three Baltic parliaments, and most especially in Latvia and 
Estonia. The literature documents empirical evidence that Estonia, as well as Latvia, 
discloses the highest parliamentary underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in Eastern 
Europe (Edinger and Kuklys 2007: 170).  
 
7.3.1. Findings from the Literature on the Parliamentary Recruitment of Ethnic 
Minorities 
 Parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities is being affected by (1) institutional 
arrangements (electoral systems, constitution, political party and citizenship laws) 
and, especially, (2) demographic and cultural influences. 
  
Institutional Arrangements 
Similar to the legislative recruitment of women, systems of proportional 
representation provide the best opportunities for the election of ethnic minorities into 
parliament (Zimmerman 1994; Lijphart 2004). This is especially applicable to the 
cases when minorities are geographically dispersed through the entire country. 
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 A larger magnitude of districts (Shugart 1994) and lower electoral thresholds also 
make parliamentary entry for ethnic minority parties easier. However, existence and 
election of ethnic parties is not an aim in itself – mixed political parties are much 
more favourable to the ethnic minority integration and policy of conciliation 
(Bochsler 2006). 
 In addition to electoral systems, there are other institutional arrangements which 
affect the representation of ethnic minorities. For instance, some constitutions 
explicitly guarantee minimal parliamentary representation of certain ethnic minorities 
(article 59.2 of the Romanian Constitution). Other laws explicitly allow or forbid 
ethnic minorities to have their own political party. For instance, since 1995 
establishing political parties on ethnic or religious basis is forbidden in Russia; 
Bulgaria – with an exception of the Turkish ethnic party – automatically disqualifies 
any ethnically oriented organisation from the election (Pan and Pfeil 2006: 92).  
 Since only citizens are entitled to elect and be elected to the national parliament, 
restrictive and tough citizenship policy may lead to the exclusion of ethnic minorities 
from political participation.    
 
Demographic and Cultural Influences 
The level of minority representation is conditioned by demographic and cultural 
characteristics of the ethnic minorities involved (Moser 2008). The share of ethnic 
minorities in population has a significant impact on the share of ethnic minorities in 
legislatures as well: the larger their share in a society, the more MPs ethnic minorities 
are likely to get.152  
 
Literature on the Recruitment of Ethnic Minority MPs in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania 
In the context of works related to the ethnic aspects of politics in Estonia and Latvia 
(Smith 1996; Steen 1997; Pettai 1998; Järve 2000; Diatchkova 2005; Järve 2005), the 
analysis by Kolstø and Tsilevich (1997) deals most directly with parliamentary 
recruitment of ethnic minorities in Latvia. However, it is limited in that it covers only 
the first three legislative terms. The parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities 
152 This logic of probability, however, does not work in the case of women MPs: the share of women in 
the population remains more or less the same, however, the share of women legislators is slowly 
increasing over time.  
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in the Estonian parliaments is analysed in the works by Pettai and Hallik (2002), 
Edinger and Kuklys (2007) and Steen with Kuklys (2010). In the Lithuanian case, 
parliamentary recruitment of ethnic minorities receives some attention in the work by 
Matonytė (2003). Analyses of Krupavičius (2000) and Žvaliauskas (2000) deal with 
political party rather than parliamentary recruitment in Lithuania. The study on the 
representation of ethnic minorities by Kuklys (2008) includes six legislative terms in 
Latvia and five legislative terms in Lithuania.   
 
7.3.2. Hypotheses and Analysis of Data 
The proportion of ethnic minorities in the seven Estonian and Lithuanian legislatures 
is rather similar – 8.8 per cent and 7.6 per cent on average respectively, although the 
share of ethnic minorities in the Estonian society is about two times larger than the 
one in Lithuania (31 per cent and 16.3 per cent respectively). The Latvian parliaments 
comprise 18.5 per cent of ethnic minorities on average, however, the share of ethnic 
minorities in Latvian society is also larger – 39.5 per cent.153 
 
Table 7.3.1. Ethnic Minority MPs in the Baltic Parliaments 
Parliament 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
Ethnic Minority MPs  































































Source: Own data and calculations. 
Note: The legislative bodies elected in 1990 were the Supreme Councils. The Estonian Riigikogu 
and the Lithuanian Seimas resumed their activities after the 1992 election, the Latvian Saeima 
started after the 1993 election. 
 
 
The share of ethnic minorities in six post-Communist Riigikogu – 6.4 per cent on 
average – is similar to the share of ethnic minorities in the interwar Riigikogu which 
was 6 per cent on average154 with a substantial difference being that the interwar 
Estonian society had 11.8 per cent of ethnic minorities in 1934 and that Estonian 
153 The 2012 data. In 1989 the ethnic minorities in Latvia and ethnic minorities in Lithuania comprised 
48 and 20 per cent of the total population respectively. The proportion of ethnic minorities in Estonia 
was 38.5 per cent. 
154 There were 5 per cent of ethnic minorities in the 1920, 1926 and 1929 Riigikogu, 7 per cent in the 
1923 and 8 per cent in the 1932 Riigikogu (Arter 1996: 73). 
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society in 2010 had 31.2 percent (Statistics Office of Estonia). Russians were the 
largest ethnic minority in Estonia also before the Second World War, however, over 
time their share in Estonian society enlarged three times – from 8.2 per cent in 1934 
to 25.5 per cent in 2010.155 The less numerous German, Swedish and Jewish 
minorities of the interwar Estonia were replaced by Ukrainian and Byelorussian 
ethnicities in the Soviet and post-Soviet period. Since ethnic minorities in the current 
Estonian society make a larger share than in the pre-war period, the potential for a 
more numerous parliamentary representation in current legislatures is by far not 
exhausted. Ten ethnic minority MPs in the last Riigikogu could be a start in the 
increasing trend. However, we doubt whether in the near future it will reach the levels 
of minority representation in the Estonian Supreme Council of 1990 which was 22.9 
per cent.     
 The percentage of ethnic minorities in the last four Latvian Saeimas achieved the 
level of the inter-war parliamentary representation, with a substantial difference being 
that in the First Republic most numerous parliamentary minorities had German and 
Jewish background, whereas most numerous ethnic minority MPs in the Second 
Republic are of Russian origin. However, none of the Saeimas – neither in the First 
nor in the Second Republic – achieved the level of the 1990 Latvian Supreme Council 
where ethnic minorities amounted to 31.3 per cent of all parliamentary 
representatives. 
 None of the Lithuanian parliaments – neither in the First, nor the Second 
Republic – achieved the level of ethnic minority representation (17.9 per cent) of the 
1923 Seimas. Only Soviet Lithuanian assemblies of deputies had higher shares of 
ethnic minorities in 1955, 1971, 1974, 1980 and 1985 (Krupavičius 2000: 24). 
However, these were decorative and pro forma institutions rather than real legislative 
bodies. The parliaments of the First and the Second Republic are rather similar in 
terms of ethnic minority share with a substantial difference being that in the First 
Republic most numerous parliamentary minorities had Jewish and Polish background, 
whereas most numerous ethnic minority MPs in the Second Republic are of Polish 
and Russian origin.  
 On the basis of the reviewed literature, we propose five hypotheses for the 
recruitment analysis of ethnic minority MPs in the Baltics: 
155 In 1989 the share of ethnic Russians in Estonia was 30.3 per cent (Raun 1997: 336). 
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1. The proportional system hypothesis: 
Countries with proportional electoral systems will have more ethnic minority 
legislators than those with majoritarian or mixed systems. 
 
2. The candidate hypothesis: 
The larger the pool of candidates, the better chances for ethnic minorities to enter a 
legislature. 
 
3. The left party hypothesis: 
Left wing parties have higher levels of ethnic minority representation in comparison 
with other political parties. 
 
4. The citizenship and lustration hypothesis: 
Softening the laws on citizenship and lustration will positively affect the 
parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities.   
 
5. The previous regime hypothesis: 
Ethnic minority legislators are likely to have more political experience associated 
with a previous regime than their ethnic majority counterparts. 
 
 
The Proportional System Hypothesis 
If the proportional electoral systems of Estonia and Latvia and a mixed electoral 
system of Lithuania are compared, there is no clear evidence in support of the 
proposed hypothesis which states that countries with proportional electoral systems 
will have more ethnic minority legislators than those with majority or mixed systems.  
 If the election of ethnic minority MPs is compared election by election, the larger 
share of ethnic minority legislators in Latvia is observed in all six terms in 
comparison to the electoral results for Lithuania. (It must be admitted though that we 
do not clearly show if this is purely due to the electoral system or also due to factors 
such as the share of ethnic minorities in a society and citizenry.) However, Estonia, 
having larger share of ethnic minorities in the society, shows slightly lower levels of 
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parliamentary representation in the Riigikogu (6.4 per cent) than the Lithuanian 
Seimas (7 per cent).   
 The mixed electoral system of Lithuania offers an opportunity to compare a 
proportional system with a majoritarian one: roughly a half of the Lithuanian 
parliament – 70 legislators – is elected according to the PR way, another half – 71 
MPs – comes through single member (SMD) districts.  
 The results for the election of ethnic minority legislators do not support the 
proportional system hypothesis: the share of the elected ethnic minority MPs is larger 
in the PR segment only in two of six parliamentary elections. 
 
Table 7.3.2. Election of the Ethnic Minority MPs to the Lithuanian Seimas 
Electoral 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Segment N % N % N % N % N % N % 
PR 5 50 3 42.9 8 57.1 4 44.4 3 50 8 61.5 
SMD 5 50 4 57.1 6 42.9 5 55.6 3 50 5 38.5 
Total  10 100 7 100 14 100 9 100 6 100 13 100 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
The Candidate Hypothesis 
The candidate hypothesis states that a larger pool of ethnic minority candidates 
increases the probability that more ethnic minorities will enter a parliament.  
 The share of ethnic minority candidates has been increasing, reaching 16.2 per 
cent in 2002 for Latvia and 11.5 per cent in 2012 for Lithuania.156 In Lithuania the 
share of ethnic minorities among candidates tends to coincide with the share of ethnic 
minorities in the Seimas. In contrast, the share of ethnic minorities among MPs in 
Latvia is larger than percentage of ethnic minorities among parliamentary candidates. 
 The Latvian and Lithuanian data do not provide evidence that enlargement of 
candidates’ pool directly affects the increase of legislators. In some cases we have the 
opposite – for instance, in the 2006 Latvian Saeima the share of ethnic minority 
legislators grows in spite of a decrease in ethnic minority candidates. The 2010 
Saeima election brought more ethnic minority MPs inspite of the smaller share of 
156 The Electoral Committee of Estonia does not provide information on the ethnicity of the electoral 
candidates. According to the Central Electoral Commission of Latvia, 36 out of 1019 candidates in 
2002, 107 out of 1024 candidates in 2006 and 175 out of 1234 candidates in 2010 did not mention their 
ethnicity. The Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania states that during the 1996 election 543 
candidates out of 1358 (40 per cent) and during the 2000 election 32 candidates out of 1271 (2.5 per 
cent) did not indicate their ethnicity. Here we include the valid percentages only. 
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minorities in candidates’ pool compared to the 2002 and 2006 elections. One may 
conclude that there must be other factors influencing the rise and decline of ethnic 
minority MPs (e.g. the enlargement of the ethnic minority share in the electorate). 
 
The Left Party Hypothesis 
The left party hypothesis states that the left wing parties have higher levels of ethnic 
minority representation compared to other political parties.  
 
Table 7.3.3. Ethnic Minority MPs in Estonian Parliaments 
Elections  
Party Families 
1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 6 85.7 -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5.3 
Greens 0 0 0 0 -- --- -- --- -- --- 1 16.7 --- --- 
Agrarians 0 0 -- --- -- --- 0 0 0 0 0 0 --- --- 
Left Liberals 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7.1 4 14.3 6 20.7 8 30.8 
Right Liberals --- --- 0 0 1 5.3 0 0 1 5.3 2 6.5 1 3 
Conservatives --- --- 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.9 0 0 0 0 
Ethnic Minority 7 100 -- --- 6 100 4 66.7 -- --- -- --- --- --- 
Other 11 91.7 0 0 -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- --- --- 
Popular Front 0 0 1 2.1 -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 24 22.9 1 1 7 6.9 6 5.9 6 5.9 9 8.9 10 9.9 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
Among the last seven legislatures, the 1990 Supreme Council of Estonia has the 
largest number of ethnic minority parliamentarians. Ethnic minority deputies came 
from the Communist, Ethnic Minority (regionalist “Virumaa” faction) and other 
(“Legal Continuity” and military officers’) groups. The 1992 Riigikogu stands in 
sharp contrast to the Supreme Council: were it not for the election of Ants-Enno 
Lõhmus, the leader of Swedish Community in Estonia, the 1992 parliament would 
have had no representatives of ethnic minorities! This contrast captures Estonia at the 
beginning of 1990s as a consequence of legal restorationism and disenfranchisement 
of about 40 per cent of eligible voters. 
 The 1995 and 1999 terms finally saw ethnic minority parties entering the 
Riigikogu: the highest shares of parliamentary ethnic minorities expressed in absolute 
numbers and percentages are found among them. From 2003 to 2011, the clear leaders 
in minority recruitment were the Left Liberals (represented by the Estonian Centre 
Party), comprising from two-thirds to four-fifths of all ethnic minorities in each of the 
last three legislatures. Since the 2003 election, the Russian ethnic minority parties 
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have not been successful electoral actors and have disappeared altogether from 
parliament because they have not met the 5 per cent threshold. Knowing that ethnic 
Russians constitute fully 25.5 per cent of the total population in Estonia (Statistical 
Yearbook of Estonia 2011: 56), this could be interpreted as a consequence of 
fragmentation of the ethnic Russian community and the incapacity of its leaders to 
politically organise. On the other hand, the failure of ethnic minority parties in 
Estonia from 2003 onwards could be interpreted as a sign of the normalisation of 
relations between the Estonian majority and the Russian minority as Estonian parties 
continue to actively integrate ethnic Russians into their ranks (Pettai 2004: 832). 
According to Bochsler (2006), mixed political parties are much more favourable to 
ethnic minority integration and a policy of conciliation than are mono-ethnic parties. 
 The party family of Communists in all Latvian parliaments after 1990 consisted 
predominantly of ethnic minorities. Socialists/Social Democrats were the friendliest 
family for ethnic minorities in the last three parliaments, in the Saeima of 2002 
turning out to be both the only party family to include ethnic minorities and to be 
dominated by them. In terms of absolute numbers, the picture is rather similar: 
Communists in the Supreme Council of 1990, in the Saeimas of 1993 and 1995 and 
Socialists/Social Democrats in all the Saeimas from 1998 to 2010 have the highest 
absolute numbers of MPs representing ethnic minorities. 
 
Table 7.3.4. Ethnic Minorities in Latvian Parliaments 
Elections 1990 1993 1995a 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Party Families N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 50 86.2 4 57.1 3 60 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. --- --- 3 23.1 2 33.3 13 43.3 19 76 18 78.3 23 79.3 
Agrarians --- --- 0 0 0 0 --- --- 0 0 1 5.6 0 0 
Left Liberals --- --- 1 20 2 11.1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Conservatives --- --- 3 20 0 0 1 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Extreme Right --- --- 0 0 1 3.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0 0 
Liberals --- --- 1 2.8 0 0 2 9.5 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Christian Dem. --- --- 0 0 -- --- 0 0 0 0 1 10 --- --- 
Popular Front 9 6.9 --- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 63 31.3 12 12 8  8 16 16 19 19 20 20 23 23 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
a According to Kolstø and Tsilevich (1997: 373), there were 9 ethnic minority MPs elected to the 
Saeima of 1995.  
 
The ethnically Latvian countryside in contrast to multiethnic cities accounts well for 
the dominance of ethnic Latvians among Agrarians: Agrarian family is being 
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represented by farmers and farmers themselves are more likely to come from a 
countryside than a city.157 MPs from the Agrarian family outnumber MPs from other 
families in posessing tractors and horses,158 however, tractors and horses are not 
necessarily an indicator for Agrarian parties. Some MPs from the Green and 
Conservative parties own them as well.  
 As one could expect, Liberals do not own tractors or horses, however, 
Socialists/Social Democrats are divided along the ethnic line: some Social Democratic 
MPs of Latvian ethnicity have tractors or horses, but MPs of non-Latvian ethnicity do 
not own them at all. Tractors and horses, in absolute number of cases, is characteristic 
of male MPs but our data indicate that an exception of this ‘rule’ is also possible.   
 An absolute majority of legislators from all Saeimas of the Second Republic have 
been residing in urban areas before being elected to the parliament: from 87 per cent 
in 1993, 79 per cent in 1995 and 78 per cent in 1998 to 65 per cent in 2002 and 64 per 
cent in 2006. The share of Riga residents among urban MPs fluctuates between 67.2 
to 78.5 per cent. In percentages for the whole parliament, the dominance of the capital 
city looks as follows: 56 per cent of all MPs from the 5th Saeima, 55 per cent MPs 
from the 6th Saeima, 54 per cent of MPs from the 7th Saeima, 51 per cent of MPs 
from the 8th Saeima and 43 per cent of MPs from the 9th Saeima have been living in 
Riga prior to election.159 In all these parliaments, the share of capital city residents 
among Socialists/Social Democrats and Communists is stabilised around 40 per cent. 
Liberals (also left wing Liberals), Christian Democrats and ‘old’ Conservatives160 in 
most legislatures have the share of Riga residents around 70 per cent. In general, 
Christian Democrats and Liberals are the ‘most urban’ party families in all post-1990 
Saeimas.  
157 In 1989 almost one third of ethnic Latvians lived in cities, the rest – 69.4 per cent – lived in towns 
and rural areas (Karklins 1994: 124). 
158 There was no special aim to study the life-style and ownership of Latvian legislators in addition to 
their recruitment, although the data of the Latvian National News Agency (LETA) and Central 
Electoral Commission, officially available declarations of property and income could have served this 
purpose relatively well. Counting of tractors and horses came out as a by-product of an attempt to 
differentiate MPs from separate party families but elected on the same list. For example, this was a case 
with the list of Greens and Agrarians in the parliamentary election of 2002. 
159 In five of six elections to the Saeima the constituency of Riga had the largest number of seats 
assigned, however, this large number is marginal and very similar to the one in the constituency of 
Vidzeme. 
160 The conservative parties like Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) and Union “For 
Fatherland and Freedom”/LNNK (TB/LNNK) were labeled ‘old’ in comparison with People’s Party 
(TP) and New Era Party (JL).  
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 Knowing that Christian Democrats are the ‘most Latvian’ party and that ethnic 
Latvians remain an urban minority in many cities, on the one side, and that 
Socialists/Social Democrats and Communists are mostly non-Latvian parties and that 
ethnic minorities dominate cities in Latvia, on the other, we get an inversed picture on 
the population distribution along the urban and ethnic lines. However, if we compare 
the proportions of urban dwellers among ethnic minority and ethnic Latvian MPs 
independently of their political affiliation, the shares of ethnic minority legislators are 
larger than those of ethnic Latvian MPs in four out of five Saeimas. 
 Similarly to their Estonian and differently from their Latvian counterparts, the 
Socialists/Social Democrats of Lithuania is not the friendliest party family in 
recruiting ethnic minorities. The flow of ethnic minority representatives into 
Lithuanian parliaments is channelled through the Ethnic Minority family – the highest 
percentages of MPs not belonging to the titular nation are found there. In terms of 
absolute numbers, Communists in 1990, Ethnic Minority in 1992, 2008 and 2012, 
Conservatives and Socialists/Social Democrats in 1996, Socialists/Social Democrats 
in 2000 and the parties coded as ‘Other’ in 2004 are leading there. 
  
 
Table 7.3.4. Ethnic Minority MPs in Lithuanian Parliaments 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
The ‘most Estonian’ parliamentary party families in Estonia are Extreme Right and 
Agrarians – they do not include ethnic minority MPs. The ‘most Latvian’ party family 
is not so much, to our surprise, the Extreme Right but the families of Agrarians and 
Term 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Party Family N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 5 83.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Social Dem. -- -- 3 3.7 3 12.5 7 14.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agrarians -- -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Left Liberals -- -- -- -- -- -- 4 14.3 1 9.1 -- -- -- -- 
Conservatives -- -- -- -- 3 4.3 0 0 1 4 1 2.2 1 3 
Extreme Right -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 
Ethnic Minority -- -- 4 100 1 100 2 100 2 100 3 100 8 100 
Other -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 2 4.9 4 8.5 
No Party 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liberals -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Christian Dem. -- -- 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Popular Front 10 7.9 2 6.7 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
TOTAL 15 11.3 10 7.1 7 5.1 14 9.9 9 6.4 6 4.3 13 9.4 
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Christian Democrats: in all Latvian parliaments before 2006 they consist exclusively 
of ethnic Latvians.  
 As in Latvian parliaments, the ‘most Lithuanian’ party family in the Lithuanian 
legislatures is Agrarians. However, instead of Christian Democrats, the Lithuanian 
Agrarians share the monopoly of ‘ethnic purity’ with the Extreme Right and Liberals. 
 In Lithuania ethnic minority parties have the highest share of ethnic minorities in 
the parliament. This pattern is also evident in the case of Estonia, however, only till 
2003. In Latvia, due to absence of explicit ethnic minority parliamentary parties, 
minorities come through communist (first three terms) and socialist/social democratic 
(last four terms) parties.  
 
The Citizenship and Lustration Hypothesis 
This hypothesis states a probability that softening the laws on citizenship and 
lustration will enlarge the ethnic minority share in the electorate and, through this, 
will positively affect the number of ethnic minority representatives in parliament.  
 After regaining independence in 1991, the citizenship policies affected about one 
third of the Estonian and Latvian population (mainly persons of Russian and other 
Slavic origin who moved to Estonia and Latvia in the Soviet period) and narrowed the 
eligible electorate by around 40 per cent. Secondly, the requirements of advanced 
proficiency in the Estonian and Latvian languages were in place before late 2001 in 
Estonia and mid-2002 in Latvia. Thirdly, the post-communist lustration laws that 
were rather mild in Estonia and Lithuania, banned from running for a parliament in 
Latvia a considerable share of persons: all those who have belonged to the salaried 
staff of the USSR, Latvian SSR or a foreign state security, intelligence or counter-
intelligence services and those who have been active in the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union or the Communist Party of Latvia, the Working People’s International 
Front of the Latvian SSR, the United Board of Working Bodies, the Organisation of 
War and Labour Veterans, the All-Latvia Salvation Committee and its regional 
committees after 13 January 1991. Although all these laws have been written for all 
inhabitants of Latvia independently of their ethnicity, the new legislation primarily 
targeted Russian-speaking ethnic minority: its largest group came to Latvia with the 
Soviet occupation and participation in the power structures of the USSR for them was 
much more attractive than for ethnic Latvians. The USSR was a Russian-speaking 
state and the Russian ethnic minority felt almost like a majority in the Latvian SSR. 
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 The extreme downfall of ethnic minorities’ share in Estonian parliaments from 
22.9 per cent in 1990 to 1 per cent in 1992 is accounted by the actions of electorate 
disenfranchisement in 1991. Since 1992 the share of ethnic minorities grows reaching 
9.9 per cent in the last Estonian Riigikogu. These changes are mainly due to the 
enlargement of the electorate through naturalisation; abolishing the requirements of 
advanced proficiency in the Estonian languages after late 2001 could have possibly 
contributed to this process as well.  
 The decrease of ethnic minorities in the Latvian legislatures from almost one 
third in 1990 to 8 per cent in 1995 and the increase of them since parliamentary 
election of 1998 could be partly explained by actions of disenfranchisement in 1991, 
start of naturalisation in 1995 and liberalisation of citizenship laws in 1998. The 
newly-naturalised citizens voted mainly for the Alliance “For Human Rights in the 
United Latvia” (Survey of Newly Naturalised Citizens 2001:8) which has been and is 
a union of parties for ethnic minorities. One should notice that in the beginning the 
share of naturalisation applications was much lower than in the years afterwards and 
that in some cases – especially from 2006 onwards - the number of naturalised 
persons exceeds the number of applications for naturalisation.  
 The naturalisation of citizens in Estonia is characterised by ups and downs in 
numbers of naturalised persons. It achieved its peak in 1994 and 1996, reaching 
22,474 and 22,773 naturalised citizens respectively. Around 2004 and 2005 the rates 
of naturalisation increased again which is attributed to Estonia’s accession to the 
European Union in 2004. Within the period from 1992 to 2008, Estonia naturalised 
almost 150 thousand persons; the share of stateless persons in Estonia fell from one-
third of the population in 1992 to 6.5 per cent in 2011. 
 The naturalisation process in Latvia had also its peaks and falls. The growing 
naturalisation rates in 1999 and 2000 are attributed to the liberalisation of Latvian 
citizenship laws in 1998; similarly as in Estonia, the peak in naturalisation rates from 
2004 to 2006 is explained by the accession of Latvia to the European Union in 2004. 
From 1995 to 2007, Latvia naturalised almost 130 thousand persons which is a lower 
figure in comparison with Estonia. The percentage of officially registered non-citizens 
of Latvia of 29.3 per cent of the total population in 1995 decreased to 14.1 per cent in 
2011 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2012). 
 The full numbers of persons affected by the lustration laws are not available. 
However, the most prominent Latvian ethnic minority politician Tatyana Ždanok, 
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banned from the Saeima since 1993, was allowed to run in the first election for the 
European Parliament in 2004, was elected and in 2009 re-elected.  
 
The Previous Regime Hypothesis 
The previous regime hypothesis stated a probability that ethnic minority (especially 
Russophone) legislators are likely to have more political experience associated with a 
previous regime than their ethnic majority counterparts. This proposed hypothesis 
relies on the assumption that many Russian-speaking minorities – Russians, 
Ukrainians, Byelorussians came voluntarily to the Baltic republics as a part and 
consequences of the Soviet policies. For them, differently from indigenous Baltic 
population, the Soviet regime and Soviet authorities must have been not alien and 
foreign, but rather normal. Therefore, we would expect ethnic minority MPs to be 
more experienced in Soviet politics than ethnic majority legislators. 
 Our data disclose membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the 
dominant (and declining, as for all other types) experience among the Baltic ethnic 
minority and ethnic majority legislators. The share of former Communists among 
ethnic minority MPs is larger in all seven Estonian, in four out of seven Latvian and 
two out of seven Lithuanian parliaments. In terms of leading party positions, ethnic 
minority representatives are leading in five out of seven Latvian and four out of seven 
Lithuanian parliaments (albeit in one of seven Estonian parliaments). The Estonian 
ethnic minority MPs have lower percentages of Soviet parliamentary positions (in 
four of seven legislative terms) and no experience in the council of ministers. The 
Latvian ethnic minority MPs have lower percentages of local, governmental and 
parliamentary positions (in comparison with majority MPs), the Lithuanian ethnic 
minority legislators do not have experience in the Soviet governmental and 
parliamentary positions at all. One may expect that the share of former dissidents is 
lower among ethnic minority than ethnic majority MPs, however, the Estonian, 
Latvian and Lithuanian data strike with the findings that there is no single dissident 
among ethnic minority legislators. 
 One easily observes the trend that the Lithuanian ethnic majority MPs have more 
experience in the Soviet power structures than Estonian and Latvian ethnic majority 
representatives. This could be explained by the general fact that ethnic Lithuanians 
have been more numerous and more willing to enroll the Communist Party in 
comparison with ethnic Estonians and ethnic Latvians: from 1970 to 1988 ethnic 
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Lithuanians constituted at least two-thirds of all members of the Lithuanian 
Communist Party, ethnic Estonians comprised 51.3 per cent of all members of the 
Estonian Communist Party in the same period, while ethnic Latvians have never 
achieved even a half of all members of the Latvian Communist Party (Antanaitis 
2001: 179-185; Pabriks and Purs 2001: 49). Being more numerous in the Communist 
Party, Lithuanians could have had more influence on the Soviet policies and a 
possibility to counteract the decisions from Moscow. 
 
The Integration Perspective 
Ethnic minority parties are considered an important instrument for expression of 
ethnic minority interests, however, large ethnic minority parties, in case of diverging 
interests and aims in comparison with ethnic majority parties, may prevent from 
ethnic minority integration and may have a destabilising effect on the political system. 
Therefore, mixed political parties are much more favourable to the ethnic minority 
integration and policy of conciliation (Bochsler 2006). Following this argument, we 
would assume that fewer ethnic minority MPs from the ethnic parties and more ethnic 
minority MPs from ‘normal’ political parties are signs of advanced integration. 
 The two largest ethnic minorities of Lithuania – the Polish ethnic minority (6 per 
cent of the total population) and the Russian ethnic minority (5 percent of the total 
population) reveal different patterns of political representation after 1990. In the 
beginning, the Poles are more numerous than Russians, however, in the latter 
parliaments the Russians outnumber the Poles. The 2012 parliamentary elections 
brought more Poles than Russians to the Lithuanian Seimas again. The Poles tend to 
get into parliament through their own ethnic parties – the Union of Lithuanian Poles 
(Lietuvos lenkų sąjunga) and the Polish Electoral Action (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų 
akcija); the Russians, inspite of the existence of Russian political organisations, 
choose a rather conventional way into the Lithuanian Seimas – on the list of Social 
Democrats or Labour Party. The Poles made use of the lower electoral threshold for 
ethnic minorities in the 1992 election, the Russians - did not. 
 The Latvian parliaments from 1990 onwards do not include ethnic political 
parties. The Russians (29.6 per cent of the total population), Byelorussians (4.1 per 
cent of the total population), Ukrainians (2.7 per cent of the total population) and 
other ethnic minorities enter the Latvian legislature on the lists of the left wing 
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organisations. Due to the fact that these leftist political parties hardly include 
representatives of the Latvian ethnicity, they turn into quasi-ethnic minority parties. 
 The Estonian parliament includes ethnic minority (mainly Russian) parties in the 
beginning of the period starting in 1990. Later on (from 2003 onwards) ethnic 
minorities start to enter the legislature exclusively on the lists of the left liberal, right 
liberal or conservative parties. 
 Following these data one may conclude that Estonia and Lithuania161 show more 
signs of political integration in comparison with Latvia.   
 
 
7.4. Concluding Remarks: Ethnic Minority Female MPs as Double Minority 
Our Baltic data reveal that in the majority of cases female MPs come from ethnic 
majorities and that ethnic minority legislators almost always are males162. If one looks 
at the share of ethnic minorities among women MPs and the share of women among 
ethnic minority MPs, one observes that they are lower than parliamentary averages for 
ethnic minorities and women in the Baltic countries163. The data also conform to the 
common trend that ethnic minorities in a society are also ethnic minorities in a 
parliament and that women – majority in a society – are a minority in a parliament. 
However, we are also interested how many double minorities – ethnic minority 
female MPs – are elected to the Baltic parliaments and how similar or how different 
are their recruitment patterns from ‘simple minority’ and majority legislators? 
 Double minority legislators – seven MPs in the Estonian parliaments, five MPs in 
the Latvian legislatures and six MPs in the Lithuanian parliaments – served in the last 
two decades after 1990164. Most of them spent only one legislative term in the 
parliament except two legislators in Estonian parliaments and one legislator in the 
Latvian parliaments who served two legislative terms.  
 The low numbers of double minority MPs disclose that double minorities have a 
more difficult and more complicated way into a parliament in comparison with 
161 Exception is the Lithuanian Poles. 
162 The Estonian data show that the share of women among ethnic minority MPs is lower than among 
ethnic majority MPs (13.2 per cent against 15.8 per cent) – a similar pattern is observed among 
legislators in Latvia and Lithuania (Kuklys 2008: 58). 
163 Except for Estonia from 2003 onwards.  
164 Ethnic minority female MPs are present in five of seven Estonian parliaments but only in three of 
seven Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures. In the Saeimas of 2006 of 2010 that have the highest share 
of women – 19 per cent - out of all Latvian legislatures ever, there is no even a single female legislator 
with an ethnic minority background. 
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‘simple minority’ – ethnic minority or female – legislators. It conforms to the general 
trend of “dual disadvantage of minority women” (Bird 2010: 151) and also indicates 
that double minorities – in comparison with simple parliamentary minorities and 
majorities – do not have legislative careers. Usually they appear only once in a 
national parliament and vanish in the next election.  
 In a situation which requires to give priority to only one – female or ethnic – 
minority, ethnic minority MPs seem to win over female parliamentarians: the national 
legislatures of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania before the Second World War and 
legislatures of 1990 are good examples of this.165 However, if we turn our analysis to 
the supranational level, the results seem to be opposite: women legislators from 
Estonia (one-third and a half of all Estonian MEPs), Latvia (22.2 and 37.5 per cent 
from all Latvian MEPs) and Lithuania (38.5 and 25 per cent from all Lithuanian 
MEPs) in the 2004 and the 2009 European Parliaments respectively clearly show a 
priority of women recruitment over ethnic minority representation. The share of 
women MEPs is also higher than the percentage of women in national parliaments of 
Baltic countries.  
 As the further analysis (chapter 9) shows, the ethnic minority background is an 
asset for Baltic parliamentarians - it slightly increases the chances for serving in 
parliament three or more legislative terms (see tables 9.2.2 to 9.2.4). Education (the 
law degree) and the female gender are assets for Latvian and Lithuanian legislators as 
well – MPs with this background stay in parliament longer. However, the combination 
of both ascriptive categories – ethnic minority and female gender – is not an asset but 
rather a serious disadvantage for a parliamentary career.  






165 Barack Obama’s victory against Hillary Clinton in the presidential nomination by the Democratic 
Party in the USA reveals a similar pattern on a different level. 
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8. Individual Elite Circulation and Turnover of the Baltic Parliamentary 
Representatives 
Circulation of elites – both individual and structural – has been a central theme in elite 
analysis from its very origin (Mosca 1939; Pareto 1986) - turnover of the personnel of 
the formal institutions of government (circulation of elites) is taken there as an 
explanatory variable for the change and stability of a political order (Bottomore 1993: 
44). The concern of classical elite theorists as well as the current ones working on 
western democracies166 seems to be a low individual turnover of elites. We can find a 
passage, where circulation of elites is compared with “the river, flooding and breaking 
its banks”, but this happens because of the too slow elite circulation which causes 
revolutions (Pareto 1966: 250).  
 One of concerns of this dissertation, as well as of the scholars working on 
democracies of Eastern Europe (Best and Edinger 2003; Crowther and Matonyte 
2007), however, is about high individual turnover of parliamentary elites and its 
potential consequences. In order to tell if the elite turnover is high or low and what it 
indicates, a more precise scale of measurement is required. For the measurement of 
individual turnover among parliamentary elites, we will use a benchmark suggested 
and applied by Heinrich Best, Christopher Hausmann and Karl Schmitt (2000: 184-
185) in the analysis of parliamentary recruitment in Germany. 
 
Figure 3. Levels of Elite Circulation 














Complete or near to complete changes of political 
order (regime discontinuity) 
 
(1) Restricted systemic changes (e.g. changes of the 
electoral system) 
(2) Volatile elite structures linked to the 
transformation of the party system at large 
 
Normal level of exchange 
 
Trend towards development of oligarchical structures 
Source: Adapted from Best, Hausmann, Schmitt (2000: 184 –185). 
 
166 See Matland and Studlar 2004;  Somit, Wildenmann, Boll and Römmele 1994. 
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From 1990 onwards turnover of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliamentary 
representatives declines167 and an every consecutive parliamentary election brings 
more experienced MPs. However, a general level of legislative turnover, as in other 
countries of Eastern Europe,168 remains high for each election taken separately and 
amounts to the 55.5 percent of newcomers for the last six terms in Estonia, 54.5 per 
cent in Latvia169 and 52.8 per cent on average in Lithuania. The mean number of 
successive mandates – another indicator for elite circulation – rises in all three 
countries, however, the average of 1.6 for Estonia and Latvia and 1.7 for Lithuania is 
significantly lower than a western European average of 2.5 mandates (Cotta and Best 
2000: 505). 
 Since the figure above suggests that the most normal level of elite exchange is 
between 20 and 40 per cent, it is clear that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as 
other Eastern European countries, with their higher elite turnover do not fall into this 
category.  
 The main question is: How could this high turnover be explained? For how long 
could it continue? What does it indicate? What are its causes and potential 
consequences? 
 The literature suggests that a high elite circulation indicates (1) restricted 
systemic changes and (2) volatile elite structures (Best, Hausmann, Schmitt 2000: 
184-185) and (3) signifies a political crisis (Putnam 1976: 65). A high legislative 
turnover could be caused by (4) electoral system, (5) electoral volatility, (6) double 
listing of candidates, (7) frequency of elections and (8) voluntary exits such as 
dissatisfaction with being a legislator, desire to retire or pursue a private career 
(Matland and Studlar 2004: 87). On the side of potential consequences, a high 
circulation of MPs might be interpreted as (9) greater chances for a system’s 
innovativeness and flexibility in terms of policy, (10) greater opportunities in 
attaining elite status, and (11) the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, 
and effectiveness (Putnam 1976: 65-67).  
167 Exceptions: The Estonian Riigikogu of 1999 and 2003, the Latvian Saeima of 1998 and 2010 and 
the Lithuanian Seimas of 2000. 
168 Legislative turnover in post-communist Eastern Europe fluctuates at the level between 50 and 75 
per cent which is almost two times higher than in most democracies of Western Europe (Best and 
Edinger 2003: 6). 
169 If the parliament of 1990 with the 92.5 per cent rate of newcomers (see Dreifelds 1996: 66) is 
included, the average for all seven terms would be 59.9 per cent. In case we treat absolutely all MPs 
elected in 1990 as newcomers, the turnover achieves the level of 61 per cent. 
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8.1. Legislative Turnover in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
The legislative turnover is connected to circulation of elites which was the core of 
elite theory from the very beginning (see Pareto 1986). Turnover rates indicate to 
what extent we observe a renewal or continuity of legislative elites and – in case of 
political party families – whether some party families bring more parliamentary 
newcomers than others. 
 
Estonia 
The average share of parliamentary newcomers in Estonia for the last six elections is 
55.5 per cent, this is slightly below the Eastern European average (57.8 per cent) for 
the last four parliaments: there were 68.8 per cent of parliamentary newcomers in the 
second, 54.1 per cent in the third, 53.9 per cent in the fourth and 54.3 per cent in the 
fifth post-Communist parliaments of Eastern Europe on average (Edinger 2010: 145). 
If we look for incumbency rates, we observe that only 37.3 per cent of the Riigikogu 
members on average get re-elected. Surprisingly enough, the share of Estonian 
newcomers is higher than average share of newcomers in the Latvian  and Lithuanian 
parliaments, in spite of the fact that the Estonian party system is considered the most 
stable and consolidated and having the lowest electoral volatility among the Baltic 
States (see Pettai and Kreuzer 1999; Pettai 2010). 
 
Table 8.1. Parliamentary Newcomers: Estonia 
Election 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Party Families N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 7 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. 9 100 8 66.7 2 33.3 10 58.8 4 66.7 2 20 9 47.4 
Greens 6 100 0 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 6 100 --- --- 
Agrarians 14 100     2 28.6 7 53.8 1 16.7   
Left Liberals 16 100 14 82.4 29 50.9 22 78.6 14 50 16 55.2 10 38.5 
Right Liberals --- --- 0 0 11 57.9 6 24 11 57.9 19 61.3 14 42.4 
Conservatives --- --- 23 79.3 2 15.4 10 55.6 29 82.9 5 26.3 5 21.7 
Extreme Right --- --- 18 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Ethnic Minority 7 100 --- --- 5 83.3 4 66.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Other 12 100 8 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
No Party 8 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Liberals 6 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Christian Dem. 6 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Popular Front 14 100 10 66.7 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 105 100 81 80.2 49 48.5 54 53.5 65 64.4 49 48.5 38 37.6 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
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If we move onto the political party family level,  the largest shares of parliamentary 
newcomers are observed among Extreme Right and Other (Independent Royalists) in 
1992, Ethnic Minority in 1995, Left Liberals in 1999, Conservatives in 2003, Greens 
in 2007 and Social Democrats in 2011. The largest absolute numbers of newcomers 
came with Conservatives in 1992 and 2003, Left Liberals in 1995 and 1999, and Right 
Liberals in 2007 and 2011. Conservatives, Left and Right Liberals were also electoral 
winners in the above indicated years. Hence, our data clearly demonstrate that the 
largest number of newcomers comes with the winners of the parliamentary elections. 
 If one differentiates between ethnic minority and ethnic majority legislators, one 
finds that a higher turnover is observed among ethnic minority MPs. 
 High legislative turnover in Estonia provides higher accessibility of the elite and 
its permeability by non-elites. In comparison with countries having low legislative 
turnover, politicians in Estonia have better chances to acquire elite status. High 
legislative turnover can be interpreted as greater chances for political system’s 
innovativeness and flexibility in terms of policy, but also an indication of the lower 
average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness and a sign of political 
crisis (Putnam 1976: 65-66).  
 It was observed, that „turnover within an elite institution tends to decline as the 
institution ages” (Putnam 1976: 65-66). In comparison with the first post-
independence election, legislative turnover rates in Estonia declined indeed, however, 
they still remain high in comparison with legislative rates in western democracies. 
Countries in Western Europe stabilised their legislative turnover rapidly after the 
Second World War (see Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007), however, 
Estonia, as well as Latvia and Lithuania, twenty years after regime change continues 
throwing away a large share of its legislators in every election. This makes us wonder 
what keeps the political system together and whether the political system functions 
under conditions of a permanent crisis.  
 
Latvia 
From 1990 onwards turnover of Latvian parliamentary representatives declines and an 
every consecutive parliamentary election brings more experienced MPs: the share 
parliamentary newcomers fell from 68 per cent in 1993 to 58 and 52 per cent in 1998 
and 2002 respectively, finally reaching a “western” level of 38 per cent in 2006.  
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Table 8.2. Parliamentary Newcomers: Latvia 
Election 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Party Families N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 58 100 4 57.1 3 60 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. --- --- 9 69 1 16.7 21 70 12 48 8 34.8 15 51.7 
Agrarians --- --- 12 100 13 81.3 --- --- 5 41.7 11 61.1 13 59.1 
Left Liberals --- --- 4 80 13 72.2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Conservatives --- --- 8 53.3 1 12.5 21 51.2 30 56.6 16 32.7 21 51.2 
Extreme Right --- --- 6 100 22 73.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- 5 62.5 
Liberals --- --- 19 52.8 4 23.5 8 38.1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Christian Dem. --- --- 6 100 --- --- 7 87.5 6 60 3 30 --- --- 
Popular Front 131 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 201 100* 68 68 57 57 58 58 52 52 38 38 54 54 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
* If the logic of our data coding is neglected and parliamentary experience in non-democratic 
regime is counted as well, the share of newcomers for the Latvian Supreme Council amounts to 
92.5 per cent (see Dreifelds 1996: 66). 
 
 
The share of newcomers among Latvian party families is constantly above 40 per cent 
except for the Liberals in 1995 and 1998, Conservatives and Social Democrats in 
1995 and 2006 and Christian Democrats in 2006. The highest absolute numbers of 
newcomers have been brought to the parliament by Liberals in 1993, Extreme Right 
in 1995, Conservatives and Social Democrats in 1998, and Conservatives in 2002, 
2006 and 2010. Most of these party families brought the highest absolute numbers of 
women to those parliaments as well.  
 
Lithuania 
Percentage of newcomers among Lithuanian party families is constantly above 30 per 
cent except for the Christian Democrats and Ethnic Minority in 1996, Conservatives 
in 2000 and 2012 and the Extreme Right in 2004, Socialists/Social Democrats in 2004 
and 2008 and Liberals (also Left Liberals) from 2004 to 2012. The highest absolute 
numbers of newcomers have been brought to the parliament by Socialist/Social 
Democrats (67 MPs) in 1992, Conservatives (43 MPs) in 1996, Liberals (31 MPs) in 
2000, by the populist Labour Party and Liberal Democrats (40 MPs, coded as ‘Other’) 
in 2004 and by Other in 2008 and 2012. Similarly as in Latvia, many of those party 






     
Table 8.3. Parliamentary Newcomers: Lithuania 
Election 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Party Families N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Communists 6 100 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Social Dem. --- --- 67 83.8 10 41.7 26 55.3 4 20 3 11.5 12 32.4 
Agrarians --- --- --- --- 0 0 3 75 3 50 1 33.3 --- --- 
Left Liberals --- --- --- --- --- --- 25 100 2 18.2 0 0 --- --- 
Conservatives --- --- --- --- 43 61.4 1 10 9 36 15 33.3 6 18.2 
Extreme Right --- --- 3 75 2 100 1 33.3 0 0 --- --- --- --- 
Ethnic Minority --- --- 3 75 0 0 2 66.7 1 50 2 66.7 6 75 
Other --- --- 7 77.8 1 33.3 2 66.7 40 90.9 23 56.1 22 46.8 
No Party --- --- 1 100 3 75 2 66.7 8 57.1 2 100 3 100 
Liberals --- --- 0 0 12 80 31 86.1 3 16.7 6 30 2 20 
Christian Dem. --- --- 7 70 4 23.5 2 33.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Popular Front 127 100 13 40.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 133 100 101 71.6 75 54.7 95 67.4 70 49.7 52 36.9 51 36.7 




8.2. Searching for Explanations of High Legislative Turnover 
Turnover of newcomers and incumbency turnover can be to some extent explained by 
the electoral turnout (see table 8.5.). The highest correlation between electoral turnout 
and turnover of newcomers is found in Lithuania (for all seven legislative terms), 
somewhat lower (and not significant) in Estonia and Latvia.  
 
Table 8.4. Electoral Turnout in the Baltic States (in per cent) 
Estonia 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Turnout 78.2 67.8 68.9 57.4 58.2 61.0 62.9 
Latvia 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Turnout 81.3 89.9 71.9 71.9 71.2 62.3 62.6 
Lithuania 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Turnout 71.7 75.2 52.9 58.2 45.9 48.6 52.9 
Source: National Electoral Committee of Estonia, Central Electoral Commission of Latvia, Chief 
Electoral Commission of Lithuania and Wolfram Nordsieck. 
 
Table 8.5. Electoral Turnout and Turnover of Newcomers and Incumbents 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Turnover of Newcomers, 
All Seven Terms  
Turnover of Incumbents, 
Last Six Terms  
Estonia 0.687 -0.154 
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.088 0.771 
Latvia 0.685 -0.715 
Sig. (two-tailed)  0.090 0.111 
Lithuania 0.813* -0.669 
Sig. (two-tailed) 0.026 0.146 
* Significant at 0.05 level.  Source: Own calculations. 
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Incumbency turnover, what is not exactly the opposite of the turnover of newcomers, 
could be considered a complementary perspective in studying elite circulation. The 
Baltic States, differently from some countries or political parties170, do not make any 
legal barriers for re-election of parliamentary incumbents, nevertheless, only less than 
a half of incumbents get re-elected. This is much below the incumbency levels in 
many Western democracies (see Matland und Studlar 2004: 93).  
 
Table 8.6. Incumbency Turnover in the Baltic Parliaments (in per cent) 
Parliament 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
Estonia 19.8 43.6 40.6 28.7 44.6 46.5 
Latvia 32.0 38.0 33.0 39.0 53.0 40.0 
Lithuania 28.4 36.5 26.2 41.1 52.5 49.6 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
As the table 8.5. shows, parliamentary incumbency correlates negatively with 
electoral turnout in all Baltic countries (especially in Latvia and Lithuania). 
 The other possible explanations have been mentioned in the literature above and 
we would like to check to what extent they are plausible. 
 
Restricted Systemic Changes 
The first turnover thesis states that restricted systemic changes, such as transformation 
of the electoral systems, account for a high turnover of parliamentary representatives. 
There were substantial changes in the electoral systems of the Baltic States in the 
period before 1993 indeed: in 1992 Estonia and in 1993 Latvia introduced the PR 
system; in 1992 Lithuania introduced a mixed electoral system (70 seats in the PR 
segment and 71 seats in the SMD). However, in the period since 1993 onwards no 
substantial changes were observed.171 Nevertheless, the stability of electoral systems 
in the Baltic States did not result into stabilisation of elite turnover and a remarkable 




170 Since 1949 the Constitution of Costa Rica prevents deputies from serving two successive terms, an 
MP may run again for an Assembly seat after sitting out one term. Political party examples include the 
German Greens rotating their members of Bundestag from 1983 to 1987, the Italian Communist Party 
replacing most of its legislators after two or three terms and the British Labour party in 1980s 
practising mandatory reselection of sitting MPs (Matland and Studlar 2004: 98-99). 
171 Some changes to report were abolishment of lower threshold for ethnic minority parties since 1996 
in the PR segment and introduction of plurality in the SMD segment for the 2000 election  in Lithuania.  
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Volatile Elite Structures (Supply-Side Volatility) 
According to the data on Eastern European democracies by Richard Rose (2009: 51), 
“of the total volatility, more than five-sixths has been due to the actions of party elites 
creating, abandoning, or merging parties”. Among countries of Eastern Europe in the 
period from 1993 to 2007, Latvia had the highest electoral volatility which was to 100 
per cent172 explained by the behaviour of political elites creating new parliamentary 
parties with an every legislative election; Lithuania with 97 per cent was not far from 
Latvia; Estonia with 66 per cent was below not only the Baltic, but also the Eastern 
European average (Rose 2009: 52)173.  
 The seemingly chaotic behaviour of the Baltic party elites, sometimes labelled 
‘political tourism’, has its rather clear organisational patterns. The analysis by Pettai 
(2010), Pettai, Auers and Ramonaitė (2011), distinguish six types of political parties 
according to their organisational behaviour and origins: (1) unchanged, (2) alliance, 
(3) merger, (4) post-alliance, (5) fission and (6) brand-new. The first type of party 
refers to the situation where politicians remain affiliated with their current party. The 
types two, three and four refer to different situations of party reconfiguration 
involving a majority of politicians from certain parties. The type five is called fission, 
“a collective affiliation strategy in which a minority group of politicians breaks away 
from an established party to form a new party”, and the type six is labelled brand-new 
party, the strategy which “involves previously unaffiliated individuals creating a 
brand-new party” (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003: 79).  
 Using the provided analytical distinctions in party behaviour, we can observe that 
Estonian party elites, distinguished for their practices of party mergers, show over 
time an increasing trend in party loyalty which in 2011 reached 100 per cent, meaning 
that no changes in party restructuring have taken place. Latvian party elites, having a 
reputation for preference in creating brand-new parties, slowed down this stategy and 
in the 2010 election opted overwhelmingly for alliances. The Lithuanian party elites, 
characterised by alliances and post-alliances and absence of mergers and fissions in 
the beginning of the transition period, started increasingly to practise party mergers 
and creation of brand-new parties (see Pettai, Auers and Ramonaitė 2011: 153). The 
observed trends allow to conclude that Estonian elites reached party consolidation, 
172 On average, 60 to 72 per cent of electoral volatility in Eastern Europe is attributed to the elite 
behaviour; the rest is explained by the changing preferences of voters (Rose 2009: 52).   
173 I have divided the figures of Rose (2009: 52) on Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – 200, 193 and 132 
per cent respectively – by two.  
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whereas the Lithuanian elites clearly increased their party de-consolidation; the 
volatility of the Latvian party elite structure continues to remain high. A partial 
explanation for the behaviour of Baltic party elites is suggested by Allan Sikk: 
 
“The principle of modern representative democracy is largely based on the principle of electoral 
accountability – the parties in power have to act in line with the will of people because otherwise they 
will be voted out of office. However, if the stakes in politics are high but steadily declining, the power 
holders may be tempted to make maximum use of their time in office by pursuing unaccountable or 
outright corrupt policies and not care too much for the negative electoral effects resulting from it. The 
maximum achievable utility from one term in office can even outweigh the expected total utility of 
future terms.” (Sikk 2006: 166) 
 
Crisis 
The third statement discloses that a high elite turnover signifies a political crisis (see 
above). Although an increased legislative turnover might mean a simple generational 
change – one generation of legislators leaving and the other coming and should not be 
necessarily seen as a trigger causing a political crisis or regime change, in many cases 
a rising parliamentary turnover follows and accompanies a political crisis or regime 
change. Hence, legislative turnover may serve as a kind of ‘seismometer’. This 
approach finds a sufficient empirical support in the data on the regime changes in 
Germany and France: the Nazi takeover in 1933 and return to power of Charles de 
Gaulle in 1958 go together with a highly increased parliamentary turnover.  Our 
Latvian and Lithuanian data on the First Republic confirm the crisis/regime change 
thesis as well: parliamentary democracy in Latvia and Lithuania ends up with the 
Seimas or Saeima in which the number of newcomers rises after the gradual decline in 
previous legislatures. Both parliaments of Latvia and Lithuania serve as good 
predictors of the regime change: having increased numbers of newcomers finish their 
activities with coup d’Etat in 1934 and 1926 respectively, signifying a replacement of 
democratic regimes with authoritarian ones in the Baltic States.  
 The data on Estonian parliaments, however, do not support the proposed 
hypothesis: the last Riigikogu before the coup d’Etat in 1934 has 26.1 per cent of 
parliamentary newcomers which is the lowest legislative turnover rate of all Estonian 
parliaments in the First Republic ever. In other words, it does not predict the switch 
from democracy to authoritarianism in Estonia. A partial explanation for this could be 
that the regime change in Estonia, differently from Lithuania and Latvia, was 
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introduced by constitutional means (Taagepera 1974: 408): in October 1933, 72.7 per 
cent of voters participating in the Referendum voted for the new Constitution 
transforming the head of the state from a servant of parliament into a powerful and 
independent executive having the right to issue laws by decree (Raun 2001:117). It 
was a pre-emptive authoritarianism that “did not result from a direct take-over by 
rightist forces” (Parming 1975: 5). Estonian authoritarianism was mild not only in the 
Baltic but also in the European context of that time (Raun 2001: 122; Raun 1997: 
340). 
 
Table 8.7. Newcomers in the Baltic Parliaments of the First Republics 
Estonia 1919 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 
Newcomers, % 100 66.1 63.8 43.4 34.9 26.1 
Latvia 1920 1922 1925 1928 1931 
Newcomers, % 100 45 33 29 37 
Lithuania 1920 1922 1923 1926 
Newcomers, % 100 46.7 31.6 53.3 
Source: Toomla 1999, www.saeima.lv, www.lrs.lt and own calculations. 
Note: The Constitutional Assembly of 1919 in Estonia and the Constitutional Assemblies of 1920 in 
Latvia and Lithuania were treated as consisting of parliamentary newcomers only. 
 
 
What strikes in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data is the relatively normal 
level of parliamentary elite circulation in the First Republic in comparison with a 
generally high level of circulation in the Second Republic: the level between 30 and 
40 per cent fits into the normal pattern of most Western European democracies after 
1945 and would be desirable for the regimes of the Baltic States after 1990. However, 
after collapse of the Soviet Union the Baltic States produce almost 60 per cent of new 
parliamentary representatives on average. Since “high turnover is associated with 
periods of crisis, while low turnover is associated with institutional stability and 
political tranquillity” (Putnam 1976: 65), we arrive at a valid question: are Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, as well as other Eastern European countries, in the state of 
permanent crisis? If yes, which mechanism then keeps the state and society together? 
This is not an exceptional Baltic phenomenon, “paradoxical configurations like 
regime stability without elite consolidation” (Best 2007b: 24) perfectly fit the patterns 
of developments among Eastern European parliamentary elites. Still, a satisfactory 




     
Electoral System: SMD vs PR 
The fourth thesis explains a high legislative turnover by the type of electoral system. 
The literature suggests that turnover in majoritarian systems is lower than in 
proportional representation (Matland and Studlar 2004: 107). Our Baltic data do not 
allow for a cross-country comparison, since both Estonia and Latvia have PR systems 
and Lithuania conducts its parliamentary elections in a mixed system. Hence, the PR 
and SMD segments can be compared only in the case of Lithuania.  
 
Table 8.8. Election of Parliamentary Newcomers in Lithuania (N) 
Election 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
PR List 52 43 49 33 27 26 
SMD 49 32 47 37 28 25 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Although the differences between results in the PR and SMD segments are negligible, 
the Lithuanian data clearly show that in many (four out of six) cases the legislative 




The fifth thesis attributes the high legislative turnover to a high electoral volatility 
meaning that voters change their preferences radically from election to election.  
The figures on electoral volatility in the Baltic countries differ depending on the 
sources and method of calculation174 (table 8.9.), however, it is obvious from all three 
sources that Estonia has the lowest electoral volatility and that Latvia and Lithuania 
have the most similar levels of electoral volatility. 
 
Table 8.9. Electoral Volatility in the Baltic States (in per cent) 
Countries        Calculated by: Kreuzer &  
Pettai 2003 
Rose 2009 Kuklys* 
Estonia  40.4 150 33.1 
Latvia 74.2 200 40.8 
Lithuania 72.9 195 47.5 
* Calculations are based on the table 8.10 and annex tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
 
174 Firstly, calculations by Rose, Kreuzer and Pettai are based on the political parties, whereas the 
figures by Kuklys rely upon political party families. Secondly, the number of legislative terms covered 
is different in all three sources. Thirdly, Rose refuses to divide his percentages by two, which is rather a 
standard (see Bartolini and Mair 1990) in volatility calculation.  
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To continue the further analysis with own data, one can conclude that electoral 
volatility accounts for the half of parliamentary newcomers (total average of 47.5 per 
cent in Lithuania; the results for Latvia and Estonia are 40.8 and 33.1 per cent 
respectively). It means that a high legislative turnover in the Baltic States is caused 
from 52.5 to 66.9 per cent by other factors than electoral volatility. Estonia has the 
highest legislative turnover, even though its electoral volatility is the lowest among 
the Baltic States. 
 
Table 8.10. Electoral Volatility (%), based on Political Party Families in Parliaments 
Estonia 1990-1992 1992-1995 1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2011 
Volatility 49 63.4 28.7 22.9 22.9 11.9 
Latvia 1990-1993 1993-1995 1995-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 
Volatility 93 37.5 69 26 6 13 
Lithuania 1990-1992 1992-1996 1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2012 
Volatility 78.7 65.9 53.8 50.4 19.2 16.7 
Source: Own calculations based on the annex tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. 
 
 
Double Listing of Candidates 
Latvian and Lithuanian electoral systems allow a double listing of candidates: Latvian 
candidates may run in all five constituencies simultaneously, Lithuanian candidates 
may be placed on the nation-wide party list in the multi-member district and run in the 
single member district at the same time. The opportunities for double listing are worst 
in Estonia: there nominated candidates, on the contrary, are allowed to run in one 
electoral district only, however, some candidates put on the nation-wide list have a 
chance to get elected in the third round of election. Following this logic, the 
legislative turnover should be lower in Estonia than in other two Baltic countries, 
however, Estonia has the highest legislative turnover of all three Baltic States. 
 
Frequency of Elections  
Parliamentary elections in the Baltic States are held every four years.175 Since 1993 
Estonia and Latvia had one premature election (in 1995)176, Lithuania so far held 
elections regularly every four years. If we distribute legislative turnover not per term 
175 In Lithuania since 1992, in Estonia since 1995 and in Latvia since 1998. 
176 The second premature parliamentary election took place in Latvia in 2011, however, these data are 
not included in our analysis. 
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but per year, the annual legislative turnover in Lithuania would be 13.2 per cent, in 
Estonia 15 per cent and in Latvia 17.3 per cent. 
 
Greater Opportunities in Attaining Elite Status 
A higher legislative turnover provides greater opportunities in attaining the elite status 
and, with this, better prospects for democracy (see Somit, Wildenmann, Boll and 
Römmele 1994). High turnover was seen as political stabilising not only by Dwaine 
Marvick (1968), but also by Pareto and Mosca who “believed that, within limits, high 
turnover prevents the build-up of frustration among potential challengers of the 
regime, by allowing them to be coopted, however briefly, into positions of leadership” 
(Putnam 1976: 67).  
 The elite status thesis, with a modifying inclusion of gender perspective, is 
confirmed as well: the highest numbers of female legislators in Latvia and Lithuania 
have been brought by the parties with the highest numbers of legislative newcomers 
(Kuklys 2008: 45). 
 
The Lower Average Level of Elite Experience, Expertise and Effectiveness  
This explanation connects a high legislative turnover with the lower average level of 
elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness. Our data do not provide with 
measurements of expertise and effectiveness177 of MPs, however, if we take a mean 
number of elections as a proxy for legislative experience, we can observe a 
relationship between a legislative turnover and elite experience. The Baltic data 
confirm indeed that, except for Estonia in 1995 and Latvia in 1998, the high 
legislative turnover goes together with the low level of parliamentary experience 
(mean number of elections).   
 
Table 8.11. Legislative Experience of Baltic MPs: Mean Number of Elections 
Estonia 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Elections 1 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.1 
Latvia 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Elections 1 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.9 
Lithuania 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Elections 1 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.5 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
177 A possible proxy for the legislative effectiveness could be the percentage of passed laws of the total 
number of law drafts proposed by an MP, however, we have this type of data only for Lithuania. 
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Turnover among Ethnic Minorities 
If one compares shares of newcomers among ethnic minority and MPs belonging to 
the titular nation, implications for stability are more visible among ethnic minority 
representatives in Latvia: in four out of six Latvian Saeimas the share of newcomers 
among ethnic majority legislators has been higher than among ethnic minority MPs. 
In Estonia, we observe the opposite trend: in five out of six Riigikogu the share of 
newcomers is higher among ethnic minority than ethnic majority MPs. The 
Lithuanian data show a situation in-between: in a half (three of six) of parliaments a 
higher legislative turnover is found among ethnic Lithuanian legislators.  
 
Path Dependence 
In spite of the obvious differences in turnover between MPs in Eastern and Western 
Europe, there are a couple of striking similarities on a less aggregate level. A 
comparison between post-1945 Western and post-1989 Eastern European countries 
makes it clear that Eastern European countries follow a pattern of political 
development of some consolidated democracies in Western Europe. This is recorded 
by political development of the third wave democracies Portugal and Spain after 
1975, having 64.1 and 57.8 per cent (the EurElite data, Best and Cotta 2000) of 
parliamentary newcomers for the first 5 terms respectively. In addition, the difference 
in age of all MPs and parliamentary newcomers in Portugal - a rather exceptional 
Western European case – is 1.9 years which coincides with an Eastern European 
average. Portugal and Spain are similar to Eastern European countries in a long 
survival of post-war authoritarian political regimes as well. None of the Western 
European countries of the 20th century except Portugal and Spain could be compared 
with Eastern European societies in that respect. This evidence allows to conclude that 
the longer the period of regime discontinuity (length of the non-democratic regime), 




178 Cotta and Verzichelli (2007: 471) argue that “the crucial factor is probably the quality of 
discontinuity more than its length”. For the Baltic countries this would mean a more precise 
differentiation among authoritarian regimes in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania before the Soviet 
occupation in 1940. 
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8.3. Conclusion 
Out of variety of explanations, the path dependence and the supply-side volatility 
seem to provide the most convincing explanations for the high turnover among Baltic 
legislators. This means that the long previous period of non-democratic regime will 
keep the legislative turnover in new Baltic democracies at a relatively high level for 
some time till they reach the ‘western’ levels of parliamentary turnover179 and that the 
volatile elite structures (party elites switching, abandoning and creating new political 
parties) will continue contributing to the high legislative turnover as well.  
 On the other hand, it may be that the Baltics, which is no exeption from Eastern 
Europe in terms of legislative turnover, provides the established democracies of 
Western Europe with a perspective of their near future: “Insofar, Eastern and Central 
Europe provides the West with an image of its own future, including the corrupting 
consequences of political career insecurity, such as tendency towards to a ‘grab and 
run’ mentality” (Best 2007b: 30-31). The changes in the political party systems of 
Italy, Austria, Netherlands and some other countries of Western Europe after 1990 
could point to this direction and could provide with a thesis of a convergence between 
European East and West. 
 
 
179 We have to note that legislative turnover was already below 40 per cent in Estonia in 2011, in Latvia 
in 2006 and in Lithuania in 2008 and 2012, however, it is to be seen whether these are events by 
chance or a start of the long term trends. 
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9. Careers of Long-Standing Parliamentarians  
      “In modern democracies of any type other than  
      the Swiss, politics will unavoidably be a career.”  
                     Schumpeter (1979: 285) 
 
      “Insofar is the post-communist setting unique and  
      exceptional in the history of European   
      representative democracies: democratisation  
      without an extension of suffrage (but with an  
      empowerment of the electorate) combines here  
      with a deprofessionalisation to the political elite.”  
         Best (2007b: 28) 
 
Occupational sociology defines a career as “succession of related jobs, hierarchical in 
prestige, with ordered directions for an individual to pass through them in a 
predictable sequence”, however, also indicates “strong career patterns in some 
occupations, weak career patterns in other occupations, and an absence of career 
patterns in a few occupations” (Taylor 1968: 266). Politics or a parliamentary job in 
advanced western democracies falls somewhere between the last two patterns. It is 
marked not only by occupational mobility (change of employers and institutions180) 
which is normal for university professors, CEOs and similar occupational positions, 
but also, differently from them, by the absence of the last (third) stage of the 
occupational career if we follow the division of occupational career by Form and 
Miller (1949: 318) into (1) initial, (2) trial and (3) stable phases.  
 Parliamentary careers are characterised by their insecurity which is normally 
associated with jobs “for semiskilled, unskilled, and domestic workers” (Taylor 1968: 
270). This career insecurity, due to much higher legislative turnover and higher 
electoral volatility, is even stronger among legislators of Eastern Europe in 
comparison with their counterparts in the stable western democracies.  
 Still, inspite of high legislative turnover and electoral volatility, we find a nucleus 
of career parliamentarians comprising from about a sixth to a third of all legislators 
per term in the Baltic parliaments (see table 9.1). These findings can be interpreted as 
an indicator of increasing parliamentary institutionalisation (see Polsby 1968) and a 
favourable condition for parliamentary socialisation of representative elites. 
180 As a consequence of the constantly increasing occupational mobility, Arthur and Rousseau (1996) 
see the “boundaryless” careers as a new dominant principle of employment.  
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Table 9.1. Percentage of MPs Serving at Least Three Legislative Terms 
Parliament 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
Estonia 14.9 22.8 17.8 23.8 26.7 
Latvia 16.0 24.0 20.0 29.0 28.0 
Lithuania 16.1 14.9 22.0 34.8 43.9 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
 
The following analysis is structured into three parts. Firstly, it applies the Putnam’s 
law of increasing disproportion to the backgrounds of the long-standing legislators 
and reviews the careers of the most experienced parliamentarians. Secondly, it 
demonstrates the importance of the political party switching for the careers of long-
standing legislators. Thirdly, it explores to what extent the positions of the most 




9.1. Applying the ‘Law of Increasing Disproportion’ 
The law of increasing disproportion by Putnam (1976: 33) states that “the higher the 
level of political authority, the greater the representation for high-status groups”. With 
a small modification – replacing the level of political authority with the number of 
legislative terms – we could apply this law to the analysis of long-standing legislators 
in the Baltic States. In doing so, we would expect the MPs serving three legislative 
terms to be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic minorities compared 
with MPs serving one or two parliamentary terms; we would expect the MPs serving 
four terms to be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic minorities 
compared with MPs serving three parliamentary terms; further, we would expect the 
MPs serving five terms to be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic 
minorities compared with MPs serving four parliamentary terms; and so on. 
 
9.1.1. Estonia 
Based on the last seven parliaments, on average, a member of the Estonian parliament 
is 47.1 years old and serves 1.6 legislative terms. Since as a newcomer she or he 
enters the legislature at an average of 45.4 years, the average age difference between 
newcomers and established members is only 4.5 years. This indicates that very few 
MPs continue their careers as professional legislators. One-fifth of MPs on average 
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(based on the last five parliaments) serve three legislative terms. What are the 
legislators who made their way to the parliamentary elite? What kind of social and 
political characteristics do they have? 
 Legislators with experience in three parliamentary terms number a total of 72 
MPs who are on average 52.3 years old. The largest party families among them are 
Left Liberals and Conservatives (26.4 per cent each), 23.6 per cent represent Right 
Liberals. Almost all of these long-standing legislators - 95.8 per cent - have a 
university degree.  
 The largest share of long-standing legislators with three parliamentary terms – a 
half - consists of those who had been members of local councils prior to their election 
to parliament. Leading party politicians constitute 34.7 per cent and members of the 
Estonian Congress 30.6 per cent. Cabinet ministers make up 16.7 per cent of the total.  
 The largest occupational group among long-standing parliamentarians is that of 
teachers and professors (27.8 per cent), followed by higher civil servants (16.7 per 
cent). All in all, 83.1 per cent of long-standing MPs came from the public sector. 
 In terms of Soviet political experience, 16.7 per cent of long-standing legislators 
were members of the local Soviets; 2.8 per cent were Communist party leaders; 6.9 
per cent and 5.6 per cent, respectively, belonged to the Supreme Soviet and council of 
ministers; 31.9 per cent were part of the republican nomenklatura; 45.8 per cent were 
simple CPSU members; 6.9 per cent were dissidents. The collective portrait of long-
standing legislators also includes 13.9 per cent of women and 6.9 per cent of ethnic 
minorities. 
 Applying the modified law by Putnam, we would expect that legislators serving 
four legislative terms would be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic 
minorities compared with MPs serving three parliamentary terms. The group of 
legislators serving four terms consists of 25 MPs (28 per cent of whom are Right 
Liberals, 24 per cent are Socialists/Social Democrats, and Left Liberals and 
Conservatives each comprise 20 percent). The Putnam law of increasing disproportion 
works well in the case of age, education, occupation, ethnicity and two types of 
political experience: the age of MPs with four legislative terms reaches 54.8 years, the 
share of those with university degrees increases to 100 per cent, the share of those in 
the public sector and that of higher civil servants increases to 88 per cent and 24 per 
cent respectively. Declining trends are observed among those with local political 
experience (24 per cent), former dissidents (4 per cent) and nomenklatura (36 per 
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cent). However, this law is challenged by ethnic minorities (8 per cent) and, 
especially, by gender perspective – women constitute one-fifth of MPs with four 
terms, and this is higher than the share of women among MPs serving three terms. 
Moreover, if we move to the group of MPs with five legislative terms (there are six 
such MPs in total), the share of women increases to 50 per cent.  
 The variables of age, occupational and political experience indicate that Putnam’s 
law of increasing disproportion continues to function at the level of legislators serving 
five parliamentary terms (there are six such MPs in total): average age reaches 55.8 
years; all legislators come from the public sector; five of six were civil servants prior 
to election. There are no former leading members of the Communist Party and no 
former dissidents among these most experienced legislators. Ethnic minorities are also 
not represented. Absence of local democratic political experience among the most 
experienced legislators comes as a great surprise since its importance for the 
parliamentary recruitment has substantially increased with every Riigikogu (see the 
chapter on the pre-parliamentary political experience).  
 Who are these most experienced legislators? There are three Estonian 
parliamentarians who served six legislative terms: Andres Tarand (Estonian Social 
Democratic Party), Edgar Savisaar (Centre Party) and Mart Laar (Pro Patria and Res 
Publica Union). Their political careers are briefly described below: 
 
 Andres Tarand started his parliamentary career at fifty years of age and had experience as a 
member of the Estonian Congress. Educated in climatology and geography (PhD), he abandoned the 
post of the Director of the Botanical Gardens at the University of Tartu in 1990 and entered the 
Supreme Council of Estonia. He served as Minister of Environment (1992-1994), Prime Minister of 
Estonia (1994-1995) and Chairman of the Estonian Social Democratic Party (1996-2001). From 2004 
to 2009 he served as a member of the European Parliament.  
Edgar Savisaar, one of the best-known Estonian politicians, embarked on his legislative career in 
1990 at forty years of age and came with previous experience as a cabinet minister, a Popular Front 
leader and member of the Estonian Congress. Educated in history and philosophy (PhD), Edgar 
Savisaar was first elected to parliament in 1990. He served as the Prime Minister of Estonia (1990-
1992), Interior Minister (1995), Minister of Economics and Communications (2005-2007) and Vice-
President of the Parliament (1992-1995). He was the Mayor of Tallinn from 2001 through 2004 and has 
held this position again since 2007. Edgar Savisaar is the leader of the Centre Party. 
Mart Laar, one of the most famous politicians of Estonia, began his parliamentary career in 1990 
at thirty years of age and has had political experience as a member of the Estonian Congress. He was 
educated as a historian and was appointed to the position of Prime Minister of Estonia in 1992 at the 
 184 
     
age of 32 and led the Estonian government until 1994. He was again the Prime Minister of Estonia 
from 1999 to 2002. In 2005 Mart Laar received his PhD from the University of Tartu. He has been a 
Chairman of the Union of the Pro Patria and Res Publica since 2007.  
 
 The data above indicate that an absolute majority of long-standing 
parliamentarians – at least two-thirds of those who have served three, four or five 
legislative terms – come from Liberal and Conservative party families. This 
dominance of Liberals and Conservatives among long-standing legislators correlates 
well with the continuous neo-liberal course of Estonian governments that has been 
pursued in the newly-independent Estonia.  
 Led by Mart Laar, Pro Patria (also Pro Patria Union, later - The Union of Pro 
Patria and Res Publica) was the major Estonian conservative party, strongly oriented 
towards the nation. Laar claimed that before becoming prime minister in 1992, the 
only book he had read on economics was Free to Choose by Milton Friedman (see 
Belien 2005). Hybrid privatisation, the flat tax and banking reform (i.e., encouraging 
bankruptcies when banks were suspected of being under mafia influence) were 
innovations implemented under Laar. The Reform Party, founded by Siim Kallas, at 
the time the president of Estonia’s Central Bank and now the Vice-President of the 
European Commission, is the main representative of Right Liberals in Estonia. 
Abolishment of the corporate income tax in January 2000 is one example of the 
party’s successful neo-liberal policies (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004: 67). Since 
appearing for the first time in 1995 and receiving the second highest number of votes 
in that election, the Reform Party has maintained and even increased its popularity, 
evidenced by its victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections. The main representative 
of the Left Liberals – the Estonian Centre Party – does not fit the mould of neo-liberal 
policy-makers. The Centre Party has an “image as a representative of the silent 
majority of ordinary people forgotten by the political establishment” (Lagerspetz and 
Vogt 2004) and is also popular among Russian speakers; however, these 
programmatic differences did not preclude the Centre Party from joining the Reform 
Party in the governing coalition in 2005. (Edgar Savisaar, the charismatic and 
authoritarian leader of the Centre Party, was Minister of Economics and 
Communications from 2005 to 2007). 
 Radical economic reforms and strict monetary policy by Liberals and 
Conservatives, together with economic growth in the country, have earned Estonia the 
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reputation of “Baltic Tiger”. Due to this, the country replaced the national currency 
with the euro in 2011 and thus became the first ex-Soviet state to join the eurozone.  
 
9.1.2. Latvia 
The data on the seven Latvian parliaments show that, on average, a Latvian legislator 
is 46.8 years old and serves 1.6 parliamentary terms. Since an average age of 
parliamentary newcomer in Latvia is 45.8 years (the age difference between all MPs 
and newcomers is only one year), we conclude that conditions for parliamentary 
careers are unfavourable (and less favourable than in Estonia).  
 If we examine long-standing Latvian MPs (N=74) serving three terms, the share 
of political experience would be larger but still rather similar to that of all MPs: 29.7 
per cent of longstanding MPs had local experience; 28.4 per cent had experience in 
leading the party; and 12.2 per cent had experience as cabinet ministers before 
entering the parliament. What is very different is the share of MPs with membership 
in Citizens’ Committees – 9.5 per cent compared with 5.2 per cent of all MPs. 
Another difference is the level of long-standing MPs who had no political experience 
before entering parliament: 40.5 per cent compared with 48.7 per cent of all MPs.  
 If those MPs (N=29) who served four terms are considered, the diminishing role 
of all sorts of political experience, except for membership in the Citizens’ 
Committees, would persist: 24.1 per cent for local, 20.7 per cent for leading the party 
and 3.4 per cent for governmental experience. The level of Citizens’ Committee 
experience would “grow” to 13.8 per cent and the share of those with no political 
experience would remain similar to that among all MPs: 48.3 per cent compared with 
48.7 per cent for all MPs from seven parliaments on average.  
 If the group of experienced legislators (N=10) serving five terms is extracted 
from the whole, the decreasing proportions of local elective (20 per cent) and leading 
party positions (20 per cent) and absence of those with cabinet experience come 
together with the increasing proportion of those having participation in the Citizens’ 
Committee (20 per cent) and those having no pre-parliamentary political experience 
(50 per cent). 
 The other variables – education, age, ethnicity and Soviet political experience – 
also show that the Putnam law of increasing disproportion is at work. Increasing share 
of those with university degrees, older age, declining percentages of ethnic minorities 
and those from the Soviet Communist establishment and increasing shares of Soviet 
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dissidents and those whose families experienced repressions of the Soviet regime are 
characteristics if one moves from MPs serving three terms to legislators serving four 
and five terms. This process is also characterised by the rise of Conservatives and 
increasing shares of managers (businessmen) and, especially, political party 
employees and decline of teachers (professors), civil servants and public sector. 
Legislators serving the fifth term are 54.6 years old and hold a university degree; only 
a half of them come from public sector. 
 The most experienced legislators are Dzintars Ābiķis (served seven terms181), 
Anna Seile and Jānis Lagzdiņš (served six terms). 
 
 Dzintars Ābiķis started his parliamentary career at the age of 38 years. Educated in geography, 
he taught at the secondary school in the capital city. Shortly before 1990 he was employed in the 
Popular Front of Latvia. In 1990 Dzintars Ābiķis was elected to the Supreme Council of Latvia. He was 
two times elected to the Saeima as a member of the liberal party “Latvia’s Way”, three times as a 
member of the conservative “People’s Party”. To the last parliament he was elected on the list of the 
union “Unity”. 
 Anna Seile embarked on her legislative career at 51 years of age. After graduation from a 
university, she worked as a teacher of geography and geologist. Her last employment before she 
entered a parliament in 1990 was a deputy director for research in the forest reserve. In 1992 she 
received her PhD in geography. In 1995 Anna Seile left the Green Party and was elected the head of 
the conservative Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK). After the Latvian National 
Independence Movement merged with the Union “For Fatherland and Freedom” (TB), she was elected 
three times to Saeima on the list of the conservative TB/LNNK. 
 Jānis Lagzdiņš started his parliamentary career at the age of 38 years. Educated in law, he 
worked as a lawyer before entering the Supreme Council of Latvia in 1990. He was two times elected 
to the Saeima as a member of the liberal party “Latvia’s Way” and three times as a member of the 
conservative “People’s Party”. 
 
Our data demonstrate that two political party families, the Liberals and Conservatives, 
constitute the largest shares of long-standing legislators. Liberals and Conservatives 
have the highest mean number of mandates. (The highest absolute mean number of 
mandates for all post-1990 Latvian parliaments belongs to the Liberals in 1995 and 
the Conservatives in 2006, each with 2.4.) Liberals have the largest share of 
experienced founders (those who continue their legislative careers from 1990 
onwards) in all the parliaments to which they have been elected, and Conservatives 
181 If the Saeima elected in 2011 is included, Dzintars Ābiķis serves the eight legislative term. 
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have the second highest share for those parliaments in which Liberals are present. 
However, in the last three parliaments, the Conservatives were the clear leaders, as 
they had the largest share of experienced founders and members serving at least three 
terms.  
Conservatives in many cases have been linked with the Congress of Citizens, while 
Liberals have been associated with the Club “21”. The Congress of Citizens, similar 
to the one in Estonia, emerged in the national rebirth and liberation processes of 
Latvia and sought to become an alternative to the Latvian Supreme Council of 1990. 
Much more radical and nationalistic than the Popular Front, the Congress of Citizens 
in Latvia failed to achieve the institutional success enjoyed by the neighbouring 
Congress of Citizens in Estonia. However, in spite of institutional failure, members of 
the Citizens’ Congress in Latvia continued their political involvement individually 
and became an important group among the most experienced parliamentary 
representatives. 
 The connection between Liberals and the Club “21” in Latvia has been very 
strong, as many Liberals who entered any Latvian parliament after 1990 had belonged 
to this club. Although Liberals cooperated with Conservatives in the Cabinet of 
Ministers, the program of Club “21” was to oppose the non-compromising citizenship 
politics of the Congress of Citizens. Small in numbers and closely related to elitist 
Latvian Liberals, the Club “21” seemed to overcome party boundaries and developed 
into an open forum for top politicians, businessmen, intellectuals and artists. It 
included former Communist nomenklatura as well as members of the Latvian 
Diaspora from Western democracies. Representatives of ethnic minorities were a part 
of the Club as well. 
  As has been argued by Steen (1997: 354), as an elite forum or an institution for 
inter-elite cooperation, the Club “21” was a purely Latvian phenomenon, and nothing 
similar has been observed in Estonia or Lithuania.  
 In 2002, Latvian Liberals endured the same political fate as the reform-oriented 
Liberals in Poland in 2001: they vanished from the parliamentary landscape.182 
However, if one defines “political elite” as appointed or elected persons who hold 
strategic positions in state authorities and affect national political outcomes regularly 
182 In 2006 some of them were elected to Saeima on the joint list with Christian Democrats. 
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and substantially, Latvian Liberals continue to be a part of the elite.  Many of them 
occupy the highest administrative positions in the Latvian state authorities. 
 
9.1.3. Lithuania 
The data on the seven Lithuanian parliaments show that, on average, a Lithuanian 
legislator is 49.1 years old and serves 1.7 parliamentary terms. Since an average age 
of parliamentary newcomer in Lithuania is 46.9 years (the age difference between all 
MPs and newcomers is 2.2 years), we conclude that conditions for parliamentary 
careers are slightly more favourable than in Latvia but less favourable than in Estonia.  
 If we examine the long-standing Lithuanian legislators (N=105) serving three 
terms, the share of pre-parliamentary political experience would be larger (except for 
experience as a cabinet minister) but still rather similar to that of all MPs: 36.2 per 
cent of long-standing MPs held local elective positions, one-third (33.3 per cent) held 
a leading party position and 1.9 per cent were cabinet ministers. Percentages for the 
university education, degrees in law and social sciences and humanities, proportion of 
women, dissidents and politically repressed parents would be slightly higher in 
comparison with the average for all legislators from all seven parliaments.  
 If we compare long-standing legislators serving three terms with those who 
served four terms (N=50) and those who served five legislative terms (N=22), we 
observe that the Putnam’s law of increasing disproportion is at work. With every 
additional legislative term, the age and the percentages for degrees in humanities and 
social sciences, experience as a cabinet minister and the Soviet experience of having 
political repressed parents continue to rise; the percentages of university degrees and 
ethnic minorities, the shares of local elective experience and experience as a manager 
(businessman) and civil servant continue to decline. The share of women legislators is 
rather stable (between 16 and 18 per cent) and the largest percentages of political 
party families fall into two comparable groups of Social Democrats and Conservatives 
(fluctuating between 29.5 to 40.9 per cent), however, if we look at the legislators 
serving six terms, we observe the rising shares of female legislators (comprising one-
fourth of them) and representatives of the Socialists/Social Democrats (five of eight 
MPs). 
 The careers of the eight most experienced Lithuanian MPs (having served or 
serving six terms) are briefly described below: 
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 Česlovas Juršėnas was elected to the Supreme Council of Lithuania at the age of 52 years. 
Beforehand, educated as a journalist not only at the University but also at the Communist Party school, 
he worked for various newspapers, in the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party as an 
instructor and the head of the department for newspapers, television and radio. Česlovas Juršėnas was 
the head of the Lithuanian parliament from 1992 to 1996 and in 2004, the chairman of the Democratic 
Labour Party from 1996 to 2001. He served as the vice-chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic 
Party from 2001 to 2004, after 2004 he occupies the position of a vice-chairman of this political party. 
 Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis was born in the family of politically repressed parents. Trained as 
a surgeon and a historian, he was involved in the dissident activity before the Lithuanian state regained 
its independence. In 1990, at the age of 39 years, he started his parliamentary career. The political 
positions held: Chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party from 1999 to 2001,  Vice-Speaker 
of Seimas from 2001 to 2004, the vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Party 1989-1999, in 2001 
and from 2008 onwards. 
 Kęstutis Glaveckas, holding professorship in economics at the University of Vilnius, entered the 
Supreme Council of Lithuania in 1990 as the candidate of the Communist Party at the age of 41 years. 
He was Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party 1989-1990, Vice-
Chairman of the Lithuanian Centre Union 1998-2000 and Chairman of the Lithuanian Centre Union in 
2000. In 2003 he was elected the vice-chairman of the Centre and Liberal Union. 
 Irena Šiaulienė, after graduation with a PhD in history and having held associate professorship in 
the institution of higher education, started her parliamentary career in 1992 at the age of 37 years. From 
1990 to 2001 she was a member of the Democratic Labour Party, served as a vice-head of this 
organisation; from 2001 onwards she enrolls the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party. 
 Rasa Juknevičienė started her parliamentary career at the age of 32 years. Trained as a 
paediatrician, she entered a parliament for the first time in 1990. The political positions held: Vice-
speaker of Seimas from 1999 to 2000, vice-head of the Fatherland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) 
from 1999 onwards and minister of defence from 2008 to 2012. 
 Gediminas Kirkilas, after graduating from the Communist Party school, worked as an instructor 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was a secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party. 
He entered Seimas for the first time in 1992 at the age 41 years. From 1991 to 1996 Kirkilas was the 
first vice-chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, from 2001 to 2007 – vice-chairman of 
the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party. The other positions held: Chairman of the Lithuanian Social 
Democratic Party 2007-2009, Minister of Defence from 2004 to 2006, Prime Minister of Lithuania 
from 2006 to 2008. 
 Algimantas Salamakinas, after having worked as a turner and chairman of the company 
supervisory board, embarked on his legislative career at the age of 40 years. He was a member of the 
Lihuanian Communist Party, later was elected a vice-chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour 
Party. He is one of the very few legislators without a degree in higher education. 
 Emanuelis Zingeris started his legislative career at the age of 33 years. Educated as philologist, 
he held the position of the Director of the Lithuanian Jewish Museum before he entered for the first 
 190 
     
time a parliament. He is also a founder of the national Gaon Jewish Museum and the Honorary 
Chairman of the Lithuanian Jewish Community. 
 
As has been mentioned in the chapters above, the specific features of Lithuania were a 
succesful transformation of the Lithuanian Soviet Communist Party into a Social 
Democratic Party and the Lithuanian political system described by the alternating 
electoral success between the Socialists/ Social Democrats and Conservatives. The 
Lithuanian Social Democrats, lead by Algirdas Brazauskas, a physically strong and 
well-built former first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and the 
Conservatives, lead by Vytautas Landsbergis, a musicology professor of an extra-
ordinary speech talent and irony, were the tempting examples inviting for a Paretian 
(or Machiavellian) analysis of alternation between lions and foxes. Even after these 
two political superfigures left the Lithuanian national scene some time ago, electoral 
alternation between the Social Democrats and Conservatives continues further 
allowing for some scholars (Norkus 2011b) to argue that Lithuania in this respect 
should be better compared not with Estonia and Latvia but with Poland and Hungary. 
 As the data demonstrated, the majority of the long-standing Lithuanian legislators 
belong to the rivalry camps of Social Democrats and Conservatives, however, this 
does not mean that membership in one political party is sufficient for a legislative 
career. As the sub-chapter below shows, at least two political parties are a 
precondition for a long-term legislative career not only in Lithuania, but also in other 
two Baltic States.  
 
 
9.2. Political Party Switching as a ‘Requirement’ for Long-Standing Legislators 
Among countries of Eastern Europe in the period from 1990 to 2007, Latvia had the 
highest electoral volatility which was to 100 per cent183 explained by the behaviour of 
political elites creating new parliamentary parties for every legislative election; the 
electoral volatility in Lithuania and Estonia was explained by the behaviour of 
political elites to 96 and 66 per cent, respectively (Rose 2009: 149-152).  
 These findings are supported by our data on legislative recruitment. A member of 
the Latvian Saeima changes 1.4 political parties and 1.2 party families on average, 
183 On average, 60 per cent to 72 per cent of electoral volatility in Eastern Europe is attributed to the 
elite behaviour; the rest is explained by the changing preferences of voters (Rose 2009: 152).   
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however, a longer legislative tenure ‘requires’ to change more political parties and 
party families. The number of political parties rises from 2.2 on average for legislators 
having served three terms to 2.9 on average for legislators with four terms. (The 
averages of party families for the same groups are lower: 1.6 and 2.0, respectively). 
The largest numbers of party and party family change (3.3 political parties and 2.2 
party families) are observed among the most professional Latvian MPs serving five 
terms.  
 The data on Estonia show the lowest rates of party change which is 2.3 for 
legislators serving five legislative terms. The Lithuanian data – an average of 2.9 
political parties – demonstrate a situation in-between. Still, the Lithuanian and even 
Estonian political party change rates are not that far from the Latvian ones184. In all 
Baltic cases this means political professionalisation at the cost of the high electoral 
volatility. 
 The figures for mobility between parties and party families are different for MPs 
with an ethnic minority background and MPs belonging to a titular nation, however, 
the cross-country differences are too large and the common Baltic patterns are not 
observed. For instance, the ethnic minority MPs with three terms of parliamentary 
experience in the Latvian Saeima changed parties an average of 2.5 times and party 
families an average of 1.4 times. Ethnic Latvian MPs with the same legislative 
experience changed parties on average 2.2 times and party families on average 1.7 
times. The higher party and lower party family mobility among ethnic minority MPs 
is also observed among legislators having served four terms in a parliament: on 
average, ethnic minority MPs changed parties 3.3 times and party families 1.5 times, 
compared with 2.7 times for parties and 2.1 times for party families for their 
counterparts of ethnic Latvian origin. 
 The Lithuanian data, on the contrary, show the opposite trends: the higher party 
and the lower party family mobility is observed among ethnic Lithuanian MPs, the 
ethnic minority legislators in the Lithuanian Seimas show a lower party but higher 
party family mobility.  
    
 
184 We should keep in mind that our data on the Baltic parliamentary elites record the political party 
and political party family affiliations of legislators only every four years. What happens within each 
legislative period lasting four years is not recorded, thus, the rates of party and party family change 
among MPs could be possibly even higher.  
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Table 9.2.1. Political Party and Party Family Switching Among Legislators (Average) 
















All MPs 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 
MPs with 3 Terms 2.0 1.5 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.5 
MPs with 4 Terms 2.3 1.9 2.9 2.0 2.5 1.8 
MPs with 5 Terms 2.3 2.0 3.3 2.2 2.9 1.7 
Source: Own data and calculations. 
 
 
The ethnic Estonian legislators in the Riigikogu demonstrate both a higher party and 
party family mobility in comparison with ethnic minority MPs. 
 The importance of the political party switching for the careers of the long-
standing Baltic MPs could be better seen if the political party change variable is 
placed among other variables for structural elite circulation. As the tables below 
show, the Estonian parliamentarians are 9.7 times, the Lithuanian legislators 23.6 
times and the Latvian MPs even 41.2 times more likely to stay in parliament for three 
or more legislative periods if they change their political parties. The political party 
change increases the chances of staying in parliament much greater than any other 
variable in presented equations. For example, the second highest effects observed in 
the respective equations are experience of having politically persecuted parents or 
being deported to Siberia among Estonian MPs (they have 7.9 times greater odds),  
   
Table 9.2.2. Predictors for Careers of Long-Standing Estonian Legislators 
Predictors B SE Exp(B) 
Law Degree 0.039 0.510 1.039 
Local Elective Position 0.139 0.350 1.149 
Cabinet Minister  1.076* 0.493 2.934 
Member of Citizens’ Committee  0.423 0.430 1.526 
Female Gender -0.028 0.475 0.973 
Ethnic Minority  0.158 0.717 1.171 
Soviet Nomenklatura  0.303 0.393 1.353 
Soviet Dissident -0.552 0.829 0.576 
Political Persecution or Exile of Parents      2.077** 0.655 7.981 
Managers, Businessmen -0.820 0.525 0.440 
Teachers, Professors   0.466 0.459 1.594 
Political Party Employees -0.056 0.544 0.945 
Political Party Change        2.277*** 0.445 9.748 
Political Party Family Change  0.456 0.485 1.578 
Nagelkerke pseudo-R²  0.36  
Note: Binary Logistic Regression. Dependent variable is long-standing MPs serving three or more 
terms without interruption. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 9.2.3. Predictors for Careers of Long-Standing Latvian Legislators 
Predictors B SE Exp(B) 
Law Degree  0.421 0.493 1.523 
Member of Citizens’ Committee  0.532 0.714 1.702 
Female Gender  0.273 0.508 1.313 
Ethnic Minority  0.179 0.430 1.196 
Leading Position in the Soviet Communist Party    1.788* 0.899 5.975 
Soviet Nomenklatura -0.248 0.677 0.781 
Member of the Soviet Communist Party -0.208 0.453 0.812 
Political Persecution or Exile of Parents  0.485 0.595 1.624 
Public Sector -0.299 0.451 0.741 
Civil servants  0.933 0.613 2.542 
Managers, Businessmen -0.654 0.510 0.520 
Teachers, Professors -0.041 0.482 0.959 
Political Party Employees -1.042 0.647 0.353 
Political Party Change        3.719*** 0.483 41.226 
Political Party Family Change -0.490 0.463 0.613 
Nagelkerke pseudo-R²  0.46  
Note: Binary Logistic Regression. Dependent variable is long-standing MPs serving three or more 
terms without interruption. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
Table 9.2.4. Predictors for Careers of Long-Standing Lithuanian Legislators 
Predictors B SE Exp(B) 
Law Degree 0.565 0.488 1.760 
Degree in Humanities or Social Sciences 0.187 0.299 1.205 
Female Gender  0.884* 0.385 2.421 
Ethnic Minority 0.444 0.506 1.559 
Local Position in the Soviet Regime 0.402 0.580 1.495 
Soviet Nomenklatura -0.233 0.505 0.792 
Soviet Dissident 1.104 0.679 3.016 
Political Persecution or Exile of Parents 0.490 0.511 1.633 
Managers, Businessmen -0.315 0.401 0.730 
Teachers, Professors 0.197 0.370 1.218 
Political Party Employees 0.510 0.442 1.665 
Political Party Change       3.162*** 0.400 23.623 
Political Party Family Change -0.341 0.384 0.711 
Nagelkerke pseudo-R²  0.38  
Note: Binary Logistic Regression. Dependent variable is long-standing MPs serving three or more 
terms without interruption. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
leading position in the Soviet Communist Party among Latvia legislators (it increases 
chances 5.9 times) and experience as Soviet dissident among Lithuanian 
parliamentarians (they are 3 times more likely to remain in parliament). The 
extremely high effect of the political party change is explained by the fact that our 
data on party change includes not only individual but also collective actions of 
parliamentarians (mergers and fissions); the latter accounts for the largest share of 
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political party switching among MPs. The high effect of party change and its variation 
across Baltic countries are attributed not only to electoral volatility but also to the 
level of party system institutionalisation (see Kreuzer and Pettai 2009: 271). 
 Interestingly enough, the change of political party families has a negative effect 
on the chances to continue a legislative career for Latvian and Lithuanian MPs. In 
contrast, the effect of political party family change is positive in the Estonian case, 
however, the effect is very low in comparison with the effect of political party change. 
 Hence, in order to become a long-standing legislator it makes sense to change a 




9.3. The Parliamentary Elite: the Most Experienced Legislators or Those at the 
Top of Institutional Hierarchy? 
In the beginning of this dissertation (chapter 1.3) we have provided two definitions of 
the parliamentary elite: the broad one and the narrow one. According to the broad 
(institutional) definition, all legislators belong to the parliamentary elite; the narrow 
definition treats a parliamentary elite only those legislators who affect the national 
political outcomes regularly and substantially. In this part of the dissertation we are 
concerned with our narrow definition which obviously requires a more precise 
operationalisation: are those legislators who affect the national political outcomes 
regularly and substantially (1) the most experienced (long-standing) MPs, (2) MPs at 
the top of the parliamentary hierarchy, (3) most productive lawmakers (persons with 
the highest number of law drafts registered), (4) most often speakers (speech 
deliverers and talk-givers),  or all four in one?  
 Intuitively, we would be certain that the most experienced (long-standing) 
legislators serving six or seven terms are the parliamentary elite, however, only one 
long-standing Baltic legislator (Česlovas Juršėnas from Lithuania) in the period of 
more than two decades would fulfil the second criterion which is the top of the 
parliamentary hierarchy (speaker or the president of parliament, see table 9.3). The 
explanation for this result is that the highest positions in the parliamentary hierarchy 
are occupied not according to the criteria of legislative tenure and parliamentary 
experience but rather following the logic of the political power (electoral results) 
structure. Secondly, it could be that a too high level of parliamentary 
professionalisation (over-profesionalisation or specialisation) leads to a process of 
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self-exclusion from the parliamentary elite in the narrow sense; in other words, with 
an extremely high professionalisation we get long-standing legislators who affect 
national political outcomes regularly but not substantially. However, if in our search 
for the legislators who “affect the national political outcomes regularly and 
substantially” we lower the yardstick for parliamentary experience, a number of 
parliamentary speakers increases obviously. If the number of legislative terms is 
reduced to three parliaments, all the five presidents of the Estonian parliaments fulfil 
this criterion; in Lithuania, five of  seven parliamentary speakers serve three 
legislative terms; in Latvia, a half (four of eight) of parliamentary speakers reach the 
experience level of three legislative terms.  
 Alternatively, one could also lower the level of parliamentary hierarchy by 
including the vice-presidents or vice-speakers of legislatures. By doing this, we come 
to the result showing that 77.8 per cent of the vice-presidents of the Estonian 
Riigikogu, 57.6 per cent of the vice-speakers of the Lithuanian parliaments and 36.8 
per cent of the vice-speakers of the Latvian Saeima serve at least three terms. Thus, 
whether we analyse data on speakers or vice-speakers, we have evidence for the 
largest overlap between the highest positions in the parliamentary hierarchy and 
legislative tenure in the case of Estonia and the smallest overlap in the case of Latvia. 
This means that Estonia provides the best chances for the emergence of the 
parliamentary elite in a narrow sense and that these chances are worst in Latvia. The 
latter comes to some extent as a great surprise since it was Latvia (not Estonia or 
Lithuania) which had the Club 21 as the unique elite forum in 1990s (see Steen 
1997a) and, therefore, the best opportunities for the elite formation. 
 
 
Table 9.3. Heads of Baltic Parliaments from 1990 onwards 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
1. Arnold Rüütel, 1990-1992 
2. Ülo Nugis, 1992-1995 
3. Toomas Savi, 1995-1999  
    & 1999-2003  
4. Ene Ergma, 2003-2006,  
    2007-2011 & 2011-present  
5. Toomas Varek, 2006-2007 
 
1. Anatolijs Gorbunovs,  
    1990-1993 & 1993-1995 
2. Ilga Kreituse, 1995-1996 
3. Alfrēds Čepānis, 1996-1998 
4. Jānis Straume, 1998-2002 
5. Ingrīda Ūdre, 2002-2006 
6. Indulis Emsis, 2006-2007 
7. Gundars Daudze, 2007-2010 
8. Solvita Āboltiņa, 2010-2011 
    & 2011- present  
1. Vytautas Landsbergis,  
    1990-1992 & 1996-2000 
2. Česlovas Juršėnas,  
    1992-1996 & 2004 
3. Artūras Paulauskas, 2004-2006 
4. Viktoras Muntianas, 2006-2008 
5. Arūnas Valinskas, 2008-2009 
6. Irena Degutienė, 2009-2012 
7. Vydas Gedvilas, 2012 – present 
 




     
Since the main output of the parliamentary activity are the laws passed and 
since debates and discussions remain an important part of parliamentary life 
(see Polsby 1992), the third (legislative productivity) and fourth (number of 
speeches) criteria are worth considering as well.  
 The most productive lawmakers are in the absolute majority of cases the 
heads of parliamentary committees, but some speakers or vice-speakers of 
parliament usually belong to the group of the most productive lawmakers as 
well185. Secondly, this type of data raises a valid question whether a nominal 
productivity (names with the registered law drafts) coincides with a real 
productivity (MPs who invested most of hours into a particular law or laws).  
 The highest number of speeches in most of the cases belongs to the long-
standing legislators serving four or five parliamentary terms. Only a few 
speakers or vice-speakers are among them.  
 
 
185 Here our analysis of legislative productivity and number of speeches relies on the statistical data 
from the Lithuanian Seimas in the period from 1992 to 2012. 
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Conclusion 
 
The dissertation, as the first comparative longitudinal study of the post-Communist 
parliamentary elites from all three Baltic countries, is an important contribution to the 
understanding of the transformation of the Baltic elites. It employs the original 
longitudinal data (that, differently from studies on elites with one point of 
observation, provides seven points of observation for each of the Baltic countries) and 
applies the analytical concepts of individual and structural elite circulations. 
Differently from many one-country studies in the area, this dissertation on three 
countries contributes to reasearch into the Baltic elites by attempting to make it more 
comparative and systematic. Finally, its findings provide insights and give impulses 
for the inquiry into the Eastern European parliamentary elites and research on the 
post-Commmunist transformations.  
 As the main body of literature observed above (Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 
1952; Putnam 1976; Keller 1991) indicated, a real transformation of elites happens 
not only when new elite members come to power but when their characteristics are of 
different social quality in comparison with previous elites. In other words, only 
structural elite circulation is a sufficient condition for transformaton of elites. 
 This dissertation on the Baltic parliamentary elites from twenty-one legislatures 
provides evidence not only for individual but also for structural elite circulation. 
Individual elite circulation in the Baltics (chapter 8), largely explained by the supply-
side volatility and path-dependence (length of the Soviet regime), shows cross-
country variation in extent and frequency but not in the manner of elite change. 
Structural elite circulation in many aspects means, notwithstanding some findings for 
continuity and changes without transformation, the transformation of social and 
political profiles of parliamentary representatives in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(see chapters 5 to 7).  
 The declining representation of teachers and professors, those educated in 
technical and natural sciences, those with doctorates and the Soviet political 
experience was interpreted as a transformation of social and political profiles of the 
Baltic parliamentary representatives. The increasing representation of women, ethnic 
minorities, those educated in humanities and social sciences, managers and 
businessmen, long-standing legislators and those with democratic pre-parliamentary 
experience was understood as a transformation of social and political profiles of 
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parliamentary representatives as well. However, our longitudinal data allowed to 
observe not only steadily increasing or gradually declining certain social categories 
but also to distinguish between different political generations of the Baltic 
parliamentary elites which is to a large extent explained by the literature on elite 
change and post-Communist transformations (see chapter 2). 
 As transformative patterns, the two generations of Baltic parliamentary elites are 
observed not only in the dimension of pre-parliamentary democratic political 
experience (especially in the local elective and the leading political party 
backgrounds) but also in occupation (decline of percentages of teachers and 
professors and rise of managers and businessmen), gender (growing percentages of 
women legislators) and legislative experience (decline of parliamentary newcomers 
and rise of long-standing legislators). On the political party level, this division into 
two generations of elites more or less coincides with the rise of brand-new and 
electorally successful political parties186, allowing for an analytical division into 
‘traditional’ political parties and new political organisations with anti-elitist rhetoric 
and indicating a socio-economic division of their electorates into two Lithuanias, two 
Latvias and two Estonias187.  
 Transformative changes without a possibility to clearly distinguish between the 
first and the second generation of elites are observed in education (decline of degrees 
in technical and natural sciences and increase of degrees in humanities and social 
sciences), ethnic representation (increase of ethnic minority MPs188) and Soviet 
experience (declining percentages of Soviet dissidents and those with the Soviet 
Communist party or nomenklatura background). 
 Majority of our variables for the structural elite circulation points to the clearly 
observable cross-country differences indicating trends that occupational, pre-
parliamentary political and other backgrounds among Baltic legislators tend to 
coincide with the lines of political party families, namely the largest political families 
in many occupational groups and the groups with pre-parliamentary political 
186 Here we mean not only Res Publica in Estonia, New Era in Latvia and New Union (Social Liberals) 
in Lithuania, but also the New Party in Latvia, Labour Party and the Party Order and Justice in 
Lithuania. 
187 The culmination of the conflict between the old and new (transitional and post-transitional) elites in 
the Baltics was a successful impeachment process against Rolandas Paksas, the President of Lithuania 
and the leader of the Party Order and Justice in 2004.  
188 In Estonia and Latvia. The ethnic minority representation in the Lithuanian parliaments fluctuates 
without clear transformative patterns. 
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experience: Left Liberals in Estonia, Conservatives in Latvia and Socialists/Social 
Democrats in Lithuania. This tallies well with the prominence of Liberals and 
Conservatives in the politics of Estonia and Latvia after 1990 and an exceptional 
success of the former Lithuanian Communist Party that managed to transform itself 
into a new political organisation in the post-Communist Lithuania. Still, one should 
observe that differently from Lithuania, where a part of parliamentary elites become 
executive elites in the alternating order between the left wing and the right wing 
political blocs, due to the remaining patterns of ethnic democracy (whether in 
Smooha’s sense or in the understanding of Linz and Stepan) the alternation of 
ministerial cabinets in Estonia and Latvia happens within the right wing camp only 
since the ostracised parties of the leftist opposition in both countries largely overlap 
with the groups of ethnic minorities. Our analysis on the structural circulation of 
parliamentary elites does report the steadily increasing representation of ethnic 
minorities, however, it does not make a full impact yet on the government formation 
in the Huntingtonian sense of democracy which is understood as an alternation 
between position and opposition (see Huntington 1993). 
 What we learn about the Baltic parliamentary elites is that, in comparison with 
the first legislatures, their second generation less resembles traditional elites and is 
more similar to general population (for instance, it includes many more women and 
fewer of those with doctoral degrees). On the one hand, this allows to be interpreted 
as a positive outcome of democratisation reducing the distance between elites and 
non-elites; democracy does not need legislators as heroes but as politically active and 
initiative persons acting on behalf of their citizens. On the other hand, de-heroisation 
of legislators or replacement of extraordinary politicians with ordinary politicians 
might also mean, as some social scientists observe, that “the elite is less concerned 
about becoming part of the history and more pre-occupied about the interior of his 
own private house”189. The danger of this trend is not that history ceases to be the 
graveyard of elites (here we paraphrase one of the most known statements by Pareto 
(1966: 249) that “history is a graveyard of aristocracies”), but that the lower quality of 
elites might become a rule rather than an exception. This is a legitimate concern, since 
the parliamentary elites (along with party and ministerial elites) of sufficiently high 
189 Interview with the Lithuanian philosopher Bronislovas Genzelis (see Rašimaitė 2010). A couple of 
years ago in one of his interviews  Arvydas Šliogeris, the most prominent Lithuanian philosopher, 
claimed that the members of the current political elite are too similar to ordinary people. 
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quality are one of the five conditions for the success of democracy or “the democratic 
method” (Schumpeter 1979: 290). The institutional explanation for these trends and 
differences between transitional and post-transitional Baltic elites could be following: 
 
“Once institutions become established, they may attract those who prefer safety and security to 
challenge and change. Social rigidity and conservatism thus may result despite the circulation of elite 
individuals. It is not that co-opted elites tend in time to choose mediocre men – as Pareto supposed – 
but that the men who present themselves as candidates may be more mediocre at a later period.” 
(Keller 1991: 249)190  
 
Paradoxically, but the period of ‘more mediocre’ post-transitional elites coincides 
with the phase of the most professional Baltic legislators ever. In spite of the still high 
supply-side volatility, our data on the Baltic parliamentary elites allow to observe the 
upward trends of political professionalisation among legislators in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Each of the Baltic parliaments has already slowed down their legislative 
turnover to the level of established western democracies at least once and the level of 
the most experienced legislators in the last parliaments was higher than a quarter in 
Estonia and Latvia and over forty percent in Lithuania (see chapter 9). These findings 
can be also interpreted as an indicator of parliamentary institutionalisation in the sense 
of Polsby (1968) and a favourable condition for parliamentary socialisation of 
representative elites. 
 Considering the predictors for the careers of the long-standing Baltic legislators, 
it is obvious that ethnic minority background and political persecution or exile of 
parents in the Soviet time slightly increase the chances for serving in parliament three 
or more legislative periods (see tables 9.2.2 to 9.2.4). Membership in the Citizens’ 
Committees increases the odds of staying in the Estonian or Latvian parliament at 
least 1.5 times. The law degree and female gender increase but the Soviet 
nomenklatura background decreases the chances for legislative careers among Latvian 
and Lithuanian parliamentarians. Of pre-parliamentary occupations, the position of a 
teacher or professor among Estonian MPs, the post of a civil servant among Latvian 
legislators and employment in the political party among Lithuanian legislators 
increase the chances for legislative careers. However, the strongest predictor for the 
190 This observation by Suzanne Keller allows to have not only individual elite circulation without 
structural circulation but also the change of their attitudes without the replacement of elite individuals 
which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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careers of long-standing parliamentarians in all three Baltic countries remains the 
variable of political party change.   
 Quality of parliamentary elites, inspite of the ambitious aims of the elite theorists 
to produce a scientific and value-free (positivistic) approach, has a strong normative 
load. In other words, while pursuing an empirical research on elites (how the 
parliamentary elite looks like), we cannot avoid the question of how the parliamentary 
elite should look like or the question “What are the personal features, practical skills, 
and linkages to society that our parliamentarians ought to possess?” (Patzelt 1999: 
266) Following Karl Jaspers (1982) who further developed Max Weber’s distinction 
between the ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ and the ‘ethic of responsibility’ (Weber 1988: 
551), parliamentary elites should be the practitioners of ethics of social responsibility 
or “consequentialists”- they should be capable to judge “the morality of actions 
according to their consequences” (Tucker 1999: 185). 
 Our normative answer in the context of the analysis in structural elite circulation 
would be following: the parliamentary elite should include more lawyers and fewer 
businessmen; it should have more experienced legislators and fewer parliamentary 
newcomers. Or, to apply the four-fold typology and terms by James D. Barber (1971) 
based on the two criteria – (1) legislative activity and (2) willingness to come back to 
parliament, legislatures should have more Lawmakers (characterised as “high in 
activity, high willingness to return”) and fewer Spectators (“low in activity, high in 
willingness to return”), Advertisers (“high in activity, low willingness to return”) and 
Reluctants (“low in activity, low in willingness to return”). Our data on the increasing 
share of the long-standing legislators in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania allows to 
expect that the group of lawmakers in the Barber’s sense grows and becomes larger in 




This dissertation has by no means exhausted all possible aspects and methods of 
inquiry into transformation of the Baltic parliamentary elites. With a further aim to 
move from descriptive analysis to investigation of substantive representation, this 
dissertation on recruitment and careers of parliamentary elites could be complemented 
by questionnaires and interviews with elite members. This would allow for a more in-
depth understanding of legislative roles (see Best and Vogel 2012) and legislative 
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representation (whether MPs act as delegates, bound by strict mandates, or as trustees 
that are free from specific instructions).191 Secondly, the research on the 
transformation of the Baltic parliamentary elites could be advanced by investigation 
of their beliefs, values and attitudes – this would reveal whether parliamentary elites 
are more democratic than ordinary citizens and to what extent transitional elites are 
different from post-transitional ones (see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2007). Thirdly, it 
would profit from the advancements in political psychology by including the analysis 




191 Of all three Baltic countries, Lithuania would be especially suitable for this type of investigation, 
since roughly a half of its parliamentary representatives is elected in the PR segment (acting as 
potential trustees or representatives of the entire country?) and roughly another half in the single 
member districts (potential delegates or representatives of their constituency only?). 
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List of Variables192  
 
 
Idnr   Identification number 
 
Name  Family name, first name 
 
Birthpla  Place of birth  
 
Party  Political party affiliation  
 
Yearelec   Year of election 
 
Nrelect  Number of democratic election (the 1st democratic election = 1)  
 
Partfam  Parliamentary party family193 at time of election: 
    
 
  Communists 
 
  Socialists/Social Democrats 
 
  Greens 
 
  Agrarians 
 
  Liberals 
 
  Left Liberals 
 
  Right Liberals 
 
  Christian Democrats 
 
  Conservatives 
 
  Extreme Right 
 
  Ethnic Minority 
   
  (Anti-communist) Umbrella Movement  
   
  Other 
   
 
192 Adapted and modified from the EurElite project on the Eastern European parliamentary elites lead 
by Prof. Heinrich Best and Dr. Michael Edinger. 
193 Except for the last two categories, the party family classification here relies on the work by 
Gallagher, Laver & Mair (2006). 
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Univ Educat           University or comparable education  
 
Law  Law degree 
 
HuSocEcon Humanities, social sciences, economics, theology 
 
TechNatMed Technical and natural sciences, medicine, architecture 
 
PhD  Doctorate 
 
 
Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience 
 
Local Elect  Local/regional political background: local/regional  
   politics, local elective position (municipality) before and/or at 
   first democratic election; incl. also appointed mayors 
 
Lead Party   Leading party position: legislators with leading position in party 
   organisation, national or local, incl. party youth and women's 
   organisations before and/or at first democratic election 
 
Govern Post Governmental positions: cabinet and comparable positions 
   before and/or at first democratic election 
 
Citizens Com  Member of Citizens’ Committee (for Estonia and Latvia only) 
 
None Above None of the political functions mentioned above 
 
One Above  One of the political functions mentioned above 
 
Two Above  Two of the political functions mentioned above 
 
Three or More  Three or more of the political functions mentioned above 
 
 
Occupations of Legislators Immediately Before the First Term 
 
Teacher Prof Teachers and professors, all sorts 
 
Journ Writer Journalists and other writers, incl. publishers and editors 
 
Party Empl Full-time, paid political party employees as well as other 




     
Civil Servants Higher and lower administrative level civil servants, 
excluded are military, judges, professors and clergymen 
(cabinet ministers are included) 
 
Military Military persons, all levels 
 




Judge Prosec Judges, prosecutors included if independent judicial organ 
 
Agri Fisher Primary sector, agriculture, fishermen  
 
Blue Collar Blue collar-workers, industrial sector  
 
Manage Busi Managers (managers of state-owned industries included) and 
those from business 
 
Liberal Jobs Liberal professions other than the law (e.g. medical doctors, 
architects, engineers – even if they are employed in the 
public sector) 
 
Public Sector  Public sector employees, all levels paid by public 
institutions, state owned companies included  
 
 
Age and Seniority 
 
Mandates        Mean number of legislatures an MP was elected to 
 
Newcomers   Members entering as newcomers, only newly elected 
without previous legislative careers in the national 
democratically elected parliament 
 
Incumbents A legislator who was elected to a previous parliament 
 
Age        Age at time of election 
 
Age Newcom      Age of a parliamentary newcomer at time of election 
 
Exp Founder  Experienced Founders (“Survivors”): MPs who were members 
of the founding session of the democratic parliament and who 
“survived” during the next terms (without any interruption) 
 
Core Group Long-standing MPs serving in three or more consecutive 
legislatures (without any interruption)  
 
Core Group 2 Long-standing MPs serving in three or more legislatures (with 
and without interruption) 
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Variables for the Soviet Experience 
 
Local Soviet  Local/regional political background: local / regional politics,  
   local elective position (municipality) during the Soviet regime;  
   incl. also appointed mayors  
 
Com Leader   Leading position in the Communist Party or satellite  
   organisation: legislators with leading position in “state party” or 
   satellite party organisation, national or local, incl. Communist 
   mass organizations such as youth and women's organisations. 
   Members of the secretariats at the regional level and the 1st and 
   2nd secretaries at the local level are also included 
 
Sov Minister  Governmental positions: members of councils of ministers, 
   deputy ministers and comparable positions of various types 
   during the Soviet period  
 
Supr Soviet  Any parliamentary experience at national or federal level during 
   the non-democratic period  
 
Nomenklatura  Any national nomenklatura position in the Soviet regime  
 
Com Party M  (Simple) membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet 
   Union 
 
Dissidents   Activity in oppositional/dissident movement and/or political 
   persecution during the Soviet period  
 





Female MPs Female legislators 
 
Ethn Minority        MPs not belonging to the titular nation 
 
Club 21                  Members of the Club 21 (for Latvia only)  
 237 
     
Annex Table 1. Estonian Parliamentary Parties/Electoral Coalitionsª by the Party  
         Families and Years of Successful Election, 1990-2011 
Coded as Estonian Name (English Translation) Elections 
Communists Communist Faction 1990 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
Social Democratic Faction 1990 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 




Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond  
(Social Democratic Party) 2007, 2011 
Greens Green Faction 1990 
Greens Eesti Rohelised, Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (Estonian Greens) 1992, 2007 
Agrarians Rural Deputies and Rural Centre Party 1990 
Agrarians Eesti Maarahva Erakond  (Estonian Rural People’s Party) 1999 
Agrarians Eestimaa Rahvaliit  (People’s Union of Estonia) 2003, 2007 
Left Liberals Kindel Kodu (Secure Home) 1992 
Left Liberals 
Eesti Keskerakond 




Left Liberals Koonderakond ja Maarahva Ühendus  (Coalition Party and Rural Union) 1995 
Right Liberals Koonderakond (Coalition Party) 1999 
Right Liberals Eesti Ettevõtjate Erakond  (Estonian Entrepreneurs' Party)  1992 
Right Liberals 
Eesti Reformierakond  




Conservatives Isamaa (Pro Patria) 1992 
Conservatives 
Rahvuslik Koonderakond 'Isamaa' ja Eesti Rahvusliku 
Sõltumatuse Partei  
(Coalition of 'Pro Patria' and ERSP) 
1995 
Conservatives Parempoolsed (Right-Wingers) 1995 
Conservatives Isamaaliit (Pro Patria Union) 1999, 2003 
Conservatives Ühendus Vabariigi Eest-Res Publica  (Union for the Republic-Res Publica) 2003 
Conservatives Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit  (Union of Pro Patria & Res Publica) 2007, 2011 
Extreme Right Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei  (Estonian National Independence Party)   1992 
Extreme Right Eesti Kodanik (Estonian Citizen) 1992 
Ethnic Minority Virumaa 1990 
Ethnic Minority Meie Kodu on Eestimaa  (Our Home is Estonia) 1995 
Ethnic Minority Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei  (Estonian United People’s Party) 1999 
 238 
     
Ethnic Minority Cooperation 1990 
Other Equal Rights 1990 
Other Sõltumatud Kuningriiklased  (Independent Royalists) 1992 
Liberals Liberal Democratic Faction 1990 
Christian 
Democrats 
Christian Democratic Faction 1990 
Umbrella 
Movement People’s Centre Group 1990 
Umbrella 
Movement Rahvarinne (Popular Front of Estonia) 1992 
ª Due to multiple political affiliations of electoral candidates for the 1990 Supreme Council, it was 
impossible to determine their ideological orientation; therefore, we chose the parliamentary factions 
that were built shortly after election. 
 
 
Annex Table 2. Latvian Parliamentary Parties/Electoral Coalitions by the Party  
         Families and Years of Successful Election, 1990-2010 
Coded as Latvian Name (English Translation) Elections 
Communists Līdztiesība (Equal Rights) 1990, 1993 
Communists Latvijas sociālistiskā partija  (Latvian Socialist Party) 1995 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
Saskaņa Latvijai – atdzimšana tautsaimniecībai  
(Harmony for Latvia – Revival for Economy) 1993 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
Tautas saskaņas partija  
(National Harmony Party) 1995, 1998 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
“Saskaņas centrs”  
(“Harmony Centre”) 2006, 2010 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
Latvijas sociāldemokrātu apvienība  
(Alliance of Latvian Social Democrats) 1998 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
Politisko organizāciju apvienība “Par cilvēka tiesībām 
vienotā Latvijā (Union of Political Organisations “For 
Human Rights in the United Latvia”) 
2002, 2006 
Agrarians Latvijas zemnieku savienība  (Latvian Farmers’ Union) 1993 
Agrarians 
Latvijas zemnieku savienības, Kristīgo demokrātu 
savienības un Latgales demokrātiskās partijas 
apvienotais saraksts 
(A United List of Latvian Farmers’ Union, Union of 
Christian Democrats and Democratic Party of Latgale) 
1995 
Agrarians Latvijas vienības partija  (Latvian Unity Party) 1995 
Agrarians Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība  (Union of Greens and Farmers) 
2002, 2006, 
2010 
Left Liberals Demokrātiskā centra partija  (Democratic Centre Party) 1993 
Left Liberals Demokrātiskā partija "Saimnieks"  (Democratic Party "Master") 1995 
Conservatives Latvijas nacionālās neatkarības kustība   (Latvian National Independence Movement) 1993 
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Conservatives 
Latvijas nacionālās neatkarības kustība  un Latvijas zaļā 
partija (Latvian National Independence Movement & 
Green Party) 
1995 
Conservatives Apvienība “Tēvzemei un brīvībai”/LNNK  (Union “For Fatherland and Freedom”/LNNK) 
1998, 2002, 
2006 
Conservatives Tautas partija (People’s Party) 1998, 2002, 2006 
Conservatives Jaunais laiks (New Era) 2002, 2006 
Conservatives Vienotība (Unity) 2010 
Conservatives Par Labu Latviju (For a Good Latvia) 2010 
Extreme Right 
Nacionālā apvienība “Visu Latvijai!” - “Tēvzemei un 
brīvībai”/LNNK  
(National Alliance “Everything for Latvia!” –  
“For Fatherland and Freedom”/LNNK) 
2010 
Extreme Right Apvienība “Tēvzemei un brīvībai”  (Union “For Fatherland and Freedom”) 1993, 1995 
Extreme Right Tautas kustība Latvijai – Zīgerista partija  (Popular Movement for Latvia – Siegerist’s Party) 1995 





Kristīgo demokrātu savienība  
(Union of Christian Democrats) 1993 
Christian 
Democrats Jaunā partija (New Party) 1998 
Christian 
Democrats 
Latvijas pirmā partija  
(Latvia’s First Party) 2002 
Christian 
Democrats 
Latvijas pirmā partija/ Savienība “Latvijas ceļš”  





Latvijas tautas fronte  
(Latvian Popular Front) 1990 
 
 
Annex Table 3. Lithuanian Parliamentary Parties/Electoral Coalitions by the Party  
         Families and Years of Successful Election, 1990-2012 
Coded as Lithuanian Name (English Translation) Elections 
Communists Lietuvos komunistų partija  (Lithuanian Communist Party) 1990 
Socialists/Social 
Democrats 
Lietuvos demokratinė darbo partija 





Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija  




Agrarians Lietuvos valstiečių partija (Lithuanian Peasants’ Party) 1996, 2000 
Agrarians Valstiečių ir naujosios demokratijos partijų sąjunga (Union of Peasants’ Party and New Democracy Party) 2004 
Agrarians Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga  (Union of Peasants and Greens) 2008, 2012 
Left Liberals Naujoji sąjunga – socialliberalai  2000, 2004, 
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(New Union – Social Liberals) 2008 
Liberals Lietuvos centro judėjimas  (Lithuanian Centre Movement) 1992 
Liberals Lietuvos centro sąjunga (Lithuanian Centre Union) 1996, 2000 
Liberals Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga (Lithuanian Liberal Union) 1996, 2000 
Liberals Liberalų ir centro sąjunga (Liberal and Centre Union) 2004, 2008 
Liberals Lietuvos liberalų sąjūdis  (Movement of Lithuanian Liberals) 2008, 2012 
Christian 
Democrats 
Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų partija  





Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų sąjunga  





Moderniųjų krikščionių demokratų sąjunga  
(Union of Modern Christian Democrats) 2000 
Conservatives Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos konservatoriai  (Fatherland Union – Lithuanian Conservatives) 
1996, 2000, 
2004 
Conservatives Tėvynes sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai (Fatherland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats) 2008, 2012 
Conservatives Nuosaikiųjų konservatorių sąjunga  (Union of Moderate Conservatives) 2000 
Extreme Right Nepriklausomybės partija (Independence Party) 1992 
Extreme Right Lietuvių nacionalinė partija “Jaunoji Letuva”  (Lithuanian National Party “Young Lithuania“) 1996, 2000 
Extreme Right Lietuvos tautininkų sąjunga  (Lithuanian Nationalist Union) 1992, 1996 
Extreme Right Lietuvos laisvės sąjunga (Lithuanian Liberty Union) 2000 
Ethnic Minority Lietuvos lenkų sąjunga (Union of Lithuanian Poles) 1992 




Ethnic Minority Lietuvos rusų sąjunga (Union of Lithuanian Russians) 2000 
Other Lietuvos moterų partija (Lithuanian Women‘s Party) 1996 
Other Lietuvos demokratų partija  (Lithuanian Democratic Party) 1996 
Other Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga  (Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees) 1992, 1996 
Other Naujosios demokratijos partija  (Party of New Democracy) 2000 
Other Darbo partija (Labour Party) 2004, 2008, 2012 
Other Liberalų demokratų partija (Liberal Democratic Party ) 2004 
Other Partija „Tvarka ir teisingumas“  (Party „Order & Justice”) 2008, 2012 
Other Tautos prisikėlimo partija (Party of National Revival) 2008 
Other Politinė partija „Drąsos kelias“  (Political Party „Way of Bravery“) 2012 
Umbrella 
Movement Lietuvos sąjūdis (Lithuanian Movement) 1990, 1992 
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Annex Table 5.2.1.1. Teachers and Professors in Estonian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 15 100 17 100 19 100 22 100 14 100 13 100 8 100 
Law 2 13.3 2 11.8 3 15.8 1 4.5 1 7.1 2 15.4 2 25 
HuSocEcon 8 53.3 11 64.7 9 47.4 12 54.5 9 64.3 5 38.5 3 37.5 
TechNatMed 8 53.3 6 35.3 10 52.6 11 50 5 35.7 6 46.2 3 37.5 
PhD 9 60.0 14 82.4 13 68.4 16 72.7 6 42.9 8 61.5 5 62.5 
Local Elect 4 26.7 2 11.8 7 36.8 13 59.1 10 71.4 9 69.2 5 62.5 
Lead Party 7 46.7 9 52.9 6 31.6 6 27.3 3 21.4 3 23.1 2 25 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9.1 2 14.3 2 15.4 2 25 
Citizens Com 10 66.7 6 35.3 5 26.3 6 27.3 3 21.4 3 23.1 2 25 
None Above 2 13.3 7 41.2 7 36.8 6 27.3 3 21.4 3 23.1 2 25 
One Above 7 46.7 5 29.4 6 31.6 8 36.4 5 35.7 4 30.8 2 25 
Two Above 4 26.7 3 17.6 5 26.3 4 18.2 4 28.6 5 38.5 3 37.5 
Three/More 2 13.3 2 11.8 1 5.3 4 18.2 2 14.3 1 7.7 1 12.5 
Female MPs 3 20.0 3 17.6 3 15.8 5 22.7 3 21.4 1 7.7 1 12.5 
Public Sector 15 100 17 100 18 94.7 22 100 14 100 11 91.7 7 87.5 
Age 45.5  50.0  50.4  51.9  50.0  53.2  55.1  
Age Newcom 45.5  50.3  45.3  50.4  51.7  55.0  na  
Mandates 1  1.4  1.8  2.0  1.9  2.2  3.1  
Newcomers 15 100 11 64.7 7 36.8 11 50.0 6 42.9 4 30.8 0 0 
Incumbents 0 0 6 35.3 11 57.9 9 40.9 6 42.9 8 61.5 8 100 
Exp Founder na na 6 35.3 4 21.1 4 18.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 4 21.1 6 27.3 2 14.3 4 30.8 5 62.5 
Core Group 2 na na na na 4 21.1 8 36.4 4 28.6 5 38.5 6 75 
Ethn Minority 2 13.3 0 0 4 21.1 4 18.2 2 14.3 2 15.4 2 25 
Local Soviet 3 20 2 11.8 3 15.8 3 13.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Leader 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 1 6.7 1 5.9 2 10.5 0 0 0 0 1 7.7 1 12.5 
Nomenklatura 7 46.7 6 35.3 7 36.8 7 31.8 3 21.4 1 7.7 1 12.5 
Com Party M 11 73.3 9 52.9 11 57.9 7 31.8 4 28.6 2 15.4 1 12.5 
Dissidents 0 0 1 5.9 1 5.3 1 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 


















     
Annex Table 5.2.1.2. Teachers and Professors in Latvian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 47 94 23 100 18 94.7 12 100 16 100 12 100 17 100 
Law 8 17 3 13 4 22.2 1 8.3 1 6.3 2 16.7 4 23.5 
HuSocEcon 18 38.3 11 47.8 9 50 10 83.3 9 56.3 5 41.7 9 52.9 
TechNatMed 25 53.2 11 47.8 5 27.8 2 16.7 9 56.3 8 66.7 8 47.1 
PhD 23 48.9 10 43.5 9 50 2 16.7 5 31.3 4 33.3 8 47.1 
Local Elect 9 18 4 17.4 3 15.8 6 50 6 37.5 7 58.3 6 35.3 
Lead Party 5 10 3 13 2 10.5 1 8.3 2 12.5 2 16.7 7 41.2 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 1 5.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Citizens Com 2 4 0 0 1 5.3 1 8.3 1 6.3 0 0 1 5.9 
None Above 21 42 16 69.6 14 73.7 6 50 9 56.3 4 33.3 6 35.3 
One Above 16 32 7 30.4 3 15.8 4 33.3 5 31.3 7 58.3 8 47.1 
Two Above 0 0 0 0 2 10.5 2 16.7 2 12.5 1 8.3 3 17.6 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Club 21 5 10 4 17.4 4 21.1 3 25 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 
Female MPs 5 10 3 13 2 10.5 2 16.7 4 25 3 25 5 29.4 
Public Sector 49 98 20 87 19 100 9 75 14 87.5 8 66.7 16 94.1 
Age 47  50.7  50.3  46.1  47.4  49.1  54.5  
Age Newcom 47  53  51.3  45.5  46.2  49  57.3  
Mandates 1  1.5  1.8  1.8  1.4  2  1.9  
Newcomers 50 100 12 52.2 9 47.4 8 66.7 11 68.8 2 16.7 9 52.9 
Incumbents na na 11 47.8 9 47.4 4 33.3 5 31.3 8 66.7 7 41.2 
Exp Founder na na 11 47.8 6 31.6 3 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 6 31.6 3 25 1 6.3 2 16.7 6 35.3 
Core Group 2 na na na na 6 31.6 3 25 1 6.3 2 16.7 6 35.3 
Ethn Minority 11 22 1 4.3 1 5.3 2 16.7 6 37.5 7 58.3 5 29.4 
Local Soviet 4 8 3 13 2 10.5 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 1 5.9 
Com Leader 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 3 6 1 4.3 5 26.3 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 9 18 3 13 4 21.1 2 16.7 1 6.3 1 8.3 0 0 
Com Party M 33 66 11 47.8 9 47.4 3 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dissidents 0 0 1 4.3 2 10.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 4 8 5 21.7 4 21.1 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD 













     
Annex Table 5.2.1.3. Teachers and Professors in Lithuanian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 46 100 50 100 35 100 23 100 19 100 20 100 24 100 
Law 4 8.7 3 6 1 2.9 1 4.3 2 10.5 3 15 5 20.8 
HuSocEcon 18 39.1 20 40 19 54.3 17 73.9 15 78.9 16 80 17 70.8 
TechNatMed 26 56.5 29 58 15 42.9 8 34.8 6 31.6 4 20 10 41.7 
PhD 30 65.2 35 70 25 71.4 16 69.6 9 47.4 12 60 14 58.3 
Local Elect 0 0 0 0 3 8.6 6 26.1 7 36.8 5 25 5 20.8 
Lead Party 4 8.7 11 22 8 22.9 11 47.8 6 31.6 7 35 7 29.2 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
None Above 42 91.3 39 78 24 68.6 8 34.8 9 47.4 10 50 14 58.3 
One Above 4 8.7 11 22 11 31.4 13 56.5 7 36.8 8 40 8 33.3 
Two Above 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8.7 3 15.8 2 10 2 8.3 
Female MPs 2 4.3 5 10 6 17.1 3 13 5 26.3 5 25 9 37.5 
Public Sector 46 100 50 100 35 100 23 100 19 100 20 100 24 100 
Age 46.4  53.5  52.3  50.5  47.7  47.9  55.9  
Age Newcom 46.4  54.7  52.3  46.9  48.6  42.3  59.5  
Mandates 1  1.3  1.9  2  2.2  2.7  3  
Newcomers 46 100 34 68 13 37.1 11 47.8 7 36.8 7 35 4 16.7 
Incumbents na na 16 32 18 51.4 10 43.5 10 52.6 12 60 14 58.3 
Exp Founder na na 16 32 10 28.6 4 17.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 10 28.6 7 30.4 5 26.3 10 50 10 41.7 
Core Group 2 na na na na 10 28.6 8 34.8 6 31.6 11 55 12 50 
Ethn Minority 4 8.7 4 8 4 11.4 1 4.3 2 10.5 1 5 2 8.3 
Local Soviet 3 6.5 4 8 1 2.9 2 8.7 2 10.5 1 5 2 8.3 
Com Leader 4 8.7 4 8 2 5.7 1 4.3 1 5.3 1 5 2 8.3 
Sov Minister 1 2.2 1 2 1 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 2 4.3 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 8 17.4 12 24 6 17.1 4 17.4 3 15.8 2 10 4 16.7 
Com Party M 12 26.1 22 44 10 18.6 6 26.1 4 21.1 3 15 5 20.8 
Dissidents 4 8.7 3 6 3 8.6 1 4.3 0 0 0 0 1 4.2 


















     
Annex Table 5.2.2.1. Journalists and Writers in Estonian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 5 62.5 12 80 6 75 7 100 6 100 6 100 5 100 
Law 0 0 2 16.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HuSocEcon 5 100 9 75 6 100 5 71.4 5 83.3 5 83.3 4 80 
TechNatMed 1 20 2 16.7 0 0 2 28.6 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 20 
PhD 1 20 3 25 1 16.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Elect 1 12.5 3 20 2 25 4 57.1 5 83.3 5 83.3 3 60 
Lead Party 3 37.5 6 40 4 50 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Citizens Com 3 37.5 6 40 4 50 2 28.6 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 20 
None Above 2 25 4 26.7 1 12.5 2 28.6 1 16.7 1 16.7 2 40 
One Above 3 37.5 7 46.7 4 50 3 42.9 4 66.7 4 66.7 2 40 
Two Above 2 25 4 26.7 3 37.5 2 28.6 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 20 
Female MPs 1 12.5 0 0 1 12.5 1 14.3 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 20 
Public Sector 7 87.5 6 40 3 37.5 4 57.1 4 66.7 4 66.7 3 60 
Age 44  51  50.9  53.1  54  58  57.6  
Age Newcom 44  50.9  50.7  51.4  51.5  58  50  
Mandates 1  1.1  1.8  1.6  1.3  2.3  2.8  
Newcomers 8 100 13 86.7 3 37.5 5 71.4 4 66.7 0 0 1 20 
Incumbents na na 2 13.3 5 62.5 2 28.6 2 33.3 4 66.7 4 80 
Exp Founder na na 2 13.3 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 12.5 2 28.6 0 0 2 33.3 4 80 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 12.5 2 28.6 0 0 2 33.3 4 80 
Ethn Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 14.3 2 33.3 2 33.3 1 20 
Local Soviet 0 0 0 0 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Leader 0 0 0 0 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 1 12.5 1 6.7 1 12.5 1 14.3 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 20 
Com Party M 4 50 6 40 4 50 2 28.6 2 33.3 2 33.3 2 40 
Dissidents 1 12.5 4 26.7 1 12.5 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 1 12.5 3 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  






     
Annex Table 5.2.2.2. Journalists and Writers in Latvian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 14 93.3 7 100 7 100 7 100 5 83.3 5 83.3 5 83.3 
Law 0 0 0 0 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HuSocEcon 13 92.9 5 71.4 5 71.4 6 85.7 5 100 5 100 4 80 
TechNatMed 1 7.1 3 42.9 2 28.6 2 28.6 2 40 1 20 1 20 
PhD 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Elect 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lead Party 3 20 0 0 1 14.3 0 0 1 16.7 2 33.3 3 50 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Citizens Com 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
None Above 10 66.7 7 100 6 85.7 6 85.7 5 83.3 4 66.7 3 50 
One Above 4 26.7 0 0 1 14.3 1 14.3 1 16.7 2 33.3 3 50 
Two Above 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Club 21 2 13.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 16.7 
Female MPs 2 13.3 3 42.9 1 14.3 2 28.6 2 33.3 2 33.3 1 16.7 
Public Sector 13 86.7 5 71.4 5 71.4 5 71.4 2 33.3 2 33.3 2 33.3 
Age 44.3  47.3  52.7  54.9  46.7  54.8  51.2  
Age Newcom 44.3  49.8  62  55.3  40.5  82  42.3  
Mandates 1  1.1  2  2.3  2  2.8  1.8  
Newcomers 15 100 6 85.7 1 14.3 3 42.9 4 66.7 1 16.7 3 50 
Incumbents na na 1 14.3 4 57.1 4 57.1 2 33.3 5 83.3 3 50 
Exp Founder na na 1 14.3 1 14.3 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 14.3 4 57.1 2 33.3 2 33.3 2 33.3 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 14.3 4 57.1 2 33.3 2 33.3 2 33.3 
Ethn Minority 5 33.3 1 14.3 1 14.3 1 14.3 2 33.3 1 16.7 1 16.7 
Local Soviet 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Leader 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 2 13.3 0 0 0 0 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Party M 10 66.7 3 42.9 3 42.9 3 42.9 1 16.7 1 16.7 0 0 
Dissidents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 1 6.7 0 0 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  





     
Annex Table 5.2.2.3. Journalists and Writers in Lithuanian Parliaments  
 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 11 84.6 10 83.3 7 77.8 6 100 3 75 4 80 4 100 
Law 1 9.1 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HuSocEcon 9 81.8 7 70 5 71.4 4 66.7 3 100 3 75 4 100 
TechNatMed 1 9.1 3 30 2 28.6 2 33.3 0 0 1 25 0 0 
PhD 0 0 1 10 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25 
Local Elect 0 0 1 8.3 2 22.2 1 16.7 0 0 2 40 1 25 
Lead Party 1 7.7 2 16.7 2 22.2 2 33.3 0 0 2 40 1 25 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 1 11.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
None Above 12 92.3 9 75 4 44.4 3 50 4 100 2 40 3 75 
One Above 1 7.7 3 25 5 55.6 3 50 0 0 3 60 0 0 
Two Above 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25 
Female MPs 1 7.7 0 0 1 11.1 1 16.7 2 50 0 0 0 0 
Public Sector 7 53.8 9 75 6 66.7 1 16.7 2 50 1 20 0 0 
Age 45.9  51.2  54.6  48.2  53  49.2  55  
Age Newcom 45.9  51.5  58  44.7  48  44  60.5  
Mandates 1  1.3  1.8  2  2.3  2  1.5  
Newcomers 13 100 8 66.7 5 55.6 3 50 2 50 4 80 2 50 
Incumbents na na 4 33.3 4 44.4 3 50 2 50 1 20 1 25 
Exp Founder na na 4 33.3 3 33.3 1 16.7 1 25 1 20 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 3 33.3 2 33.3 1 25 1 20 0 0 
Core Group 2 na na na na 3 33.3 2 33.3 1 25 1 20 0 0 
Ethn Minority 1 7.7 1 8.3 1 11.1 1 16.7 0 0 1 20 1 25 
Local Soviet 2 15.4 3 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Leader 3 23.1 3 25 1 11.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 4 30.8 6 50 3 33.3 1 16.7 1 25 1 20 2 50 
Com Party M 7 53.8 10 83.3 4 44.4 2 33.3 1 25 1 20 2 50 
Dissidents 1 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 1 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  




     
Annex Table 5.2.3.1. Political Party Employees in Estonian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 14 82.4 7 77.8 8 88.9 12 75 11 91.7 17 89.5 15 88.2 
Law 1 7.1 1 14.3 1 12.5 0 0 2 18.2 2 11.8 3 20 
HuSocEcon 7 50 1 14.3 3 37.5 6 50 7 63.6 10 58.8 10 66.7 
TechNatMed 6 42.9 5 71.4 5 62.5 6 50 2 18.2 5 29.4 3 20 
PhD 1 7.1 1 14.3 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 1 5.9 0 0 
Local Elect 6 35.3 2 22.2 3 33.3 10 62.5 8 66.7 14 73.7 14 82.4 
Lead Party 4 23.5 7 77.8 5 55.6 7 43.8 4 33.3 8 42.1 9 52.9 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Citizens Com 0 0 5 55.6 3 33.3 4 25 1 8.3 1 5.3 0 0 
None Above 6 35.3 2 22.2 2 22.2 1 6.3 2 16.7 3 15.8 1 5.9 
One Above 6 35.3 1 11.1 2 22.2 8 50 7 58.3 9 47.4 9 52.9 
Two Above 2 11.8 5 55.6 5 55.6 7 43.8 3 25 7 36.8 7 41.2 
Three/More 0 0 1 11.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female MPs 2 11.8 2 22.2 0 0 4 25 3 25 8 42.1 3 17.6 
Public Sector 17 100 3 33.3 5 55.6 8 50 8 66.7 9 47.4 8 47.1 
Age 47.7  42.8  49.1  43.9  40  36.4  37.7  
Age Newcom 47.7  42.8  48  40.3  32.2  34.9  34.4  
Mandates 1  1  1.6  1.4  1.8  1.6  2.1  
Newcomers 17 100 9 100 4 44.4 12 75 5 41.7 12 63.2 5 29.4 
Incumbents na na 0 0 4 44.4 4 25 6 50 5 26.3 9 52.9 
Exp Founder na na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 0 0 2 12.5 1 8.3 4 21.1 2 11.8 
Core Group 2 na na na na 0 0 2 12.5 2 16.7 4 21.1 3 17.6 
Ethn Minority 6 35.3 0 0 0 0 1 6.3 0 0 1 5.3 0 0 
Local Soviet 10 58.8 0 0 2 22.2 1 6.3 1 8.3 0 0 1 5.9 
Com Leader 9 52.9 0 0 1 11.1 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 1 5.9 
Sov Minister 1 5.9 0 0 1 11.1 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 1 5.9 
Supr Soviet 4 23.5 1 11.1 1 11.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 15 88.2 0 0 4 44.4 3 18.8 2 16.7 0 0 1 5.9 
Com Party M 15 88.2 1 11.1 5 55.6 5 31.3 2 16.7 0 0 1 5.9 
Dissidents 0 0 2 22.2 1 11.1 1 6.3 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD 







     
Annex Table 5.2.3.2. Political Party Employees in Latvian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 27 96.4 14 93.3 7 63.6 10 90.9 9 81.8 9 100 10 90.9 
Law 3 11.1 1 7.1 0 0 2 20 1 11.1 0 0 3 30 
HuSocEcon 3 11.1 4 28.6 1 14.3 2 20 3 33.3 3 33.3 2 20 
TechNatMed 16 59.3 7 50 4 57.1 6 60 5 55.6 5 55.6 7 70 
PhD 2 7.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.1 2 20 
Local Elect 6 21.4 6 40 4 36.4 4 36.4 4 36.4 3 33.3 3 27.3 
Lead Party 10 35.7 5 33.3 7 63.6 5 45.5 5 45.5 5 55.6 9 81.8 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9.1 
Citizens Com 3 10.7 2 13.3 3 27.3 2 18.2 2 18.2 1 11.1 0 0 
None Above 3 10.7 4 26.7 1 9.1 1 9.1 2 18.2 2 22.2 1 9.1 
One Above 11 39.3 9 60 6 54.5 9 81.8 7 63.6 5 55.6 8 72.7 
Two Above 4 14.3 2 13.3 3 27.3 1 9.1 2 18.2 2 22.2 1 9.1 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9.1 
Club 21 2 7.1 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female MPs 1 3.6 2 13.3 0 0 1 9.1 2 18.2 1 11.1 1 9.1 
Public Sector 13 46.4 3 20 3 27.3 2 18.2 2 18.2 1 11.1 2 18.2 
Age 44.6  49.4  39.5  44  49.9  49.7  44.8  
Age Newcom 44.6  47.6  38.9  46  45.8  47.5  37.1  
Mandates 1  1.4  1.5  2.4  2.6  2.9  2.2  
Newcomers 28 100 9 60 7 63.6 2 18.2 4 36.4 2 22.2 7 63.6 
Incumbents na na 6 40 4 36.4 5 45.5 6 54.5 6 66.7 3 27.3 
Exp Founder na na 6 40 2 18.2 2 18.2 2 18.2 1 11.1 1 9.1 
Core Group na na na na 2 18.2 3 27.3 4 36.4 3 33.3 2 18.2 
Core Group 2 na na na na 2 18.2 4 36.4 5 45.5 4 44.4 3 27.3 
Ethn Minority 11 39.3 2 13.3 0 0 0 0 1 9.1 3 33.3 1 9.1 
Local Soviet 3 10.7 3 20 1 9.1 1 9.1 1 9.1 0 0 1 9.1 
Com Leader 9 32.1 1 6.7 1 9.1 0 0 1 9.1 1 11.1 1 9.1 
Sov Minister 2 7.1 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 3 10.7 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 15 53.6 2 13.3 1 9.1 1 9.1 1 9.1 2 22.2 2 18.2 
Com Party M 18 64.3 4 26.7 1 9.1 2 18.2 2 18.2 3 33.3 2 18.2 
Dissidents 3 10.7 2 13.3 2 18.2 1 9.1 1 9.1 1 11.1 0 0 
Repr Parents 4 14.3 5 33.3 1 9.1 2 18.2 2 18.2 1 11.1 2 18.2 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD 
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 5.2.3.3. Political Party Employees in Lithuanian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 14 87.5 17 73.9 20 87 13 92.9 20 95.2 20 90.9 24 96 
Law 2 14.3 1 5.9 1 5 1 7.7 1 5 1 5 2 8.3 
HuSocEcon 9 64.3 7 41.2 8 40 8 61.5 10 50 9 45 15 62.5 
TechNatMed 5 35.7 11 64.7 11 55 5 38.5 10 50 10 50 8 33.3 
PhD 3 21.4 6 35.3 4 20 1 7.7 2 10 2 10 4 16.7 
Local Reg 4 25 2 8.7 9 39.1 6 42.9 10 47.6 13 59.1 12 48 
Lead Party 9 56.3 13 56.5 12 52.2 7 50 9 42.9 12 54.5 10 40 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
None Above 4 25 8 34.8 6 26.1 3 21.4 6 28.6 3 13.6 6 24 
One Above 11 68.8 15 65.2 13 56.5 9 64.3 11 52.4 13 59.1 16 64 
Two Above 1 6.3 0 0 4 17.4 2 14.3 4 19 6 27.3 3 12 
Female MPs 1 6.3 0 0 2 8.7 3 21.4 7 33.3 4 18.2 5 20 
Public Sector 14 87.5 19 82.6 15 65.2 10 71.4 11 52.4 8 36.4 14 56 
Age 48.8  49  46.1  44.7  47.1  46.8  47.5  
Age Newcom 48.8  46.9  41.3  42.2  47.7  37  41.7  
Mandates 1  1.3  1.4  1.9  2  2.5  2.8  
Newcomers 16 100 17 73.9 13 56.5 5 35.7 10 47.6 7 31.8 9 36 
Incumbents na na 6 26.1 9 39.1 8 57.1 8 38.1 15 68.2 14 56 
Exp Founder na na 6 26.1 1 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 4.3 3 21.4 6 28.6 7 31.8 11 44 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 4.3 3 21.4 7 33.3 10 45.5 12 48 
Ethn Minority 4 25 2 8.7 1 4.3 2 14.3 0 0 0 0 2 8 
Local Soviet 12 75 10 43.5 2 8.7 1 7.1 2 9.5 1 4.5 2 8 
Com Leader 11 68.8 10 43.5 2 8.7 3 21.4 3 14.3 2 9.1 3 12 
Sov Minister 3 18.8 1 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 5 31.3 3 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 13 81.3 14 60.9 4 17.4 3 21.4 3 14.3 2 9.1 4 16 
Com Party M 13 81.3 14 60.9 4 17.4 3 21.4 3 14.3 2 9.1 4 16 
Dissidents 1 6.3 2 8.7 2 8.7 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 0 0 1 4.3 1 4.3 1 7.1 2 9.5 1 4.5 1 4 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD 




     
Annex Table 5.2.4.1. Civil Servants in Estonian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 14 100 20 95.2 25 96.2 26 100 36 97.3 34 100 42 95.5 
Law 2 14.3 2 10 4 16 1 3.8 8 22.2 5 14.7 9 21.4 
HuSocEcon 5 35.7 10 50 6 24 8 30.8 13 36.1 16 47.1 20 47.6 
TechNatMed 8 57.1 8 40 15 60 17 65.4 15 41.7 13 38.2 14 33.3 
PhD 3 21.4 7 35 7 28 8 30.8 5 13.9 6 17.6 4 9.5 
Local Elect 9 64.3 10 47.6 15 57.7 18 69.2 24 64.9 24 70.6 35 79.5 
Lead Party 3 21.4 8 38.1 13 50 7 26.9 7 18.9 4 11.8 7 15.9 
Govern Post 3 21.4 5 23.8 9 34.6 7 26.9 16 43.2 12 35.3 12 27.3 
Citizens Com 7 50 7 33.3 6 23.1 3 11.5 5 13.5 4 11.8 2 4.5 
None Above 1 7.1 3 14.3 3 11.5 4 15.4 1 2.7 3 8.8 2 4.5 
One Above 5 35.7 7 33.3 9 34.6 11 42.3 22 59.5 19 55.9 30 68.2 
Two Above 7 50 10 47.6 9 34.6 9 34.6 12 32.4 11 32.4 10 22.7 
Three/More 1 7.1 1 4.8 4 15.4 2 7.7 2 5.4 1 2.9 2 4.5 
Female MPs 0 0 3 14.3 3 11.5 4 15.4 6 16.2 9 26.5 9 20.5 
Public Sector 14 100 21 100 26 100 26 100 37 100 34 100 44 100 
Age 43.1  40.2  46.5  48.4  49.2  49.8  46.8  
Age Newcom 43.1  39.9  45  45.1  46.2  44.9  43.1  
Mandates 1  1.1  1.5  1.9  1.8  2.1  1.9  
Newcomers 14 100 18 85.7 15 57.7 10 38.5 25 67.6 13 38.2 20 45.5 
Incumbents na na 3 14.3 11 42.3 13 50 9 24.3 17 50 15 34.1 
Exp Founder na na 3 14.3 3 11.5 2 7.7 3 8.1 2 5.9 1 2.3 
Core Group na na na na 3 11.5 5 19.2 7 18.9 6 17.6 9 20.5 
Core Group 2 na na na na 3 11.5 6 23.1 9 24.3 8 23.5 10 22.7 
Ethn Minority 2 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5.9 4 9.1 
Local Soviet 8 57.1 2 9.5 8 30.8 4 15.4 4 10.8 2 5.9 3 6.8 
Com Leader 3 21.4 0 0 1 3.8 1 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 3 21.4 1 4.8 4 15.4 3 11.5 2 5.4 0 0 1 2.3 
Supr Soviet 3 21.4 1 4.8 3 11.5 1 3.8 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 8 57.1 2 9.5 9 34.6 11 42.3 10 27 5 14.7 8 18.2 
Com Party M 10 71.4 5 23.8 14 53.8 11 42.3 15 40.5 11 32.4 7 15.9 
Dissidents 0 0 3 14.3 1 3.8 0 0 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 1 7.1 3 14.3 5 19.2 4 15.4 3 8.1 1 2.9 1 2.3 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD 
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 5.2.4.2. Civil Servants in Latvian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 20 90.9 21 100 13 100 20 100 13 100 27 100 22 100 
Law 3 15 3 14.3 1 7.7 3 15 1 7.7 6 22.2 7 31.8 
HuSocEcon 6 30 13 61.9 5 38.5 13 65 8 61.5 17 63 11 50 
TechNatMed 15 75 9 42.9 8 61.5 5 25 5 38.5 8 29.6 5 22.7 
PhD 2 10 5 23.8 1 7.7 0 0 1 7.7 4 14.8 1 4.5 
Local Elect 14 63.6 0 0 1 7.7 10 50 2 15.4 16 59.3 8 36.4 
Lead Party 1 4.5 3 14.3 0 0 8 40 6 46.2 13 48.1 8 36.4 
Govern Post 2 9.1 7 33.3 7 53.8 9 45 7 53.8 11 40.7 10 45.5 
Citizens Com 2 9.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
None Above 6 27.3 13 61.9 6 46.2 4 20 3 23.1 3 11.1 5 22.7 
One Above 13 59.1 6 28.6 6 46.2 7 35 6 46.2 11 40.7 10 45.5 
Two Above 3 13.6 2 9.5 1 7.7 7 35 3 23.1 10 37 5 22.7 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 1 7.7 3 11.1 2 9.1 
Club 21 0 0 9 42.9 3 23.1 3 15 0 0 1 3.7 0 0 
Female MPs 1 4.5 3 14.3 2 15.4 8 40 2 15.4 8 29.6 5 22.7 
Public Sector 22 100 21 100 13 100 20 100 13 100 27 100 22 100 
Age 42.3  45.6  44.5  46.7  51.4  48.3  47.5  
Age Newcom 42.3  43.4  40.7  47.8  42.3  46.7  48.5  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.8  1.5  2  1.5  1.7  
Newcomers 22 100 16 76.2 6 46.2 13 65 4 30.8 18 66.7 11 50 
Incumbents na na 5 23.8 6 46.2 5 25 5 38.5 7 25.9 9 40.9 
Exp Founder na na 5 23.8 3 23.1 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 3 23.1 2 10 1 7.7 2 7.4 2 9.1 
Core Group 2 na na na na 3 23.1 2 10 3 23.1 4 14.8 5 22.7 
Ethn Minority 3 13.6 2 9.5 2 15.4 3 15 2 15.4 1 3.7 0 0 
Local Soviet 8 36.4 3 14.3 0 0 1 5 1 7.7 1 3.7 0 0 
Com Leader 5 22.7 5 23.8 3 23.1 1 5 2 15.4 1 3.7 0 0 
Sov Minister 3 13.6 4 19 1 7.7 1 5 2 15.4 1 3.7 0 0 
Supr Soviet 4 18.2 6 28.6 3 23.1 2 10 1 7.7 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 15 68.2 7 33.3 5 38.5 5 25 4 30.8 3 11.1 2 9.1 
Com Party M 17 77.3 10 47.6 5 38.5 3 15 2 15.4 1 3.7 1 4.5 
Dissidents 2 9.1 1 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 2 9.1 2 9.5 1 7.7 1 5 1 7.7 1 3.7 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD 




     
Annex Table 5.2.4.3. Civil Servants in Lithuanian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 5 100 9 81.8 30 96.8 23 95.8 26 96.3 27 93.1 28 100 
Law 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.3 4 15.4 5 18.5 4 14.3 
HuSocEcon 3 60 3 33.3 13 43.3 8 34.8 14 53.8 13 48.1 15 53.6 
TechNatMed 2 40 6 66.7 17 56.7 14 60.9 14 53.8 12 44.4 12 42.9 
PhD 3 60 4 44.4 6 20 2 8.7 4 15.4 0 0 1 3.6 
Local Elect 1 20 4 36.4 19 61.3 16 66.7 16 59.3 21 72.4 22 78.6 
Lead Party 0 0 2 18.2 4 12.9 6 25 9 33.3 9 31 6 21.4 
Govern Post 0 0 1 9.1 3 9.7 2 8.3 2 7.4 1 3.4 0 0 
None Above 4 80 5 45.5 8 25.8 7 29.2 9 33.3 7 24.1 6 21.4 
One Above 1 20 5 45.5 20 64.5 11 45.8 9 33.3 13 44.8 16 57.1 
Two Above 0 0 1 9.1 3 9.7 5 20.8 9 33.3 9 31 6 21.4 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female MPs 2 40 3 27.3 8 25.8 4 16.7 9 33.3 7 24.1 11 39.3 
Public Sector 5 100 11 100 31 100 24 100 27 100 29 100 28 100 
Age 47.6  42.4  45.7  46.6  49.2  49.2  52.5  
Age Newcom 47.6  42.4  45.8  44.5  50.1  45.3  50.2  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.9  2  
Newcomers 5 100 9 81.8 24 77.4 17 70.8 18 66.7 12 41.4 14 50 
Incumbents na na 2 18.2 6 19.4 7 29.2 8 29.6 15 51.7 12 42.9 
Exp Founder na na 2 18.2 1 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 3.2 3 12.5 3 11.1 4 13.8 8 28.6 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 3.2 3 12.5 4 14.8 5 17.2 8 28.6 
Ethn Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.2 2 7.4 2 6.9 5 17.9 
Local Soviet 3 60 2 18.2 4 12.9 5 20.8 8 29.6 4 13.8 5 17.9 
Com Leader 2 40 2 18.2 5 16.1 5 20.8 4 14.8 1 3.4 0 0 
Sov Minister 1 20 0 0 4 12.9 2 8.3 2 7.4 1 3.4 1 3.6 
Supr Soviet 2 40 0 0 2 6.5 1 4.2 1 3.7 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 3 60 3 27.3 5 16.1 6 25 7 25.9 2 6.9 2 7.1 
Com Party M 4 80 7 63.6 9 29 7 29.2 7 25.9 2 6.9 1 3.6 
Dissidents 0 0 1 9.1 1 3.2 0 0 1 3.7 1 3.4 0 0 
Repr Parents 1 20 2 18.2 4 12.9 1 4.2 2 7.4 2 6.9 2 7.1 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  




     
Annex Table 5.2.5.1. Managers and Businessmen in Estonian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 16 94.1 9 90 20 100 14 100 21 100 15 93.8 15 93.8 
Law 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.1 0 0 1 6.7 2 13.3 
HuSocEcon 3 18.8 3 33.3 5 25 5 35.7 8 38.1 4 26.7 8 53.3 
TechNatMed 13 81.3 8 88.9 17 85 9 64.3 13 61.9 10 66.7 6 40 
PhD 3 18.8 0 0 2 10 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Elect 10 58.8 4 40 10 50 8 57.1 12 57.1 12 75 13 81.3 
Lead Party 3 17.6 5 50 7 35 1 7.1 2 9.5 2 12.5 2 12.5 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.1 4 19 1 6.3 1 6.3 
Citizens Com 6 35.3 3 30 2 10 2 14.3 0 0 1 6.3 0 0 
None Above 2 11.8 2 20 4 20 4 28.6 7 33.3 2 12.5 2 12.5 
One Above 7 41.2 4 40 13 65 8 57.1 10 47.6 12 75 12 75 
Two Above 3 17.6 4 40 3 15 2 14.3 4 19 2 12.5 2 12.5 
Female MPs 1 5.9 0 0 1 5 2 14.3 2 9.5 3 18.8 4 25 
Public Sector 17 100 10 100 15 75 5 35.7 9 42.9 4 25 2 12.5 
Age 48.2  44.7  48.4  45.6  46.6  46.4  45.8  
Age Newcom 48.2  42.4  45.8  45.4  46.1  46.7  45.4  
Mandates 1  1.3  1.6  1.5  1.3  1.5  1.9  
Newcomers 17 100 7 70 10 50 9 64.3 16 76.2 12 75 5 31.3 
Incumbents na na 3 30 5 25 5 35.7 4 19 4 25 7 43.8 
Exp Founder na na 3 30 3 15 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 3 15 1 7.1 2 9.5 3 18.8 1 6.3 
Core Group 2 na na na na 3 15 1 7.1 2 9.5 3 18.8 2 12.5 
Ethn Minority 3 17.6 0 0 2 10 0 0 1 4.8 0 0 0 0 
Local Soviet 8 47.1 4 40 8 40 3 21.4 2 9.5 1 6.3 0 0 
Com Leader 1 5.9 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 4 23.5 1 10 3 15 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 7 41.2 2 20 6 30 4 28.6 4 19 2 12.5 0 0 
Com Party M 12 70.6 6 60 14 70 6 42.9 6 28.6 2 12.5 0 0 
Dissidents 1 5.9 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 3 17.6 1 10 3 15 1 7.1 1 4.8 1 6.3 1 6.3 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD 




     
Annex Table 5.2.5.2. Managers and Businessmen in Latvian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 27 65.9 15 88.2 21 91.3 23 95.8 24 96 20 83.3 23 79.3 
Law 0 0 2 13.3 1 4.8 2 8.7 0 0 0 0 1 4.3 
HuSocEcon 7 25.9 6 40 4 19 6 26.1 6 25 6 30 10 43.5 
TechNatMed 21 77.8 10 66.7 19 90.5 15 65.2 18 75 14 70 15 65.2 
PhD 1 3.7 2 13.3 1 4.8 1 4.3 2 8.3 3 15 1 4.3 
Local Elect 3 7.3 0 0 3 13 7 29.2 8 32 10 41.7 16 55.2 
Lead Party 1 2.4 1 5.9 4 17.4 8 33.3 9 36 7 29.2 6 20.7 
Govern Post 0 0 1 5.9 1 4.3 2 8.3 3 12 2 8.3 1 3.4 
Citizens Com 1 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
None Above 36 87.8 15 88.2 16 69.6 12 50 11 44 10 41.7 10 34.5 
One Above 5 12.2 2 11.8 6 26.1 9 37.5 10 40 11 45.8 16 55.2 
Two Above 0 0 0 0 1 4.3 1 4.2 2 8 1 4.2 2 6.9 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8.3 2 8 2 8.3 1 3.4 
Club 21 2 4.9 2 11.8 1 4.3 1 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female MPs 2 4.9 1 5.9 1 4.3 3 12.5 3 12 2 8.3 2 6.9 
Public Sector 41 100 6 35.3 6 26.1 5 20.8 5 20 4 16.7 5 17.2 
Age 46.6  44.9  45.2  42.4  43.2  45.4  47.2  
Age Newcom 46.6  42.7  46.3  41.8  40.6  46.6  45.4  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.8  1.9  1.8  
Newcomers 41 100 14 82.4 15 65.2 19 79.2 14 56 11 45.8 16 55.2 
Incumbents na na 3 17.6 8 34.8 4 16.7 11 44 12 50 11 37.9 
Exp Founder na na 3 17.6 1 4.3 1 4.2 1 4 1 4.2 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 4.3 3 12.5 4 16 5 20.8 6 20.7 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 4.3 3 12.5 4 16 5 20.8 7 24.1 
Ethn Minority 16 39 1 5.9 1 4.3 4 16.7 3 12 5 20.8 13 44.8 
Local Soviet 2 4.9 0 0 1 4.3 0 0 1 4 0 0 2 6.9 
Com Leader 0 0 1 5.9 4 17.4 1 4.2 1 4 1 4.2 1 3.4 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 1 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 7 17.1 3 17.6 9 39.1 1 4.2 1 4 2 8.3 3 10.3 
Com Party M 35 85.4 7 41.2 10 43.5 5 20.8 5 20 2 8.3 2 6.9 
Dissidents 0 0 1 5.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 0 0 3 17.6 1 4.3 2 8.3 1 4 0 0 1 3.4 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  







     
Annex Table 5.2.5.3. Managers and Businessmen in Lithuanian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 20 100 21 87.5 10 90.9 54 93.1 48 94.1 34 94.4 36 92.3 
Law 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.1 2 5.9 2 5.6 
HuSocEcon 6 30 6 28.6 6 60 24 44.4 25 52.1 20 58.8 23 63.9 
TechNatMed 14 70 18 85.7 5 50 34 63 26 54.2 19 55.9 15 41.7 
PhD 4 20 2 9.5 3 30 4 7.4 8 16.7 3 8.8 2 5.6 
Local Elect 0 0 6 25 6 54.5 35 60.3 25 49 16 44.4 25 64.1 
Lead Party 1 5 0 0 2 18.2 16 27.6 8 15.7 5 13.9 7 17.9 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5.2 3 5.9 1 2.8 2 5.1 
None Above 19 95 18 75 5 45.5 20 34.5 24 47.1 18 50 13 33.3 
One Above 1 5 6 25 4 36.4 24 41.4 19 37.3 14 38.9 19 48.7 
Two Above 0 0 0 0 2 18.2 12 20.7 7 13.7 4 11.1 7 17.9 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3.4 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Female MPs 1 5 0 0 2 18.2 3 5.2 5 9.8 5 13.9 5 12.8 
Public Sector 16 80 19 79.2 2 18.2 6 10.3 8 15.7 5 13.9 7 17.9 
Age 43.8  49.1  44.1  45.9  48.6  49.7  51.8  
Age Newcom 43.8  49.6  41.3  45.7  46.1  44.5  46.6  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.3  1.1  1.6  2  2.4  
Newcomers 20 100 20 83.3 9 81.8 52 89.7 26 51 13 36.1 15 38.5 
Incumbents na na 4 16.7 2 18.2 3 5.2 21 41.2 20 55.6 17 43.6 
Exp Founder na na 4 16.7 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 9.1 0 0 2 3.9 9 25 13 33.3 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 9.1 0 0 4 7.8 10 27.8 19 48.7 
Ethn Minority 3 15 1 4.2 0 0 7 12.1 5 9.8 1 2.8 3 7.7 
Local Soviet 1 5 7 29.2 2 18.2 9 15.5 9 17.6 5 13.9 5 12.8 
Com Leader 1 5 3 12.5 0 0 6 10.3 4 7.8 3 8.3 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2.8 0 0 
Supr Soviet 0 0 1 4.2 1 9.1 0 0 2 3.9 2 5.6 0 0 
Nomenklatura 6 30 13 54.2 2 18.2 13 22.4 11 21.6 5 13.9 4 10.3 
Com Party M 8 40 17 70.8 2 18.2 12 20.7 11 21.6 5 13.9 3 7.7 
Dissidents 2 10 2 8.3 2 18.2 1 1.7 2 3.9 2 5.6 2 5.1 
Repr Parents 1 5 1 4.2 0 0 1  2 3.9 3 8.3 3 7.7 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 5.2.6.1. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions in Estonian Parliaments 
Parliament 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 13 100 11 84.6 7 77.8 8 100 8 100 5 100 5 100 
Law 2 15.4 3 27.3 3 42.9 2 25 2 25 2 40 3 60 
HuSocEcon 0 0 2 18.2 1 14.3 3 37.5 2 25 3 60 2 40 
TechNatMed 11 84.6 6 54.5 3 42.9 3 37.5 4 50 0 0 0 0 
PhD 0 0 2 18.2 1 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Elect 5 38.5 3 23.1 3 33.3 4 50 5 62.5 4 80 4 80 
Lead Party 5 38.5 4 30.8 3 33.3 2 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12.5 1 20 1 20 
Citizens Com 5 38.5 4 30.8 2 22.2 2 25 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 
None Above 2 15.4 6 46.2 4 44.4 2 25 3 37.5 1 20 1 20 
One Above 2 15.4 3 23.1 2 22.2 4 50 3 37.5 3 60 3 60 
Two Above 5 38.5 4 30.8 3 33.3 2 25 2 25 1 20 1 20 
Female MPs 0 0 3 23.1 1 11.1 2 25 3 37.5 1 20 1 20 
Public Sector 13 100 9 69.2 8 88.9 5 62.5 6 75 1 20 0 0 
Age 46.6  48.1  51.6  52  48.5  46.4  40.4  
Age Newcom 46.6  49  54  39  48.8  43.5  33  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.6  2  1.4  2.2  2.2  
Newcomers 13 100 10 76.9 6 66.7 2 25 6 75 2 40 2 40 
Incumbents na na 3 23.1 3 33.3 5 62.5 2 25 3 60 3 60 
Exp Founder na na 3 23.1 2 22.2 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 2 22.2 1 12.5 1 12.5 2 40 2 40 
Core Group 2 na na na na 2 22.2 1 12.5 1 12.5 2 40 2 40 
Ethn Minority 4 30.8 1 7.7 1 11.1 0 0 1 12.5 0 0 1 20 
Local Soviet 1 7.7 1 7.7 1 11.1 1 12.5 1 12.5 1 20 0 0 
Com Leader 0 0 1 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 0 0 0 0 1 11.1 1 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 2 15.4 3 23.1 5 55.6 4 50 1 12.5 1 20 0 0 
Com Party M 5 38.5 4 30.8 6 66.7 5 62.5 2 25 2 40 1 20 
Dissidents 0 0 1 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 0 0 1 7.7 1 11.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  




     
Annex Table 5.2.6.2. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions in Latvian Parliaments 
 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 23 79.3 8 80 14 100 12 100 15 100 14 100 9 100 
Law 6 26.1 4 50 4 28.6 2 16.7 4 26.7 1 7.1 2 22.2 
HuSocEcon 2 8.7 1 12.5 3 21.4 1 8.3 2 13.3 3 21.4 3 33.3 
TechNatMed 19 82.6 3 37.5 8 57.1 9 75 10 66.7 10 71.4 6 66.7 
PhD 3 13 0 0 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Elect 3 10.3 2 20 2 14.3 4 33.3 5 33.3 6 42.9 4 44.4 
Lead Party 8 27.6 4 40 5 35.7 3 25 4 26.7 5 35.7 2 22.2 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 2 14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Citizens Com 6 20.7 3 30 3 21.4 2 16.7 2 13.3 2 14.3 0 0 
None Above 10 34.5 3 30 6 42.9 5 41.7 7 46.7 4 28.6 5 55.6 
One Above 10 34.5 5 50 4 28.6 5 41.7 5 33.3 7 50 2 22.2 
Two Above 2 6.9 2 20 4 28.6 2 16.7 3 20 3 21.4 2 22.2 
Three/More 1 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Club 21 3 10.3 0 0 2 14.3 2 16.7 0 0 3 21.4 0 0 
Female MPs 0 0 2 20 0 0 0 0 5 33.3 3 21.4 3 33.3 
Public Sector 28 96.6 9 90 11 78.6 12 100 8 53.3 10 71.4 3 33.3 
Age 45  47  46  43.1  43.9  56.4  48.2  
Age Newcom 45  49.2  46.9  43.7  42.7  52.5  42.4  
Mandates 1  1.5  1.4  2.2  1.9  2.9  1.8  
Newcomers 29 100 5 50 10 71.4 3 25 9 60 2 14.3 5 55.6 
Incumbents na na 5 50 3 21.4 7 58.3 4 26.7 9 64.3 4 44.4 
Exp Founder na na 5 50 2 14.3 1 8.3 1 6.7 1 7.1 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 2 14.3 2 16.7 4 26.7 3 21.4 3 33.3 
Core Group 2 na na na na 2 14.3 4 33.3 4 26.7 7 50 3 33.3 
Ethn Minority 7 24.1 0 0 2 14.3 3 25 2 13.3 2 14.3 2 22.2 
Local Soviet 1 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Leader 1 3.4 0 0 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 1 3.4 1 10 2 14.3 0 0 1 6.7 1 7.1 0 0 
Nomenklatura 1 3.4 0 0 1 7.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Party M 15 51.7 3 30 5 35.7 1 8.3 0 0 1 7.1 0 0 
Dissidents 1 3.4 1 10 1 7.1 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 2 6.9 3 30 2 14.3 2 16.7 2 13.3 1 7.1 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  





     
 Annex Table 5.2.6.3. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions in Lithuanian Parliaments 
 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 25 100 14 100 22 100 15 100 17 100 23 95.8 14 100 
Law 6 24 2 14.3 2 9.1 2 13.3 2 11.8 3 13 3 21.4 
HuSocEcon 5 20 2 14.3 4 18.2 3 20 2 11.8 7 30.4 1 7.1 
TechNatMed 15 60 11 78.6 17 77.3 12 80 15 88.2 15 65.2 11 78.6 
PhD 1 4 3 21.4 3 13.6 6 40 6 35.3 5 21.7 4 28.6 
Local Elect 1 4 3 21.4 6 27.3 6 40 7 41.2 8 33.3 8 57.1 
Lead Party 3 12 4 28.6 7 31.8 5 33.3 5 29.4 3 12.5 3 21.4 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 2 9.1 1 6.7 1 5.9 2 8.3 2 14.3 
None Above 21 84 7 50 9 40.9 3 20 5 29.4 13 54.2 3 21.4 
One Above 4 16 7 50 11 50 12 80 11 64.7 9 37.5 9 64.3 
Two Above 0 0 0 0 2 9.1 0 0 1 5.9 2 8.3 2 14.3 
Female MPs 5 20 2 14.3 5 22.7 1 6.7 3 17.6 5 20.8 3 21.4 
Public Sector 24 96 13 92.9 19 86.4 11 73.3 14 82.4 16 66.7 9 64.3 
Age 42.9  49.1  48.7  52.4  54.8  51.8  58.7  
Age Newcom 42.9  50.9  45.4  46.1  51.1  42.4  48.7  
Mandates 1  1.4  1.8  2  2.2  2.3  3.3  
Newcomers 25 100 9 64.3 9 40.9 7 46.7 7 41.2 10 41.7 3 21.4 
Incumbents na na 5 35.7 7 31.8 6 40 7 41.2 10 41.7 10 71.4 
Exp Founder na na 5 35.7 4 18.2 2 13.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 4 18.2 4 26.7 5 29.4 5 21.7 8 57.1 
Core Group 2 na na na na 4 18.2 5 33.3 7 41.2 10 41.7 10 71.4 
Ethn Minority 3 12 2 14.3 1 4.5 2 13.3 0 0 1 4.2 0 0 
Local Soviet 2 8 1 7.1 1 4.5 2 13.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Com Leader 1 4 0 0 1 4.5 1 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.7 1 5.9 0 0 1 7.1 
Supr Soviet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 3 12 1 7.1 2 9.1 3 20 1 5.9 2 8.3 1 7.1 
Com Party M 6 24 1 7.1 3 13.6 3 20 2 11.8 4 16.7 2 14.3 
Dissidents 1 4 4 28.6 2 9.1 3 20 2 11.8 1 4.2 1 7.1 
Repr Parents 4 16 3 21.4 6 27.3 3 20 2 11.8 4 16.7 4 28.6 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  




     
Annex Table 6.1.1. Estonian MPs as Local Politicians 
Parliaments 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 41 95.3 27 96.4 46 100 62 96.9 65 98.5 73 98.6 73 93.6 
Law 6 14.6 3 11.1 3 6.5 4 6.5 8 12.3 9 12.3 14 19.2 
HuSocEcon 11 26.8 14 51.9 15 32.6 20 32.3 28 43.1 39 53.4 42 57.5 
TechNatMed 25 61 12 44.4 32 69.6 40 64.5 30 46.2 25 34.2 21 28.8 
PhD 5 12.2 6 22.2 6 13 14 22.6 6 9.2 8 11 3 4.1 
Lead Party 14 32.6 16 57.1 17 37 15 23.4 8 12.1 10 13.5 15 19.2 
Govern Post 1 2.3 1 3.6 6 13 7 10.9 14 21.2 11 14.9 10 12.8 
Citizens Com 16 37.2 10 35.7 7 15.2 8 12.5 5 7.6 7 9.5 4 5.1 
One Above 20 46.5 6 21.4 22 47.8 39 60.9 42 63.6 48 64.9 52 66.7 
Two Above 15 34.9 17 60.7 17 37 18 28.1 20 30.3 24 32.4 23 29.5 
Three 8 18.6 5 17.9 6 13 7 10.9 4 6.1 2 2.7 3 3.8 
Female MPs 4 9.3 5 17.9 7 15.2 10 15.6 7 10.6 18 24.3 13 16.7 
Teacher Prof 4 9.3 2 7.1 7 15.2 13 20.3 10 15.2 9 12.2 5 6.4 
Journ Writer 1 2.3 3 10.7 2 4.3 4 6.3 5 7.6 5 6.8 3 3.8 
Party Empl 6 14 2 7.1 3 6.5 10 15.6 8 12.1 14 18.9 14 17.9 
Civil Service 9 20.9 10 35.7 15 32.6 18 28.1 24 36.4 24 32.4 35 44.9 
Public Sector 42 97.7 22 78.6 36 78.3 49 76.6 51 77.3 49 66.2 51 65.4 
Military 1 2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clergy 1 2.3 2 7.1 1 2.2 1 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lawyers 1 2.3 2 7.1 1 2.2 2 3.1 2 3 2 2.7 2 2.6 
Judge Prosec 2 4.7 0 0 0 0 1 1.6 1 1.5 1 1.4 1 1.3 
Agri Fisher 3 7 1 3.6 2 4.3 2 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Blue Collar 1 2.3 1 3.6 1 2.2 2 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manage Busi 10 23.3 4 14.3 10 21.7 8 12.5 12 18.2 12 16.2 13 16.7 
Age 46  43.8  50.2  47  47.1  46.7  45.5  
Age Newcom 46  42.1  49.3  45.5  46  43.7  41.3  
Mandates 1  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.7  1.9  
Newcomers 43 100 20 71.4 33 71.7 43 67.2 44 66.7 37 50 31 39.7 
Incumbents na na 8 28.6 8 17.4 19 29.7 20 30.3 31 41.9 35 44.9 
Exp Founder na na 8 28.6 5 10.9 3 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 3 6.5 3 4.7 6 9.1 14 18.9 15 19.2 
Core Group 2 na na na na 3 6.5 5 7.8 7 10.6 15 20.3 17 21.8 
Liberal Jobs 4 9.3 1 3.6 2 4.3 2 3.1 3 4.5 2 2.7 2 2.6 
Ethn Minority 9 20.9 1 3.6 2 4.3 5 7.8 4 6.1 8 10.8 8 10.3 
Local Soviet 22 21 5 17.9 17 37 8 12.5 7 10.6 4 5.4 3 3.8 
Com Leader 7 6.7 0 0 3 6.5 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1 1.3 
Sov Minister 2 4.7 0 0 3 6.5 1 1.6 2 3 0 0 1 1.3 
Supr Soviet 4 9.3 0 0 2 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 18 17.1 1 3.6 16 34.8 20 31.3 18 27.3 10 13.5 10 12.8 
Com Party M 32 30.5 9 32.1 34 73.9 27 42.2 26 39.4 16 21.6 10 12.8 
Dissidents 2 4.7 5 17.9 2 4.3 1 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 5 4.8 2 7.1 6 13 3 4.7 2 3 1 1.4 1 1.3 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 6.1.2. Estonian MPs as Political Party Leaders 
Parliaments 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 26 89.7 40 87 40 93 23 88.5 16 100 18 100 19 95 
Law 4 15.4 8 20 7 17.5 2 8.7 3 18.8 4 22.2 5 26.3 
HuSocEcon 11 42.3 18 45 14 35 9 39.1 8 50 7 38.9 10 52.6 
TechNatMed 14 53.8 16 40 21 52.5 12 52.2 5 31.3 7 38.9 5 26.3 
PhD 11 42.3 14 35 8 20 5 21.7 2 12.5 1 5.6 2 10.5 
Local Elect 14 48.3 16 34.8 17 39.5 15 57.7 8 50 10 55.6 15 75 
Govern Post 2 6.9 3 6.5 8 18.6 5 19.2 7 43.8 5 27.8 5 25 
Citizens Com 16 55.2 20 43.5 14 32.6 10 38.5 1 6.3 1 5.6 0 0 
One Above 5 17.2 12 26.1 12 27.9 3 11.5 3 18.8 4 22.2 3 15 
Two Above 16 55.2 29 63 24 55.8 16 61.5 10 62.5 12 66.7 14 70 
Three/More 8 27.6 5 10.9 6 14 7 26.9 3 18.8 2 11.1 3 15 
Female MPs 2 6.9 6 13 5 11.6 4 15.4 3 18.8 5 27.8 3 15 
Teacher Prof 7 24.1 9 19.6 6 14 6 23.1 3 18.8 3 16.7 2 10 
Journ Writer 3 10.3 6 13 4 9.3 1 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Party Empl 4 13.8 7 15.2 5 11.6 7 26.9 4 25 8 44.4 9 45 
Civil Service 3 10.3 8 17.4 13 30.2 7 26.9 7 43.8 4 22.2 7 35 
Public Sector 28 96.6 32 69.6 34 79.1 20 76.9 13 81.3 12 66.7 14 70 
Clergy 0 0 3 6.5 2 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lawyers 1 3.4 2 4.3 1 2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agri Fisher 3 10.3 2 4.3 2 4.7 1 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Blue Collar 1 3.4 1 2.2 1 2.3 1 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manage Busi 3 10.3 5 10.9 7 16.3 1 3.8 2 12.5 2 11.1 2 10 
Age 47.9  44.6  46.2  46.8  45.5  42.4  42.6  
Age Newcom 47.9  44.2  44.8  35.9  37.8  37.1  35.9  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.7  2.3  2.4  2.3  2.5  
Newcomers 29 100 35 76.1 20 46.5 8 30.8 4 25 7 38.9 8 40 
Incumbents na na 11 23.9 23 53.5 17 65.4 10 62.5 11 61.1 10 50 
Exp Founder na na 11 23.9 8 18.6 5 19.2 1 6.3 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 8 18.6 10 38.5 6 37.5 7 38.9 8 40 
Core Group 2 na na na na 8 18.6 11 42.3 6 37.5 8 44.4 8 40 
Liberal Jobs 4 13.8 2 4.3 2 4.7 2 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ethn Minority 1 3.4 1 2.2 1 2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Soviet 9 31 6 13 8 18.6 3 11.5 2 12.5 0 0 1 5 
Com Leader 5 17.2 1 2.2 1 2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 2 6.9 1 2.2 3 7 2 7.7 2 12.5 0 0 1 5 
Supr Soviet 5 17.2 1 2.2 2 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 13 44.8 6 13 10 23.3 6 23.1 4 25 1 5.6 3 15 
Com Party M 20 69 15 32.6 19 44.2 8 30.8 6 37.5 2 11.1 2 10 
Dissidents 0 0 9 19.6 3 7 3 11.5 1 6.3 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 4 13.8 8 17.4 7 16.3 4 15.4 3 18.8 2 11.1 2 10 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 6.1.3. Estonian MPs as Cabinet Ministers 
Parliaments 1990 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 3 100 5 100 9 100 10 100 23 100 16 100 17 100 
Law 0 0 1 20 2 22.2 1 10 6 26.1 4 25 5 29.4 
HuSocEcon 2 66.7 2 40 2 22.2 4 40 11 47.8 6 37.5 7 41.2 
TechNatMed 1 33.3 1 20 5 55.6 5 50 6 26.1 6 37.5 5 29.4 
Ph.D. 1 33.3 1 20 2 22.2 2 20 3 13 3 18.8 3 17.6 
Local Elect 1 33.3 1 20 6 66.7 7 70 14 60.9 10 62.5 10 58.8 
Lead Party 2 66.7 3 60 8 88.9 5 50 7 30.4 5 31.3 5 29.4 
Citizens Com 1 33.3 1 20 1 11.1 1 10 2 8.7 1 6.3 0 0 
One Above 0 0 1 20 0 0 0 0 4 17.4 2 12.5 5 29.4 
Two Above 2 66.7 3 60 4 44.4 7 70 15 65.2 12 75 9 52.9 
Three/More 1 33.3 1 20 4 44.4 3 30 4 17.4 2 12.5 3 17.6 
Female MPs 0 0 1 20 1 11.1 1 10 4 17.4 2 12.5 3 17.6 
Teacher Prof 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 20 2 8.7 2 12.5 2 11.8 
Civil Servants 3 100 5 100 9 100 7 70 16 69.6 11 68.8 12 70.6 
Public Sector 3 100 5 100 9 100 9 90 19 82.6 13 81.3 14 82.4 
Manager Busi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 4 17.4 1 6.3 1 5.9 
Age 43.3  45  44.6  48  46.6  51.2  49.4  
Age Newcom 43.3  45.8  44  50  43.8  52.7  43  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.3  1.9  1.6  2.3  2.4  
Newcomers 3 100 4 80 7 77.8 4 40 16 69.6 3 18.8 6 35.3 
Incumbents na na 1 20 2 22.2 5 50 6 26.1 12 75 8 47.1 
Exp Founder na na 1 20 1 11.1 1 10 1 4.3 0 0   
Core Group na na na na 1 11.1 2 20 3 13 4 25 7 41.2 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 11.1 2 20 4 17.4 5 31.3 8 47.1 
Liberal Jobs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.3 1 6.3 1 5.9 
Ethn Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.3 1 5.9 
Local Soviet 2 66.7 1 20 4 44.4 4 40 4 17.4 2 12.5 2 11.8 
Com Leader 1 33.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 2 66.7 1 20 3 33.3 2 20 2 8.7 0 0 1 5.9 
Supr Soviet 1 33.3 0 0 1 11.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 3 100 1 20 3 33.3 6 60 5 21.7 4 25 4 23.5 
Com Party M 3 100 3 60 6 66.7 5 50 6 26.1 5 31.3 2 11.8 
Dissidents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 1 33.3 2 40 2 22.2 2 20 2 8.7 1 6.3 1 5.9 
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Annex Table 6.2.1. Latvian MPs as Local Politicians 
 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 37 97.4 13 92.9 13 76.5 35 94.6 27 93.1 44 97.8 37 94.9 
Law 9 24.3 4 30.8 3 23.1 6 17.1 3 11.1 4 9.1 6 16.2 
HuSocEcon 8 21.6 2 15.4 1 7.7 15 42.9 6 22.2 17 38.6 16 43.2 
TechNatMed 22 59.5 8 61.5 9 69.2 16 45.7 22 81.5 27 61.4 21 56.8 
PhD 4 10.8 2 15.4 2 15.4 2 5.7 2 7.4 5 11.4 4 10.8 
Lead Party 2 5.3 1 7.1 3 17.6 10 27 7 24.1 16 35.6 14 35.9 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 2 11.8 7 18.9 4 13.8 7 15.6 5 12.8 
Citizens Com 4 10.5 0 0 1 5.9 1 2.7 1 3.4 0 0 0 0 
One Above 33 86.8 13 92.9 12 70.6 23 62.2 20 69 28 62.2 24 61.5 
Two Above 4 10.5 1 7.1 4 23.5 10 27 6 20.7 12 26.7 11 28.2 
Three/More 1 2.6 0 0 1 5.9 4 10.8 3 10.3 5 11.1 4 10.3 
Club 21 4 10.5 3 21.4 3 17.6 3 8.1 0 0 1 2.2 0 0 
Female MPs 2 5.3 3 21.4 0 0 5 13.5 2 6.9 4 8.9 5 12.8 
Teacher Prof 9 23.7 4 28.6 3 17.6 6 16.2 6 20.7 7 15.6 6 15.4 
Journ Writer 1 2.6 0 0 0 0 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Party Empl 6 15.8 6 42.9 4 23.5 4 10.8 4 13.8 3 6.7 3 7.7 
Civil Service 14 36.8 0 0 1 5.9 10 27 2 6.9 16 35.6 8 20.5 
Public Sector 32 84.2 11 78.6 10 58.8 27 73 17 58.6 31 68.9 22 56.4 
Lawyers 1 2.6 0 0 0 0 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 1 2.6 
Judge Prosec 1 2.6 1 7.1 1 5.9 1 2.7 1 3.4 0 0 0 0 
Agri Fisher 0 0 1 7.1 2 11.8 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manage Busi 3 7.9 0 0 3 17.6 7 18.9 8 27.6 10 22.2 16 41 
Liberal Jobs 2 5.3 2 14.3 2 11.8 3 8.1 5 17.2 6 13.3 3 7.7 
Age 43.3  50.2  44.3  44.7  47  49.9  50.3  
Age Newcom 43.3  50.4  41  44.4  44.8  48.5  49.4  
Mandates 1  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.8  1.6  1.9  
Newcomers 38 100 7 50 13 76.5 27 73 15 51.7 27 60 19 48.7 
Incumbents na na 7 50 4 23.5 7 18.9 12 41.4 16 35.6 18 46.2 
Exp Founder na na 7 50 3 17.6 2 5.4 1 3.4 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 3 17.6 3 8.1 4 13.8 6 13.3 7 17.9 
Core Group 2 na na na na 3 17.6 4 10.8 5 17.2 8 17.8 11 28.2 
Ethn Minority 4 10.5 3 21.4 2 11.8 8 21.6 11 37.9 11 24.4 13 33.3 
Local Soviet 17 44.7 7 50 5 29.4 4 10.8 2 6.9 1 2.2 4 10.3 
Com Leader 2 5.3 1 7.1 3 17.6 1 2.7 2 6.9 2 4.4 1 2.6 
Sov Minister 1 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 2 5.3 2 14.3 2 11.8 1 2.7 1 3.4 1 2.2 0 0 
Nomenklatura 13 34.2 2 14.3 4 23.5 3 8.1 3 10.3 6 13.3 2 5.1 
Com Party M 22 57.9 7 50 7 41.2 8 21.6 6 20.7 5 11.1 2 5.1 
Dissidents 3 7.9 0 0 1 5.9 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 6 15.8 6 42.9 2 11.8 3 8.1 1 3.4 0 0 1 2.6 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 6.2.2. Latvian MPs as Political Party Leaders 
Parliaments 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 26 92.9 14 82.4 16 80 25 89.3 29 93.5 35 94.6 31 88.6 
Law 6 23.1 3 21.4 4 25 5 20 3 10.3 4 11.4 7 22.6 
HuSocEcon 7 26.9 3 21.4 5 31.3 8 32 14 48.3 18 51.4 8 25.8 
TechNatMed 14 53.8 10 71.4 10 62.5 12 48 14 48.3 16 45.7 18 58.1 
PhD 8 30.8 3 21.4 3 18.8 0 0 1 3.4 3 8.6 7 22.6 
Local Elect 2 7.1 1 5.9 3 15 10 35.7 7 22.6 16 43.2 14 40 
Govern Post 1 3.6 2 11.8 3 15 6 21.4 6 19.4 9 24.3 6 17.1 
Citizens Com 5 17.9 3 17.6 5 25 2 7.1 3 9.7 1 2.7 0 0 
One Above 21 75 11 64.7 10 50 14 50 18 58.1 17 45.9 19 54.3 
Two Above 6 21.4 6 35.3 9 45 10 35.7 10 32.3 15 40.5 12 34.3 
Three/More 1 3.6 0 0 1 5 4 14.3 3 9.7 5 13.5 4 11.4 
Club 21 1 3.6 2 11.8 1 5 2 7.1 0 0 2 5.4 1 2.9 
Female MPs 1 3.6 2 11.8 0 0 6 21.4 4 12.9 6 16.2 4 11.4 
Teacher Prof 5 17.9 3 17.6 2 10 1 3.6 2 6.5 2 5.4 7 20 
Journ Writer 3 10.7 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 3.2 2 5.4 3 8.6 
Party Empl 10 35.7 5 29.4 7 35 5 17.9 5 16.1 5 13.5 9 25.7 
Civil Servants 1 3.6 3 17.6 0 0 8 28.6 6 19.4 13 35.1 8 22.9 
Public Sector 18 64.3 12 70.6 10 50 13 46.4 14 45.2 20 54.1 21 60 
Clergy 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 6.5 1 2.7 0 0 
Lawyers 2 7.1 1 5.9 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manage Busi 1 3.6 1 5.9 4 20 8 28.6 9 29 7 18.9 6 17.1 
Liberal Jobs 6 21.4 3 17.6 4 20 3 10.7 4 12.9 5 13.5 0 0 
Age 46.3  46.4  45.9  43.1  46.1  49.9  48.5  
Age Newcom 46.3  41.1  46.7  42  43.2  49.7  44.3  
Mandates 1  1.4  1.6  1.4  1.8  1.9  1.8  
Newcomers 28 100 10 58.8 12 60 21 75 13 41.9 17 45.9 19 54.3 
Incumbents na na 7 41.2 6 30 5 17.9 15 48.4 16 43.2 14 40 
Exp Founder na na 7 41.2 3 15 1 3.6 1 3.2 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 3 15 2 7.1 3 9.7 8 21.6 6 17.1 
Core Group 2 na na na na 3 15 3 10.7 4 12.9 11 29.7 8 22.9 
Ethn Minority 3 10.7 1 5.9 1 5 2 7.1 2 6.5 5 13.5 5 14.3 
Local Soviet 1 3.6 3 17.6 0 0 1 3.6 1 3.2 1 2.7 1 2.9 
Com Leader 2 7.1 2 11.8 4 20 1 3.6 3 9.7 2 5.4 2 5.7 
Sov Minister 2 7.1 2 11.8 1 5 1 3.6 2 6.5 1 2.7 0 0 
Supr Soviet 4 14.3 2 11.8 2 10 0 0 1 3.2 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 5 17.9 3 17.6 5 25 3 10.7 4 12.9 6 16.2 3 8.6 
Com Party M 11 39.3 7 41.2 8 40 2 7.1 4 12.9 4 10.8 3 8.6 
Dissidents 3 10.7 2 11.8 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 4 14.3 5 29.4 2 10 1 3.6 2 6.5 1 2.7 0 0 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  




     
 
Annex Table 6.2.3. Latvian MPs as Cabinet Ministers 
Parliaments 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002 2006 2010 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 2 100 8 100 12 100 13 100 11 100 14 100 12 100 
Law 0 0 0 0 3 25 1 7.7 0 0 3 21.4 4 33.3 
HuSocEcon 1 50 3 37.5 3 25 7 53.8 5 45.5 9 64.3 4 33.3 
TechNatMed 1 50 5 62.5 7 58.3 5 38.5 6 54.5 4 28.6 5 41.7 
PhD 0 0 2 25 2 16.7 0 0 0 0 2 14.3 1 8.3 
Local Elect 0 0 0 0 2 16.7 7 53.8 4 36.4 7 50 5 41.7 
Lead Party 1 50 2 25 3 25 6 46.2 6 54.5 9 64.3 6 50 
Citizens Com 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
One Above 1 50 6 75 8 66.7 4 30.8 4 36.4 3 21.4 5 41.7 
Two Above 1 50 2 25 3 25 5 38.5 4 36.4 6 42.9 3 25 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 1 8.3 4 30.8 3 27.3 5 35.7 4 33.3 
Club 21 0 0 5 62.5 2 16.7 1 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female MPs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 21.4 1 8.3 
Teacher Prof 0 0 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Journ Writer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Party Empl 0 0 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.3 
Civil Service 2 100 7 87.5 7 58.3 9 69.2 7 63.6 11 78.6 10 83.3 
Public Sector 2 100 7 87.5 9 75 10 76.9 8 72.7 12 85.7 10 83.3 
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.7 1 9.1 1 7.1 0 0 
Lawyers 0 0 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agri Fisher 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manage Busi 0 0 1 12.5 1 8.3 2 15.4 3 27.3 2 14.3 1 8.3 
Liberal Jobs 0 0 0 0 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age 49.5  45.4  46.8  46.6  55.2  48.4  48.2  
Age Newcom 49.5  43  45.8  46.7  62.5  46.3  48.5  
Mandates 1  1.3  1.4  1.3  2.1  1.5  1.9  
Newcomers 2 100 6 75 8 66.7 10 76.9 2 18.2 10 71.4 4 33.3 
Incumbents na na 2 25 4 33.3 3 23.1 7 63.6 3 21.4 6 50 
Exp Founder na na 2 25 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 8.3 1 7.7 1 9.1 3 21.4 0 0 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 8.3 1 7.7 2 18.2 3 21.4 3 25 
Ethn Minority 1 50 2 25 2 16.7 2 15.4 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 
Local Soviet 1 50 2 25 0 0 0 0 2 18.2 0 0 0 0 
Com Leader 2 100 2 25 3 25 0 0 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 2 100 3 37.5 2 16.7 2 15.4 2 18.2 1 7.1 0 0 
Supr Soviet 2 100 2 25 2 16.7 1 7.7 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 2 100 3 37.5 6 50 3 23.1 3 27.3 2 14.3 2 16.7 
Com Party M 2 100 7 87.5 7 58.3 1 7.7 1 9.1 1 7.1 1 8.3 
Dissidents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Repr Parents 2 100 2 25 1 8.3 1 7.7 1 9.1 0 0 0 0 
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Annex Table 6.3.1. Lithuanian MPs as Local Politicians 
Parliaments 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 6 100 11 68.8 42 93.3 64 91.4 61 93.8 61 91 72 94.7 
Law 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.6 4 6.6 5 8.2 8 11.1 
HuSocEcon 3 50 1 9.1 13 31 26 40.6 34 55.7 31 50.8 38 52.8 
TechNatMed 3 50 10 90.9 30 71.4 42 65.6 39 63.9 37 60.7 37 51.4 
PhD 0 0 1 9.1 6 14.3 5 7.8 6 9.8 5 8.2 7 9.7 
Lead Party 1 16.7 1 6.3 10 22.2 23 32.9 22 33.8 21 31.3 19 25 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5.7 2 3.1 2 3 4 5.3 
One Above 5 83.3 15 93.8 35 77.8 46 65.7 42 64.6 45 67.2 55 72.4 
Two Above 1 16.7 1 6.3 10 22.2 21 30 22 33.8 22 32.8 20 26.3 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4.3 1 1.5 0 0 1 1.3 
Female MPs 2 33.3 0 0 6 13.3 4 5.7 9 13.8 9 13.4 18 23.7 
Teacher Prof 0 0 0 0 3 6.7 6 8.6 7 10.8 5 7.5 5 6.6 
Journ Writer 0 0 1 6.3 2 4.4 1 1.4 0 0 2 3 1 1.3 
Party Empl 4 66.7 2 12.5 9 20 6 8.6 10 15.4 13 19.4 12 15.8 
Civil Service 1 16.7 4 25 19 42.2 16 22.9 16 24.6 22 32.8 22 28.9 
Public Sector 6 100 13 81.3 36 80 35 70 39 60 41 61.2 45 59.2 
Lawyers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.5 1 1.3 
Agri Fisher 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 1.3 
Manage Busi 0 0 6 37.5 6 13.3 35 50 25 38.5 15 22.4 25 32.9 
Liberal Jobs 1 16.7 3 18.8 6 13.3 6 8.6 7 10.8 7 10.4 7 9.2 
Age 46  48.8  45.5  45.5  48.3  50.2  52.5  
Age Newcom 46  48.1  44.4  44.9  49.0  46.0  48.5  
Mandates 1  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.6  2  2.2  
Newcomers 6 100 15 93.8 39 86.7 59 84.3 33 50.8 25 37.3 34 44.7 
Incumbents na na 1 6.3 6 13.3 10 14.3 27 41.5 37 55.2 34 44.7 
Exp Founder na na 1 6.3 1 2.2 1 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 1 2.2 3 4.3 6 9.2 14 20.9 24 31.6 
Core Group 2 na na na na 1 2.2 3 4.3 8 12.3 19 28.4 30 39.5 
Ethn Minority 2 33.3 1 6.3 1 2.2 7 10 5 7.7 3 4.5 10 13.2 
Local Soviet 6 100 8 50 5 11.1 14 20 15 23.1 8 11.9 12 15.8 
Com Leader 4 66.7 2 12.5 2 4.4 8 11.4 5 7.7 3 4.5 1 1.3 
Sov Minister 0 0 0 0 1 2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 0 0 0 0 2 4.4 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 5 83.3 10 62.5 5 11.1 16 22.9 14 21.5 6 9 8 10.5 
Com Party M 5 83.3 11 68.8 9 20 15 21.4 15 23.1 7 10.4 7 9.2 
Dissidents 0 0 1 6.3 3 6.7 2 2.9 2 3.1 2 3 1 1.3 
Repr Parents 0 0 2 12.5 4 8.9 1 1.4 3 4.6 4 6 5 6.6 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 6.3.2. Lithuanian MPs as Political Party Leaders 
Parliaments 1990 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 17 94.4 31 88.6 33 89.2 46 95.8 35 94.6 36 94.7 34 97.1 
Law 1 5.9 3 9.7 2 6.1 2 4.3 4 11.4 5 13.9 6 17.6 
HuSocEcon 10 58.8 14 45.2 15 45.5 28 60.9 15 42.9 18 50 18 52.9 
TechNatMed 9 52.9 18 58.1 17 51.5 23 50 21 60 17 47.2 16 47.1 
PhD 6 35.3 17 54.8 12 36.4 12 26.1 8 22.9 7 19.4 10 29.4 
Local Elect 1 5.6 1 2.9 10 27 23 47.9 22 59.5 21 55.3 19 54.3 
Govern Post 0 0 0 0 1 2.7 3 6.3 3 8.1 1 2.6 1 2.9 
One Above 17 94.4 34 97.1 26 70.3 25 52.1 13 35.1 17 44.7 17 48.6 
Two Above 1 5.6 1 2.9 11 29.7 20 41.7 23 62.2 21 55.3 17 48.6 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6.3 1 2.7 0 0 1 2.9 
Female MPs 1 5.6 0 0 3 8.1 5 10.4 7 18.9 5 13.2 7 20 
Teacher Prof 4 22.2 11 31.4 8 21.6 11 22.9 6 16.2 7 18.4 7 20 
Journ Writer 1 5.6 2 5.7 2 5.4 2 4.2 0 0 2 5.3 1 2.9 
Party Empl 9 50 13 37.1 12 32.4 7 14.6 9 24.3 12 31.6 10 28.6 
Civil Service 0 0 2 5.7 4 10.8 6 12.5 9 24.3 10 26.3 6 17.1 
Public Sector 16 88.9 28 80 27 73 28 58.3 23 62.2 23 60.5 23 65.7 
Lawyers 0 0 0 0 1 2.7 1 2.1 1 2.7 0 0 1 2.9 
Judge Prosec 0 0 1 2.9 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.9 
Agri Fisher 0 0 1 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Blue Collar 0 0 1 2.9 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manage Busi 1 5.6 0 0 2 5.4 16 33.3 8 21.6 4 10.5 7 20 
Liberal Jobs 3 16.7 4 11.4 6 16.2 4 8.3 4 10.8 3 7.9 2 5.7 
Age 49.6  49.3  49.0  46.9  48.6  48.8  53.8  
Age Newcom 49.6  48.0  44.4  44.2  46.2  44.5  50.5  
Mandates 1  1.3  1.7  1.6  2.0  2.4  2.9  
Newcomers 18 100 25 71.4 14 37.8 32 66.7 14 37.8 13 34.2 6 17.1 
Incumbents na na 10 28.6 21 56.8 13 27.1 19 51.4 21 55.3 20 57.1 
Exp Founder na na 10 28.6 5 13.5 3 6.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 5 13.5 9 18.8 6 16.2 12 31.6 14 40 
Core Group 2 na na na na 5 13.5 9 18.8 9 24.3 17 44.7 20 57.1 
Ethn Minority 4 22.2 3 8.6 2 5.4 4 8.3 2 5.4 2 5.3 4 11.4 
Local Soviet 7 38.9 3 8.6 0 0 1 2.1 4 10.8 2 5.3 3 8.6 
Com Leader 9 50 8 22.9 3 8.1 3 6.3 3 8.1 2 5.3 4 11.4 
Sov Minister 3 16.7 1 2.9 0 0 1 2.1 1 2.7 0 0 1 2.9 
Supr Soviet 6 33.3 4 11.4 1 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 9 50 13 37.1 6 16.2 7 14.6 6 16.2 3 7.9 6 17.1 
Com Party M 10 55.6 13 37.1 6 16.2 8 16.7 6 16.2 3 7.9 6 17.1 
Dissidents 2 11.1 6 17.1 7 18.9 4 8.3 3 8.1 3 7.9 2 5.7 
Repr Parents 1 5.6 3 8.6 4 10.8 4 8.3 2 5.4 3 7.9 4 11.4 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD  
refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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       Annex Table 6.3.3. Lithuanian MPs as Cabinet Ministers 
Parliaments 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Univ Educat 1 100 6 100 6 100 6 100 4 100 5 100 
Law 0 0 1 16.7 0 0 1 16.7 2 50 1 20 
HuSocEcon 1 100 2 33.3 3 50 4 66.7 1 25 2 40 
TechNatMed 0 0 3 50 3 50 2 33.3 1 25 2 40 
PhD 1 100 4 66.7 2 33.3 3 50 2 50 3 60 
Local Elect 0 0 0 0 4 66.7 2 33.3 2 50 4 80 
Lead Party 0 0 1 16.7 3 50 3 50 1 25 1 20 
One Above 1 100 5 83.3 2 33.3 2 33.3 1 25 1 20 
Two Above 0 0 1 16.7 1 16.7 3 50 3 75 3 60 
Three/More 0 0 0 0 3 50 1 16.7 0 0 1 20 
Female MPs 1 100 1 16.7 0 0 1 16.7 1 25 0 0 
Journ Writer 0 0 1 16.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Party Empl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20 
Civil Service 1 100 3 50 2 33.3 2 33.3 1 25 0 0 
Public Sector 1 100 5 83.3 3 50 3 50 2 50 2 40 
Lawyers 0 0 1 16.7 0 0 0 0 1 25 1 20 
Manage Busi 0 0 0 0 3 50 3 50 1 25 2 40 
Liberal Jobs 0 0 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 16.7 1 25 1 20 
Age 53  56  50.2  51.2  53.8  56.6  
Age Newcom 53  55.8  46.5  50  50  52  
Mandates 1  1.2  1.3  1.7  2.5  2.6  
Newcomers 1 100 5 83.3 4 66.7 3 50 1 25 2 40 
Incumbents na na 1 16.7 2 33.3 3 50 3 75 3 60 
Exp Founder na na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Core Group na na na na 0 0 1 16.7 2 50 2 40 
Core Group 2 na na na na 0 0 1 16.7 2 50 2 40 
Ethn Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Local Soviet 0 0 1 16.7 2 33.3 2 33.3 1 25 2 40 
Com Leader 0 0 2 33.3 1 16.7 1 16.7 0 0 0 0 
Sov Minister 0 0 2 33.3 1 16.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Supr Soviet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nomenklatura 0 0 3 50 2 33.3 2 33.3 1 25 2 40 
Com Party M 0 0 3 50 2 33.3 2 33.3 1 25 2 40 
Dissidents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




     
   Annex Table 6.5.1. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1a (in per cent) 







Law Degree  





Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core Group   
Core Group 2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Member 
Dissident  

























































































































Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine 




     
Annex Table 6.5.2. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1b (in per cent) 
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Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core Group   
Core Group 2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Member 
Dissident  

























































































































Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine 
and PhD refer not to all MPs, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees. 
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Annex Table 6.5.3. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1c (in per cent) 
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Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core Group   
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Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
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Communist Party Member 
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Annex Table 6.5.4. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1d (in per cent) 











Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  






Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers  
Liberal Professions  
 






Exp Founders  
Core Group   
Core Group 2   
 
Local Soviet  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Membership 
Dissident  

















































































Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine 




     
Annex Table 6.5.5. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2a (in per cent) 
MPs as Local Politicians  








Law Degree  





Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core Group   
Core Group 2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Member 
Dissident  

























































































































Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine 




     
Annex Table 6.5.6. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2b (in per cent) 
MPs as Local Politicians  
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Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core Group   
Core Group 2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Member 
Dissident  




























































































































     
Annex Table 6.5.7. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2c (in per cent) 
MPs as Political Party Leaders  








Law Degree  





Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core Group   
Core Group 2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Member 
Dissident  




























































































































     
Annex Table 6.5.8. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2d (in per cent) 
MPs as Local Politicians &  












Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  






Blue-Collar Workers  
Businessmen, Managers  
Liberal Professions  
 






Exp Founders  
Core group   
Core group2   
 
Local soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  






















































































     
Annex Table 6.5.9. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2e (in per cent) 
MPs as Political Party Leaders &  












Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Businessmen, Managers  
Liberal Professions  
 






Exp Founders  
Core group   
Core group2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  



















































































Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine 




     
Annex Table 6.5.10. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2f (in per cent) 
MPs as Cabinet Mnisters &  












Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Businessmen, Managers  
Liberal Professions  
 






Exp Founders  
Core group   
Core group2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  













































     
Annex Table 6.5.11. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 3a (in per cent) 
MPs as Local Politicians, 
Political Party Leaders  








Law Degree  





Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core Group   
Core Group 2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership 
Council of Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Member 
Dissident  



























































































































     
Annex Table 6.5.12. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 3b (in per cent) 
MPs as Local Politicians, Party Leaders  






Law Degree  





Ethnic Minority  
 
Teachers, Professors  
Journalists, Writers  
Political Party Employees  




Judges, Prosecutors  
Agriculture  
Blue-Collar Workers  
Managers, Businessmen  
Liberal Professions  
 






Experienced  Founders  
Core group   
Core group2   
 
Local Soviets  
Communist Party Leadership Council of 
Ministers  
Supreme Soviet  
Nomenklatura  
Communist Party Member 
Dissident  









































1 observation only 
Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine 




     
Annex Table 7.1.1. Estonian Legislators with University Education (in per cent) 






Doctorate 9.5 20.7 22.5 
Local Elective Background 56 57.8 59.5 
Leading Party Position 39.3 26.2 25.7 
Cabinet Minister 22.6 11.6 9.3 
Congress of Estonia 16.7 22.4 19.6 
No Political Experience 13.1 16.7 21.9 
One Type of Experience 45.2 50 43.7 
Two Types of Experience 30.0 31 25.7 
Three Types of Experience 5.0 2.4 6.4 
Female Gender 20.2 22.4 9.3 
Teachers, Professors 15.5 19.4 15.8 
Journalists, Writers 2.4 13.3 2.6 
Political Party Employees 11.9 15 10.3 
Civil Servants 36.9 26.5 28.9 
Military 1.2 0 1.9 
Clergy 0 3.4 0 
Lawyers 20.2 0 0 
Judges 4.8 0.3 0.6 
Primary Sector 1.2 0 3.5 
Managers, Businessmen 4.8 12.6 24.4 
Liberal Professions 0 4.4 8.7 
Public Sector 72.6 73.5 83.6 
Age 44.9 46.4 49.3 
Mean Number of Elections 1.63 1.65 1.57 
Newcomers 60.7 58.5 63 
Incumbents 39.7 37.9 37.9 
Exp Founder 8.2 6.4 9.8 
Core Group 1 21 17.8 18.5 
Core Group 2 22.6 21.9 20.8 
Ethnic Minority 8.3 7.1 10 
Soviet Local Politics 16.7 10.9 17 
Soviet Party Leader 2.4 4.4 2.9 
Soviet Minister 0 4.4 1.6 
Soviet Supreme Council 6 4.1 5.8 
Soviet Nomenklatura 27.4 20.1 31.2 
Soviet Communist Party 48.8 31.6 42.8 
Dissident 1.2 6.1 1.9 
Parents Repressed 7.1 8.2 8.0 
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Annex Table 7.1.2. Latvian Legislators with University Education (in per cent) 






Doctorate 16.8 11.6 13.3 
Local Elective Background 34.7 22.3 31.3 
Leading Party Position 31.7 21.6 23.5 
Cabinet Minister 10.9 11 8.3 
Citizens’ Committee 4 5.1 5.3 
No Political Experience 34.7 51.4 48.8 
One Type of Experience 52.5 38 37 
Two Types of Experience 9.9 8.9 11.5 
Three Types of Experience 3 1.4 2.8 
Female Gender 15.8 24.3 5.5 
Teachers, Professors 22.8 24.3 17 
Journalists, Writers 1 14.7 3 
Political Party Employees 9.9 6.8 13.8 
Civil Servants 23.8 25 13.8 
Military 0 0 2.3 
Clergy 0 2.7 0.3 
Lawyers 20.8 0.7 0 
Judges 10.9 1.4 0 
Primary Sector 0 0.3 1.8 
Managers, Businessmen 5.9 15.4 30 
Liberal Professions 2 4.5 16.3 
Public Sector 78.2 71.2 64 
Age 44.1 47.0 47.4 
Mean Number of Elections 1.72 1.54 1.61 
Newcomers 60.4 64.7 65 
Incumbents 44.3 37.3 41.8 
Exp Founder 25.3 7.1 11.8 
Core Group 1 25 18 21.2 
Core Group 2 31.3 19.5 27.4 
Ethnic Minority 16.8 15.4 22.8 
Soviet Local Politics 11.9 2.7 7.5 
Soviet Party Leader 1 5.1 8.8 
Soviet Minister 1 3.8 2 
Soviet Supreme Council 8.9 5.1 5.3 
Soviet Nomenklatura 7.9 16.1 20.3 
Soviet Communist Party 35.6 26 37.8 
Dissident 5 4.5 1.3 
Parents Repressed 17.8 5.5 7.5 
 
 282 
     
Annex Table 7.1.3. Lithuanian MPs with University Education (in per cent) 






Doctorate 17.9 27.2 27.9 
Local Elective Background 21.4 33.6 41.3 
Leading Party Position 27.4 27.2 25.8 
Cabinet Minister 6 3 2.3 
No Political Experience 60.7 48.8 40.6 
One Type of Experience 23.8 39.2 50 
Two Types of Experience 15.5 11.3 9 
Three Types of Experience 0 0.7 0.4 
Female Gender 15.5 23.7 10.2 
Teachers, Professors 22.6 28.1 21 
Journalists, Writers 2.4 8.1 1.9 
Political Party Employees 10.7 15.2 12.5 
Civil Servants 17.9 15.9 16 
Military 0 0 0 
Clergy 0 0.2 0 
Lawyers 21.4 0.5 0 
Judges 16.7 0 0 
Primary Sector 0 0.2 0.6 
Managers, Businessmen 6 25.3 27.3 
Liberal Professions 2.4 5.1 20 
Public Sector 77.4 68.9 72.5 
Age 46.6 48.8 50.1 
Mean Number of Elections 1.64 1.80 1.67 
Newcomers 63.1 56.5 60.4 
Incumbents 38.8 41.3 37 
Exp Founder 9 9.1 7.2 
Core Group 1 22.4 23.6 20.1 
Core Group 2 27.6 26.9 25.4 
Ethnic Minority 8.3 7.4 7.9 
Soviet Local Politics 11.9 13.6 14.8 
Soviet Party Leader 6 13.8 8.5 
Soviet Minister 8.3 2.3 2.7 
Soviet Supreme Council 8.3 4.1 2.5 
Soviet Nomenklatura 23.8 22.4 20.6 
Soviet Communist Party 34.5 27.6 26.9 
Dissident 0 4.8 5.2 
Parents Repressed 4.8 8.8 10 
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Annex Table 8.1. Electoral Volatility in Estonia (per cent), by Political Party Families 
 1990-92 1992-95 1995-99 1999-03 2003-07 2007-11  
Communists 6.7 0 0 0 0 0  
Social Dem. 3.3 6 10.9 10.9 4 8.9  
Greens 4.7 1 0 0 5.9 5.9  
Agrarians 13.3 0 6.9 6 7 0  
Left Liberals 1.6 39.6 28.7 0 1 3  
Right Liberals 1 17.8 6 6 11.9 2  
Conservatives 28.7 15.8 4.9 16.9 15.9 4  
Extreme Right 17.8 17.8 0 0 0 0  
Ethnic Minority 6.7 5.9 0 5.9 0 0  
Other 3.5 7.9 0 0 0 0  
No Party 7.6 0 0 0 0 0  
Liberals 5.7 0 0 0 0 0  
Christian Dem. 5.7 0 0 0 0 0  
Popular Front 1.6 14.9 --- --- --- ---  
SUM 97.9 126.7 57.4 45.7 45.7 23.8 Average 
VOLATILITY 49 63.4 28.7 22.9 22.9 11.9 33.1 
 
 
Annex Table 8.2. Electoral Volatility in Latvia (per cent), by Political Party Families 
 1990-93 1993-95 1995-98 1998-02 2002-06 2006-10  
Communists 21.9 2 5 0 0 0  
Social Dem. 13 7 24 5 2 6  
Agrarians 12 4 16 12 6 4  
Left Liberals 5 13 18 0 0 0  
Conservatives 15 7 33 12 4 8  
Extreme Right 6 24 30 0 0 8  
Ethnic Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Christian Dem. 6 6 8 2 0 0  
Liberals 36 19 4 21 0 0  
Other 5.9 0 0 0 0 0  
Popular Front 65.2 --- --- --- --- ---  
SUM 186 75 138 52 12 26 Average 
VOLATILITY 93 37.5 69 26 6 13 40.8 
 
 
Annex Table 8.3. Electoral Volatility in Lithuania (per cent), by Political Party Families 
 1990-92 1992-96 1996-00 2000-04 2004-08 2008-12  
Communists 4.5 0 0 0 0 0  
Social Dem. 57.4 39.9 16.5 19.8 3.5 8.9  
Agrarians 0 0.7 2.1 4.3 5 1.4  
Left Liberals 0 0 19.9 12.1 7.1 0.7  
Conservatives 0 51.1 44 10.6 14.9 8.9  
Extreme Right 2.8 1.3 0.1 1.4 0 0  
Ethnic Minority 2.8 2.1 0.7 0 0.7 3.7  
Other/Independents 6.4 1.3 1.6 35.5 7.1 4.1  
Liberals 1.4 9.5 14.6 12.7 0 5.6  
Christian Dem. 7.8 4.6 8.1 4.3 0 0  
Popular Front 74.2 21.3 --- --- --- ---  
SUM 157.3 131.8 107.6 100.7 38.3 33.3 Average 
VOLATILITY 78.7 65.9 53.8 50.4 19.2 16.7 47.5 
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    Zusammenfassung 
 
Transformation parlamentarischer Eliten: Rekrutierung und Karrieren 
von Abgeordneten in Estland, Lettland und Litauen, 1990-2012 
 
Die klassischen Elitentheorien (Pareto and Mosca) und die meisten heutigen Arbeiten 
über politische Eliten (Higley und Lengyel 2000; Best und Cotta 2000; Best und 
Higley 2010) verbinden den Wechsel und die Stabilität des politischen Regimes mit 
dem Wechsel vom Personal in den formalen Institutionen der Politik 
(Elitenzirkulation). Nach der Theorie der Konkurrenzdemokratie (Schumpeter 1979; 
Sartori 1987) gelten die politischen Eliten als maßgebliche Akteure in modernen 
Demokratien. Die Literatur unterscheidet zwischen der Elitenzirkulation auf 
individueller Ebene und der strukturellen Zirkulation auf der Ebene der 
sozialen/politischen Profile (Lasswell, Lerner und Rothwell 1952; Keller 1991). 
Während die Zirkulation der sozialen/politischen Profilen immer eine individuelle 
Zirkulation mit sich bringt, trifft das Gegenteil nicht notwendig zu: Die individuelle 
Zirkulation bedingt nicht automatisch eine strukturelle Zirkulation. 
 Die vorliegende Dissertation über die baltischen parlamentarischen Eliten 
untersucht auf der Basis der 21 zwischen 1990 und 2012 gewählten 
Nationalparlamente von Estland, Lettland und Litauen sowohl Prozesse der 
individuellen als auch der strukturellen Elitenzirkulation. Die individuelle 
Elitenzirkulation variiert in den baltischen Staaten in ihrem Ausmaß und ihrer 
Häufigkeit, obgleich sich Art und Weise des Elitenwechsels nicht unterscheiden. Die 
Variation erklärt sich vor allem durch die Volatilität auf der Angebotsseite und die 
Pfad-Abhängigkeit (die Länge des sowjetischen Regimes). Die strukturelle 
Eltenzirkulation lässt in vielerlei Hinsicht eine Transformation der sozialen und 
politischen Profile von Abgeordneten in Estland, Lettland und Litauen erkennen, 
wenngleich einzelne Befunde auf eine Kontinuität (Elitenreproduktion) hindeuten. 
 Die Transformation der politischen Eliten ist im Baltikum durch die Abfolge 
zweier Generationen von Parlamentariern charakterisiert: Auf die Transitionseliten 
während der frühen Demokratisierungsphase in den 1990er Jahren folgten die Post-
Transitionseliten. Diese beiden Abgeordentengenerationen unterscheiden sich nicht 
nur hinsichtich ihrer vorparlamentarischen demokratischen politischen Erfahrung 
(besonders in Bezug auf Positionen in der Lokalpolitik und Führungfunktionen in der 
 285 
     
Partei), sondern auch in ihrem beruflichen Hintergrund (sinkender Anteil von Lehrern 
und Professoren bei gleichzeitig wachsender Präsenz von Managern und 
Geschäftsleuten) und bezüglich des Geschlechts (stärkere Repräsentation von 
Frauen). Parteipolitischen findet die Unterscheidung der beiden Elitengenerationen 
ihren Ausdruck in dem Wettbewerb zwischen den traditionellen Parteien und neuen 
politischen Kräften (mit oftmals anti-elitärer Rhetorik), in deren Fraktionen zum 
Beispiel Manager und Geschäftsleute überproportional vertreten sind.  
 Ungeachtet der fortbestehenden Volatilität der Angebotsseite lassen die Befunde 
Tendenzen einer politischen Professionalisierung der Parlamentarier in Estland, 
Lettland und Litauen erkennen. Die Turnover-Raten sind in jedem der drei Länder 
schon mindestens einmal auf die Werte der etablierten westlichen Demokratien 
gesunken, wenngleich sie auf diesem niedrigen Niveau nicht verblieben. Gestiegen ist 
in den letzten Legislaturperioden zugleich der Anteil erfahrener Abgeordneter (in 
Estland und Lettland auf etwa ein Viertel der Parlamentarier, in Litauen sogar auf 
mehr als vierzig Prozent). Dieser kann als Indikator für eine parlamentarische 
Institutionalisierung im Sinne Polsbys (1968) verstanden werden und erleichtert 
zudem die parlamentarische Sozialisation neuer Repräsentationseliten.  
 Wichtigster Prädiktor für die Dauer der parlamentarischen Karrieren baltischer 
Abgeordneter ist der Wechsel der politischen Partei, was die strategische Funktion des 
party switching unterstreicht und eine Teilerklärung für die volatilen 
Angebotsstrukturen bietet. Einen positiven Einfluss auf die Verbleibsdauer im 
Nationalparlament haben auch eine Mitgliedschaft in Bürgerkomitee und ein 
rechtswissenschaftlicher Universitätsabschluss. Obwohl ethnische Minderheiten 
ebenso wie Frauen in den Parlamenten unterrepräsentiert sind, verfügen die gewählten 
Abgeordneten aus diesen Gruppen über gute Chancen, länger im Parlament zu 
verbleiben. Unter den Berufsgruppen gilt dies in Estland vor allem für 
Lehrer/Professoren, in Lettland für Beamte im gehobenen Verwaltungsdienst und in 
Litauen für Abgeordnete, die zuvor bei Parteien oder Interessengruppen beschäftigt 
waren. Auch Parlamentarier, deren Eltern politische Verfolgung in der sowjetischen 
Zeit erfahren haben, weisen eine überproportionale Mandatsdauer auf, während für 
ehemalige Mitglieder der sowjetischen Nomenklatur zumindest in Lettland und 
Litauen das Gegenteil gilt. 
 Die Dissertation ist die erste vergleichende Längsschnittstudie über die 
parlamentarischen Eliten in allen drei baltischen Ländern. Sie stellt einen wichtigen 
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Beitrag zur Erforschung der baltischen Eliten dar, der auf einem eigenständig 
konstruierten Längsschnittdatensatz mit den beruflichen und politischen Biografien 
sämtlicher Abgeordneter der baltischen Staaten zwischen 1990 und 2012 beruht. Der 
innerbaltische Vergleich und die Einbettung der baltischen Fälle in eine ost- und 
westeuropäische Perspektive geben wichtige Aufschlüsse über Ausmaß und 
Determinanten der strukturellen und individuellen Zirkulation nach Regimewechseln. 
Von den empirischen Befunden wie von der theoretisch fundierten Analyse gehen 
Impulse sowohl für die Eliten- als auch für die Forschung zur osteuropäischen 
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